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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
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PH.D. DISSERTATION

EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN ASIA

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




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ABSTRACT

EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN ASIA

Prepared by Hakan Mehmetcik

March, 2017

Istanbul

The aim of the dissertation is to synthesize, update, and contextualize extended deterrence in Asia and to explore the link between extended deterrence and some of the tensions that might be characterized as security dilemma situation. The main hypothesis argues that one of the driving forces behind the emerging regional security dilemma is the way in which the United States adopts and implements its available extended deterrence means, tools and strategies to address the risks and challenges in the region. The logic behind this hypothesis is that as requirements of the extended deterrence has been changing, the United States constantly tailors its deterrence strategies to counter different types of threats at different levels in different regions with different types of deterrence and defense postures. All of these differences, however, create causal effects on understanding of security requirements for regional countries pushing them into an action reaction cycle of arms race. In this sense, to study the link between extended deterrence and regional security dilemma in Asia, this dissertation first focus on the concept of deterrence, extended deterrence, as well as essence of security dilemmas in Asia over five current tensions. Later, it links these cases and extended deterrence to Japan, South Korea. Cases are studied with a focus case study methodology, in which every case is approached with certain set of questions to figure out both similarities and differences. Main findings of this research are three folds. First, both theory and practice of deterrence has been changing. Second, because of changing dynamics of extended deterrence, the gap between required force postures for deterrence and assurance have been widening and assuring/reassuring allies over some of the lower level conflicts fail due to the nature of extended deterrence in Asia. Third, because of widening gaps between deterrence-assurance/reassurance both allies hedge against uncertainties by increasing their own capabilities, which gives a way to military competition in the region. Therefore, extended deterrence instruments, policies and broader strategies and management of alliance relations play a catalyzing role in growing security dilemma among regional actors.

Key Words: Deterrence Theory, Extended Deterrence, Nuclear/Conventional Deterrence, Regional Security in Asia, Security Dilemma.

ÖZ

ASYA'DA YAYGINLAŞTIRILMIŞ CAYDIRICILIK

Hazırlayan Hakan Mehmetcik,

Mart 2017

İstanbul

Bu tezin amacı Asya'da yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılığı incelemek, analiz etmek ve güncel tartışmalar çerçevesinde değerlendirmek ve Asya'da güvenlik ikilemleri olarak karakterize edilebilecek bazı sorunlar çerçevesinde yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılık ve güvenlik ikilemleri arasındaki ilişkinin araştırılmasıdır. Temel hipotez olarak bölgede yükselen güvenlik ikilemlerinin temel itici unsurlarından birinin Amerika'nın bölgede karşılaştığı risk ve meydan okumalara karşı kendisi için ulaşılabilir olan yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılık araçları, mekanizmaları ve stratejilerini kullanış şekli olduğudur. Bu hipotezin arkasında yatan mantık, yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılık gereklilikleri sürekli değişirken, Amerika'nın farklı düzeylerde, farklı bölgelerde, farklı araç ve stratejilerle caydırıcılık ve savunma unsurlarını kurgulamak zorunda olmasıdır. Fakat bütün bu farklılıklar bölge ülkelerinin savunma ve güvenlik anlayışları üzerinde silahlanma yarışı şeklinde tezahür eden karşılıklı eylem-karşı eylem sarmalı yaratmaktadır. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma Asya'da yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılık ve güvenlik ikilemi arasındaki ilişkiyi çalışmak üzere öncelikle caydırıcılık, yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılık, güvenlik ikilemleri, Asya'da bölgesel güvenliğin temelleri gibi kavram ve olguları ele alacak, daha sonra ise yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılık ve bazı bölgesel sorunlar çerçevesinde ortaya çıkmakta olan güvenlik ikilemleri incelenecektir. Daha sonra Japonya ve Güney Kore için ABD tarafından sağlanan yaygınlaştırmış caydırıcılık olgusu analiz edilecektir. Vaka analizi incelemesi, her bir örneklemin tek bir soru setiyle ele alındığı yoğunlaştırılmış vaka analiz metodu kullanılarak yapılmıştır. Araştırmanın temel bulguları üç yönlüdür. Birincisi hem teorik hem de pratik düzeyde caydırıcılık değişmektedir. Caydırıcılığın dinamiklerinde meydana gelen değişimlerin bir sonucu olarak yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılık ve müttefiklerin caydırıcılığa inancı anlamında güvence/yeniden güvence arasındaki fark genişlemektedir. Son olarakta, caydırıcılık, güvence arasındaki değişen ilişkinin bir sonucu olarak ABD'nin mevcut yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılık stratejisinin bir ürünü olan gelişmiş silahlar/silah sistemleri ve artan müttefik kapasiteleri/katılımları artmaktadır ve bu da hedef ülkelerin caydırıcılığın niyeti anlamında güvence ve karşı güvence arasındaki farkı genişletmektedir. Bundan dolayı yaygınlaştırılmış caydırıcılık araçları, politikaları, müttefik ilişkilerinin yönetilmesi usulleri bölgesel aktörler arası ortaya çıkmakta olan güvenlik ikilemlerinin önemli bir katalizörü olmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Caydırıcılık Teorisi, Yaygınlaştırılmış Caydırıcılık, Nükleer ve Konvansiyonel Caydırıcılık, Asya'da Bölgesel Güvenlik, Güvenlik İkilemi.

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Hakan Mehmetcik

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZ	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
LIST OF TABLES.....	viii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	ix
ABBREVIATIONS	x
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	6
3. EXTENDED DETERRENCE: A CONCEPTUAL MAP	11
3.1 Deterrence Theory: Definitions	13
3.2 Deterrence Theory: Taxonomies.....	16
3.3 Deterrence Theory: Histories	18
3.3.1 Early Roots of the Concept	18
3.3.2 Changing Nature of Extended Deterrence in the Post-Cold Era	20
3.4 Assurance and Reassurance Missions	30
4. SECURITY DILEMMA.....	36
4.1 Essence of Security Order in Asia as a Source of Uncertainty	37
4.1.1 Power Transition Discussion	39
4.1.2 Secondary Powers' Behaviors in Asia	41
4.1.3 Regional Tensions.....	43
4.2 Actors as a Source of Uncertainty.....	48
4.2.1 China	48
4.2.2 America as an Asia-Pacific Power	59
4.2.3 North Korea	64
4.3 Militarization as a Source of Uncertainty	67
4.4 Security Dilemma in Asia.....	74
4.4.1 US-Japan-China Relations and Security Dilemma over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands	76
4.4.2 US-Japan-China Relations and Security Dilemma over Taiwan.....	84
4.4.3 Japan- North-Korea Relations and Security Dilemma over North Korean Nuclear and Missile Programs.....	89
4.4.4 South Korea- North Korea Relations and Security Dilemma over North Korean Nuclear and Missile Program.....	92

4.4.5	Japan South Korea Relations and Security Dilemma over Dokdo/Takeshima Islands.....	100
5.	EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN ASIA.....	103
5.1	Extended Deterrence to Japan.....	107
5.1.1	Overview	107
5.1.2	Normalization of Japan	110
5.1.3	Changing Security Environment for Japan	116
5.1.4	Diverging Priorities and Expectations for the Extended Deterrence	119
5.2	Extended Deterrence to South Korea	127
5.2.1	Overview	127
5.2.2	Divergence in Extended Deterrence Aims and Scope	131
5.2.3	South Korean Response to Divergences in the Question of What and How to Deter?	140
6.	CONCLUSION.....	146
	REFERENCES.....	158

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Defensive-Offensive Deterrence	17
Table 2: General-Immediate Deterrence	17
Table 3: The Nature and Development of Extended Deterrence	21
Table 4: The US Nuclear Arsenal 2015	28
Table 5: The United States Nuclear Modernization	29
Table 6: Extended Deterrence Puzzles and Assurance/Reassurance Missions	32
Table 7: Power Shift Debate	40
Table 8: Some of the Maritime Disputes in Asia	45
Table 9: China's Nuclear Modernization	52
Table 10: Recent Bilateral Agreements	58
Table 11: US Troops Deployment under the Rebalance	62
Table 12: The US Extended Deterrence Commitments in Asia	62
Table 13: Defense Expenditure (\$, Million)	67
Table 14: Military Expenditure, GDP, Arms Transfer, 2004-2014	68
Table 15: Defense Expenditure of GDP (%)	72
Table 16: Arms Acquisition Patterns	72
Table 17: Asia's Rising Naval and Air Power	73
Table 18: Threat Perceptions and Counter Measure	73
Table 19: Security Dilemma and Extended Deterrence in Asia	76
Table 20: Japanese/Chinese assets based near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands	79
Table 21: Taiwan-China Military Power	85
Table 22: The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula	92
Table 23: Selected Public Estimates of North Korea's Plutonium Stockpile and Weapons Arsenal	93
Table 24: Extended Deterrence Differences between Japan and the United States	120
Table 25: The Extended Deterrence Differences between South Korea and the United States	137

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Extended Deterrence as Mechanical Movements of Deterrence, Assurance and Reassurance (Prepared by the Author)	12
Figure 2: New Nuclear Triad	25
Figure 3: Defense Expenditure (\$, Million).....	70
Figure 4: Japan's Defense Expenditure (\$, Million, 2002-2015).....	70
Figure 5: South Korea Defense Spending.....	71
Figure 6: Defense Expenditure Per Capita.....	71
Figure 7: North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities.....	95

ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD: Anti Access Area Denial
ADIZ: Air Defense Identification Zone
AIIB: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ALCM: Air Launched Ballistic Missiles
APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum
ASAT: Anti-Satellite
ASB: Air-Sea Battle
ASBM: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BMD: Ballistic Missile Defense
BMDR: Ballistic Missiles Defense Review
C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Or Nuclear
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CPP: Chinese Communist Party
DMZ: Demilitarized Zone
DoD: Department of Defense
DOJOC: Deterrence Operations Joint Concept
DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone
GLCM: Ground Launched Ballistic Missiles
HLG: High-Level Group
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IMF: International Monetary Found
IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
JMSDF: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
JOC: The Joint Operational Concept
KEDO: Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KPA: Korean Peoples Army
MARV: Maneuverable Re-Entry Vehicle
MIRV: Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MRBM: Multiple Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
MTDP: Medium term Defense Program
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPG: National Defense Program Guidelines
NMD: National Missile Defense system
NPG: Nuclear Planning Group
NPR: Nuclear Posture Review
NPT: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

NSC: National Security Council
NSS: National Security Strategy
NTI: The Nuclear Threat Initiative
NWFZ: Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones
OPLAN: Operations Plan
PGSC: Prompt Global Strike Capability
PLA: People's Liberation Army
PLAAF: People's Republic of China Army Air Force
PLAN: People's Republic of China Army Navy
PRC: People's Republic of China
QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review
RMA: Revolution in Military Affairs
ROK-US SCM: Republic of Korea- United States Security Consultative Meeting
ROK: Republic of Korea
RSCT: Regional Security Complex Theory
SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCC: Security Consultative Council
SDF: Self Defense Forces
SLBM: Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles
SLOC: Sea Lines of Communications
SRBM: Short Range Ballistic Missiles
SSBN: Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missiles
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TLAM/N: Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear
TMCS: Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
TMD: Theater Missile Defense systems
TPP: Trans Pacific Partnership Trade Accord
UN: United Nations
UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
US-Japan EDD: The US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue
US-Korea EDDPC: The United States-Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee
US/ROK CFC: The United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command
USA: United States of America
USFK: United States Forces Korea
USJMST: The US Japan Mutual Security Treaty
WB: World Bank
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO: World Trade Organization

1. INTRODUCTION

Deterrence is one of the most successful theory and practice in influencing foreign policies. However, even at the heat of the Cold War's end, many were doubtful about deterrence's role in the new era. Indeed, Cold War's end radically transformed both practice and theory of deterrence leaving the so-called perfect condition for nuclear deterrence known as 'one size fits all' has gone. Today's deterrence postures require tailored strategies using an amalgam of conventional and nuclear forces as well as active and passive defense/offense tools. Many of these new strategies have number of differences compare to what classical deterrence theory and practice suggests.

Protect another's territory, interests, safety and security by providing deterrence is defined as extended deterrence in the literature. In today's world, extended deterrence is 'an American enterprise' as the United States, only country whose military has a global defense perimeter.(Monteiro,2014, 1) In general, extended deterrence foretells security guarantees usually given in formal alliance agreements. When it comes to Asia, by virtue of its bilateral alliance agreements, the United States is obliged to postulate extended deterrence for its three principal allies, Japan, South Korea and Australia. The case of Australia is, however, kind of idiocentric and has lesser comparison traits for the research question. Other countries like Philippines, Thailand, or Vietnam can be placed under US security umbrellla, yet the United States has not any formal commitment to protect them.(O'Neil,2013) Therefore, the research's focus is limited to Japan and South Korea related cases.

The purpose of this research is to summarize, synthesize, update, and contextualize extended deterrence in Asia over Japan and South Korea and its broader effects on some of the tensions that might be characterized as security dilemma situations. These are issues on Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; Taiwan; North Korean Nuclear and Missile Programs; Korean Japan Relations. After presenting a combination of theoretical and empirical evidences that either support or disqualify security dilemma propositions over these issues, the dissertation analyzes extended deterrence to Japan, and South Korea to explore the link between these phenomena.

Expressively, the point of departure of the research is that the post-Cold War extended deterrence postures (capabilities, deployment patterns, and command and control mechanisms) to deal with new types of deterrence challenges and evolving security structure in Asia accelerate security dilemma types of action-reaction cycles among regional countries. Traditionally, security dilemma in Asia is supposed to occur in the absence of the United States military presence in the region. Therefore, the US role as an outside mediator helps alleviate potential security dilemma spirals. In the current Asian security environment, this traditional role has been changing as both Japan and South Korea pursue military build-ups to overcome increasing vulnerabilities. The main argument here is that the mismatch over expectations, priorities and posture of the extended deterrence drive both Japanese and Korean behaviors within some particular examples where a link between extended deterrence and security dilemma can hypothetically be assumed.

Asia's political and economic weights in the world affairs are increasing as the region passing through an extensive transition. One fifth of the world's population lives in Asia. Asian economies grow continuously and as of 2015, the region accounted 35 percent of total world GDP.¹ All countries are among the most competitive economies in the world. In this sense, Asia is one of the epicenters of world trade and investment as it is now literally accounted 60 percent of global capital inflows. China and Japan in the top six nations in terms of GDP (1st and 3rd respectively) while South Korea (14th) is ranked in the top twenty. All of these countries turn to be the world's most successful source of innovation and R&D. When it comes to security, China, North and South Koreas have their places world's top ten largest armies. According to IISS figures, China and Japan the second and fourth largest defense spenders as the United States comes first.(The Military Balance 2014, 2014) All militaries in the region pursue extensive military modernizations projects as well. China, Japan, South Korea all are in the list of the world's top ten arms importers according to SIPRI figures.² As a result, the region becomes one of the most heavily armed part of the world and has a risk of being host to a major war between great powers as ideological,

¹ See "Gross Domestic Product Ranking, 2013," **World Bank**, last modified 2013, accessed March 29, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1f0wiSm>.

² See "SIPRI Military Expenditures Database," **SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)**, last modified 2013, accessed March 30, 2015, <http://bit.ly/24x3MkG>.

religious, territorial, cultural differences and strong historical antipathies go with arms races.(Dibb ,2005, 3)

In such a vibrant and complex security environment, confronting with nontrivial challenges in geopolitics, challenges stemming from the changes in modern warfare and changes in fiscal environment such as sequestration (mandatory budget cuts), the financial restrains and challenges from political constraints –rising negative public opinions on the role of United States in world affairs, changing political environment at home and harsh critics from outside- the United States has shifted its Cold War large permanent force postures towards an expeditionary force structures supported by allies' contribution under bilateral security agreements and maintaining the ability to defend the United States and its allies from security threats with an amalgam of nuclear, missile defense, and conventional forces. The primary aim of tailoring is to build up a force structure that has both strategic hedge against any other country or group of countries and to have flexibility to act in response to a specific threat from a specific location. Even though, the United States has strengthened its foothold and power in Asia by both increasing its forward deployed capabilities and strengthening its alliance relations, the US presence and role becomes more contested. This is especially true for some of the emerging contexts in Asia. In this sense, the US off-shore type of extended deterrence posture does not serve well for allies' expectations and priorities by providing them an optimal deterrence for their security for these contexts. Since the United States priorities, principles and force postures profoundly shape the entry security structure in the region, a causal link between extended deterrence and security dilemmas over some of these contexts can be assumed and this is the focus of the research.

The overall argument is understudied within large deterrence literature. This might be the fact that there are numbers of variables effecting the outcome and it is an issue in transition. Furthermore, it is hard to operationalize the rationale in a systemic way. At the end of the day, it is a chicken-egg question, where the question is who did what and why rather than who is who. In this sense, to assess such an inquiry, the concepts of assurance and reassurance provide an innovative way of looking different parts of the extended deterrence relations. These three concepts -deterrence, assurance, and reassurance- are often improperly used interchangeably within deterrence related literature. These concepts are, indeed, related to each other but they are neither

synonymous nor inseparable. Assurance is credibility of deterrence in the lens of allies. Other than deterrent effects of the extended deterrence force postures, assurance effect is about getting rid of the belief that the United States may not be willing to or unable to protect them when it is necessary for some of the emerging conflicts in the region.

Therefore, it is more about 'will and resolve' rather than capacity. Reassurance is an approach i) To persuade allies in a crisis situation about the credibility of deterrence; ii) To convince adversaries that military component of extended deterrence is not there to harm them as long as they refrain from aggression. Reassurance' target would be an adversary or allies alike, whereas assurance mission is directed to allies.(Hooper and Brooks ,2013) These concepts are not new to deterrence related discussions, yet their usage is slightly nuanced from the traditional versions. What is important here is that the success of extended deterrence depends equally the success of assurance, reassurance as well as deterrence mission altogether.

The research overall intends to contribute to both understanding and explaining the theory and practice of extended deterrence in Asia. Hereby, the dissertation employs both narrative-based and theory-based approaches and explanations as well as case studies. In this sense, research agenda is a descriptive one. To study the link between extended deterrence and security dilemmas, there are two types of evidences. First one is anecdotal evidences that can be inferred from public statements by national leadership or bureaucratic machineries, national strategic guidance papers and policy statements, defense treaties and security agreements. These are the primary sources of the research. Articles, monographs, books and reports are all used as secondary sources. The other type of evidences are empirical evidences such as figures on defense spendings and militarization patterns that support the assumption that there is an emerging security dilemma in the region.

Methodologically, to study extended deterrence in Asia, an intensive case study is carried out, which is common in deterrence related inquiries.(George and Smoke ,1974, 36) This method requires a focused comparison over a small number of cases.(George and Bennett, 2005) A set of general questions is an essential part of this methodology. This procedure overall allows us to make generalizations by investigating differences and similarities over cases in a systematic manner. To test the link between security dilemmas and extended deterrence and contextualize the discussion, the research looks at i) the role of nuclear extended deterrence in the

security of given state; ii) how and why deterrence priorities and expectations form extended deterrence are changing and changing over what; iii) what are states doing to adapt to the new security environment; iv) which strategy papers, statements and recent occurring show us what and why they are doing; v) what are the arms acquisition patterns and offense/defense balance in the specific contexts; vi) what are the drivers of military build-ups (are military buildups in the region driven by clashing interests?) The first three aims at bridging the link between security dilemma and extended deterrence while last three aims at testing whether there is a security dilemma or not.

The dissertation starts with a literature review where three types of literature are broadly addressed: i) Extended deterrence in Asia related studies; ii) The studies that explains concepts of extended deterrence, assurance, reassurance; iii) Studies that pay particular attention on security dilemma in Asia. After this up to the point literature review, the research consists of three parts dealing with issues related to deterrence theory and practice, concept of security dilemma and security dilemma types of relations in Asia, and extended deterrence in Asia over Japan and South Korean cases. Finally, the research concludes with a conclusion part providing a wrap-up on cases and main findings of the research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Deterrence discussion can be roughly divided into three sub-categories for an overview. The first one is the discussion on the essence of the concept. How does deterrence work or fail? What are the utilities of deterrence? What are the roles of the interrelated concepts such as perception, threats, commitment, and assurances in deterrence mission? What are the borders with other concepts such as compellence, coercive diplomacy? What are the theory's basic assumptions and how do these assumptions of deterrence -rationality, credibility, capability, communication-function in the theory and practice? Second discussion turns around the role of deterrence. What is the role of deterrence in systemic change and continuity? What drives change? For instance, how did the invention of nuclear weapons play a role in the change or how deterrence is affected by the vast systemic changes? Third set of discussions consist of contemporary issues such as deterrence against non-state actors; deterrence in different domains such as cyber, outer space; the dilemma between the role of nuclear weapons; the changing nature of deterrence with the revolutions in military affairs (RMA), conventional deterrence, missile defense systems and rising ballistic missile proliferation, arms control agreements.

The literature on deterrence is huge. A search for “deterrence” on the Google Search Engine, gave 1.860.000 results. Google-Scholar Search Engine came up with 246.000 results. Amazon gave 3.296 links for books. General databases in the Humanities and Social Sciences such as Jstor, EBSCO, WoS conveyed around 4.500 links for books and articles in a modified search (includes just political science subjects). Therefore, providing an in-depth summary of the literature is beyond any single study's achievements. In this sense, the aim here is to provide a framework for the analysis of the hypothesis that there is a link between extended deterrence and security dilemmas in some of the contexts in Asian security. The review dwell more on the two kinds of studies, which deals with either the topic of extended deterrence in Asia or the topic of security dilemmas in Asia. For the former, indeed, few studies pay particular attention to current form of extended deterrence in Asia. For the latter,

yet another classification over two questions can be made: first, is there a security dilemma in Asia in the form of arms race? This is a typical yes-no question and for nay-sayers further analysis is unnecessary. For yea-sayers, the question turns to be whom and what drives it. To the last follow-up question, general answer is that China's rise or North Korean nuclear program drive the security dilemmas in many of the contexts in Asia. However, almost surprisingly very few, to the best of my knowledge, takes the role of extended deterrence as an integrated variable effecting regional countries' behaviors that either hinder or assert security dilemma types of spirals. Here is where this research fits into the vast literature as a unique attempt.

In the literature on extended deterrence in Asia, O'Neil's book, *Asia, the United States and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the Twenty-First Century*, is one of the best and up-to-date elaborations and has many insightful conclusions and recommendations for both scholars and policy makers. O'Neil wittingly analyses the nuclear part of the current extended deterrence and points out that as the new security environment emerges in Asia, the nuclear parts of the extended deterrence becomes more relevant and preserved. The book is, indeed, one of the most important work on the extended deterrence in Asia. As he underlines, it is "the first ever detailed analysis of extended nuclear deterrence in contemporary Asia." (O'Neil, 2013) I do share many of his insights, hypothesis, methods, case selection criteria and I have cited the book here extensively. However, even though he consciously elaborates on many aspects of nuclear extended deterrence in the region, O'Neil's aim is not to investigate the link between the extended deterrence and evolving regional security, but he aims at exploring the role of nuclear weapons in forms of extended deterrence in the region. He, in his article, "*Extended Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia: Redundant or Resurgent?*" keeps this aim and states that nuclear weapons continue to be relevant in the East Asia and discuss whether nuclear extended deterrence becomes redundant in Asia and whether conventional deterrence has become as effective as nuclear deterrence in the eyes of Asian allies.

Richard Tanter and Peter Hayes in their article "*Beyond the Nuclear Umbrella: Re-thinking the Theory and Practice of Nuclear Extended Deterrence in East Asia and the Pacific*" provides overview of the contested traits of the extended deterrence in some of the current contexts. They draw attention to theoretical poverty in the study of extended deterrence as contemporary deterrence theory, which is still limited and

mostly derived from deterrence theory and practice shaped in the Cold War. The main argument of their paper is, however, on how to build a more credible extended deterrence in the Korean peninsula.

On the question of whether there is a security dilemma in Asia (in the form of arms race), on the naysayers' side, the best-known inquiry has been made by Desmond Ball. What he argues that if we compare the old arms races there is no regional arms race, since two principal features characteristic of previous arms races - a very rapid rate of acquisition and some reciprocal/spiral dynamics- were not obviously present in the region's then current military acquisition programs.(Ball ,1993) On the yea-sayers' side, there are several different views, but the most obvious question at this front is that what and who drives it. Moving into this part of the literature, Brooks and Hooper underline conceptual differences between deterrence, assurance at least in definition. Their chapter is dedicated to show us how these complexities (not just in evolving relations, but also in conceptualizations) makes harder to achieve credible and working extended deterrence in Asia. However, they conclude that there are some security types relations and these are mainly driven by Chinese rise, not by the complexities of extended deterrence.(Hooper and Brooks ,2013) Santoro and Warden underline that Northeast Asia becomes one of the contested area where the gab between assurance and deterrence increases in their article titled "*Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age.*" Their aim is to address the requirements of assurance in Northeast region for the extended deterrence to Japan and South Korea. Complying with many other views on this, they suggest that in the post-Cold War, assurance mission in the region becomes harder. Even though the United States has spent pronounced time and energies to strengthen extended deterrence through some initiatives such as joint security consultive meetings, both Japan and South Korea has increasingly doubted about the United States credibility. As Santoro and Warden mention the main problem is not stemming from the capability that is from deterrence part of the extended deterrence equation, yet from the trust in the United States resolve to protect its allies when it is necessary (Santoro and Warden ,2015, 156). Santoro and Warden's article has paid particular attention to assurance problem. In an article, Futter and Zala states that as the United States has been shifting its defense and deterrence posture towards more reliance on conventional weapons, therefore, the US allies is becoming more reliant on traditional nuclear deterrence (Futter and Zala ,2015, 6). As

they suggest the initial problem for the US deterrence strategies is the fact that it should address the controversial problem of dealing with North Korean threats in the short run vis-a-vis dealing with assertive China in the long-run without making allies doubtful about the extended deterrence. Facing with new types of threats, the United States pursues a new types of deterrence relations, which overall staunchly effects strategic stability throughout the region. In a similar direction, Brad Roberts draws our attention to the link between strategic stability and extended deterrence in Northeast Asia. He argues that non-nuclear elements such as conventional forces, ballistic missile defense, and increasing allies' contribution make the regional deterrence architecture stronger. He suggests that "a failure in strategic stability in Northeast Asia" could results new forms of strategic rivalry with an increasing arms race including proliferation of nuclear technology. According to Roberts, similar to Futter and Zara's and Santoro and Warden's suggestions, the fundamental driving forces in the change of security environment of the region are i) North Korean nuclear program, missiles threats, and its bellicose acts; ii) simultaneous developments in China's economic, politic and military muscles.(Roberts, 2013, 5-6-7) These articles are well designed and rich yet, they fall short of presenting a systematic analysis of the escalatory relations between extended deterrence and emerging security environment in the region by pinpointing a causal relationship between the deterrence and assurance/reassurance as well as extended deterrence and security dilemma. Moreover, they see that the focus of changing deterrence strategy is the threats from North Korean nuclear program, and China whereas I see changing deterrence posture is a direct result of changing security environment coupled with technological innovations and financial/political requirements. That is, even if there were no risk stemming from North Korea or China, the United States extended deterrence would be more conventional oriented in the new era.

One of the articles, that make very similar argument with the one I raise here, is that "*China, the Us-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia*" written by Thomas J. Christensen. He argues that the way to reduce security dilemma in East Asia is to have an outside arbiter that can prevent regional actors from destabilizing security. The United States has traditionally played such a role either by positive security guarantees given to allies that they don't need to make destabilizing defense spending as they rely on the US security umbrella or by negative security guarantees

to possible contenders that the United States will not just deter adversaries but also keep in check its own allies. This path has been obvious in particular when it comes to Japan. Christensen's main hypothesis is that the United States traditional arbiter role diminishes, therefore a security dilemma types of relations among regional countries might happen in Asia (Christensen, 1999, 51). In another article, Christensen argues that the United States policies towards China's rise can be characterized in either zero-sum or positive-sum perspectives, both potentially create a security dilemma logic in the region (Christensen, 2006). He also draws attention to the Taiwan issue and how the way US-Japan alliance incorporate in East Asia creates zero-sum thinking in Chinese part regarding with Taiwan, which potentially creates a security dilemma in East Asia (Christensen, 2002). Liff and Ikenberry argues that there is an emerging security dilemma in Asia that is basically driven by the China's rise (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014) whereas Andrew Scobell concludes that security dilemma is not central to Chinese thinking or China's rise is not a source of security dilemma in the region (Scobell, 2012). Therefore, security dilemma in Asia is somehow a question of chicken and egg. Who creates first what depends on where you stand. To Japan, the reason Japan takes action because China gets assertive as it rises. To Chinese, what Japan is heading is not a self-defense, yet very formidable offensive capabilities that makes all regional actors anxious given Japan's war history. The same goes exactly in a similar way for the United States-China dyad. Overall, an action-reaction cycles of tensions and military build-ups intensify in today's Asia. (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014) However, it is both controversial and contested whose actions drive what kinds of reactions on the other side is a difficult question to figure out. Therefore, a study on the link between security dilemma and extended deterrence will be relevant both theory-wise and practice-wise.

3. EXTENDED DETERRENCE: A CONCEPTUAL MAP

Using adjectives as a way to characterize diversified theories, strategies, concepts and phenomena is a common practice among IR scholars. In a similar way, deterrence scholars generally start with a theoretical, broad concept and then employ different adjectives to assign differences to deterrence theory and practice in different contexts. (Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz, 2009, 37) Thus, in the study of deterrence, there are many other names for different strategies such as existential deterrence, collective actor deterrence, recessed deterrence, strategic deterrence, pivotal deterrence, dependent deterrence, tailored deterrence or retired deterrence so on so forth. These are mostly fragments and strategies but not different theories. Extended deterrence is, however, not one of these “adjective attached” deterrence strategies and varieties of strategic coercions. Extended deterrence is a type of deterrence. Therefore, deterrence mission is a manifold part of extended deterrence.

In addition to deterrence mission, we need to look at the concepts of assurance/reassurance for better understanding of the logic behind any extended deterrence situations. In a deterrence mission, where there are hypothetically only two actors, the success is a function of ‘will and capabilities’ and other side’s understanding of these ‘will and capacities’. As a methodological incentive to simplify the model, there is a strong tendency to exclude pawn countries’ preferences from the strategic interactions in the studies of extended deterrence. (Crawford, 2009, 292) However, even though this might be true for Cold War’s bipolar interactions, in today’s extended deterrence relations, pawn countries are important part of the equation. (Kilgour and Zagare, 1994) Not just because they are as effective as the deterree itself, but also in the new era, the most of the security issues play out at the regional level. Thus, the success of deterrence seems to be now even more complex. An effective extended deterrence is dependent on the perception of pawn, capability of pawn, strategic interaction between pawn and deterree as well as perceptual lenses of potential advisories towards these postures. In this sense, an extended deterrence mission, first and foremost, is not just a function of will and capabilities but also perceptual lens of allies in the form of assurances/reassurances as well as perceptual lens of adversaries in the form of reassurance.

Michael Howard popularized these two concepts in his classic 1982 article *“Reassurance and Deterrence”* (Howard, 1982). What Howard underlines is the fact that extended deterrence entails a credibility problem by definition. That is, what we have here is a third-party assurance problem, since pawn country must be convinced that the assurances/reassurances provided by defender is potent enough. Given the close economic, cultural and political bonds between two sides of the Atlantic and the nature of NATO and the tight integration of militaries, all seems plausible enough that the United States would use nuclear options when the Soviet attacked to Europe. However, even this did not stop European leaders ask the question of whether the United States was willing to defend Berlin or Paris at the expense of risking New York, which overall pushed France and UK to build its own nuclear deterrent capabilities. When it comes to Asia, that question is even more plausible and most of the current discussion regarding with the extended deterrence in the region stems from assurance/reassurance missions.




Figure 1: Extended Deterrence as Mechanical Movements of Deterrence, Assurance and Reassurance (Prepared by the Author)

In this sense, it is not possible to have a working and succeeding extended deterrence without having a successful assurance and reassurance missions. Therefore, extended deterrence, as it is shown in the figure above, includes three related but distinct mission: deterrence, assurance and reassurance. These three missions in extended deterrence is akin to clockwork, which is made of many moving parts. Extended deterrence is like mechanical movements of deterrence, assurance and

reassurance, and its success or failure cannot be separated from the success of these three related but distinct missions.

3.1 Deterrence Theory: Definitions

A study concerned with extended deterrence need to understand the conceptual foundations of deterrence through the analysis of the nature and development of deterrence theory. Deterrence is an instrument of policy to dissuade an adversary from pursuing certain courses of action. The word deterrence has its etymological roots in the Latin term for 'terror' (Jervis and Stein, 1989, 4) and starts with the Latin 'deteree' –to frighten from or away.(Freedman, 2004, 27) According to the *International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language*, deterrence means, "to prevent or restrain by fear, difficulty, danger etc. from acting or proceeding". *The Oxford Dictionary* defines the term as "a thing that discourages or is intended to discourage someone from doing something". *American Heritage Dictionary* catalogs deterrence as "to prevent or discourage the occurrence of an action as by means of fear and doubt". It is, thus, obvious from the consistent definition of the term that deterrence is concerned with deliberate attempts to scare off another through threats and is mainly about manipulating another's behavior through fears. Therefore, to deter literally means to stop someone from doing something by frightening him.(Waltz and Art, 1971, 86)

Even though a theory of deterrence (a systematic analysis of deterrence) until early 20th century had never been articulated, the essentials of deterrence are as old as social life itself. As a practice of social affairs, it has been known for centuries. In another words, "deterrence is almost as familiar in everyday life as dust on your shoes".(Morgan ,2006, 77) In this sense, deterrence is one of the very few concepts on which we do not have to have a long lasting conceptual analysis. Contrary to many other concepts in Social Sciences, its meaning has not changed greatly person-to-person or context-to-context.(Knopf, Jeffrey W., 2009, 34) On the other hand, the difficulty of the concept of deterrence starts when it casts itself in practice. Deterrence becomes one of those vague concepts as a practice even though in many instances it is extensively exercised as a major component of human affairs. It is far beyond to challenge all the discrepancies between the theory and the practice of deterrence within a single work. Nevertheless, in terms of having a practical conceptual base, there are

few things to draw attention. First of all, in the context of IR, when we talk about deterrence we simply understand the possibility of use of force by one in order to encourage another not to take (or sometimes to take) a particular action or course of behavior. Thus, on theory, even if rewards are effective, they lie outside the scope of classic deterrence theory.(Jervis, 1979) The second gap within the literature on the concept of deterrence is about the differences between deterrence and other similar concepts such as compellence, and coercive diplomacy. Sperandei wittingly underlines that “Despite decades of research on coercive diplomacy, the linkage between deterrence and compellence still remains unexplored” (Sperandei ,2006). Thomas Schelling was the one who introduced the concept of compellence departing from Singer’s persuasion-dissuasion distinction.³ In his definition, the main difference between compellence and deterrence is that the former aims at alteration whereas later aims at preservation of the advisories’ behavior.(Schelling, 1980, 198) Nonetheless, the distinction between dissuading an adversary from doing something (deterrence) and persuading to undo something already done (compellence) and forcing to do something (coercive diplomacy) is not always clear. In general, coercive actions are:

- i) Deterrence as trying to persuade not to do by using fear of consequences; ii)
- Compellence as trying to recall an action that already initiated; iii) Preventive war as

acting before your opponent act to make sure that your security is guaranteed.⁴ For an illustration of these concepts, take the example of the latest Russian move in Crimea. To prevent Russia from invading Crimea by the threat of use of counter-force would be an example of deterrence, once Russia occupied Crimea, to persuade Russia leave it back to Ukraine would be example of compellence, to attack Russia before its annexation of Crimea would be example of preventive war. All these possible actions are the example of coercive diplomacy. Another problem with deterrence practice is that claims for the success of deterrence must rest on assertions about why something did not happen.(Guertner, Haffa Jr, and Quester,1992) Therefore, it is always hard to

³ Shelling also makes a distinction with compellent and deterrent threats, former punish until the other acts later does if he acts. See (Schelling, 1980, 198).

⁴ Many use unwittingly the concept of preemptive war and preventive war interchangeably. However, these two concepts define totally different situations. Preventive wars are thought of as one state initiating war when it perceives an imminent threat from an adversary. Preemptive wars are fought when one state (the more powerful of a dyad) is declining in power relative to its potential adversary. Fearing the political consequences of the relative shift in the balance of power, the declining state fights a war to prevent the shift in the balance of power. There is not an actual example of preemption in modern history. See, (Trachtenberg, 2007; Reiter, 1995)

measure its effectiveness since it is always hard to prove deterrent successes or failures. Some argues deterrence made the best of a bad job by preventing a total nuclear war.(Freedman, 2004, 47) Some scholars question the role of nuclear deterrence in preventing war,⁵ which turn to be a more potent question with further proliferation of nuclear technology.⁶ Furthermore, the question of how to measure deterrence efficiency leads us to think the double role of deterrence in determining the relationship between states. On the one hand, it is a strategy to prevent war. The initial aim to put a deterrent is always to avoid the possible destruction of wars. On the other hand, its implication is likely to lead destructive war by leading an arm race between adversaries by creating a security dilemma between them. Jack L. Snyder points out the delicate balance between deterrence and security dilemma by explaining the World War I in terms of such a cycle of action and reaction.(Snyder, 1989) The last problem with deterrence stems from rationality assumption, which is largely criticized from two fronts: i) Widespread psychological critique that argues that some political leaders may lack the intelligence or emotional stability to make deterrence work (mainly non-Western circle);⁷ ii) Even within the Western circle it is inadequate even false to assume "rational decision making" since a) there are real world evidence and case studies that show us in many instances decision makers do not make decision in complete rationally; b) organizational critique argues that military organizations are unlikely to fulfill the operational requirements for deterrence since they have their own procedural decision making process and sometimes wrongheaded tendencies such as seeing war as natural.(Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Sagan and Waltz,1995) On this topic, Paul et al. takes our attention to the distinction between instrumental rationality in which actors act based on cost-benefit calculations and value rationality in which actors driven by goals such as ideological and religious objectives.(Crawford, 2009,6-7) This distinction is a Weberian conceptualization, which suggests that an action's

⁵ See argument on morality question of nuclear weapons (Rotblat, 1996; Kegley and Schwab, 1991).

⁶ See for an argument on India and Pakistan Conflict (Kenneth J. Cooper and John Ward Anderson, 1998).

⁷ Arguments maintains that some of today's states, are different than the past one, in terms of risk taking propensity like North Korean leadership, Saddam's Iraq, Kaddafi's Libya or ayatollah's Iran. However, Waltz provide and counter argument that past leaders such as Mao, Stalin were not any different today's Kim Jong II or Saddam Hussein in terms of rationality. If nuclear weapons deterred them there is no reason to believe that it is not going to deter today's rouge states and their leaders. See for a discussion (Sagan and Waltz, 2002).

rationality makes sense when we acquire a completely clear context of the subjective meaning of that particular action.⁸ From this interpretation, Weber draws attention to value rational behavior, in which an opponent has values or perspectives alien to us.⁹ Thus, some authors draw our attention to the problem of ethnocentrism.(Payne, 2011) That is, “the boundaries for procedural rationality and its characteristics are reflections of Western Culture and thought.”(Payne, 2013, 51) Such biased approaches (taking Western standard of logic) on deterrence and rationality are one of the particular discussions in the literature. These states and their leaders seems they are acting not rationally at all by Western Standard of rational thinking. Keith Payne explicitly argues that “the possible variation in perceptions, goals, will, values, and norms may affect expected utility calculations is so great that filling in those values with familiar Western parameters can serve more to mislead than to enlighten.” (Payne, 2013, 54)

3.2 Deterrence Theory: Taxonomies

There are two types of deterrence in the crime and punishment literature – general deterrence that aims to discourage whole society from engaging criminal activities and specific deterrence that aims to discourage specific individual from repeating criminal activities. In the IR literature, there are two categories of deterrence theoretically: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial.(Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz ,2009, 110) This classification is, however, a bit different from the one in the crime and punishment literature and simply based on offensive and defensive strategy divides. Deterrence by punishment is deterrence with unacceptable retaliation while deterrence by denial is deterrence that refrains an offender from taking certain action by utilizing defensive tools. Patrick M. Morgan has introduced another classification of deterrence strategies under two broad categories: general deterrence and immediate deterrence. Morgan’s categorization is very similar to the one that in the crime and punishment literature. General deterrence is a strategy of maintaining broad military

⁸ However, the idea that every human action is “*rational*” within its subjective meaning is a problematic one since we cannot evaluate the rationality clearly. For instance, Ansgar Beckermann argues, “...to be sure effectual and emotional behavior is not just a reaction to certain stimuli. For even in this kind of behavior processes of perception and interpretation play an important role. But that makes it no less inappropriate to qualify such behavior as rational, correct, or the right thing to do under given circumstances. In my opinion, one has to abandon Weber’s overly close connection of rationality and understandability if one is looking for a reasonable result.” (Ansgar Beckerman, 1985, 227).

⁹ See for the examples on the idea that rationality is culture- and context-dependent: Timothy W. Crawford, 2009, 6–8; Walter Slocombe, 1981).

capabilities and issuing broad threats against any attack. In this sense, it is always there. Immediate deterrence is a policy directed to short-term proximate threats.(Morgan, 2003, 9) Paul K. Huth uses different categorization by utilizing the place attacks directed to. In this term, direct deterrence is to avert and stop an armed attack against its territory. In the literature, this is called as “central deterrence, national deterrence, core deterrence etc. Extended deterrence is preventing an attack over a third country – territory, interest, right, etc.-. Therefore, extended deterrence is sometimes called as third party deterrence.(P. K. Huth, 1988) In addition to these typologies, Freedman offers ‘narrow and broad’ deterrence divides, narrow deterrence is about deterrence against a specific type of military operation within a war; while broad deterrence implicates deterring all war.(Freedman, 2004, 32) Following to all different categorizations, the division can be made in deterrence either based on means or based on the type of the situations. Then these two divisions have its own four subdivisions. Thus, deterrence, in any divisions, can be divided into four types. These four types of deterrence have been summarized in *Table 1* and *Table 2* respectively. When we make classification on the means that is in use in providing deterrence we have: i) Central deterrence by denial, ii) Central deterrence by punishment, iii) extended deterrence by denial, and iv) extended deterrence by punishment; or when we have classification on the type of situations in which deterrence is sought: i) direct immediate deterrence, ii) direct general deterrence, iii) extended immediate deterrence, and iv) extended general deterrence.

Table 1: Defensive-Offensive Deterrence

#	Territorial	
	Own Territory	Third Party Territory
Means		
Defensive	Central Deterrence by denial	Extended Deterrence by denial
Offensive	Central Deterrence by punishment	Extended Deterrence by Punishment

Prepared by the Author

Table 2: General-Immediate Deterrence

#	Territorial	
	Own Territory	Third Party Territory
Situation		
General (Broad)	Central Deterrence	Central Extended Deterrence
Immediate (Narrow)	Immediate Deterrence	Immediate Extended Deterrence

Prepared by the Author

Thus, extended deterrence is the deterrence that aims at protecting a third party. Extended deterrence is, then, a concept that refers a state seeks to extend/ expand

deterrence capability beyond homeland to deter attacks against another country.(Anderson, Larsen, and Holdorf ,2013, xi) Thus, the concept of extended deterrence is based on territorial classification of deterrence. The weapon systems, capacity, credibility under the two conception of deterrence is quite different from each other even though these two concepts stay under the same theoretical boundaries. Extended deterrence theory merges assumptions and propositions about different actors, their views about the situation from different angles. Crawford calls it “a concatenated theory.”(Crawford ,2009, 279). In this sense, involving more actors, more capabilities, different expectations and incentives, extended deterrence is more complex than central deterrence whereas actor pursue to defend its own homeland against one particular adversary.

3.3 Deterrence Theory: Histories

3.3.1 Early Roots of the Concept

As every theory is a child of its time, deterrence theory is shaped by its age. However, alterations occur in the character of the concept (the way of putting deterrence in place with different materials) not in the nature (the core (essence) and basic assumptions); the former changes over time, contributing to the rise of other practices or types while the latter remains constant over time and space. The essence of deterrence is based on three broad assumptions; credible capacity, actor’s rationality and secure information between actors to transcend threat and rewards to each other. The classic deterrence theory rests upon these clear and very few assumptions.

Although deterrence theory and practice is the product of 20th century, deterrence has been around at least since the Roman general Vegetius declared, “If you want peace, prepare for war.”(Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz ,2009, 34) Indeed, deterrence became a popular phrase during the Cold War in which victory would cost nearly as much as defeat. Therefore, it is in the nuclear sphere that much of the research has taken place in terms of the theory and practice of deterrence.(Morgan ,2003, 1) According to Robert Jervis, the development of deterrence theory in the Cold War era can be divided into three waves.(Jervis ,1979) The first wave appeared after WW II and had relatively little impact on the development of the theory and yet, one of the most important aspects of the first wave is that nuclear weapons became the central tipping point on the theory. The atomic bombs that ended WW II and the bipolar world

led the arrival of classic deterrence theory as the Cold War made stable deterrence necessary, and nuclear weapons made it possible.(George and Smoke, 1974, 20) The academic debate began with an effort to make sense of the superpower relationship after the invention of the bomb. Nonetheless, very few academics tried to evaluate the effects of the bomb on international relations at that time since scholarly community was not well engaged with national security. The second wave of deterrence theory appeared in the late 1950s as the Soviets also built their own atomic bomb in 1949 and more sophisticated hydrogen bomb in 1954. With Sputnik on the space in 1957, which made the United States vulnerable to the Soviet's nuclear weapons, the confrontation of two superpowers turned into something very different episode in the world history. Confronted with a mutual assured destruction (MAD), superpowers plunged into a nuclear arms race. Given the fierce competition, new strategies had evolved within deterrence theory.¹⁰ The second wave of deterrence theory had broadened the study of the concept little bit by employing game theories, hypothesis testing, studying of historical records etc. There was a substantial weight given to rational theory within study on deterrence theory at the time, which overall was a product of behavioral turn in IR studies. Robert Jervis identified the beginning of the third wave in the development of deterrence theory by the early 1970s. On the political front, second strike capability and MAD was still in play, yet policy makers were willing to search for alternatives as the threat of massive retaliation undermined the credibility for the confrontation in the periphery. Flexible response was born out of this need for a wider set of much more selective targeting. Thus, deterrence during this period underwent a clear transition from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial strategies. In a similar direction, on theoretical front, there was a great diversification in theories and models being used within the third wave by applying both empirical analysis and case studies.(Flax, 1985) Within the third wave, many scholars challenged deterrence theory on cognitive and psychological basis for the first time giving ways for greater interdisciplinary studies on the concept.(Freedman, 2003, 220) For instance, in 1971, Yehezkel Dror in his book was departing from the fact that sometimes conflicting sides might not be able to perform a cost benefit analysis that make deterrence work.(Dror ,1980) Allison's and Zelikow's book was a showcase that the role of organization routines and bureaucratic politics plays an important role in decision making process,

¹⁰ See for some discussion in this direction (William W. Kaufmann, 1956; Kissinger, 1957; Brodie, 1961; Wohlstetter, 1959, Snyder, 1975).

which overall challenges the finding of rational decision making.(G. T. Allison and Zelikow, 1999) George and Smoke's influential book is another example that presents the deterrence failures during Cold War due to many non-rational attributions.(George and Smoke, 1974) Finally Jervis and Lebow take attention to cognitive psychology in an effort to show that how leaders behave irrationally time to times.(Jervis and Stein, 1989) It is a matter of fact that rational deductive theories, such as perfect competitive market, are highly productive.¹¹ In a similar fashion, deterrence theory has certain core assumptions, which are constructive to generalize: rationality, credible capability and perfect communication. Today we have witnessed a revival in the literature as a fourth wave. As a response to developments such as 9/11, slow-motion nuclear proliferations, missile proliferations, increasing conventional capabilities boosted by the advancement in the command and control mechanisms, the fourth wave of deterrence has gained momentum in the early 2000s. However, the fourth wave dwell more on developing strategies rather than theoretical thinking.(Knopf, 2010) Lupovici states that in the emerging literature theoretical and empirical questions are isolated from each other as interests has shifted from theoretical thinking to practical use of deterrence to deter new types of threats -such as terrorism, rouge states, and ethnic conflicts.(Lupovici, 2010) This made theory of deterrence still dependent on Cold-War thinking, while practice tends to inclined towards new realities. Therefore, widening gap between theory and practice is one of the most important aspects of the new era.

3.3.2 Changing Nature of Extended Deterrence in the Post-Cold Era

Today's extended deterrence has certain differences at both theoretical and practical levels. During the Cold War, when we talk about deterrence, we did usually talk about the extended deterrence in Europe provided by the United States. Today, Europe as a stabilized region is no more in the geographical focus of the United States deterrence missions. In the post- Cold War era, the extended deterrence strategic focus has shifted towards Asia. Secondly, during the Cold War, the target and objectives of

¹¹ According to Jervis and Stein, theories of IR and foreign policy differ from economics since the latter deals with large n cases, which make more prone predictions. Therefore, linking an analogy from an economic theory is not proper one. See (Jervis and Stein, 1989). However, IR scholars use constantly theories of economics in any way and even many times these attempts produce very valuable results. One of the best examples of this type IR theory is, Kenneth Waltz' Theory of International Relations. See (Waltz, 1979).

deterrence was very clear: The Soviet Union and deterring its ambitions over Europe. The relationship between two sides was absolutely conflictual and deterrence was at the top of the foreign policy alternatives. Today, there is no clear enemy to the United States, there are potential adversaries but the relationship between any pair of states is not absolutely conflictual. Furthermore, the very nature of the international system is not bipolar anymore. During the Cold War era, attention was given to immediate deterrence since severe conflict between two conflicting poles created a sense of prolong crisis situation. The end of the Cold War restrained incentives for immediate deterrence making general deterrence thoughts direct security planning by and large.(Morgan, 2003, 3) Thus, this shift from the immediate to general deterrence allows nuclear weapons to recede into the background of great power politics.

Table 3: The Nature and Development of Extended Deterrence

#	I. Age	II. Age
Period	1945 – late 1980s	End of the Cold War (1990s) up to now
Types of Rivalry and relations	A bipolar, long-term competition between two superpowers (Monocular Rivalry)	Unipolar at the Systemic Level (Binocular Rivalry) Multipolar at the Regional Level Regional peer competitors, near-term and emerging threats new type of threats (Binocular Rivalry)
Means	Nuclear Large inventories of strategic nuclear weapons	Nuclear + Conventional Varied inventories of nuclear arsenals and varied advanced conventional capabilities including missiles defense to sophisticated threats
Geography	Europe- Single objective	Multi Regional-Multi dimensional
System of Assurances	Alliance	Alliance + Bilateral
System of Reassurance	Arms Control and Reductions Dialogs and Agreements	Bilateral talks and second track diplomacy
Type of deterrence	Immediate extended deterrence by punishment	General Deterrence by punishment at strategic level Extended immediate deterrence by denial + punishment at regional level

Adapted from Colin S. Gray, *The Second Nuclear Age* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1999); Paul Bracken, "The Second Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 146–156; Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (University Press of Kentucky, 1996); Robert P. Haffa Jr, Ravi R. Hichkad, and Dana J. Johnson, "Deterrence and Defense in 'The Second Nuclear Age,'" *Northrop Grumman Analysis Center*, Mar (2009).

Again, during the Cold War, the target of the US extended deterrence had a clear opponent, the Soviet Union, which was represented a massive, powerful and

extensive military adversary to the USA and its allies and their interests that created an unbearable zero sum situation for the other parties as well. In the post-Cold War era, the relations between US and Russia in particular and among other great powers have turned to be more cooperative reflecting a win-win situations since the removal of Cold War era thinking and rhetoric led more constructive relations between states no matter which types of regime they have. Thus, there is no direct enemy of the USA in the globe any more. There are potential rivals, but no potentially matching adversaries to the USA. The USA continued to represent the primary security broker for states across the globe, with significant conventional and nuclear forces deployed abroad, yet its military presence today is smaller than it has ever been (Shanker and Cooper, 2014) and financial burden force a collective security and deterrence posture.

Furthermore, we have witnessed relatively small proliferation of nuclear weapons with regional conflict driven regional powers as well as few small states such as North Korea, Pakistan, Israel and possibly Iran. In this sense, this time there is a huge question mark on the success of nuclear deterrence for these types of “risk prone” states and leaders.¹² As Tanter and Hayes pointed countries with relatively small nuclear are concerned with neighbors and they use nuclear deterrence in the form of immediate deterrence assets to avoid hot conflicts. So, on the global level of deterrence, immediate deterrence shifted to general deterrence formation whereas at the regional level, deterrence requirements are still based on immediate deterrence strategies. There are ten nuclear weapons have states, around five latent nuclear powers, and all have different strategic culture and security and threat perceptions.(Tanter and Hayes, 2011, 21)¹³

Moreover, in the new era, many of the emerging challenges are regional, rather than global. In the new era, the United States extended deterrence aims at (sub)regions

¹² Morgan notes that “It is not new. Britain worried about trying to deter an irrational (German) government in the 1930s Analysis of the problem of deterring “crazy states” appeared years ago. What about the utility of deterrence in these circumstances? Can the United States, or other actors, readily deter states with “irrational” leaders or moved by irrational forces?” See (Morgan, 2003, 274; Sagan and Waltz, 2002)

¹³ Virtual or latent proliferation should have been considered as a new phenomenon as well. In this sense, virtual arsenal has two meaning. First of all, as a latent proliferation, meaning that the growing available civilian nuclear materials could enable states to assemble nuclear weapons and rapidly deploy them. Secondly, virtual proliferation and virtual arsenals are the capacity of the knowledge and experience needed to design, assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. In this second usage, virtual arsenal is seen as a means of pursuing disarmament and nuclear free world by convincing already nuclear weapon have states move from actual possession of the bomb to viral possession of it. See (Cohen and Pilat, 1998; Cohen and Frankel, 1990; Mazarr, 1997).

such as Korean Peninsula, Far East Asia, Eastern Europe and Baltics in Europe. That is, the geography of the extended deterrence in the new era is multi regional. However, deterrence has been long studied as if there is no other level of analysis in the study of deterrence other than systemic level. Therefore, study of deterrence at regional level is still ad hoc and underdeveloped. Patrick Morgan is the one who offered first distinction between global and regional deterrence without further elaborating on the notion. (Morgan, 2003, 257) The relevance of regional level has grown even much before the end of the Cold War as global regions enjoying more autonomy and involvement.¹⁴ At the systemic level, new types of great power relations have emerged, in which nuclear weapons kept as a secondary instrument. At the regional level, we have deterrence among great powers including the United States, deterrence among great powers and regional powers (peer or near peer competitors), deterrence among states other than great powers, deterrence among states and non-state actors. However, every region has its own attributions for the management of deterrence. This makes necessary to tailor deterrence posture and strategies according to characteristics of the regional contexts. Regionalization of defense and deterrence thinking and needs for tailoring in deterrence strategies and postures is a fact that is recognized by the official US strategy papers. For instance, 2010 Ballistic Missiles Defense Review (BMDR) states that “The United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach within each region that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including their scale, the scope and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment.” (Department Of Defense: Ballistic Missiles Defense Review, 2010) Therefore, today’s deterrence requires constant tailoring according to strategic environment that is encountered.¹⁵

Over the years, extended deterrence in general has changed fundamentally in two important ways. First, the role of the nuclear weapons in the United States (extended) deterrence posture diminished as opposed to increasing conventional forces with the advancement of military hard and soft-wares even though the need for nuclear extended deterrence has increased, especially for allies’ part. Second, basic parameters

¹⁴ Taking regions as a level of study in the security studies is a contemporary and important phenomenon. See for example (Buzan and Weaver, 2003; Lake and Morgan, 1997; Katzenstein, 2005; Lemke, 2002).

¹⁵ According to O’Hanlon, the management of deterrence on the level of global security is hybrid one, since the US has established many alliances, multi and bilateral arrangements, institutions and norms to rule the global security collectively. See (O’Hanlon, 1992, 13).

of (extended) deterrence such as actors, risks, policies, as well as domains and methods has changed. The role of nuclear weapons is important to better understand the changing nature of extended deterrence and widening gap between assurance/reassurance and deterrence missions. In April 2009, in a speech he delivered in Prague, Obama argued that “Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up.”(Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered, 2009). After declaring nuclear weapons is “the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War”, President Obama referred that in the long-term, he would seek a nuclear free world by completing new arms reduction treaty with Russia and by seeking more realistic nonproliferation policy. He has also promised to follow a nuclear zero goal yet conceding that it would be unlikely in his lifetime. Today, even though, at least on the administrative rhetoric, nuclear forces remain critical, nuclear forces are playing increasingly narrow role within US overall deterrence strategy. Indeed, nuclear weapons are increasingly believed to be neither fully useful to deter regional risk-taking states in possession of limited nuclear arsenals all alone nor fully relevant to today’s security environment. For instance, Colin Gray underlines that the over-reliance on nuclear force inflicts dangers to cope with the contemporary era.(Bracken, 2000) Policy makers largely share this view too. 2003 dated White House Press release, for example, states that “The contemporary and emerging missile threat from hostile states is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War and requires a different approach to deterrence and new tools for defense. The strategic logic of the past may not apply to these new threats, and we cannot be wholly dependent on our nuclear capability to deter them.”(National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense, 2003) In this sense, with the RMA, and advancement of air and ballistic missile technology, the offense –defense balance has shifted in favor to defensive strategies as doctrinal and operational aspects of nuclear deterrence become more contested and complex in the new era.(Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz ,2009, 315) Thus, in the new era, a mix of denial and punishment strategies offsets nuclear deterrence practice and thinking. Accordingly, the United States has long been trying to revise tools available to strategize deterrence.

The United States continues to rely on its nuclear deterrence capability to deter nuclear attack. What is new is the increasing role of conventional defensive and strike

capabilities and assets in deterrence/extended deterrence posture. With new types of actors, such as terrorist groups and international criminals, the nuclear weapons have limited leverage and today's conventional forces can sustain what nuclear forces can do. This makes more tailored case specific deterrence strategy a necessity that employs every available source of influence and weaponry. Building several ballistic missile defense systems, stationing special forces into strategic points, sustaining rapid deployable forces on land, air, sea as well as building capacities on emerging domains such as cyberspace and outer space are among tailoring strategies of the deterrence in the post-Cold War era. The high-tech conventional weapons that showed how effective they can be during the first Gulf War and Obama administration's employment of new generation of weapons such as drones downgraded the role of nuclear forces a step further by highlighting the role of more advanced, small highly flexible conventional forces in dealing with new types of threats. This Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and advancement in critical technology such as missile defense pushed nuclear option as a substitute to conventional forces in American thinking of deterrence and defense.

In this sense, the nuclear triad has changed in the post-Cold War era. Old triad appears as only one edge of the new triad, which includes active and passive defenses as well as responsive infrastructures. Following Figure provides an illustration of these new emerging triad.




Figure 2: New Nuclear Triad¹⁶

The US Cold War nuclear posture developed on the concept of nuclear triad, which includes submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and strategic bombers. During Cold War, deterrence was

¹⁶ Retrieved from <http://1.usa.gov/1VJHQkO>.

largely dependent on the survivability of these three legs of capabilities. On the one hand this triad reduced the possibility that an enemy could destroy all US nuclear forces in a single strike, even in a surprise attack.(Lieber and Press, 2006) On the other hand, it gave policy makers and military officers wide range of options for a number of potential scenarios. In the post-Cold War era, the first leg of the new triad covers all traditional capabilities of the old triad. The second leg of the new triad points the importance of active and passive defense forces. Passive defenses are used to reduce the effects of damage initiated by a adverse action. Active defense measures refer to the use of partial offensive fighting and counter-attacks to refute entrance into a disputed area.(McDonough, 2006, 51) This is today better known as anti-access area denial (A2/AD). Ballistic missile defense in the new security environment as a new growing component of the United States deterrence is one of the most important passive defense posture. This posture becomes more important especially against small inventory nuclear powers such as North Korea.(Soesanto, 2014) The last leg of the triad is the ‘Responsive Infrastructure’ that allows for flexibility in countering new and emerging threats over various time periods thus enabling political leaders to adapt operationally deployed forces to suit the severity or urgency of evolving crises.(C. M. Graham ,2010, 83) The US bases and military personals abroad are particular assets to this end. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) puts it as “This capability provides a rapid and effective hedge against technical challenges with another leg of the triad, as well as geopolitical uncertainties.”(Department Of Defense: Nuclear Posture Review 2010, 2010, 24)

There are three fundamental documentation titles to evaluate post-Cold War US nuclear strategy and nuclear posture. The first one is *The Nuclear Posture Reviews* (NPR). NPRs are significant to evaluate the reviews of policy, force structure, operations, doctrine, arms control and safety and security and the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy. Department of Defense state that “the NPR is a legislatively-mandated review that establishes U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities and force posture for the next five to ten years.” In the post-Cold War environment, first NPR in kind goes back to 1994, and second issued in 2002, and the last one is dated 2010. The second type of documents is the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR). According to Department of Defense “QDR is a legislatively-mandated review of Department of Defense strategy and priorities. The QDR will set

a long-term course for Department of Defense (DOD) as it assesses the threats and challenges that the nation faces and re-balances DOD's strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats.” (Department of Defense: Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, iii). The 1996 QDR was the first review that issued after the dissolution of Soviet Union. Later the document was updated in 1997, 2006, 2009 and 2013. The most recent QDR was issued in 2014. The last documents title in revealing the United States strategies in the post-Cold War era is *the Ballistic Missile Defense Review*, (BMDR), which is issued for the first time in 2010. NPR, BMDR, and QDR reflect the current US desire to increase reliance on non-nuclear means while reducing the role of nuclear weapons to provide deterrence and assurance. Thus, a close examination of these documents reveals the new triad of US nuclear posture has emerged.

To promote Obama’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of nuclear free world, five central objectives of the latest NPR report: i) nuclear proliferation with a special focus on nuclear terrorism; ii) Down grading nuclear weapons role in the future contingencies planning; iii) Preventing strategic stability at the systemic level among nuclear powers; iv) Consolidation of deterrence at the regional level by strengthening allies v) Maintaining a secure and potent nuclear arsenal. NPR states that overall “threat of global nuclear war has become remote yet the risk of nuclear attack has increased” due to new terrorism. Religious extremists such as Al Qaeda seeking WMD are described as the gravest threat to the United States. Second growing threat perception in the NPR is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular to the attempts of North Korea and Iran. NPR states that there is an amplified danger of proliferation of dangerous technologies with a cooperation of state and non-state actors. NPR stress the importance of the strategic stability with existing nuclear powers, most notably Russia and China. However, NPR underlines the changing charter of US - Russian relations by stating, “Russia and US are no longer adversaries.” China is not mentioned as an adversary either yet NPR raises the question of Chinese nuclear modernization project and its ambitions.(H. Kristensen, 2013) NPR also stresses the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era, and underlines the presidential commitments towards the nuclear free world. However, it clearly set forward that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces, which will continue to play an essential role

in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners around the world.” In terms of the role of the nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era, the NPR clearly underlines that “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”(Department Of Defense: Nuclear Posture Review 2010, 2010, 17) However, NPR does not leave out nuclear options against states that have nuclear arms and states that not fulfill non-proliferation obligations under NPT.

Kristensen and Norris acknowledge that the United States will maintain significant nuclear arsenal and will not completely rely on non- nuclear strike options as an substitute for nuclear deterrence. (H. M. Kristensen and Norris, 2015a) The US nuclare arsenal has been listed in table below. Even though it is the lowest level of nuclear arsenal in American nuclear history since 1960s, the United States possess one of the largest and the most advanced nuclear arsenal and delivery system on earth.

Table 4: The US Nuclear Arsenal 2015

Type/Designation	Deployed
ICBMs	
MK-12A	200
MK-21/SERV	250
SLBMS	
UGM-133A Trident II D5	288
MK-4	168
MK-4A	600
MK—5	384
Bombers	
B-52H Starorfortress	200
B-2A Sprit	100
Nonstrategic Forces	
B-61-3, -4 Bombs	180
Total Deployed: 2,080	
Reserve: 2,680	
Total Stockpile: 4,760	
Awaiting Dismantlement: 2,340	
Total Inventory: 7,100	
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles	
SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles	
Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71, no. 2 (March 1, 2015): 107–119.	

Even though nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers are maintained with a substantial reduction, it is right to claim that the US has shifted its extended deterrence strategy towards more conventional arsenals and its force posture towards more stationary and off-shore forces. In the current nuclear posture, the United States

has no tactical nuclear weapons deployment in Japan or in Korea. B-2 and B-52H rotational deployments to Guam are partly nuclear extended deterrence mission. For the last 25 years, the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles, Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N) were the central assets on which nuclear extended deterrence built-up. Lewis underlines that “TLAM-N is the only unique, tactical nuclear weapon system that demonstrates the commitment of the United States to the security of Japan and South Korea.”(Lewis, Jeffrey ,2009) Yet these assets have been retired on the technical incapability(H. M. Kristensen ,2013) even though there were criticisms from Japan and South Korean officials.(H. M. Kristensen ,2009) According to the United States assessment, TLAM/N could be substitute by the forward deployment of heavy bombers and dual capable fighters as well as by ISBMs and SLBMs.(Tow and Stuart, 2014, 79). New B61-12 guided standoff bombs, new nuclear capable Joint Strike Air Craft F-35A, new air-launched cruise missile that known as long-range standoff weapons (LRSO) are part of the new US nuclear posture.

Table 5: The United States Nuclear Modernization

Existing Weapons	New or Modernized Weapons	Status
Strategic Land		
Minuteman III ICBM	GBSD: Modified or new solid-fuel ICBM with MIRV	Under development, deployment from 2015
W87/W78 Warheads	IW-1 interoperable warhead based on W78 and W88	Under development: production in 2030-40
Strategic Sea		
Ohio SSBN	SSBNX: 16 SLMBs each	Under development: 12 Boats planned; First patrol in 2031
Trident II D5 SLBM	Trident IID5LE: life-extended version of current SLBM with new guidance system	Deployment from 2017 on US and UK SSBNs
W76/Mk-4 Warhead	W76-1/MK-4A: warhead and reentry body	Production underway (completion in 2019): being deployed on US and UK SSBNs
W88/MK5 Warhead	W88-1/MK-5A: reentry body with new arming, fuzzing & firing units	Under development, production in 2020-2024
Strategic Air		
B-2A Bomber	B-2A bomber: new aviation suite and bomb bay	Being upgraded
B-52H bomber	LRS-B: Long range, penetrating bomber	Under development; 80-100 planned from 2025
ALCM	LRSO: long range, enhanced land-attack ALCM	Under development, production in 2026-2031
B61-7/11 Bombs	B61-12; guided standoff strategic and tactical gravity bomb	Under development, production of 480 in 2020-24
Tactical		
F-15E Fighter Bomber		
F-16 Fighter Bomber	F-35A Stealthy fighter bomber	Under development, deliver from 2015

B61-3/4/10 bombs	B61-12 guided standoff strategic and tactical gravity bomb	Same as above
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ALCM: Air Launched Ballistic Missiles
GLCM: Ground Launched Ballistic Missiles
IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
MIRV: Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
SSBN: Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missiles
SLBM: Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles
SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missiles

Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Slowing Nuclear Weapon Reductions and Endless Nuclear Weapon Modernizations: A Challenge to the NPT,” **Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists** 70, no. 4 (July 1, 2014): 94–107.

NPR also explicitly stresses that the United States deterrence commitments increasingly rely on non-nuclear elements including conventional presence and ballistic missile defense systems. NPR underlines that given the shifts in the strategic environment, the United States response to deter non-nuclear attacks would be limited to conventional only. In this sense, the post-Cold War deterrence strengthens the non-nuclear capabilities such as rapidly deployable conventional forces and effective missile defenses. Missile defense makes sense in terms of US homeland security purpose as well as advances in missile technology and its proliferation are underway.

3.4 Assurance and Reassurance Missions

There are numbers of puzzles within extended deterrence practice. For example, one of the phenomenon related with extended deterrence is moral hazard. The moral hazard problem is introduced in the deterrence literature by George and Smoke and it basically means that a weak ally could take risky actions that would not be taken without security commitments of stronger ally. That is a security commitment could potentially make an ally more risk prone.(George and Smoke ,1974, 370) Snyder and Diesing put it more explicitly: “the issuing of [deterrent] threats or the underlining of alliance commitments may make the ally more confident or dangerously intransigent.”(Glenn Herald Snyder and Diesing, 1977, 436) This causes a situation known as the fear of entrapment for deterrence provider.(Glenn H. Snyder, 1984) James Fearon voiced it within a context by arguing that the “problem of moral hazard in alliances and extended deterrence” could help to explain why defenders “shy away from absolute commitment” when the costly signals logic of credibility would instruct them to do otherwise.(Fearon, 1997) In a similar way, in any extended deterrence

relations, there are concerns about decoupling or stability-instability paradox. Decoupling means that some extended deterrence commitments become less worthy to risk a conflict over times. Stability instability paradox means that as countries possess dangerous technologies and nuclear weapons, instability increases at lower level conflicts since these capabilities would make them more risk prone. Decoupling creates fear of abandonment on the allies' side and stability-instability paradox creates fear of entrapment on the deterrence provider's side. For instance, two fundamental driving forces in the change of security environment in Asia are: i) North Korean nuclear program, missiles threats; ii) Rise of China's economic, politic and military muscles. Both of these developments raise concerns about decoupling and stability-instability paradox. Here decoupling is a situation where the United States might not be willing to take the risk of being nuclear strike target to defend an ally. Both North Korean and Chinese emerging nuclear capabilities put the United States homeland at nuclear risk over unwanted conflicts. Stability-instability paradox is a situation where that both China and North Korea could turn into assertive players at the conventional level due to nuclear deterrence they newly build. Again, both North Korean and Chinese increasing confidence in their strategic deterrence of nuclear weapons has made them more aggressive at the conventional level. According to Roberts, both North Korean and Chinese threats and decoupling and stability-instability paradox have been increasing a security deficit in the region, in particular for Japan.(Roberts ,2013) We can add this the fact that both American reluctance (due to decoupling/fear of entrapment) or commitment (due to stability-instability paradox/moral hazards) could encourage escalation of lower level conflicts.(Ayson and Ball ,2014a) Another complication is the rise of the audience cost. Deterrence speaks for different audiences.(Freedman ,2004, 47) It speaks for pawn countries, for adversaries as well as for defender itself. When it comes to extended deterrence in Asia, audiences cost generally works against the United States, since the United States is the party that has more domestic political constrain compare to other regional countries such as China and Russia. Not just convincing the world that American has the "will and capacity" to deter aggression, any US administration has to repeatedly assure Americans that what is at stake is indeed American vital interest. In this sense, for instance, the discussion is not just whether the United States is willing to carry the burden of war for protecting of some uninhabited islands but how it will sell it at home.(Sanger ,2014)

Table 6: Extended Deterrence Puzzles and Assurance/Reassurance Missions

#	Deterree/Pawn	Defender	Challenger
Fear of	Abandonment	Entrapment	Containment
Danger	Decoupling	Moral Hazard	Stability-Instability Paradox
Complication	Audience Cost	Audience Cost	Audience Cost
Matter of Credibility	Assurance/Reassurance	Deterrence	Reassurance
Prepared by the Aauthor			

All of these perceptual variables that are summarized above are related to perceptual lenses of extended deterrence parties (deterrence provider, pawn and adversary) and all are about assurance and reassurance missions. Therefore, we need to look at the concepts of assurance/reassurance for better understanding of the logic behind an extended deterrence situation. In this sense, assurance and reassurance missions are part of extended deterrence and includes actors' perceptions, fears, and complications. Yet, these concepts are vaguely used in the literature. These concepts are, indeed, related to each other but they are not identical. Assurance is an approach aimed at allies to persuade them on the credibility of the extended deterrence. Reassurance, on the other hand, is a strategy to i) convince allies about the credibility of deterrence in a crisis situation; ii) to convince adversaries that military component of extended deterrence is not there to harm them as long as they refrain from aggression. Thus, reassurance is an assurance strategy that is given to convince allies as well as adversaries. When it comes to reassurance to adversaries, it can be positive or negative forms. In positive form, it aims at assuring the adversaries that as long as it do not attack countries under protection, deterrence posture has nothing to do with anything else. (Hooper and Brooks, 2013, 267) The aim of the reassurance in positive form is to prevent a possible action reaction cycle of insecurity. A negative form of reassurance is about to remind "the would-be attacker" that deterrer is going to provide protection for the pawn in any conditions. For instance, the Korean War arguably had started because both North Korean leader Kim II- Sung and Stalin believed that the

United States would not be willing to defend Korea.(Gaddis ,2005, 99) Thus, deterrence had failed in this particular example because negative form of reassurance had failed. Therefore, assurances given to allies and reassurances given to adversaries are not mere alternative or supplement to extended deterrence but a part of deterrence and they are critical parts that manifest success or failure in deterrence.(Crawford, 2009, 289)

We can classify assurance challenges within four general titles. The first one is the doubts about the United States political will to protect allies. This can be called fear of abandonment as well. That is, the question of whether the United States would risk New York to protect Tokyo or Seoul. The second one is the questions of appropriate military capabilities to address today's threats. While many supports US's efforts to reduce global nuclear arsenals through arms control and arms reduction treaties, they do not favor of seeing the United States replace its nuclear force posture with conventional systems.(Anderson, Larsen, and Holdorf, 2013, 75) In this sense, as O'Neil also suggest, allies do not see conventional weapons as a substitute for nuclear forces.(O'Neil, 2013) The third assurance challenge is the question of how much is enough to deter and how much is enough to assure. This is the perpetual credibility problem of extended deterrence in allies' eyes. As former British defense secretary Denis Healey pointed out it takes always more to assure allies than what it takes deter adversaries. The last one is the fact that allies always tend to resist to any changes in extended deterrence strategies. Indeed, many of US allies rely solely on US extended deterrence for their national security and any change in the United States extended deterrence strategies immensely effects allies' foreign and defense policy.(Anderson, Larsen, and Holdorf, 2013, 79)

We have to acknowledge the changing face of the extended deterrence in the post-Cold War era. Even though extended deterrence remains an integral part of the United States strategy, its focus, its aims and its scope has changed as both assurance of allies and reassurance of adversaries in Asia becomes more complex and more difficult than the Cold-War era politics. When it comes to Asia, extended deterrence credibility requires threats of retaliation, yet the United States stakes in lower level provocations are not high enough to retaliate on the behalf of its allies. One of the important domain where lower level conflicts increase over the times is maritime and territorial border issues. The question of whether the United States would risk a war,

let alone a nuclear confrontation, to defend allies contested sovereignty claims over uninhabited islands is difficult one.

According to Santoro and Warden, the United States has been trying to escape from facing an assurance crisis by increasing consultations and dialog in which they try to convince allies that nuclear weapons are still part of the extended deterrence through the combination of US strategic forward deployed forces. In a parallel attempt, the United States also has prevented restricting its nuclear policy option. Here is the main drawback is the fact that the United States has had no formal consultation channels similar to what it has under NATO with its allies in East Asia to discuss nuclear policy. To fill the gap, the United States-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) and US-Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) were established in 2010. As Santoro and Warden underline these efforts of institutionalization of extended deterrence by enfranchising matters to allies greatly enhanced the credibility of the United States extended deterrence.(Santoro and Warden, 2015) They also suggest that Obama administration has equally acknowledged and succeed in that assurance is a function of sound and well eco-politic relationships. To enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence by deepening politic and economic relations through increasing economic, political, diplomatic, cultural and military channels, Obama administration has taken many steps since 2008. However, even though the Obama administration has made great efforts to strengthen the believe in its deterrence in the region, both Japan and South Korea has increasingly doubted about the United States extended deterrence due to the doctrinal and strategic changes that have been taken place. First reason is that in the new security environment, extended deterrence is needed more to deal with lower level issues, where the United States increasingly wants its allies deal with issues on their own. Santoro and Warden states that as threats are increasing at the lower level where the current form of extended deterrence has little to offer or unbinding, assuring allies will be harder.(Santoro and Warden, 2015)

Indeed, the United States position to lower level conflicts affects allied perceptions of the United States extended deterrence. On the one hand, the United States appears to give political commitments at rhetorical level by addressing issues and reiterating US extended deterrence guarantees. For instance, Obama publicly state that the United States extended deterrence covers contested islands of Japan,(Aoki

,2014) or reassure South Korea every time the North tests its missiles, rockets or nuclear weapons.(Steinberg, 1995) In addition, the United States has increased both allies' capabilities and joint capabilities for intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission to countering lower level conflicts as well as forging better trilateral relations (the United States-Korea-and Japan) in this areas. Yet, fearing to be entrapped in an escalating conflict on lower level provocations, the United States remains reluctant giving binding commitment. Therefore, in terms of today's extended deterrence mission in Asia, the main problem is not stemming from the capability of deterrent assets. Indeed, against China, Japan has air and naval superiority whereas South Korea has conventional military superiority over the North. Given the United States superiority, including nuclear domain there should have been no problem of deterrence. The problem is resolve (will) and perceptual lenses of this resolve as assurance/reassurance. That is, the believe in the United States resolve to protect its allies when it comes to lower level conflicts.

4. SECURITY DILEMMA

A security dilemma indicates a state of affairs where a state feels threatened from other states actions and to make itself more secure it builds up arms and alliances. Thereby, the other states interpret this reciprocal act as threatening and they follow the same path to make themselves more secure. Thus, enhancing security by one brings mutual insecurity for all. This cycle of action reaction is the simplest definition of the phenomenon that is known as security dilemma. John Herz had introduced the concept into the IR jargon by pointing out that the main logic behind the dilemma is the anarchic nature of international relations.(Herz ,1950) Herbert Butterfield also describes the situation by pointing the human nature as the main reason.(Butterfield, 1951, 19–21) Independent from the driving reason, the point is here that states are drawn into conflict over security concerns, even though none of them actually desire a conflict let alone war. Yet the anarchic nature of the international relations, or mere human nature, put actors into a position where security seekers cannot be sure about other's intentions and assume the worst case and this assumption drives them into spirals of competitive/conflictual behaviors. In this sense, security dilemma is a byproduct of anarchic, uncertain and divisive security environment. Therefore, a security dilemma situation emerges where trust among actors is difficult to maintain due to historical and cultural enmity and animosities and one actor's action ferments a military competition and arms races.

Tang more rigorously defines a security dilemma having some major aspects:

- i) The anarchic nature of international politics is one of the most important factor that derives countries security dilemma types of actions;
- ii) Anarchy creates uncertainties on each other's intentions, uncertainties create fears
- iii) Most of the security dilemma types of situations are unintentional
- iv) Due to uncertainties and fears, states opt for power accumulations
- v) Even though states opt for power acquisition as a means of defense, this creates counter actions;
- vi) Thus, this self-reinforcing dynamics lead to worsening of relationships and arms races;
- vii) The dynamics of the security dilemma tends to be self-defeating as it represents more power but less security;
- viii) The result could be tragic such as unnecessary or avoidable wars.(Tang ,2009)

The four casual factors are anarchy, uncertainty, fear and eventual accumulation of power. The others are material and psychological regulators: misperceptions, cultural and historical

enmity, animosities. Casual factors lead security dilemma whereas the severity of the security dilemma can be regulated by both material factors and psychological factors. According to this conceptualization anarchy generates uncertainty; uncertainty leads to fear in the absence of pacifying institutions; fear then leads to power accumulation and eventual power accumulation; power contest triggers security dilemma.(Tang ,2009) In the absence of pacifying institutions (EU and NATO in European example) or actors (the US traditional role in Asia) security dilemma can easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

4.1 Essence of Security Order in Asia as a Source of Uncertainty

On theoretical front, there are numbers of different theoretical explanations or alternative models for characterizing the Asian regional order/system. In a book edited by Ikenberry and Mastanduno, contributors offer a number of alternatives: hegemonic stability theory, balance of power theory, liberal institutionalism, constructivist theory, normative socialization theory, identity theory, economic interdependence theory, and hierarchical stability theory.(Ikenberry and Mastanduno ,2003) In another major study, Alagappa and Mustanduno identifies three formations of regional order: liberal-hegemony, balance of power, and normative-contractual conceptions.(Muthiah Alagappa and Mustanduno ,2002b) Shambaugh identified seven distinct alternative models: hegemonic system, major power rivalry, American-centric system of alliance, concert of powers, balance of power, normative community building, and complex interdependence.(D. L. Shambaugh ,2005) Aaron Friedberg argues that Asia's future is Europe's past, that is, great power rivalry will prevail.(Friedberg ,1993) In contrast, David Kang argues that Asia is not going to follow Europe's past, since Asia is very distinct from Europe.(Kang ,2003) Indeed, all of these different approaches, or models, theories contribute to our understanding of the contemporary Asian order. Yet, none is sufficient alone to define it.

In international relations, order means a rule-based interaction among units.(Bull ,1995; Hall ,1996; Kissinger ,2014) When it comes to Asia, Asian order historically was led and organized by the United States military and economic activities. However, as China rising, Asian order is increasingly marked by two conflictual hierarchies: the United States dominates security realms while the China takes over economic center stage.(Ikenberry, 2016) Trade becomes one of the most

important assets for Asian nations since 1980s when trade liberalizations started. With wide range of production networks, construction of regional division of labor, integrated markets, close geographic proximity, growing labor force, and spectacular size of intraregional trade patterns, Asia is far more interdependent than most of the other regions. Thus, economic imperatives over peace and stability is high in Asia. In addition, some specific norms and rules, especially non-interference and sovereignty, are dear to many Asian countries in constructing their nation states. However, institutions (ASEAN, SAARC, SCO, ARF, and APEC) are weak by design. So called 'ASEAN way', informal second track diplomacy,(Acharya, 2009) proved to be effective tool in managing disputes in some areas yet it is has limited capacity in maintaining peace and stability.

In such environment, the US role is neither uncontroversial nor the United States itself willing to be manager of all security affairs in Asia. Indeed, the United States, with its preponderant power capability, not just plays crucial role in almost every issue in the region but also provides invaluable public goods.(Alagappa, 2002, 93) In this sense, America provides security as 'oxygen' for the developments and prosperity in the region.(Nye,1995) But, it has its own limitations. Despite its vast power projection capability, the United States cannot manage Asian affairs without cooperation with Asian major powers. Therefore, the United States has kept security environment from deteriorating yet has failed to create enduring solutions to regional problems. As the US traditional role in management of the order in Asia diminishes and there are many pressing conflicts, irredentist territorial claims, aggrieved nationalisms, high altitude military modernizations and proliferations of dangerous technologies and with growing economies arming antagonized states side by side, Asian states' behavior towards the regional security are now too often shaped by realpolitik. Power politics has, indeed, been a distinct feature of Asian order in the post-Cold War era. The effects of the Cold War's end in Asia had multi casual effects on regional security. First, it has triggered a strategic uncertainty due to the future of the United States presence in the region. The United States has been scaling down of its commitment, which has accelerated in the last decade as the United States has faced numbers of domestic and international challenges from financial crisis at home to daunting wars abroad. America is not alone in decline; its close allies and stakeholders in liberal international order, core European countries and Japan in particular, are

declining as well.(Ikenberry, 2011) Nevertheless, after at least three decades of steady growth, Asian countries has kept growing economically and politically. China is the forerunner of this trend. Secondly, the power vacuums created by post-Cold War uncertainties and US decline, regional countries expanding economy of scales all have created some degree of arms race between regional states. The proliferation of dangerous technologies such as missiles, precision guided munitions, nuclear and chemical weapons, and high tech military equipment are the most dangerous aspects of this trend. In this sense, ‘self-help’ is a new synecdoche in many capitals against American retreat. In this sense, there are three broad indications that the essence of security order in Asia feeds uncertainties and mutual suspicions. First, the anecdotal and empirical evidences of power transition; second the way secondary powers behave against the power transition; third the sources of the regional tensions. These are the sources of uncertainty and fears in the region.

4.1.1 Power Transition Discussion

The most supportive indication of the evolving security order in Asia as a source of uncertainty is the power transition discussion.¹⁷ On theoretical front, power transition theorists link transition and the probability of war and argue that hegemonic war often occurs when rising power starts challenging the status-quo.(Gilpin, 1983) For instance, Graham Allison notes that 11 of 15 cases in which a rising power had rivaled a ruling power over the last 500 years, the result was war.(G. Allison, 2013) Therefore, at least on theory, peaceful power transition is not prospected in Asia.(Chan, 2007, 23). With the end of the Cold War, Asia experiences a degree of power transition over the last decades. Matter of fact that power transition discussion in East Asian contexts is about the claims that China is rising whereas the United States and Japan decline. The most supportive indicators of these claims are economic: China’s GDP, trade, investment, foreign currency reserves are all growing, while United States and Japan are both undergoing a mixture of economic and financial restrains, grave difficulties of aging populations and administrative inefficiencies. As a result of growing economic might, China is able to increase its material capacities with a rate much higher than what Japan or the United States is able to do.

¹⁷ For a comprehensive review of power transition theory see (DiCicco and Levy, 1999).

Table 7: Power Shift Debate

Power Shift is Real	Power Shift is Hyped
China grows, the US-Japan Declines	China's growth stop, the US-Japan sustain their hedge
<p>Outcomes</p> <p>1. The USA might has to withdraw some or all of its military presence from East Asia¹⁸</p> <p>Scenario 1: Increased tensions, arms race, security dilemma: Since the USA plays a crucial role in containing China's expansion, North Korean nuclear threats, and Japanese remilitarization, without it the region will be in tensioned arms races and security dilemma.¹⁹</p> <p>Scenario 2: A new order: Probably a Chinese led order emerges and China led East Asian order would be peaceful.²⁰</p> <p>2. The USA stay with Hard Nose:</p> <p>Scenario 1: China may directly challenge the US-led order and conflict becomes inevitable as power transition theorist suggest,²¹</p> <p>Scenario 2: China might attempt to modify the US-led order without directly challenging it.²²</p> <p>3. The USA stays with soft nose: the USA decided to stay with positive engagement by increasing political investment in bilateral and multilateral relations</p> <p>Scenario 1: China could continue to integrate into this progressively institutionalized order or China could be socialized into regional security community (logics of interdependence and mutual gain Works).²³</p>	<p>Outcomes</p> <p>Chinese economic growth might stop due to a combination of political, financial, demographic, ethnic, and environmental factors or the USA and Japan can successfully sustain their hedge against China leaving power shift a hyped or overblown argument.²⁴ This basically led status quo continue.</p>
Prepared by the Author	

Within power transition debate, everyone agrees neither on the outcome of it, nor it is a case. The table above briefs the debate. However, the power transition discussion is important for at least three reasons. First, the question of 'what kind of great power China will be' must be answered (D. Shambaugh, 2011, 7) as a reading of power transition in contemporary Asia, suggests that conflict between the United States and China is plausible. (Kugler, 2006) Charles Glaser argues that security dilemma also becomes more potent where states are more revisionist and greedy. Thus, there could be two types of security dilemma: Type I: Traditional security dilemma where rivals are both suspicious about their intentions yet both are status quo power; Type II: a security dilemma dynamics are those in which one or more states seek

¹⁸ See: (Betts, 1993; Roy, 1994; Ikenberry, 2004; Samuels, 2011; White, 2013).

¹⁹ See: (Ikenberry, 2004; Shambaugh, 2005; Berger, 2000; Christensen, 2006; Goh, 2008; Friedberg, 1993).

²⁰ See: (Kang, 2010; Kang, 2003).

²¹ See: (Mearsheimer, 2014; Layne, 2008).

²² See: (Pempel, 2010; Schweller and Pu, 2011; Chan, 2013; Acharya, 2014; Breslin, 2009).

²³ See: (Qin and Wei, 2008; Bijian, 2005).

²⁴ See: (Chan, 2007; Chan, 2005; Shirk, 2008; Beckley, 2012; Cox, 2011).

changes to the status quo in a fundamentally zero-sum manner.(Glaser ,1992) China could be a revisionist power (or put it as risk taker) willing to face the costs and alter the status quo or China could be a status quo power willing to operate within existing order that is basically created by the United States.(Schweller and Pu ,2011) Secondly, what kind of response the United States will assume against China's rise. In the new era, the United States would have to share power and responsibilities with China, and many other states as it dictated by the changes in the international system. In this sense, the status quo in Asia cannot be sustained as China has determination to change the Asian order substantially in its favor, and much then depends on how America and the other allies respond. Therefore, the discussion has potential to shape and reshape the understanding of security in Asia, thereby, feeds the uncertainty that enforce a security dilemma driven by insecurity and uncertainty about other's intentions. Yet, one of the most important question here is that the question of how secondary power behave in a power transition. In general, Asian states has been conveying military, socio-political and economic responses to declining US and rising China at different level. Yet, what secondary powers do and do not are important causal factor in understanding the dynamics in Asia.

4.1.2 Secondary Powers' Behaviors in Asia

On this, in the literature, there are numbers of state acts form appeasement or transcending to engagement and hiding or from bandwagoning to balancing or buck-passing. Yet, three of these policy options for the secondary powers have been mostly theorized.²⁵ First one is power-balancing strategy.(Walt, 1990, 28) As it is known, there are two kinds of balancing act. A secondary state that faced with a great power either engage with the great powers through internal balancing by building up arms and capacities or through external balancing by making counter alliances. These balancing acts could be in hard or soft forms of balancing, where balancing differs only in degree not in kind. Balancing, hard balancing especially, restrains diplomatic flexibility of a secondary power. Therefore, in theory, it is logically assumed that secondary powers rarely pursue balancing acts. In practice, however, balancing is the most commonly observed policy-practice for secondary states. The second option is

²⁵ Kenneth Waltz argues they pursue bandwagoning with the rising power whereas Stephen Walt argues they would balance against the rising power. Robert Ross, argues that secondary powers behavior depends on geographic proximity, close secondary powers bandwagons whereas far away secondary powers balance against rising power. (Waltz,1979; Walt, 1990; Ross, 2006).

bandwagoning, where secondary powers align with the rising powers' or existing great powers' policies.(Waltz ,1979) This could be defensive, where small states bandwagon to neutralize or avoid conflict with the rising power, or it could be offensive where small states pursue to gain profit by being on the side of winning by being on the side of ascending power. The third option is buck-passing, where secondary powers try to stand neutral and wait for other great powers to pay the price and bear the costs. In this sense, in Asia, secondary states' behavior is characterized within these three definitions: bandwagoning (acknowledgment and compliance to China's concerns) or power balancing (rebuffing China's assertiveness through internal and external sources) or buck-passing (let the United States bear the cost.) Nonetheless, it is not easy to find those who completely balance or bandwagon or buck pass all the time. Even the United States has not pursued a full-scale containment or engagement strategy; instead, America's China-policy is along with terms 'conengagement' as a mixture of containment and engagement.(Goldstein ,2005; Klare ,2001) In a similar way, secondary states pursue a policy of "hedging" against China's rise as a middle course of the balancing-bandwagoning continuum.(Goh, 2006; Jackson, 2014; Medeiros ,2005; Tessman ,2012) Hedging is, in a simplest definition; diversify the strategies to prepare for the future uncertainties. It is, literally, a way of protecting, controlling, or limiting something by having multiple options. It can be defined as a middle ground between balancing and bandwagoning or engagement and containment. However, it is undoubtedly distinct from other strategies in a conceptual term. It is a strategy of neither being dominated by a great power nor antagonize it. Hedging is also a strategy that compatible with both power transition and realist and liberalist ontologies. It is useful under conditions of bipolar, multipolar or unipolar order. It can be multi-dimensional to cope with any threat by employing different tools and approaches. For instance, in energy security, it can be diversification of supplies to reduce vulnerabilities and dependencies or in security realm; it can be in form of balancing militarily while engaging economically to cope with an ascending power. Thus, it makes a lot more sense than any other strategies at where international relations are mostly based on both conflict and cooperation at the same time, and hedging is the most rational act. It includes pre-emptive acts as well as positive incentives. Kuik defines hedging as behavior in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects, under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-

stakes.(Cheng-Chwee, 2008) There are variants in hedging too. For instance, Japan hedges against China more than what South Korea does. In this sense, Japan closes to be a hard balancer, as it balances militarily and diplomatically. It advances its special relations with the United States while also forging closer links with regional countries to check Chinese power projection at the same time sustaining relations with China. Japan also builds up military capabilities to counter the challenges and risk stemming from China's rise(Ayson and Ball, 2014b). South Korea does hedges against China but its hedging is more restrained than Japan due to economic pragmatism. Australia in a similar way hedges against China in a softer way as a soft balancer. Initially Australia balances diplomatically by forming closer relations with the United States and other regional countries while engaging with China in economic realms. On the other hand, South Korea hedges against North Korea as a soft balancer. Besides, hedging most states balance against rising China by solidifying alliances with the United States while there is scant evidence of bandwagoning.(D. Shambaugh ,2011) Yet, Japan, Australia, and South Korea all hedges against the decline of the United States power by building up arms. In this sense, in Asia, arms acquisitions among secondary powers are driven by fears of future uncertainties stemming from China's future behavior, the United States future resolve, and Japan future status.

4.1.3 Regional Tensions

Predictability and stability in Asia are, indeed, all the more remarkable given complex and multilayered conflicts, historical suspicions and animosities, the internal political and economic challenges confronting several major Asian countries, and region's weak institutionalization.(Muthiah Alagappa and Mustanduno, 2002a, 4) Conflicts have become more localized in the region as a result of regionalization trends in today's Asia. If we make a hierarchy of security issues, Taiwan, and Korea as the two acute security issues of the region come first. These conflicts are heavily militarized and management of the conflicts is based on deterrence, alliances, and exchange of threats continuously. The second greatest danger in the region is proliferation of dangerous technologies such as missiles and weapons of mass destructions. The greatest concern on the United States side is, indeed, the spread of nuclear weapons and the future of NPT. In this sense, there is a strong correlation between the United States extended deterrence and nonproliferation commitments of the United States allies. The third maritime and territorial border issues and related

energy security. There are security concerns stemming from perceptions and historical animosities too. Taiwan issue, even though it has partly rooted in the results of superpower politics, the current cause of the tension is both Chinese and Taiwanese domestic politics, rather than global pressures.(Goldstein, 2007) For a matter of fact, the dispute across Taiwan Strait is one of the most pressing issues since it has potential to drag China, the United States and Japan into a hot war that could possibly escalate into a nuclear war.(Ross, 1999) Given Beijing determination to unify Taiwan with the mainland, by force if necessary; given the United States quasi alliance with Taiwan to counter Beijing coercive acts towards the island; and given Japanese view and the United States-Japan alliance and the nature of Japan policy regarding with China and Taiwan, a conflict including major powers is not a distinct possibility. Korean conflict was historically a proxy war between superpowers and the United States has heavily involved in the disputes. Yet, the current conflict is not a rivalry between superpowers or regional powers, but becomes a proliferation of nuclear weapons issues.

In the modern history of international relations, the single most common concern over which states fight wars is territory. Paul Huth has identified 129 territorial conflicts between 1950 and 1990 on the world and 32 of them was in Asia. Asia had the largest territorial dispute while Europe had the smallest rate.(P. Huth ,1998, 252) In Asia, almost every country in East and Southeast Asia has bilateral or multilateral territorial quarrels with its neighbors, which led many military- nonmilitary conflicts over the course of the past decades. Sino-Indian border war in 1962, Sino-Vietnamese borders war in 1979, India-Pakistani border war in 1947 and 1965 are the example of full-scale war caused by border disputes. Naval engagements between China and Vietnam in 1974 and 1988, clashes between China and Nepal in 1960, China and Burma 1969, and many other lesser level quarrels and conflicts are example of severity of conflicts. Most divided nations and countries, Korea, Vietnam, China, are located in the region. Moreover, numerous interstate and intrastate territorial disputes exist in Asia. China has taken lead in solving many of its territorial issues as well as pressing more assertive diplomacy over some of its claims. China's relations with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines have deteriorated over maritime disputes whereas it is searching for “negotiated solutions” to the border dispute with India and some ASEAN members. China has some border issues with Russia, Tajikistan, Bhutan, and North Korea too. Japan has a cluster of territorial and maritime disputes over a bunch of

islands with Russia over Kuril Islands, and with South Korea over Takeshima/Dokdo islands as well as conflicts with China over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, China, Taiwan and Indonesia are engaged in multilateral dispute over the Sparkly Islands, where China builds up artificial islands with huge land reclamation activities. Indeed, Chinese activities in the South and East China Seas forges tensions in the recent years.

Apart from traditional security topics, there are many issues that affect regional security architecture in Asia. For instance, energy security and maritime conflicts became important parts of the regional security. Sea one of the most important aspect of daily life for the Asian countries as a critical source of food supplying nutrition, source of energy and pathways to incoming energy sources and as a way of transportation between countries. The energy security and protecting sea lines is a common imperative that put all countries on the same page including China and the United States. Therefore, it is not surprise to see cooperation between on the issues such as piracy on the sea lines or disaster relief efforts in the region. On the other hand, it is also a prudent imperative for the countries to invest more on maritime defense assets. In this sense, islands ownership quarrels, controversies over maritime and continental shelf boundaries, friction over Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) and piracy threaten all by some degree.

Table 8: Some of the Maritime Disputes in Asia

Resource to Dispute	Disputants	Economic Issue
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands	China and Japan	Oil, fish, SLOCs
Tokdo/Takeshima	South Korea and Japan	Oil fish
Yellow Sea (continental shelf)	China, Japan, South Korea	Oil, fish
Southern Kuriles	Japan, Russia	SLOCs
Source: Heritage Foundation		

The most important international documents to understand the essence of the maritime disputes in Asia is UNCLOS, which is not only created or magnified maritime disputes in the region but also shapes the legal and normative discourses.(Muthiah Alagappa and Mustanduno, 2002a, 432) UNCLOS came into force in 1994. Under UNCLOS a state can have different sovereignty over different parts of the sea, and Under UNCLOS islands have their own internal waters, the

territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, and the EEZ, which creates huge overlapping maritime borders in Asia.²⁶ That's why it is commonly referred that UNCLOS made it more likely that states will quarrel over islands (even small remote inhabitant islands, islets and rocks.)

There are security concerns stemming from perceptions such as perception of rising China (especially in the United States and Japan), perception of normalizing Japan (especially in China and Korea), and perception of the United States hegemony in the region (in China and North Korea). On the other hand, rising nationalism is a current in the regional security environment. Greater Asia is home to four (out of five) communist regimes: China, North Korea, Vietnam, Burma. There are also countries in transition such as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia; many authoritarian countries such as China, North Korea, Vietnam, Burma, Pakistan. However, independent of regime types, almost all Asian countries are characterized by strongly nationalist governments.(Blackwill and Dibbs, 2000, 5) Chinese and Japanese behavior in the East China Sea are also related to status quests and rising nationalist appeals in the domestic politics. "Confident nationalism" is an unmitigated realist national security posture on the part of China to defend its sovereignty, preserve its national unity and project its strategic interest (Tow ,2001, 18). This view is reflected China's relation with Taiwan and Japan in particular. Abe's Japan is back rhetoric is another nationalist agenda, and cause alarms bells not just in China but equally in Korea too. At the end of the day, nationalist leaders, nationalist nations are all product of status and prestige sentiments.

Asia is one of the places where proliferation of WMD and dangerous technologies are utmost concern. Given severe competitions over power and territories and historical enmity patterns, the existence of these weapons makes conflicts more acute as there are no arms control regimes, participation of global attempts to restore such routines are infrequent. Moreover, these programs are generally not transparent enough as most of the countries are not democratic, which makes these programs unsafeguarded. In this sense, "Asia represents the worst of two worlds: small nuclear

²⁶ States can claim 12-mile territorial water over which they have full sovereignty (over sea, airspace, seabed, and substratum.) 24-mile Contiguous zone, over which they have limited sovereignty. (Control and prevent violation of customs, fiscal and migration laws etc.) 200 miles EEZ, over which states have sovereign right to explore, exploit, converse, and manage all living and nonliving resources of seabed, its subsoil. In addition, they have right to construct, operate artificial islands, installations, and structures.

powers operating under conditions of security scarcity, where fierce animoties and rivalries do not bode well for rational or stable deterrence."(Muthiah Alagappa and Mustanduno ,2002a, 452) Primary proliferation drivers are mostly from the intersection of security needs and resource constrains. Secondary drivers are domestic forces, status and prestige. Although there is widely shared pessimism over the stability stemming from the spread and appeal of proliferation of the dangerous technologies and nuclear weapons, deterrence is likely to continue due to taboo on nuclear first use. In this sense, it is noticeable that China and North Korea have pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. Almost every country in Asia demonstrate variety of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.(Cha, 2002b, 460) China holds the most sophisticated nuclear weapons and missile programs in the region except Russia, only country that have the capability of ICBM (reaching the United States soil). China follows a modernization program aiming at improving range, payload, and accuracy as well as survivability, command and control and communication capabilities. Matter of fact, "China is the only one of the five original nuclear weapon states that is quantitatively increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal."(H. M. Kristensen and Norris, 2015b) Currently it has around 400-450 devices capacity and relies most on land-based leg of triad, which roughly consists of 250 units warheads. Bomber leg of triad comprises 120 Hong-6 bombers and 30 Qian-5A attack aircraft. The bomber force is old, highly vulnerable to air defense and incapable of reaching the continental United States. Sea based leg consists of about 12 JL-1 SLBMs and 1 Xia-class submarine. North Korea is the second source of nuclear threat, yet it is the number one driving force that could potentially pose greatest danger for proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region.

Apart from the danger of cascading nuclear proliferation, one of the greatest danger is the proliferation of different types and range of missiles. North Korea has been known both an active producer of SCUD and proliferator of missiles technology to Iran, Syria, and Pakistan. North Korea has produced a range of missile systems and believed to have several nuclear weapons, as it is in activities inconsistent with international nonproliferation norms for over a decade.(Medeiros, 1999) Given ballistic missiles proliferation, missile defense (BMDs) is a key for the region's future security. Especially BMDs that the United States and its allies build around the region has been seen a direct threat by both China and Russia.(Weitz ,2013) In this sense,

BMDs would become an engine for further proliferation due to: i) Cause greater production and deployment by others seeking to overwhelm any defensive shield; ii) Create incentives to renounce current arms control and nonproliferation agreements; iii) Spur proliferation among allies due to the belief that shield might undermine US extended deterrence credibility.

Besides missiles proliferation, advance weapons systems known as RMA spreads in Asia. RMA works a double edge sword as it makes deterrence capability more potent with more accurate weapons systems supported by real-time intelligence and surveillance. Yet, RMA also make adversaries more capable via robust A2/AD capabilities. Therefore, RMA feeds the security dilemmas in the region more than any other assets possibly can do.(Blackwill and Dibbs, 2000, 6) Jervis underlines the difficulty to draw exact lines between offensive and defensive postures, thereby any militarization can potentially cause security dilemma driven military competition and arms race.(Jervis ,1978) RMA and sophisticated military technology make more difficult to demarcate offensive and defensive capabilities. RMA and sophisticated military technology make also a situation where offense has advantage over defense, where by security dilemma becomes more unavoidable.

4.2 Actors as a Source of Uncertainty

In Asia, China is the key player holding the strategic initiatives akin to Germany's role in the early 20th century Europe. Equally, the United States role is key to evolution of the regional security, which has been broadly addressed above in the earlier sections. Thirdly, North Korean race to nuclearization and future of conflicts in the Korean peninsula and proliferation pressures beyond should be addressed to understand the sources of uncertainties.

4.2.1 China

Realists argue that China is a dissatisfied power and will be working against the status quo as it gets economic and military might. Indeed, development of a security culture in Beijing that projects a worse case interpretation on the current regional issues, in particular revitalizing US-Japan alliance.(Tow ,2001, 67) There are shared views about China becomes more assertive and bullying diplomacy since 2008.(D. Shambaugh, 2013b, 33–43) Indeed, China has prioritized economic

development, and then uses its newfound economic muscle to reshape the international security environment in accordance with its own national security interests. Arguably, China has followed two phases of rising-strategy. At the first stage till 2008, China intended to assimilate high technology from abroad and develop its economic capabilities at home in order to establish an economy of scales to become an authentic great power. At this stage, China pursued an open-door trade policy and avoided from confrontation, especially with the United States and Japan. However, at the second stage since 2008, China has sought to resurrect traditional goals of defending national sovereignty and enhanced its major power status by applying broadening technological, economic and military base.(Swaine, 2010; Christensen, 2011; Holslag, 2014) In this sense, China is not a status quo power, as it seeks greater role for itself in the regional affairs with its growing economy, and advancing military power.(D. Shambaugh and Yahuda ,2014) In this sense, after decades of modest and charm offensive foreign policy, with its increasing economical ground, a more assertive China on maritime and territorial disputes as well as many other secondary issues has emerged.²⁷ There are, indeed, many examples of these kinds of Chinese behavior in South and East China Seas. In the region, threat perception towards China changes in degree, yet in general is shared by many countries. Most importantly, Japan's first concern becomes a rising China and its more assertive diplomacy. This is also partly shared by the United States officials. For instance, after stating, "The rebalance is not a goal, not a promise, or a vision – it's a reality" at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2014, then US Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel pointed out that "The United States will not look the other way when fundamental principles of the international order are being challenged."(Hagel, 2014) As Aaron L. Friedberg points out that the United States and other regional countries pursue a two-prolonged strategy to cope with rising China: to engage Beijing through bilateral, and multilateral diplomacy on varies of topics from trade to military to military dialogues while taking steps designed to offset China's growing military capabilities and aggressive/assertive hard/soft powers. In his article, he compares and contrasts various strategies and argues that "better balancing", which includes a numbers of subsidiary elements i.e. strengthening the United States and its

²⁷ "At a meeting of South-East Asian nations in 2010, China's foreign minister Yang Jiechi, facing a barrage of complaints about his country's behavior in the region, blurted out the sort of thing polite leaders usually prefer to leave unsaid. "China is a big country," he pointed out, "and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact." ("The Dragon's New Teeth," **The Economist**, last modified April 4, 2012, accessed May 3, 2016, <http://econ.st/26OYAdW>).

allies' military capabilities, bolstering relations with traditional allies at the same time developing quasi alliance with other regional partners such as Taiwan, Philippines, India, Singapore is the best option.(Friedberg ,2015) Yet, perception is always a two ways street. Therefore, China perceives all these better balancing efforts as a threat to its national security characterizing these actions as traditional anti-Chinese containment strategy. China's top military priority interests lie at the consolidation of lost territories, in particular Taiwan. Second, China see Japanese remilitarization trend, and the way US-Japan alliance evolve in the recent years as a direct threat to its security and its long aimed at reunification of Taiwan and mainland. The experience of foreign intervention during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries makes China acutely sensitive to any alignments or perceived coalitions against it.(Dibb, 2005, 13) In this sense, American extended deterrence strategies in Asia trigger a sense of insecurity and encirclement in Beijing, as Chinese elites believe that the United States seeks to subvert and contain China.(White Papers, 2013) American-led forces is perceived one of the greatest challenges to China by Chinese officials.(Crane et al., 2005, 22) In this sense, American pivot to Asia strategy further complicated Chinese perception and increased US-China competition in the region. Li suggests that even though China has benefited tremendously from the US led architecture, China's interests were never taken into account in the design of the order at the first place. According to him, as China claims bigger share, tension is natural.(Mo, 2015) Indeed, in today's Asia, China is an outsider as a non-allied country even though it's immense relations with other Asian states and with the United States. On this ground, China claims its 'rightful' position in the world stage (especially in Asia) by challenging the US led regional order. Furthermore, China sees itself as a target of the United States containment policy in the post-Cold War era. American presence limits and counters Chinese growing power projection capabilities and reduced its soft power effects. The US alliance system increases the power differential and widens the gap between China and other powers making it even more difficult for China to catch up. To balance against the United States and its regional hub and spoke alliance system, China must gain support of other powers, whose perception of China is mostly seen as rival too. China is a country with huge strategic capability (the combination of economic strength, technological capability, population and educational level, and natural resources) to alter the order in the region in the long run. The most important source of Chinese power and influence stems from China's economy and ties with the region.

Asia's dependence on the United States has been reduced and the leverage and influence of the United States in the region has been diminished correspondingly. In this sense, China has normalized and stabilized with most of its neighboring countries by avoiding Mao's interventionist foreign policy. It no longer supports communist insurgencies in Asia simply because it needs stable environment to do business and gain economic benefits.(Overholt, 2008) China actively participates many multilateral regional and global institutions, cultivates a wide array of trading and investment ties boosting interdependencies. Almost all of the regional countries, including the United States allies and the United States itself are either China's first or second trade partners. China has become one of the most important source and destination for foreign direct investment (FDIs) over the years in Asia. China's 100 billion dollars Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has received more than 50 countries' application including the United States traditional allies South Korea, UK, France, Taiwan, and Germany even though the United States opposition to the initiative.²⁸ China led investment and infrastructure projects link many Asian countries more closely to the Chinese economy. The United States and its traditional allies are now deeply dependent on trade with China as much as China depends on these countries. Indeed, China has stepped up its effort to build a strategic partnership with Russia, cordial political relations and strong economic ties with France, UK, South Korea, the EU and the ASEAN countries. Russia is the core partner to China as a source of military technology and equipment. In this sense, Russia is one of the most, if not the most, important partner to China. Through a series of agreements beginning in 1996, China and Russia have sought to coordinate their action on certain issues like missile defense, the expansion and reinvigoration of American alliance system in Europe and in Asia. Cooperative Strategic Partnership, Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation are some of the treaties they reached.(Garnett, 2000) They act together in the UNSC, they are founding members of Shanghai Security and Cooperation Organization as well as BRICS. China relations with major powers, especially with Russia and India are important for the balance of power in the region. A triple entente between Russia, China and India would threaten the entire stability of

²⁸ According to Stiglitz "Perhaps America's opposition to the AIIB is an example of an economic phenomenon that I have often observed: firms want greater competition everywhere except in their own industry. It simply wanted hegemony. In an increasingly multipolar world, it wanted to remain the G-1." See (Stiglitz, 2015).

the region.(Blackwill and Dibbs, 2000, 7) Yet, due to Chinese perceptions throughout the region, this prospect doesn't seem to be on the horizon.

Yet, China's most major balancing act is through the development of its own strategic capabilities. Over the last decades, China pursues an intensive military modernization as an internal balancing effort. Historically, Chinese army had limited capacity to project power beyond mainland China. Chinese military could not be capable enough to neutralize the force combination of the United States and its allies, as there is increasing possibility of confrontation between China and other powers in Asia-Pacific maritime environment.(Ayson and Ball, 2014b) Washington and many other regional states suspect Chinese opaque military modernizations, especially A2/AD capabilities. One of the most important modernization takes place in nuclear area. When it comes to nuclear issues, China has pledged a no-first-use policy and historically its nuclear strategy is based on limited deterrence by not participating nuclear arms race. Yet, in the current international affairs, it is the only country that increases its nuclear arsenal as well as pursues an opaque nuclear modernization.

Table 9: China's Nuclear Modernization

Existing Weapons	New or Modernized Weapons	Status
Strategic Land		
DF-3A IRBM		
DF-4 ICBM	DF-31: solid fuel, road mobile ICBM with single warhead	Deployment in progress but might have stalled
DF-5A ICBM	DF-31A: Extended-range, solid fuel, road mobile ICBM with single warhead	Deployment underway
DF-21 A/B MRBM	DF-21A/B: solid fuel, road mobile MRBM	Deployment possibly continuing
DF-31 ICBM		
DF-31 A ICBM	DF-41: extended-range, solid fuel, road mobile ICBM	Status unclear; possible with single warhead but might be capable of MIRV
Various warheads	Potentially MIRV Warhead	Potential option to deploy MIRV in future if so decided
Strategic Sea		
Xia SSBN	Jin (Type 094) SSBN: each 12 SLBMs	3 delivered; 4-5 planned
	? (type 096) SSBN	Possibly under development
JL-1 SLBM	JL-2: long-range, solid fuel SLBM with single warhead	Under development; deployment soon
Warhead	New warhead for JL-2 SLBM	Production underway or completed
Strategic Air		
H-6 Bomber	H-6K: modified intermediate range bomber with land attack ALCM	Production underway
	CJ-20: long range, land-attack ALCM	Nuclear status uncertain

Tactical		
DF-15 SRBM		
DH-10 GLCM	DH-10: long range, land attack GLCM	Deployment underway
(Fighter-bomber)		
ALCM: Air Launched Ballistic Missiles GLCM: Ground Launched Ballistic Missiles IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missiles MIRV: Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle SSBN: Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missiles SLBM: Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missiles		
Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Slowing Nuclear Weapon Reductions and Endless Nuclear Weapon Modernizations: A Challenge to the NPT," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 70, no. 4 (July 1, 2014): 94–107		

Even though China's current nuclear arsenal is relatively small and its nuclear expansion and modernization efforts are relatively slow, without a clear-cut arms control mechanism, similar to the one between the United States and the Soviet Union or now the United States and Russia, China's nuclear modernization raises eyebrows in the region and beyond. China sees nuclear weapons as a tool that will be useful to deter the United States intervening to where China may confront Taiwan or Japan. (Tow, 2001, 17) Prior to March 1996, China thought few nuclear weapons (limited deterrence) would be sufficient to deter significant US intervention in a China-Taiwan confrontation. Beijing was clearly surprised when Clinton administration deployed American aircraft carriers near Taiwan straits. Departing from this fact on the ground, China pursues a modernization program that would give a secure second-strike capability as well as aggressive A2/AD capabilities. Moreover, China sees nuclear weapons as a response to increasing ballistic missiles defense systems and conventional war fighting capabilities of the United States and its regional allies, in particular Japan. Lu Yin points out that the development of ballistic missile defense or advanced conventional weapons could trigger a renewed nuclear arms race due to Chinese threat perceptions. (Yin, 2015). China's 2015 White Paper asserts that new types of weapons and systems known as RMA and changing nature and implementation of war fighting professed new and severe challenges to China's military security. (China's Military Strategy, 2015) As a response to these changes, China is increasing its nuclear arsenals, advancing on mobile systems by changing the composition of its nuclear forces. According to Pentagon annual reports on China's Military Assessment, via multiple warheads on a single missile or by delivering them

separately against targets with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) China has ability to strike to the United States with nuclear weapons. Jeffrey Lewis argues that this doesn't mean that China changing its nuclear posture but it is kind of response to the developing missile defense systems in the Pacific hoping to get through some of its missiles.(Lewis, Jeffrey, 2015) Especially, Chinese air and air launched cruise missiles as well as Jin class ballistic missile submarines would significantly increase Chinese second strike capabilities, which serve as a deterrent asset for China. Besides development of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, China has a nascent ballistic missile and BMDs program too. CSS-5 variant DF-21 carrier killer anti-ship ballistic missiles are designed to deter the United States aircraft carrier and other stationaries as an extreme A2/AD capability. They are mostly deployed in the provinces facing Taiwan. CSS-10 variant DF-31 ballistic missiles likely deployment of MARV (maneuverable re-entry vehicle) and MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) warheads are also designed to improve China's second-strike capabilities. China can possibly strike US soils with DF-31, DF-31A and DF-41 ballistic missiles.(Rowberry, 2014) These ICBMs are parts of Chinese nuclear deterrence dyads with ballistic missile carrying capable submarines forces. Dian points out that Beijing primary aims at first gaining superiority in a possible conflict over Taiwan, over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and secondly at acquiring the capacity to deny any opponent, and particularly the United States, access to these area of conflict.(Dian, 2015) In this sense, China is building both reliable and survivable second strike capability with its far-reaching modernization projects. Through new types of missiles, nuclear warheads, projection capabilities, improved C4ISR capabilities, China surely shifts from limited nuclear deterrence to a secure second-strike capable nuclear deterrence.

According to SIPRI report, China's military spending continuously increasing for the last decade. China's military capabilities have grown, as its economy has grown. It has reached around US\$170 billion annual spending on defense with an average 10 per cent per annum increase.(SIPRI Military Expenditures Database, 2013) As China pursues its own 'Monroe Doctrine' for Asian waters with its increasing A2/AD capabilities, a strong focus on maritime security issues and building up strong navy capable of operating across oceans is the biggest part of Chinese spending. In this sense, China has numerous modernization programs for submarines, combat and

amphibious destroyers and frigates and smaller vessels.(Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2015, 2015, 29–43) China has already operationalized an aircraft carrier and also planning to operational a second one by the 2018.

The biggest danger is that China may miscalculate the strategic and military capability of its potential opponents relative to the increase in its own strategic capabilities. Evidence that the Chinese are prone to make this type of mistake as it was a case during 1996 Taiwan missile crisis.(Ayson and Ball ,2014b) According to some experts, China's increasing capabilities and perceptions for the United States decline embolden its policy makers to employ coercion as a tool to change the status quo in the region. With increasing nuclear capability, China's behaviors are to be generalized as a classic stability-instability paradox. The latest Chinese attempt of air defense identification zone implementation in the East China Sea and assertive diplomacy in the South China Sea are evidences of this. Furthermore, the US airlines comply with Chinese ADIZ for the safety of commercial flights even though Japanese insistency not to do so.(Hayashi and Pasztor, 2013) However, the US Air Force, without prior notice, challenged with China by sending a pair of B-52 bombers over disputed islands in the East China Sea following China's declaration of ADIZ, which extends over the islands. Similarly, the United States has been challenging China's assertion in the South China Sea by flying or sailing through the contested areas, yet staying short of a declaration of its full engagement. Departing from these types of examples, it is widely assumed that US fundamental interests in East and South China seas will be more attentively restricted and United States might be unwilling to be embroiled in a situation where China opt for a fait accompli.(Barnes and Page, 2013)

Yet, at the heart of the China's assertive diplomacy lies the defense of Chinese 'core interest' in the South and East China Sea and territorial integrity of China regarding with the Taiwan issue. Taiwan is, indeed, still one of the most important core security concerns in Beijing strategy as China keeps its reserves of use of force in the event of Taiwanese declaration of independence. Meanwhile, Taiwan's defense posture is based on the ability to withstand an attack by the PLA for up to one month, in the hope that the United States will abide by its security responsibilities as outlined Taiwan Relations act.(Huxley ,2014, 32) As Taiwan's position in asserting Taiwan's international status as an independent state and confront China's assertive policy

towards the island, tension brings a real risk of miscalculation and escalation.(Blackwill and Dibbs ,2000, 9) Additionally, China tries to catch up to the United States since there is a huge technological and material gaps that gives the United States and its allies a military edge in Asia. The US preponderance power capabilities and the United States allies' easy access to the United States technology have created great imbalances against China in the region. In this sense, the more conventional advanced military capacities the United States build in the region, the more insecurity China would feel and push hard to close the gap by building up arms and nuclear arsenals. In this sense, regional security developments challenging China's core interests such as the pivot to Asia strategy of the United States, the United States advanced military might and its forward presence, the Japan's revised guideline and remilitarization pattern and current of the United States-Japan alliance, the United States resolve on Korean peninsula, the US-Taiwan relations-overall all parts of the United States extended deterrence- have been causing deep rooted anxiety among Chinese and triggers military builds up including nuclear modernization in China's part. However, at the end of the day, ironically the more China builds up, the more other countries region feels being threaten. Thus, as China rises on the global and regional stage, other regional allies and the United States (as the only capable power in kind) are crafting counter balance. Yet, it is difficult to say that these efforts cast an effective rebalancing strategy in the regional stage. Over all this action reaction cycle creates an uneasy security dilemma among regional actors. Therefore, China, with high growth rate, spectacular size, vibrant demography, its contentious efforts to modernize its military, is epicenter of the balancing acts and counteracts. Anxiety about China's rise has shaped Japanese, Australian, the Pilipino, Vietnamese, Taiwanese, and Korean foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Japan's effort to counter Chinese threats varies from revising the United States-Japan military cooperation to reviewing constitutional limits and open debate about Japan's security needs. Hence, Japan's recent interest in fortified military capabilities is driven by long-term concern about China rather than short-term danger of North Korea even though it is not generally publicly stated.(Goh ,2011) A possible unification on the Korean peninsula would not just make more difficult for Japan to portray its defense policies driven by North Korean danger but also it would make Japan feel more vulnerable since a unified Korea will be more inclined within Chinese orbit rather than Japanese or American.(Alagappa and Goldstein ,2002, 189) Australia, like Japan, has revised its alliance agreement with the

United States to counter growing China while it feels deep contradiction about being depended on Chinese trade. Without geographic and historical concerns that inform Japanese thinking of China, Australia's post-Cold War concern is fed instead by recent activation of multi-state disputes involving China, among others, over claims to the vast, allegedly resource rich, strategically situated islands and passages in the South China Sea. Among ASEAN states, Vietnam and Philippines have concern about growing China as being party to territorial disputes with China. These two countries insist on having solution through ASEAN but China insists to resolve disputes through bilateral negotiations where China can surpass these smaller nations. With China tightening its grip on much of the South China Sea, ASEAN members express serious concerns vis-à-vis the South China Sea disputes, but struggling to adopt an appropriate and unified response falling short to do that.(Heydarian and Vu, 2015)

The strategies for coping with the China's Rise for the regional countries not much varies. One of them is internal balancing. As a balancing act, internal balancing means building up own capabilities by increasing defense spending. Over the last few years, the evidence has become increasingly persuasive that action-reaction dynamics are taking hold of regional countries' military modernization programs. External balancing is the second option as a balancing act to Chinese rise in the region. It means that looking for counter coalition to offset a rising power. In this sense, partnering with the United States and other regional countries is another key strategy to balance against China's rise in the region. The United States as a resident power has a massive military power in the region and it is still central to the Asia pacific military equation. However, the future role of the United States in the management of regional tensions is bleaker in the long run and Asia's future security environment will be shaped more by the strength of the large Asian powers rather than by the United States.(Dibb ,2005, 37) Many smaller states in Asia look for the United States support as an external balancer in conducting relations with China since they have limited economic and military capacity compare to the Chinese potential.

Besides having robust security alliance with the United States, Asian nations try to build up a web of security links as a soft balancing. Australia foresees cooperation with Japan, South Korea, India, and other smaller powers. Japan-Korean defense cooperation slows down under guise of historical sentiments, yet Japan has good relations with India, and Australia as well as keeps it close with Koreans. These

mini bilateral security links are open to questions of what they would provide in a conflict with China but at least rhetorical level it shows countries willingness to cooperate to rebalance China. Changing patterns of military sales and renewed buyers-sellers' relationship such as Australia-US, Japan-India, South Korea-Indonesia exemplifies building up external balancing too. In this changing patterns commercial imperatives as well as diversification of security relations play a significant role.(Huxley ,2014, 41)

Table 10: Recent Bilateral Agreements

Year	Agreement
2007	Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security and Cooperation
2008	Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India
2009	India-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation
2009	Australia-Republic of Korea Joint Statement on enhanced Global and Security Cooperation
2010	Republic of Korea –India Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation and Defense Research &Development
2013	Australia-China Strategic Partnership
2014	India-China Bilateral Maritime Security Dialogue

Source: IISS, Regional Security Assessment 2014, p38.

Bilateral engagement in forms of extensive diplomatic and trade relations with China is another strategy in coping with growing Chinese power. In the region war is not singled out to the degree it has been done in Europe, but there are increasing formal and non-formal constraints on the use of force such as trade and socio cultural relations. It is arguably true that China has advanced its regional position in economic terms too. Indeed, as the largest trading country in the history, China has deeply engaged with all Asian countries, including the United States and Australia. Asia pacific countries are increasing economic links with each other as well as with China while intra-Asian trade links are extending beyond East Asia. Economic dependencies historically play an important role to curb conflictual patterns among states and these patterns become more evident as trade and interdependencies rise among Asian states. Chinese total trade with neighboring countries has surpassed the total Chinese trade with the United States and EU. However, trade and economic dependencies is a two-ways street, and has enforce China's hand in form of soft-power and influence. Moreover, when it comes to economic loss versus political cost, countries tend to choose economic costs. This is a case in Asia, too.(Mastro ,2014) Multilateral engagement with China within global and regional organizations is the last strategy for the regional countries in coping with China. For a matter of fact that, even though they are weak and

ineffective in general, regional organizations are the forefront of the attempts of multilateral engagement in Asia for Asian countries. ASEAN, (ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus) and APEC are two of the most important such platforms. None of these powers, nonetheless, is willing to place all its hopes on such multilateral management of regional security, as these organizations are weak. Indeed, besides daunting numbers of security challenges, weakly institutionalized security structure is a trait of Asian security order.

4.2.2 America as an Asia-Pacific Power

The United States came to Asia after the victory against Spain and became the colonial possessor in the Philippines and Guam. With consolidating its hold in Hawaii, the United States expanded its presence in Asia Pacific. The Second World War brought about American military dominance of the Pacific Ocean and within the Cold War; the USA established numbers of bilateral alliances in the region with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Philippines, and New Zealand to contain the communist spread. Zelikow assesses that the general tendency to equate the story of America in Europe with the story of America in the world is a fundamental mistake. For instance, even the time of isolation in the early 1900s, the United States was a country widely and deeply engaged in the affairs of Asia by extending its domain to the Philippines and occupying Hawaii. Isolationism, indeed, was not a policy of disengagement from world affairs totally. The United States had a sense of scarcity of resources and military capabilities times to times and they had to decide where their interest lies more and foremost. In this sense, the United States decided to disengage from European politics while invested heavily in Asia-Pacific. For instance, one of the prominent politicians known as isolationist then, Senator Robert Taft, decisively supported American commitment in Asia while opposing any engagement in Europe. As renouncing League of Nations in Europe, the United States was creating an international order by Washington system in economical term, by naval treaties in military terms, and by nine-power treaty in political terms. (Zelikow, 2000, 24) Today, with Obama's 'the pivot to Asia strategy' America once again declares its Asia priority. For instance, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 suggests that "The United States has been a Pacific power for more than a century, with deep and enduring economic and security ties to the region." (Department of Defense: Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, 4) There is a general recognition almost everywhere in the

region that America is one of the most important player for the continuation of the peace and stability in the region. Only the United States has the capability and potential to balance or to alter the regional balance of power. Moreover, the United States has no territorial claims and serenely refrained from using military power for self-interest.(Alagappa and Goldstein, 2002) Other contenders would not be acceptable to the regional powers. China is feared as a potential dominant; Japan has historically been treated with great suspicion in the region; Russia is weak and unable. We can classify responses to American involvement into the region as Japan is the most supportive; South Korea is simply supportive; North Korea is the most adversarial; China has serious misgivings but not totally against per se; Russia, India, most of the ASEAN countries are ambivalent if not nothing else. However, differences do not just raise from Asian apprehensions to the US role, but also stems from competing aspirations in the management of security among Asian countries.(Alagappa ,2002, 72) In this sense, China's apprehension towards the US presence cannot be separated from the evolution of the US-Japan alliance. Matter of fact, even China recognizes that an Asia without the USA would be much more dangerous place as the United States is the only power that ensure the peace and stability in the region by providing much of the security as a public good and restrains Japan from becoming militarized.

The United States has "will and capacity" to defend its allies not just because these countries are allies and partners but also its own global interests require to do so. In this sense, deterrence (extended deterrence) is not just a matter of declaring a security guarantee, it also widely associated with its own interests. It is, however, not easy to find the logical reasoning why the United States risks fighting a war, let alone a nuclear war, to protect allies. Only possible answer to this reiteration is that for some country the stake may be just about the sovereignty over inhabited rocks and the natural resources that surrounds and lies beneath them. But to the United States, the stakes are higher than that. It is about sustaining the order that the United States has built and underwritten since the end of World War II. (Hagel, 2014) Alagappa points that Asia is a vital hotspot for American economic and security interests.(Alagappa ,2002, 73) Compatible to this interpretation, Obama administration's Asia pivot, or rebalancing Asia, makes important contribution to the credibility of the United States in the region. For many, pivot to Asia is a timely response to the changing balance of power that effects regional and global order.(Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, 2013)

Actually, the pivot strategy goes back to early years of Obama administration. Obama's national security transition team suggests that the US disproportionately focused into the Middle East while its real interests are lying in the Asia-Pacific. (Zakaria, 2015) Bearing in mind this assessment, Obama wittingly decides to implement rebalancing to Asia strategy. The factors behind the strategy are: i) Growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region; ii) perceived need for both cooperation with and balancing against China; iii) provide assistance to the allies and sustain regional peace and security by countering challenges of nuclear proliferation efforts of North Korea and assertive diplomacy of China in South and East China Seas; iv) political messaging after Iraq and Afghanistan wars. (Green, 2013)

Empirically, the rebalance is a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy that entailed economic, diplomatic and military components. Then National Security Advisor Tom Donilon identified five pillars of the rebalance: i) Reinforcement of the existing alliance relations; ii) Developing relationships with other nations in the region; iii) Constructing a stable relationship with China; iv) investing in regional cooperation; v) protecting the existing economic and political structures. In this sense, the strategy has diplomatic, military and economic aspects. The region has enjoyed a continued growth and prolonged development for over four decades and become one of the epicenters of the globalization and global trade. In this sense, the link between the economic dynamism of the Asia Pacific and the future American prosperity is key driver for the rebalance and is frequently highlighted by the US officials. American continued effort to create a trading pact with region under Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) is the most assertive economic dimension of the Asia pivot strategy. The USA has negotiated with 12 countries to build an economic front as economic arm of rebalance for more than three years and finally they have reached an agreement. (Calmes, 2015) Diplomatically, Washington recently commenced a series of diplomatic endeavors to boost relations with existing alliances as well as former enemies such as Vietnam, Myanmar. (D. Shambaugh, 2013a)

Table 11: US Troops Deployment under the Rebalance

Host-Country	End-2013	Planned Changes under Rebalance
South Korea	28,500*	
Japan	50,350	41,350
Philippines	600*	
Guam	5,450	10,000 **
Thailand	250	
Singapore	150	350
Australia	200	2,700***

*Including rotational, ** 3,200 will be rotational, *** 2,500 will be rotational
Source: US Defense Manpower Data Center

The USA has greater military presence in the region as a counterweight to rising uncertainties. Besides standing bases in Australia, Philippines, Singapore, Guam, Thailand, South Korea and Japan, the USA extends its military presence across the region by having numbers of stationary bases. The USA has significantly increased its presence in the region. The basic idea is to complicate things for China if it tries to neutralize American capabilities by taking out a few large bases. (Dyer, 2014) Defense Secretary Ashton Carter recently put it by saying “Nothing will stop US military operations at all. We will fly, we will sail, and we will operate here in the Pacific as we always have. We will continue to do what we have done for seven decades since World War Two ended by being the pivotal military power in the region, which we are and will continue to be.” (“Ashton Carter: US Will Play ‘Pivotal’ Role in Asia” 2015)

Table 12: The US Extended Deterrence Commitments in Asia

	Japan	South Korea	Philippines	Australia	Taiwan
Extended Deterrence Commitment	U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation (1951, revised 1960–present)	U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (1953–present)	U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (1951–present)	ANZUS (1951–present)	Taiwan Relations Act (1979–present); U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (1954–79)
Major US Military Installations	26 total (army, navy, air force, and marines)	28 total (army, navy, air force, and marines)	None	1 communications station (navy) 1 Rotationary Station in Darwin	None
Regular Joint Military Exercises	Keen Sword/Keen Edge, Orient Shield, Rim	Foal Eagle, Key Resolve, Max	Balikatan, PHIBLEX, Philippine	Rim of the Pacific, Talisman Saber	None

	of the Pacific, Tempo Brave, Yama Sakura	Thunder, Rim of the Pacific, Ulchi-Freedom Guardian	Interoperability Exchange		
Ballistic Missile Defense	BMD Framework partner; AN/TPY-2 radar host; X-band radar host; PAC-3 and Aegis/SM-3 deployed; cooperative BMD research program	BMD Framework partner; PAC-3 deployed; developing independent KAMD system	Potential host of U.S. X-band radar	BMD Framework partner; acquiring Aegis capability	PAC-2 and PAC-3 deployed (not part of integrated framework)

Source: Hooper and Brooks, “CFR,” 273.

In this sense, progress in both formulation and execution of Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept is important. Therefore, ASB is one of the essential component of the Pivot to Asia strategy at military domains. ASB’s focus is to develop an integrated capabilities and forces. The Joint Operational Concept (JOC) defines ASB as “Improve integration of air, land, naval, space, and cyberspace forces to provide combatant commanders the capabilities needed to deter and, if necessary, defeat an adversary employing sophisticated anti access, area-denial capabilities.” (“Department Of Defense: Joint Operational Access Concept” 2012) Barry Posen argues that only way to ensure the US primacy is to build a system of strategies to control the command of the commons consisting of air, space, and cyber domains.(Posen, 2003) The ASB is an essential part of that system reaffirming the US primacy in the region vis a vis China’s A2/AD strategy. Thus, main rational behind the ASB is the threat perception of China’s fast growing capabilities. According to Pentagon’s reports on China’s military, China is developing a robust A2/AD capacity including short-, medium- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), destroyers bristling with cruise missiles, and nuclear-armed submarines.(“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015” 2015)

However, the United States faces also massive political and economic problems, and the US foreign policy is short of a central vision under several administrations. Given strategic power shift from West to Asia and ensuing

anticipation that American dominance in the strategic environment would be short-lived, Asian regional order turns to be multiplayer if not multipolar. The US allies already recognize that they may have to depend largely on their own military capabilities in the future contingencies.

4.2.3 North Korea

Historically, Korean Peninsula is bent by the legacy of Korean War in the early 1950s. Following 1950 North invasion, Korea became the symbol of the United States determination to deter communist spread.(Tow, 1993, 63) Korean War ended with one of the longest survived military stalemate at the 38th parallel leaving a divided Korea well over five decades. While South Korea has emerged one of the shining stars of the Asia politically, economically and militarily, the North has turn to be a failed state in every sense. Nonetheless, North Korean military threat remains intact with a number of dangers such as the nuclear weapons and missile program.(Fitzpatrick, 2011, 47) It is the most militarized nation on earth and its military, Korean People's Army (KPA), is the strongest institution in the country. Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between South and North Korea at 38th parallel is the most heavily armed border in the world. In this sense, any escalation on the peninsula would be disastrous for both Koreas and many other regional countries, in particular China and Japan.

Given these facts, there are several limited options to deal with North Korean threat. Indeed, some of these options are have been discussed and negotiated by different parties since 1953. South Korean Sunshine Policy, or North Politics, the United States Agreed Framework, Six Party Talks and many other numerous initiatives and thousands of sanctions imposed by international community, debates on sovereign nuclear options for South Korea or Japan over and over again have not yielded desired outcome: a nonnuclear free zone on Korea (divided or not.) Therefore, the best option to deal with North Korea at hand appears as extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States.

North Korea possesses military and non-military threat for the regional security. For instance, North Korea has engaged with illicit transactions including surreptitious transfer and procurement of nuclear and ballistic missile –related equipment, know-how and technology.(Reports of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874-2009, 2015) Another category of non-military issues is

about humanitarian concerns. Humanitarian concerns generally stem from two different malfunctions. First is the fact that North Korean regime systematically mistreats its own people. Second it fails to feed or provide basic human needs for its own people. Even though these non-military threats are quite evident and dire, the most important danger to the regional security comes out of North Korea is North Korean nuclear and missile programs. These military threats have been critical driver of Japan's and South Korea's national security policy and militarization.(Futter and Zala, 2015) North Korean nuclear and missile threats is also critical driver of proliferation of missile defense and advance conventional weapons (RMA) in the region, which shakes regional security by altering the balance of power among major power. Given dynastic rule, failed economy and unpredictable leadership in the North, North Korea is susceptible to periodic crises. It has long been proved to be resilient to external pressure and sanctions however. The failure in preventing or scaling back the North Korean nuclear program has created wider nuclear proliferation incentives among small states in the world by putting many decades old NPT regime at risk. Furthermore, it has hugely damaged the United States leadership and assurance and credibility in the region.

The crisis stability on the peninsula is fragile but sustained. None of the principal parties wants fighting a war, but all of them for the time being prefers preserving the status quo. On the other hand, given North Korea's delicate power capacities and failing economy, and increasing numbers of provocations, the crisis stability could be broken down by a potential miscalculation or escalating small use of force any moment, which makes situation fragile and urgent. Even a possible collapse of the regime in the North would be devastating for almost everyone in the region. However, the question of whether Washington will remain fully committed to the defense of the Republic of South Korea by risking a nuclear exchange with North Korea, and possibly with China, is still not just elusive one but also problematic. Predominant deterrence strategies largely operationalized in the context of Cold War deterrence do not constitute a ready-answer to what best deters North Korea. To tackle the issue, Washington tries to tailor its deterrence posture by employing missile defense systems, and use of advanced conventional military assets as well as strengthening South's capabilities at conventional level.

After the first North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, the term extended deterrence appeared for the first time in the joint statement of the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).(Choi, 2011) Thus, arguably, the United States has been transforming its ‘nuclear umbrella’ to ‘extended deterrence’ by employing other offensive and defensive non-nuclear assets (missile defense and RMA) to provide better protection to South Korea. However, in the long term, this is counter-productive for at least two reasons. First of all, the United States resolve and capacities constitute pretext and legitimate North Korean nuclear option as the best and only available option to deter the United States intervening North Korean challenge, an ontological security for the regime in the North. Therefore, ironically, the United States will for contain and suspend North Korean nuclear program push North Korean regime to step up in their nuclear program. Second, these efforts create more dichotomies and security dilemmas in broader East Asian security environment by pushing and legitimizing South Korea’s and Japan’s increasing defense spending. In return, alarmed with changing regional balance of power, China, as rising economically, is speeding its efforts to catch up to the rest by increasing its own defense spending and military modernization. As China challenge increasing with an opaque military modernization, other regional actors, in particular Japan, feels threatened and take counter measures that push the regional security in a wider vicious circle of arms races.

In such environment, the United States doctrine has evolved from the use of nuclear weapons in otherwise non-nuclear situations to deployment of conventional capabilities and information-warfare operations and nuclear option for nuclear use, which over all creates huge pressure on those who are explicitly depended on the United States nuclear umbrella. Due to diminishing role of nuclear weapons and increasing missile threats, defensive capacities in the form of missile defense systems has gained ground in strategizing extended deterrence in the 21st century. Yet, diminishing role of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence posture comes always with price tag in the form of diminishing credibility of the United States extended deterrence in allies’ eyes. For instance, Anderson and Larsen suggest that allies are increasingly concerned about the possible effect of these reductions on the United States ability to protect them from nuclear threats.(Anderson, Larsen, and Holdorf, 2013, xiv)

4.3 Militarization as a Source of Uncertainty

Driven by thriving economies and amplified uncertainties about the rise of Chinese assertiveness, doubt on US deterrence commitments, historical hatreds, Asian countries spent billions on defense over the last decades becoming home to the largest arms trade.(Mastro, 2014) From 2005 to 2014, military spending grew 76%, which is the most rapid growth compare to other regions. In the absence of arms control regimes that might constrain or restrains for the future military developments, arms race prospects in Asia is considerable.

Table 13: Defense Expenditure (\$, Million)

	2000	2005	2010	2015
Japan	39285	43910	54357	59956
S_Korea	13081	21504	25069	33460
China	68063	103400	264210	453746
Taiwan	7580	7978	8649	10257
Source: SIPRI				

As there are numbers of unresolved tensions in Asia, especially in the East Asia, there are both undergoing large-scale military modernization programs. Defense spending trends in North East Asia (China, Japan, two Koreas and Taiwan) accounted for more than 80% of total military expenditure in East Asia, which is evident of action-reaction dynamics and emerging complex arms race in this region. In this sense, one way of the looking at this is to compare the share defense spending, which is given at the table above and is depicted at the figure below.

Table 14: Military Expenditure, GDP, Arms Trnasfer, 2004-20014

Country	Parameter	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
East Asia	Military expenditure (ME)											
East Asia	- Current dollars (millions)	159.000	178.000	197.000	214.000	232.000	254.000	268.000	284.000	301.000	317.000	338.000
East Asia	- constant 2014 dollars (millions)	194.000	209.000	225.000	238.000	253.000	275.000	287.000	298.000	310.000	322.000	338.000
East Asia	Arms exports (goods & services)	1,6	1,9	2,3	2,5	2,9	2,6	4,3	2,7	3,0	3,6	2,9
East Asia	Arms imports (goods & services)	24,2	23,8	33,3	24,3	31,2	32,7	39,7	41,6	44,3	44,9	44,9
East Asia	ME/AF (constant 2014 dollars)	23.500	25.200	26.800	29.600	33.800	36.900	41.500	46.900	49.300	50.100	52.200
East Asia	ME per capita (constant 2014 dollars)	78	83	87	95	107	115	127	142	148	149	153
Japan	Military expenditure (ME)											
Japan	- Current dollars (millions)	34.800	36.200	37.400	38.300	39.700	40.400	41.500	43.700	44.400	45.200	45.900
Japan	- constant 2014 dollars (millions)	42.300	42.600	42.700	42.600	43.300	43.700	44.400	45.800	45.700	45.900	45.900
Japan	ME/AF (constant 2014 dollars)	176.000	178.000	178.000	177.000	180.000	181.000	186.000	192.000	193.000	194.000	196.000
Japan	ME per capita (constant 2014 dollars)	330	330	330	330	340	340	350	360	360	360	360
Japan	Gross domestic product (GDP)											
Japan	- Current dollars (millions)	3.580.000	3.740.000	3.920.000	4.110.000	4.150.000	3.950.000	4.180.000	4.250.000	4.400.000	4.540.000	4.600.000
Japan	- constant 2014 dollars (millions)	4.340.000	4.400.000	4.480.000	4.570.000	4.530.000	4.280.000	4.480.000	4.460.000	4.530.000	4.610.000	4.600.000
Japan	GDP per capita (constant 2014 dollars)	34.000	34.500	35.000	35.800	35.400	33.500	35.100	34.900	35.600	36.200	36.200
Japan	Arms exports (goods & services)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0,1
Japan	Arms imports (goods & services)	10,6	12,5	17,5	11,9	15,9	16,2	21,9	22,8	24,6	26,3	24,3
S-Korea	Military expenditure (ME)											
S-Korea	- Current dollars (millions)	18.900	21.400	23.400	25.200	27.800	29.600	30.100	31.900	33.700	35.400	37.300
S-Korea	- constant 2014 dollars (millions)	22.900	25.200	26.800	28.000	30.300	32.000	32.200	33.400	34.700	35.900	37.300
S-Korea	ME/AF (constant 2014 dollars)	33.200	36.500	38.700	40.800	44.400	47.500	48.500	51.100	52.900	54.700	56.800
S-Korea	ME per capita (constant 2014 dollars)	480	530	560	580	630	660	660	690	710	730	760

S-Korea	Gross domestic product (GDP)											
S-Korea	- Current dollars (millions)	810.000	869.000	942.000	1.020.000	1.070.000	1.080.000	1.170.000	1.240.000	1.290.000	1.350.000	1.410.000
S-Korea	- constant 2014 dollars (millions)	984.000	1.020.000	1.080.000	1.130.000	1.170.000	1.170.000	1.250.000	1.300.000	1.330.000	1.370.000	1.410.000
S-Korea	GDP per capita (constant 2014 dollars)	20.600	21.300	22.300	23.500	24.100	24.200	25.700	26.600	27.200	27.900	28.800
S-Korea	Arms exports (goods & services)	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,2	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,8	0,8
S-Korea	Arms imports (goods & services)	5,5	5,2	6,1	5,9	7,2	7,1	7,1	7,6	8,5	7,8	7,7
China	Military expenditure (ME)											
China	- Current dollars (millions)	72.200	85.000	99.600	110.000	122.000	140.000	153.000	163.000	175.000	185.000	201.000
China	- constant 2014 dollars (millions)	87.700	100.000	114.000	122.000	133.000	152.000	164.000	171.000	180.000	187.000	201.000
China	ME/AF (constant 2014 dollars)	37.100	43.200	50.100	55.000	60.900	70.900	78.600	83.600	90.000	95.900	104.000
China	ME per capita (constant 2014 dollars)	65	75	85	90	100	110	120	130	130	140	150
China	Gross domestic product (GDP)											
China	- Current dollars (millions)	3.520.000	4.030.000	4.670.000	5.450.000	6.060.000	6.620.000	7.410.000	8.260.000	9.040.000	9.860.000	10.700.000
China	- constant 2014 dollars (millions)	4.280.000	4.750.000	5.330.000	6.060.000	6.610.000	7.170.000	7.920.000	8.660.000	9.310.000	10.000.000	10.700.000
China	GDP per capita (constant 2014 dollars)	3.280	3.630	4.050	4.580	4.970	5.360	5.890	6.410	6.860	7.340	7.820
China	Arms exports (goods & services)	1,2	1,2	1,8	2,0	2,4	2,0	3,4	1,9	2,2	2,7	2,0
China	Arms imports (goods & services)	3,9	2,0	4,5	0,8	1,6	1,2	1,3	0,7	1,2	1,0	1,3
Source: WMEAT												




Figure 3: Defense Expenditure (\$, Million)

When we compare the defense spending China, with its huge potential, comes first even though other countries defense expenditures are also on the rise. Yet, none of the countries can compete with China in terms of resource and potential, which is evident by almost any measure. Nonetheless, since 2008, Japan and South Korea has sharply risen their defense spending due to the exabertating security environment as numerous territorial and maritime conflicts intensified. A direct response to China's assertive claims and decvlining US role in the region, these country have opted for increasing military expenditure as an internal balancing act.



Figure 4: Japan's Defense Expenditure (\$, Million, 2002-2015)



Figure 5: South Korea Defense Spending

Another way to looking at the data that supports the claim that Asian states increasing defense spending is to compare their defense expenditure to GDP ratios. Chinese military expenditures per capita are relatively small when we compare to other countries in the region, which gives China huge windows of opportunity as its economy keeps growing.




Figure 6: Defense Expenditure Per Capita

Another measure, which is also the most common measure to identify the patterns of militarization is to compare defense spendings as percentage of GDP. However, we have to keep in mind that, these countries' GDP has been rising over the recent decades. In this sense, even it seems stagnant at certain point, spending one

percent of the GDP ten years ago and spending one percent of GDP now is not the same.

Table 15: Defense Expenditure of GDP (%)

	2002	2005	2010	2015
Japan	1	1	1,01	1,02
S_Korea	2,4	2,7	2,68	2,4
China	1,6	1,3	1,41	1,36
Taiwan	2,7	2,2	2,29	1,98
Source: World Bank				

The rise in absolute defense spending might be a direct result of increasing prosperity and wealth as well as domestic politics in the region. In this sense, especially, Japan's defense expenditure to GDP rise patterns (falling in the early 2000s while rising back since 2010) and arms acquisition patterns reveal that threat perceptions stemming from China is the key driver of the militarization.

Table 16: Arms Acquisition Patterns

	Japan			China			S_Korea		
	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010-2015	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010-2015	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010-2015
Aircraft	1.178	1.379	1.184	10.100	9.673	8.174	1.814	1.316	2.001
Air defence systems	168	56	70	664	429	444	440	370	450
Armoured vehicles	0	0	4	1	0	0	927	1.011	1.088
Artillery	56	16	1	537	666	727	46	51	51
Engines	473	289	210	1.274	1.482	1.980	230	233	241
Missiles	81	372	286	30	30	50	609	561	613
Naval weapons	107	126	131	602	634	586	45	60	80
Other	0	30	20	760	2.060	3.080	180	193	230
Sensors	172	411	178	0	0	0	220	124	42
Ships	28	0	28	13.965	14.971	15.038	0	0	0
Total	2.263	2.679	2.112	27.933	29.945	30.079	4.511	3.919	4.796
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database									

This is also partly true for other regional countries. Three main elements of the emerging sub-regional arms race in Northeast Asia are advancing naval and maritime capabilities, electronic warfare and intelligence capacities, missile and missile defense capabilities.

Table 17: Asia's Rising Naval and Air Power

<u>Country</u>	Submarine		Major air-capable ships (ACS)		Principle surface Combatants (PCS)		Modern combat aircraft		Number of active overseas deployments	
	2004	2014	2004	2014	2004	2014	2004	2014	2004	2014
China	69	88*	0	1	63	79*	174	929	6	10
Japan	16	22*	0	4*	54	47*	170	277	3	3
South Korea	20	29*	0	2*	15	27*	153	284*	7	11
North Korea	71	72	0	0	3*	5	20	18	0	0
Australia	6	6	0	2*	10	15*	71	179*	9	10
*including to be purchased /pre-operational assets										
Source: IISS, Strategic Survey, 2014										

Without any formal dialogue or arms control mechanisms on strategic stability, the United States-China and China-Japan bilateral relations sour while countries in the region build up arms. Furthermore, there are two worrying characteristics of the current arms race in Asia. These are the uncertainty and lack of trust among major players and offensive character of some weapons systems that regional states were acquiring such as strike aircrafts, anti-ship missiles, and submarines.(Huxley ,2014, 91) Chinese and North Korean ballistic missile developments have led Japan and South Korea to enhance greatly their airborne intelligence collection and early warning capabilities as well as their theatre missile defenses jointly developed with the United States. All these examples show us that even though there is no immediate danger of arms race, yet there are strategic action reaction cycles of military modernization, which is equally dangerous.

Table 18: Threat Perceptions and Counter Measure

	China	Japan	South Korea
Threat Perception	Unresolved issue of Taiwan	China's pressure on Japanese controlled Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea	North Korean nuclear, missile, artillery and cyber threats
	Territorial conflicts in the East and South China Sea	North Korean nuclear and missile program	Chinese assertiveness (Contention over Socotra rock)
	Concerns over the United States rebalance	Territorial disputes with South Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima Islands	Rivalry with Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima
	Beijing search for international standing		
Military Modernization			
Air and Naval modernization (to build A2/AD capability)	J15 combat aircrafts	Helicopter carriers for Maritime self-defense forces	Hyunmu-2 and Hyunmu-3 ballistic and cruise missile
	The aircraft carrier Liaoning (China is building a second aircraft carrier, and will deploy total four of these types of carrier by 2020.)	Extras surveillance capacities, Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles	F-X combat aircraft programs (under which South Korea procure 40 F-35A Joint Strike)

	Type 081 amphibious warfare ships	F-35A joint strike Fighters	Son Won-il class (German type-214) submarine
	Type-052D destroyers	V-22 tilt-rotor transport aircraft	FEX frigates (24 units)
		New destroyers and submarines	Dokdo class helicopter carriers
Mis siles and nuclear forces	YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missiles		
	DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles		
	Land based DF-41 and Submarine launched JL-2 (could reach continental US)		
	Its own missile defense system		
	Capabilities to destroy satellite (anti satellites missiles)		
	Growing cyber space capabilities		

Source: IISS, Strategic Survey, 2014.

Arms acquisition patterns and the nature of action reaction cycle of these patterns are the direct indicators of the emerging arms race in the region has already gained ground, especially between Japan and China, and South North Korea dyads, which is depicted at table above.

4.4 Security Dilemma in Asia

One important characteristics of Asian security dilemma is that it has a multi-actoral dynamics. The Cold War security dilemma is a simple bipolar (or dyadic) model in which only two main actors' behaviors create and reinforce the spiral of action reaction cycle that generates security dilemma. In a multi-level security dilemma structure, we have to take into account numbers of interactions and thus it becomes much more complex than a bipolar version.(Drmola ,2016).

As the United States changes its extended deterrence posture to deal with new types of deterrence challenges and evolving security structure in Asia, in some of the particular examples, a link between extended deterrence and security dilemma can hypothetically be assumed. The research deals with five major cases where the link between extended deterrence and security dilemma can be found. These cases are mentioned in the table below. The research argues that there is an emerging security dilemma over each of these cases driven by extended deterrence strategies and posture.

Extended deterrence (deterrence, assurance, and reassurance) is one of the backbone policy of the United States in Asia since the early Cold War era. All these

missions are closely linked, yet none of them is subset of the other. Since the end of the Cold War, the ground on which all of these missions practiced, has fundamentally changed. Therefore, the research primarily focuses on these changes and the way in which extended deterrence posture in the new era effects allies' decisions over the cases where security dilemma is suspected. Extended deterrence constrains actors from using nuclear weapons and going beyond limited escalations to full-fledged war. Yet, it also effects certain decision making such as military acquisition and policy changes. To understand the role of extended deterrence on allies' decision, we have to look at the assurance/reassurance parts of the equation. James Schoff notes that effective deterrence is not always enough to assure an ally or a deterrent capacity can assure an ally yet make a potential adversary worry about the intent. He underlines that this is the case as the United States replaces its major deterrent assets with diverged, diffused and off-shore assets even though these are more capable in terms of range and power. According to him, "The assurance effect is less concrete and immediate, though the deterrence effect might actually be stronger, because a potential adversary's defense planners are paying perhaps the closest attention to the whole array of new capabilities. This helps explain why Tokyo can be underwhelmed with recent developments while at the same time Beijing is alarmed."(Schoff, 2009, 34.) That is, the growing gap between assurance/reassurance and deterrence missions crafts changing security doctrine and policies in Asia. Matter of fact, no one questions extended deterrence credibility over Washington's commitment to protect Tokyo or Seoul. However, for the lower level conflicts over remote inhabitant islands or conventional fire exchanges, the US intervention cannot be so easily presumed. Moreover, deterring such conflicts over small offshore islands are far more difficult to deter major wars. In this sense, the dissertation deals with the four crises in Asia. It applies security dilemma theories to these junctures in order to test the link between extended deterrence and security dilemma. While brief of the crises introduced below, the subsequent chapters on the respective extended deterrence analysis will provide a detail of the gap between assurance/reassurance and deterrence.

Table 19: Security Dilemma and Extended Deterrence in Asia

Deterrence Contexts	Extended Deterrence to Japan		Extended Deterrence to South Korea
Security Dilemma	US-Japan-China	Japan- Korea(s)	South Korea- North Korea
Issues	China's pressure on Japanese controlled Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea	North Korean nuclear and missile program	North Korean nuclear, missile, and artillery threats
	Unresolved issue of Taiwan		Territorial disputes with South Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima Islands

4.4.1 US-Japan-China Relations and Security Dilemma over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

First aspect of the Sino-Japanese tensions is the territorial conflict over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The United States returned the Ryukyu Islands chain, which includes Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, to Japan with the 1972 Okinawa Reversion and since then Japan controls and administers the disputed territory. Even though China has begun actively challenging this status-quo over the recent years, it has maintained its objections since 1970s. As all territorial tensions in East and South East China Seas, the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes goes well beyond territorial rivalry. In this sense, it is partly on energy sources and fishing areas since conflict materialized in the early 1970s after oil resources in the area was discovered.(Nakano ,2015) For both country, energy security and the hydrocarbon value of East China Sea is important as China and Japan are hugely depended on oil and gas imports from Middle East and Africa. In Japan's immediate threat perceptions, energy security issues are, indeed, one of the important titles. In this sense, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, where 70% of Japan's oil needs come from, was a test for Japanese security thinking. Senkaku/Diaoyu islands chain may hold 160 million barrels of oil reserve. In this sense, maritime borders are especially important in terms of hydrocarbon resources. Japan and China reached a common understanding of a joint-venture to extract the natural resources in this area in June 2008, yet a series of incidents after 2010, the agreement had been scrapped and both countries resumed their own conflicting operations on drilling activities.

China argues that islands belongs historically to China, whereas Japan discards this interpretation and sees no dispute at all over the islands. Japan still holds residual sovereignty over the islands as well as administrative control. China's major claim is based on a map produced under Ming Dynasty indicates the Diaoyu islands as part of China's maritime territory. As both sides attach strategic importance to the islands, their willingness to use force increases. In September 2005, military dimensions to the dispute emerge for the first time when PLAN vessels locked on a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) patrol aircraft. Yet, the most daunting event occurred in 2010 when Japanese Coast Guard detained a Chinese fishing boat captain and crew after the Chinese captain refused to leave area and collided with two Japanese coast guard ships near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Before this incident, in April 2010, Chinese PLAN vessels consisting of ten warships passed closed tiny islet of Okinotorsihima, and Japan quickly passed a bill through Diet to consolidate Japan's exclusive economic zone claims through additional construction activities. Japan also objected China's maritime activities to stop Japanese research operations in the disputed area. After series of conflicting maneuvers around the area, tensions drastically intensified. In September, 2010, a captain and crew of a Chinese trawler ramming into Japanese coast guard vessels were detained. China reacted to the detention of Chinese citizens with an escalatory pattern exercising extreme diplomatic and economic pressure on Japan suspending all high-level contacts and talks. Japan directly tempted to the extended deterrence commitments from the United States for the disputed islands. Meanwhile, after the event both then Secretary State Clinton and then Secretary of Defense Gate reiterated that the US security assurances for the disputed area.(Asia-Pacific, 2016, 126) The tension at this point had risen rapidly with reciprocal accusations and diplomatic bickering. China publicly threatened Japan and anti-Japanese protests occurred in Beijing. Japan has extended captain's custody contrary to usual 48 hours and the captain was charged for violating Japanese domestic laws. Overall, the incident had deep-seated consequences in the relations between China and Japan. Japan has started considering seriously likelihood military incidents in and around the Senkaku Islands, and evaluate Chinese a fait accompli incursion as a real possibility. (Koga ,2016) Chinese pattern of behavior towards the disputed Islands has changed considerably as well. It increased its air and maritime maneuvers around the islands and become more assertive on its territorial claims.

The second successive escalatory event occurred in 2012 when Japan has decided to nationalize Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012. Even before Senkaku Boat Collision in 2010, China had increased its presence in the area by using civilian maritime law enforcement vessels. As a response to these increasing Chinese intimidations, a public campaign was launched by then the governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishiara, arguing that central government was not doing enough to protect Japanese sovereignty over islands. On July 7, 2010, Yoshihiko Noda, then Prime Minister of Japan, had decided to nationalize islands, which have soured relations further. China has taken a more assertive stand over the dispute, whereas Japan has presented little constrain in showing determination to protect its interests. With Abe's return to office, nationalization of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012, prolonged increased in Chinese maritime assertiveness, Sino-Japan disputes has reached a more dangerous level. In 2012, China stopped Japanese Coast Guard Ship entering in the disputed territory. On November, 2013, China established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which was another direct indication of Chinese growing assertiveness since 2010 towards Japan. By establishing an ADIZ over the disputed Islands, China has institutionalized its claims, as it does in Taiwan issue with the introduction of 2005 anti-Secession law. Institutionalization of dissatisfaction with the status quo is assumed that China will challenge the status quo at its first convenience either by force or intimidations. China has, indeed, entered within twelve nautical miles of the disputed territory more than twenty times between September 2012 and September 2013, which casts 20 times increase compare to before 2010. Even though China shows some kinds of restrain by regularizing patrols,(Fravel ,2016a) or resuming senior level consultations after President Xi's bilateral meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Abe in 2015, China has crossed another line by sending its naval vessels, for the first time, into the contiguous zone on June 2016.(Nakazawa ,2016) China also allowed unpresented anti-Japanese demonstrations, where Japan related business vandalized throughout the country. Domestic politics and nationalism are also important driver of securitization of each other in Sino-Japanese relations, yet since 2010 with increasing tensions and diplomatic, and political confrontations, there is certain military aspects lingering in the both sides. Meantime, Russian naval ships also starts entering the contiguous zone near the contested islands since 2016, which makes Japanese anxiety even more heightened.

Indeed, both sides chose to escalate the dispute for different reasons. China has never controlled or administered the islands and it has not sufficient power to alter the status quo even though recent improvements in its naval capabilities. Due to this position of weakness, China has incentives to escalate to strengthen its claims by creating a new status quo through sharp rhetoric and increasing presence by its navy vessels within the territorial waters around the islands.(Fravel ,2016b) China has also incentives to push Japan to recognize the existence of a dispute. Japan, on the other hand, has strategic future-insecurity and uncertainty due to its abnormal status and dependency on the US extended deterrence while the United States remains neutral against the conflict. Due to this strategic position of weakness, Japan has tried to enhance its control over the contested islands chains by escalating the issue on its own ways. In the new (un)stability, two countries are still short of militarizing the conflict, yet a militarized escalation can occur anytime. As both China and Japan continue naval modernizations and military buildups, there can be military confrontation in the increasing military presence in the region.

Even though no substantial shift in the balance of power in East Asia occurred yet, Chinese defense modernization has been seen as a threat in Japan. Lack of transparency in military modernization and security strategies in both countries feed the security dilemma. Chinese opaque military modernization and security policies, including the defense budget creates huge insecurity not just in Tokyo and also in many other capitals. Special concerns are the quantity and quality of weapons systems and command and control mechanism China has introduced recently, the lack of transparency in defense projects aims and budgets, PLA's increasing ability of offensive military capabilities, and Chinese missile developments and nuclear force modernization. Yet, when it comes to Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, naval capabilities make the greatest sense.

Table 20: Japanese/Chinese assets based near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Assets	Japan	China
Submarines	0	16
Principal Surface Combatants	16	27
Bomber Aircraft	20	48
Tactical Aircraft	15	400
Source: IISS		

Even though Japan has one of the most capable navy in the region, China has significantly modernized its maritime capabilities over the years. Given the pace and opacity of Chinese military buildups, Japan has potent reasons to be worried. Matter of fact, the gap between Japanese and the United States capabilities and Chinese counter capabilities are significant. The US extended deterrence provides a hedge against Chinese threat for Japan. However, one of the major factor that shape the Japanese strategic understanding of the regional security in East China Sea is that the US involvement into the regional affairs has created a sense of anxiety in Japan. According to 2015 White Paper document, there are increasing numbers of ‘gray-zones’ for which Japan cannot explicitly rely on the extended deterrence provided by the United States. (“White Paper 2015: Defence of Japan” 2015) For instance, Japan’s the first National Security Strategy paper (NSS) implies that Japan would expect US support at an early stage in a security contingency involving China in the East China Sea. (Huxley ,2014, 41) Nevertheless, the United States remains to be neutral to the conflicts over these offshore islets, yet under the US-Japan treaty, the security guarantees applies to the disputed territories, which is underlined by first Clinton and Gate in 2010 and then by Obama in 2014. (Aoki ,2014) The United States remains, however, neutral in the dispute for the sake of strategic stability in the region. Basic US calculation is that too much confident of US involvement in favor of Japan into the conflict could cause a moral hazard situation where Japan could make strategic mistakes and take unnessesary risks that it would not take otherwise. However, Japanese fears that given Crimea crisis, against a Chinese fait accompli seizure of the Islands, the United States security guarantees would be mooted. Therefore, the stability around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is indeed fragile with increasing possibility of unwanted escalation. Ayson and Ball argues that a minor event in the area could escalate to a serious arms clash. He further underlines that any US-Japan joint strikes on China’s army could generate a contingencies at where China would opt for using its nuclear weapons. (Ayson and Ball, 2014a). Bearing in mind this kind of interpretations and fears of entrapment/abandonment and moral hazard, the US barely supports Japan claims over these inhabitant islands, while Japan sees no point the US would risk a nuclear war with China over these islands.

Sino-Japanese escalatory behaviors also are driven by the perceptions of power transition at the global level. (Nakano ,2015) 2010 China has recovered from 2008

financial crisis much faster than any other country did. As result of this, China gained confidence in its position. The most obvious indication of growing confidence is its growing military visibility in and around East and South China Sea. These changes at strategic level feeds Japan's desire to be less dependent on the United States in its security, which is not limited to Abe's nationalist agenda. Indeed, in 2010, after breaking 54th consecutive years of Liberal Democratic Party dominance, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leader, Yukio Hatoyama, was also eager to shift from over-dependency to the United States towards more independent foreign and security policy. In this sense, Japan's desire of normalization and pursuing close regional ties with other countries in the region to reduce dependency on the United States goes beyond personalities and it is driven by strategic and structural changes. To this end, since 2010, Japan has increasingly sought a proactive defense doctrine as well as amplified multilateral cooperation track in the region and less dependency on the United States. When it comes to nuclear weapons, in general, Japan is not against Obama's nuclear free world initiative, yet concerns its impact on extended deterrence. As both South Korean and Japanese confidence, have been shaken by the fact that nuclear umbrella provided by the United States has not prevented North Korean nuclearization and offers little for the lower level conflicts, both countries have requested tactical nuclear weapons deployment in the region.

With unsettled issues in the US-Japan relations regarding to the American military bases and increasing doubts about the American resolve to protect Japan, profound tensions over territorial and maritime security issues with China, Russia and Korea, ongoing financial/economic difficulties and distresses in regional politics, Japan uncertainties has kept growing since 2010. As China gaining air and sea superiority over Japan in East China Sea and China's increasing A2/AD capabilities and increasing nuclear second strike capabilities, 'gray-zones' for Japanese security under the US extended deterrence are on the rise. Therefore, Japan pursues an effective and independent deterrence capability for the defense of the disputed territory. Japan had long worried from China's military build-up, especially its maritime power accumulations. Japan's response to growing Chinese assertiveness and military capability to continue to hedge militarily against it as at the present time, within the alliance with the United States. Indeed, following increased Chinese assertiveness in and around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the Japan has immediately sought

reassurances from the United States. In this sense, maritime and territorial disputes over tiny islets, rocks and islands in this part of the region have become inimitable contest for the future of the extended deterrence. The United States is, however, slow to grapple. According to Mira Rapp Hooper there are at least three reasons for the gap between allies and the United States expectations. First, existing treaties between allies and the United States does not provide guidance about the US extended deterrence posture (what, when and how the US will deter). The United States interests are little compare to ally when it comes to these off-shore territories, which overall reduce the credibility of the extended deterrence. Third, unlike the Cold-War rivalries, neither the United States nor allies are sworn enemies to any of the potential adversaries, which overall makes distancing behavior more common in the understanding and perceptions of the US role in the region. Indeed, along the way, the United States has showed distancing behaviors over Japan's unilateral decisions over Senkaku Islands such as Japan's nationalization of the disputed islands even though it shows rhetorically adhesion by underlying commitment to security of Japan under USJMT includes Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. For instance, when Japan nationalize disputed territory, although the United States did not publicly denounce its ally after the decision was announced, it was not satisfied with what they perceived as Japan's move to create unnecessary tensions in the region, and delivered the Japanese side a clear message of their frustration. Thus, under current fear of entrapment, the United States engages in a waffling strategy, or in other words, it simply maintains a state of strategic inaction. It does not criticize nor support Japan in these conflicts. The United States does not distance himself from its ally totally, which undermines strategic deterrence in the region, or adhere fully Japan, which cause stability-instability paradox and increase risk of being entrapped, but simply waffles by trying to convince Japan of its continuing loyalty and commitment to the security of Japan while simultaneously push Japan for taking more for its own security. For instance, when China announced the establishment of ADIZ in November 2013 covering disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the United States sent two B-52 strategic bombers to the airspace over the disputed islands (which was later revealed by the Pentagon that it was arranged prior to China's ADIZ declaration) at the same time ordered civilian airlines to comply with Chinese ADIZ.(Pugliese and Insisa, 2017, 59) Thus, Washington tries to (re)assure its ally, but not at the cost of entrapment in a conflict for distant and inhabitant rocks.

Therefore, in the changing security environment, Japan has to depend on its own capabilities to defy lower-level conflicts that may erupt around the Senkaku as the United States shifted towards a more risk averse and hand-off foreign and security policy in Asia. In this sense, Japan has only recently raised the defense of the Senkaku to a national strategic priority. At the end of the 2010, Japan published revised National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG), alongside a new Mid-Term Defence Programme (MTDP) for 2011– 2015. Policy changes were significant. First of all, new documents shifted threat perceptions and underlined China as a threat to regional and global security. Accordingly, the new document called for a dynamic defense forces instead of previous basic defence concept, which was hold over from the Cold War. Thus, Japan has shifted from a passive military doctrine to an active military engagement for contingencies possibly even outside its own territory. Under the new concept, JSDF has calibrated its defense capabilities. First of all, force structures and procurement priorities has significantly changed. Japan's Ground Self Defense Forces, which was designed to counter Soviet threats in the Cold War, has restructured as a lighter and more advance forces and redeployed southwards including a garrison, for the first time, in Okinawa Prefecture to defend against Chinese military movements. Air Self Defense Forces has continued to increase its airlift and airstrike capabilities by acquiring stronger fighter jets. Even more capable fighter jets requests have been finalized in April 2011. The Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) has been, however, the biggest recipient of the defence funds and has been given the utmost importance under the new defense concept. MSDF's capabilities has been improved by procurement of helicopter carriers, increasing numbers of destroyers, submarines as well as integrated BMDs systems. 2015 budget includes 20 P-1 maritime surveillance aircrafts, an early warning aircraft, six F-35 fighter jets, 2 radar equipped destroyers, 30 amphibious assault vehicles a TMD system joint venture with the United States. Most of these newly acquired capabilities are intended to be used in a potential constigencies over Senkaku Islands dispute. More importantly, Japan has shifted away from one of the main taboos by lifting export ban on military technology and allowing joint venture development of defense systems. Overall, in 2015, Japan announced its largest defense budget in post-war history. For China, increasing military capability of Japan, however, is regarded a threat to its security. Japan's defensive military portfolio to secure its territorial interest appears offensive and

creates an action reaction cycle of security competition with China over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Under the security dilemma theory, the inability to make offense/defense distinction and apparent advantage of offense are two key requirements. In Sino-Japanese security relationship, the first one withholds on both sides, as Japan underlines the opaque militarization of China while China worries Japan normalization efforts. However, the latter's effect on the security relationship between China and Japan is more contested as the United States is also part of the equation. On the one hand, defense certain advantages on both Japanese and Chinese calculations, yet especially for China, offensive escalation and capability of escalation dominance is the only way-out for possible contingencies in East China Sea. When it comes to offense-defense balance and advantage of offense, we should take into account what Glaser and Kaufmann called directional balances, for which defensive alliances becomes important factor affecting the balance. (Glaser and Kaufmann, 1998) Traditionally, the US-Japan alliance was a guarantee that Japan remained an abnormal power without an army. In today's alliance setting, even though Japan depends on the US nuclear umbrella for its ultimate security, it opts for its own deterrence capabilities for the lower level conflicts. In this sense, Japan, traditionally defensive power, look after offensive capabilities for situation where China's future fait accompli. In Chinese case, China's desire to change current status-quo either by will or force make offense prevails defense in its strategic orientation. China's opt for nuclear and missile modernization and armament as well as other offensive capabilities such as aircraft carrier, long-range ballistic missiles, and stealth fighter jets are evidence of this thinking. In China's understanding, as long as it stops or delays automatic involvement of the United States, either by building strong and effective A2/AD capacities or strategic deterrence, it can control the escalation dominance. Therefore, when security dilemma applied to Japan-China relations in the context of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, predictions of security dilemma are duly satisfied.

4.4.2 US-Japan-China Relations and Security Dilemma over Taiwan

Even though Taiwan is not direct point of contention in Sino-Japanese relations, it is strategically important. Taiwan is the most important security issue in Chinese strategy. Taiwan is of vital security interest to Japan too, due to its strategic

location as Taiwan would facilitate China to project power into wider Asia. If Taiwan was integrated into China, the South China Sea would effectively fall under China's control and China would also have more strategic sway over Japan's southwestern (Nanshei) islands and the East China Sea risking security of sea-lanes and Senkaku islands for Japan. When we think Chinese first island chain concept, Taiwan's importance to China as a key strategic step forward can be understood better.

The military balance between Taiwan and China has shifted in the recent years towards Chinese favor. A decade ago, China had few short-range missiles that could reach Taiwan. In current environment, China is either procuring or developing a range of short and long range ballistic/cruise missiles. Coupled with its expanding special operations forces, cyber and outer space capabilities, China is expanding and empowering its A2/AD capabilities.(Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016 ,2016)

Table 21: Taiwan-China Military Power

	Army	Air-Force	Navy	Missiles
Taiwan	Personnel:130,000 Tanks:1,100 Artillery pieces:1,600	Fighters:388 Bombers/attack: 22	Destroyers: 4 Frigates: 22 Submarines: 4	Limited the PAC-3, and domestically made Hsiung Feng surface-to-surface missiles.
China	Personnel:1.25 million Tanks: 7,000 Artillery pieces: 8,000	Fighters:1,680 Bombers/attack: 620	Destroyers: 26 Frigates: 53 Submarines: 54	More than 1,500 missiles China aims at Taiwan

Source: Taipei Times

In recent years, China's strategy towards Taiwan was influenced positively by the expanding cross-strait trade and economic links even though pro-independent party won the election in Taiwan in 2015. Despite this positive environment, China's military posture has shown little to abate from coercing Taiwan. Over the years, China has refrained from use of force, yet using intimidation and threat to use of force to prevent Taiwan making moves towards de jure independency is prolonged part of the China's Taiwan strategy. Even though, China's current modernization and military acquisition trends does not only aim at enhancing China's A2/AD capabilities to cope with contingencies in and around Taiwan, but also enabling China operate beyond its near geography. Nevertheless, China's A2/AD capacities first and foremost serve to dissuade a third party (the US and Japan) intervening a potential Taiwan contingency or limit and delay intervention if it is necessary.

As Christensen underlines that in Political Science literature, the link between deterrence and security dilemma is loose one and finding proper reassurance tools to avoid security dilemma is a must. In this sense, Taiwan issue presents a 'knotty security dilemma' for the US role in East Asia. Indeed, Taiwan is the most important strategic interest to China. Therefore, US arms sales to Taiwan or the US backing for de-jure independency of Taipei is worrying for Chinese. To prevent this to be happened, China continues to increase its military deployments towards Taiwan even though Cross-Strait relations was on path forward through political and economic issues over the years. Over the recent years, there were many strains in the Sino-American relations due to numbers of issues such as meeting with the Dalai Lama, disagreement over economic issues, and Chinese extortion on US technology companies, cyber brickerings. Yet, none of them is as important as US arms sales to Taiwan. The United States is the main source of arms and ammunitions to Taiwan as the United States continue sell arms to Taiwan under Taiwan Relations Act. Patriot (PAC-3) missiles, Radar sets, Osprey Class Mine Hunting Ships, Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, Assault Amphibious Vehicles, UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, TOW missiles, Man pad Missiles, Apache Attack Helicopters, F16 Fighter Jets and many more advanced US weapons and weapons systems has been sold to Taiwan under US-Taiwan Relations act. In 2011, 5.8 billion worth arms sales approved and the package included a major modernization program for Taiwan's F-16 fighter jets fleet. Recently, Obama administration has realized 6.4 billion US dollars worth of arms sales. China has kept insisting that the United States must respect China's core interests and Taiwan is the foremost core interest of China.²⁹ In this sense, China's replies to arms sales to Taiwan are generally suspension of military exchanges, ministerial level consultations as well as hardening bilateral cooperation on regional level issues. China can only afford to bark rather than bite for the time being, yet suspicions of the US and US-Japan alliance towards Taiwan grows in Beijing. China is the only significant power that opposed to the status quo, a de facto independent but de jure not recognized Taiwan, and its stance against Taiwan independence is also institutionalized domestically by the 2005 Anti-Secession Law adopted by Chinese Communist Party. The most important attribution of this institutionalization of dissatisfaction with the

²⁹ Other irredentist disputes of China: winning back Hon-Kong from UK in 1997, Macau from Portugal in 1999; border problems with India and Russia; Taiwan, Spratly Islands, Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands –continues.

status quo is that China will challenge the status quo at its first convenience if it feels it has to. For the United States the best option is the status quo, which is equals to stability whereas this option is the second-best option for China or Taiwan whose first best option has been defeating and assimilating the other under their respective systems of government. Even though Japan is lesser important part of this equation, Japanese policies and relations with the US and Taiwan effects the security dilemma.

Independent from the US relations with Taipei, the US-Japan alliance can potentially effect the security dilemma between US and China over Taiwan through varieties of ways. For instance, China considers MDSs, even if these are defensive in nature, as a threat for its security for several reasons. First, MSDs can provide protection to Taiwan against China's ballistic missiles. Second, a joint venture with Japan, as it is implemented, could encourage Japan to be involved in a potential Taiwan contingency more freely. Third, if MDSs are offered to Taiwan that could possibly create a quasi-alliance between the United States and Taiwan, which can suggest an unconditional support for Taipei's independence. Moreover, the United States must have been supported by Japan to intervene a conflict in the Straits if it happens. Therefore, China consider MDSs and US-Japan alliance and relations with Taiwan threatening.(Christensen ,2002) In this sense, Chinese apprehension about the United States-Japan alliance only worsened after Japan failed explicitly to exclude Taiwan from the scope of its defense agreement with the United States. Furthermore, in 2013, Japan has given exclusive fishing rights around Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to prevent Taiwan from cooperating with China over the dispute. Japan's attempt to improving relations with Taiwan alarmed China.(Nakano ,2015) When it comes to increasing US-Japan relations with Taipei, China tends to view the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese alliance and the development of US missile defense technology in terms of security dilemma. Yet, here again perception is two way streets. China's near seas active defense strategy, which aims at the reunification of Taiwan, restoration of the lost and disputed maritime territories, protection of maritime resources, securing major sea lanes through improvements in conventional missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, air defense systems, fighter jets, and etc. greatly affect Japanese perception of Chinese threat.

Chinese view of US-Japan alliance is, thus, complicated when it comes to Taiwan. On the one hand, China has live with the United States-Japan Security Treaty

(USJST) for more than five decades. There are no logical reasons to assume change in Chinese policy towards the alliances in the short term. China sees alliance positive effect on restraining Japan becoming militarized again. Furthermore, at strategic level, China sees the United States as a counterpart, whereas Japan sees China as a counterpart. On the other hand, US request for more active and burden sharing Japan cause China to worry about an assertive Japan in the region. China sees Japan is already formidable militarily with its existing constitutional limits and without them it would be difficult to predict where it goes to head. In this sense, in particular the Chinese considers joint venture TMDs either by US-South Korea or US-Japan is not against North Korea but against China over Taiwan issue. Accepting the United States provided public goods on the regional waters, China worries about the extent of the United States naval presence in the region. Bearing in mind, conflicts over maritime borders and China's claims, China sees US navies on East and South China Sea as threatening its strategic security and builds extensive and formidable A2/AD capacity to prevent or delay the US intervention. The United States does not recognize Taiwan's independency officially, yet it is obliged to help Taiwan in case of an armed attack by the mainland China and China sees that without Japan and Japanese support the US cannot opt for this. This makes also the US-Japan alliance a threat to China when it comes to Taiwan. In this sense, in Taiwan issue, there is no clear line between offense and defense, and for China, even exclusively defensive systems such as missile defense systems developed by Japan and the United States are regarded as threats and fed Chinese security dilemma. For the offense -defense balance traits, offense plays in Chinese hand as it is not a status quo power on this issue, whereas Taiwan, and Japan-US alliance are in line with defense. Therefore, China benefits from the United States-Japanese alliance while being threatened by that. There is little that Japan or China can do to reduce feelings of insecurity in relation to each other as the United States continues its extended deterrence strategies as it is. In this sense, future of the United States in the region is one of the most important factors that shapes and reshapes Japanese and Chinese security in Asia. Overall, when we apply security dilemma to Taiwan case, there is a complex multi-actoral security dilemma in plays between US-Japan and China.

4.4.3 Japan- North-Korea Relations and Security Dilemma over North Korean Nuclear and Missile Programs

The third factor that shape the Japanese strategic understanding of the regional security is about the North Korea's nuclearization, which has created a direct sense of vulnerability.(Kamiya, 2002) Indeed, North Korea is one of the central motif in revisionist Japan post-Cold War security policy. 2015 White Paper states that North Korea threatens the peace and stability in the region and Japan has to pay utmost attention to it. Japan's revised NDPG and MTDP identified North Korea as a regional threat too. In this sense, Japan has shifted its low-risk engagement policy towards North Korea to high-risk containment policy by building up a more proactive security policy.(Maslow, Mason, and Paul ,2016, 36) Regarding with the threat perceptions, North Korea posed is two folds. First is the fact that it could potentially cascade a nuclear proliferation in the region and beyond. Against this, the United States extended deterrence is the bedrock of the security of Japan, without which Japan has no exit other than having its own nuclear deterrence. Second threats North Korea poses stems from the North Korean missiles. The White Paper underlines that if North Korea acquire nuclear weapons and necessary delivery capabilities, this would possibly give it a free hand to escalate its severe and dangerous provocations, and this would make Japan vulnerable and worrying.(White Paper 2015: Defence of Japan, 2015) Indeed, the North Korea's nuclear arrival in 2006 made Japan vulnerable to North Korean possible first strike in an escalating conflict in Korean Peninsula. Japan sees itself as a most likely candidate for a North Korean first strike attack due to: i) Given historical anti-Japanese sentiment in North Korea unfolding from the Japanese colonial background; ii) Presence of the United States bases on Honshu and Okinawa as well as the United States-Japan alliance itself. Matter of fact, Pyongyang warned many times that Tokyo would be its primary target of any war on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, North Korean threats are one of the most pressing sources of anxiety in Tokyo. Japan have a both National Missile Defense system (NMDs) and a joint venture US-Japan Theater Missile Defense systems (TMDs) in place. In this sense, Japan partly provides its own central deterrence by denial through missiles defense systems. China has inadequate quantity of ICBMs capable of striking the US continental soils. Therefore, missile defense creates a security dilemma with China at the strategic level by threatening China's second-strike capability, which is an externality of the security

dilemma between Japan and North Korea. That is, as Japan search for security against North Korean missile threat, that makes China insecure due to the mistrust and misgivings between Japan and China.

Matter of fact, North Korea as a threat under the Japanese radar since 1990s. Even though 1993 North Korean Nodong missile tests in the Sea of Japan brought the North Korean danger to a new level for Japan, Japan's North Korean narrative and security policy implementation has begun shifting towards a hardline after 1998 Taepodong-1 missile launch, which travelled over Japan before falling into Pacific Ocean. North Korean 1998 missile launch was akin the US shock of Soviet Sputnik.(Maslow, Mason, and Paul ,2016, 41) As a result of these missiles test, Japan felt the vulnerability of their country against a bellicose North Korean acts.(Shen ,2016, 110) The first nuclear test by North Korea in 2006, and after this, a series of North Korean provocations, such as 2006 Missile tests, 2006 Nuclear Test, 2009 nuclear and missile tests, 2012 missile test, 2013 nuclear test, 2015 missiles test, 2016 nuclear and missiles test, altered Japanese understanding of post-Cold War security fundamentally.

In addition to North Korean danger, anxieties about a strong (united) Korea have created further anxieties in Japan regarding future of its strategic environments. Japan has traditionally concerned with the possibility of Korean unification due to the fear of rising anti-Japanese sentiment. As a colonial power, Japan is not perceived in North and South Korea, and a rising anti-Japanese would be harmful to Japan's political and economic interests. Furthermore, there is an overlapping claim of sovereignty or jurisdiction on the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands between Japan and South Korea and this dispute escalated since mid 2000s. The dispute derives from a disagreement over whether the islands should be seen as included within Japan's annexation of the entire Korean peninsula and therefore returned to South Korea according to San Francisco Treaty. The islands are under administrative control of South Korea, their status yet to be determined. Japan Defense White paper in 2009 has underlined that disputed Takeshima/Dokdo Islands are inalienable Japanese territory, and this has created a dim view of Japan in Seoul. In August 2002, South Korean President, Lee Myung-bak had visited the islands as incline to his willingness to demonstrate his party's nationalistic credentials ahead of presidential election. A unified Korea will be hostile to Japan and closer to China as there are territorial

disputes and historical grievances between Korea and Japan. Continued US involvement on the peninsula would be only factor that limit deteriorating relations with Korea and Japan. In this sense, there is a recessed conflict between South Korea and Japan due to alliance relations with the United States. The most recent indication of this recessed conflict is that South Korea's last-minute decision not to sign an agreement in 2012 to share military data with Japan, including details about the North Korean threat to both countries.(Kwon ,2012) The first ever trilateral meeting between South Korea, Japan and the US was hold at the end of May, 2009 after North Korea's April 2009 missile test, where both Japan and South Korea was frustrated by the Washington's consent with China on UNSC President condemnatory statement but nothing else. Every time an initiative started between South Korea and Japan, bilateral ties hampered by the issues of history and territory. South Korea culturally and historically is an anti-Japan country, there are many issues stemming from Japan's colonial rule on the Korean peninsula such as comfort women, or controversial Yasukuni Shrine. A unified Korea would also provide rationale to the United States for reducing or totally withdrawing its forces in the East Asia, which would be another security externality for Japan regarding with Korea. Korea is, indeed, strategically important to Japan's security. Snyder shows that Japan's change and evaluation over the years (change from the free rider to a shareholder in US led security) is all direct response what happens in Korean peninsula. (Synder, 2015)

Indeed, Japan has traditionally highly sensitive to changes in its external environment due to strong sense of vulnerability to external threats stemming from Japan's lacks of a geographic protection as well as being heavily dependent on imports of energy, food and materials. Ergo, Japan has historically sophisticated security strategies that aimed both minimizing its strategic vulnerabilities and maximizing its capacity to influence external security environment. Therefore, Japan has started upgrading its SDF and revising the United States-Japan security cooperation and its legal and moral restrains to project power. However, historically any militarization efforts in Japan has counterproductive effects in the wider region.(Nakano, 2015)

Thus, when we test security dilemma theory over North Korean related security issues, even though there is a kind of action-reaction cycle between Japan and North Korea, the whole requirements are not satisfied. For instance, after 2009 nuclear and missile test, Japan, for the first time, authorized its SDF to intercept missiles from

North Korea, and deployed high altitude interceptors such as Aegis ship, and Patriot missiles in the Sea of Japan. However, even though Japanese responses as reaction to North Korean actions are not main driver of North Korean initial actions. Therefore, North Korea can be characterized as an externality rather than a spiral of security dilemma. Yet, North Korean nuclear and missile dangers creates other externalities, which exacerbates security dilemma between China and Japan.

4.4.4 South Korea- North Korea Relations and Security Dilemma over North Korean Nuclear and Missile Program

On paper, North Korean forces are sizable and formidable compare to the South Korea. The North has 1.8 times as many military personals, 1.7 times as many tanks and 2.1 times as many naval vessels as South Korea has. In military terms, South Korean inventory are, however, more modern and more up to date whereas North Korean equipment are mostly obsolescent. Even though North Korea has military personnel superiority in numbers, South Korea has higher level of military readiness and more trained and equipped personals. Moreover, US-South Korea have jointly invested in interoperability of capabilities, which has given a broad range of advance platforms to South Korea. In this sense, the United States-South Korean alliance displays an unusually high degree of equipment specificity (Suh ,2004). However, North Korea has an array of asymmetric capabilities including WMDs, sizeable Special Forces, cyber capabilities, artilleries and missiles.

Table 22: The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula

	North Korea	South Korea (and US Forces)
Defense Expenditure	8.2 billion \$ (2008)	25 billion \$ (2010)
Percentage of GDP	22-24%	2.6%
	Ground Forces	
Active troops	1.2 million	655,000 (+28,000)
Reserves and paramilitaries	5-7.7 million	3 million
Tanks	4,100	2,400 (+50)
Armored personal carries	2,500	2,600 (+110)
Field artillery pieces	8,500	5,200 (+16)
Multiple Rocket Launchers	5,100	200 (+4)
Mortars	7,500	6000
Air Defense Guns	11,000	300
	Air Forces	
Combat aircrafts	820 (max 620 serviceable)	460 (+90)
Helicopters	300	680 (+120)
	Naval forces	
Principle surface combatants	3	19
Patrol and coastal combatants	383	111

Submarines	70	23
Hovercraft	135	5
Landing ships and craft	130	41
Source: IISS, North Korean Security Challenges, p51		

Besides these asymmetric capabilities, North Korean long-range artilleries and mini-submarines are important in the North Korean force posture.(Fitzpatrick, 2011, 49) Among these capabilities nuclear one is the most important and contentious one. North Korean nuclear efforts date back several decades and there has been determined and enduring efforts to acquire nuclear weapons even though it cost too much. North Korea appears to be stockpiling nuclear weapons as it conducted its fifth nuclear test in 2016. North Korea's nuclear capability increases over the years which can be derived from the fact that recent nuclear tests were more advanced and powerful than the previous one. Moreover, it has expanded and extended its a range of missiles capabilities including a MRVs, ISBMs, SLBMs. Overall, this indicates that North Korea has been racing towards to be fully a nuclear power sooner than expected. Nonetheless, it is still debatable to argue whether North Korea possess 'usable' nuclear weapons or capability to deliver it. In this sense, it is highly speculative to have an explicit idea of North Korea's nuclear posture and policies. It is clear that it has some kinds of advancement over the years, and it is now widely believed that North Korea has enough stockpiles for couples of nuclear weapons. There are differences among estimations due to many unknowns about the quantities of produced possessed. Thus, arguably it has 25-50 kg enriched plutonium enough for 4-12 bombs.

Table 23: Selected Public Estimates of North Korea's Plutonium Stockpile and Weapons Arsenal

Estimate	Stockpile	Weapons
ROK Ministry of Defense (2006)	Up to 50kg produced by 2006	Up to 8
US Director of National Intelligence (2007)	Up to 50kg produced by 2006	Enough for at least 6 weapons
DPRK initial declaration (2007)	30kg produced, 26kg separated and weaponized after first test	
ISIS (2007)	28-50kg separated, after first test	5-12
Unofficial US intelligence estimates (2008)	Between 35-40 and 50-60kg (with 40-60 most likely)	
DPRK final declaration (2008)	37kg	
Siegfried Hecker estimate (2010)	24-42kg separated, after tests	4-7
International panel on fissile materials (2009)	46.1-58.3kg produced	
ROK Defense Minister (2010)	40kg	
Source:IISS, North Korean Security Challenges, p113		

In this sense, the estimations vary from five to twenty-seven weapons.(Borger, 2015; Allbright and Walrond, 2012) On delivery issue, North Korea has verified short- and medium-range missiles and some sorts of ISBM capabilities.(Hayes and Cavazos, 2015). North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests, yet as Kristensen pointed out there is no confident public information on the success of it. In this sense, with huge nuclear weapon design and fabrication as well as problem of miniaturization and delivery issues, North Korean nuclear capability is arguably for minimal deterrent purpose rather than a war fighting, let alone war winning capability for the time being. Although the North Korean nuclear program began many years ago, the collapse of Soviet Union and North Korea's premier allies Russia and China' normalization of relations with South Korea in the early 1990s, combined with South Korean alliance with the United States and increasing South Korean military capabilities emboldened and accelerated the North's nuclear program to ensure its survival in the post-Cold War era.(Cha, 2002a) In this sense, North Korea has made frequent reference to use of its nuclear weapons to sustain its position both domestically and internationally as a deterrent against any kind of attack, since it is well aware that nuclear weapons use against Seoul, Tokyo or Washington (or to any other) would be the beginning of its final annihilation. Yet, North Korea also know that even with all drawbacks and technical difficulties its nuclear threats are credible enough to effect target audience (fellow North Koreans, the South Koreans, the United States and Japan).

Another area of concern from North Korean threat is its world largest ballistic missiles inventories, which include short and medium range missiles, long-range systems and space launchers. North Korea conceivably has potent missile capability. Allegedly it is also debated over and over again that North Korea could develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and thus reach continental the United States soils as Pyongyang demonstrated its rocket capabilities by sending a satellites in orbit on a multistage launch vehicle.(Fitzpatrick ,2011, 129) For a matter of fact, North Korean missile threat is more potent and real than its nuclear threats due to its large missile inventories. The numbers and ranges of the missiles North Korea has already have procured from outside or developed on its own. Accordingly, North Korea has one of the largest missile inventories in the world and could terrorize many regional capitals by attacking large urban centers with conventional arms missiles. Given North Korean chemical and biological (and alleged nuclear) weapons stockpile, and variety

of delivery systems North Korea has including artillery, mortars, and missiles, there is a great danger for these countries to be target of North Korean chemical and biological attacks. Moreover, North is moving steadily closer towards marrying its fledging nuclear-weapons capacity with its medium and long range delivery vehicles, in the process materially enhancing its ability to credibly threaten its neighbors and perhaps even the United States with nuclear weapons.(Huxley ,2014, 88) For instance, some of North Korean missiles, such as Nodong, can also be used deliver nuclear warheads mounted bombs to South Korea and Japan as well as US's bases in the region. It is allegedly believed that North may not use its nuclear weapons mounted on a ICBMs or mounted on a small and medium range missiles, but it can at least used them with other conventional capacities by loading its nuclear weapons on it Soviet era bombers or submarines or battle ships as, for the North Korean regime.(Ham, 2013) Therefore, the United States extended deterrence in Asia, in particular defensive parts of the deterrence posture including ballistic missile defenses and advanced conventional capabilities such command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) are, first and foremost, designed to deter North Korean ballistic missile threat in Asia. Pyongyang possessed high alert risk for the South due to its huge conventional capabilities as well as opaque nuclear program, Special Forces, missiles, and chemical weapons.




Figure 7: North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities³⁰

³⁰ Retrieved from <http://bit.ly/1NIEbae>

All in all, there is no doubt that the North has capability to initiate a destructive war against the South Korea in particular, Japan and the United States (related to the United States bases in the region). Indeed, nuclear weapons and missiles threats represent a new level of threat as South has no ability to counter these threats on its own. Therefore, the existence of a constant and high calibrate nuclear threats, missiles tests and bellicose rhetoric are inescapable factors that shapes South Korean policy makers towards seeking American nuclear extended deterrence and arms acquisition and modernization. In this sense, the North Korean issue overrides other security challenges and becomes the central point of reference in the agenda of the South Korean defense priorities. Therefore, North Korean's nuclear push and the United States reluctant selective assurance against the North Korean danger is triggering a military buildups in South Korea and even rising the debate over South Korean sovereign nuclear option (Gale ,2016). As one senior South Korean official stated starkly: "A nuclear missile from the North can land on this office in four to five minutes. We don't have the luxury of thinking twice. This is no longer a dark cloud on the horizon. It's a threat at our doorstep."(Ignatius, 2016)

Recent events were especially volatile in terms of North South conflict intensity. The launch of a multi-stage, long range Unhca 3 rocket (December, 2012); a series of nuclear tests (fifth since first in 2006) on February 2013 (the North claimed that it miniaturized nuclear device); July 2013 paraded road mobile system designated Hwasong-13 missiles, a 5.500 km range and capable of hitting the United States; a medium range-Nodong missiles test in March 2014, a series of rhetorical and practical measures between March- April 2013 when there was a joint US-ROK military exercises all show how volatile the security in the region. There are two nuclear tests in January and September in 2016, and dozens of missiles tests with varied results since Kim-Jong un took power. North Korea aims at several things with these provocations. First of all, North Korean leadership tries to create a sense of crisis with the outside world as a means of creating unity at home. Thereby reinforcing legitimacy of the regime (this was a necessity for the young Kim Jong-un) can be sustained. Raising prospect of war is a way of economic extortion for the North. Lastly, North tries to divide the United States from its allies by threatening neighbors.

In addition to nuclear/missiles issues, a dangerous maritime dispute exists between North and South Korea. In 1953 armistice agreement set the Northern Limit

Line (NLL) as a boundary between two Korea leaving some islands within South Korean sovereignty. However, maritime borders never settled and it was always a source of conflict between two Koreas. In 2010, the Cheonan, a South Korean navy corvette sunk by a North Korean submarine torpedo fire, which was the one of the most important escalation in the North-South relations. The United States and many other countries race to condemn the attack yet the US had showed no desire to escalate the incident. On 24-25 May, 2010, the second SED meeting was held in Beijing and nothing substantial came out as an international response to sinking Cheonan. China called the incident unfortunate but refused to condemn it. China along with Russia also prevented condemnation of the attack at the UNSC. Even when the international investigation report named North Korea as fully responsible, China remained silent. Few months later, Yeonpyeong Island was shelled by North Korean artilleries, Beijing released an eluded response and stood short of condemnations of this attack. In a similar manner, when IAE released the update that North Korea pursuing uranium enrichment activities in contrast with the UN resolutions for the issue, China stayed sidelined. Chinese closed relations with the North Korea continued while South Korean and Chinese relations relatively being tense as South Korean foreign policy relations is fixated to the North Korean issue. China South Korea relations has also frayed due to the disputed EEZs claims in the Yellow Sea.

China's ongoing closed ties with North Korea demonstrates that North Korean survival and stability are very dear to China. Therefore, every time the North carries out yet another nuclear or missile test, it also tests relations with Beijing. On the one hand, China plays a central role in UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions against North Korea. On the other hand, China also plays important role for North Korea to buy time and bypass these resolutions and sanctions. China has, indeed, not just increased pressure on North Korea by allowing UNSC resolutions and new rounds of sanctions but also increased its economic investment in the North. In this sense, China has the absolute leverage over the North, yet its capacity is short of convincing the North on denuclearization. For instance, in 2009, North Korea agreed to resume the Six-Party Talks despite having declared it dead few months ago to satisfy Chinese demands for progress. Yet, it went nowhere due to the North Korea's demand a separated peace treaty with the US as a pre-condition. Over the years many incidences have evidently showed that North Korea cannot be persuaded to denuclearize for

improved relations and economic aids and it aims at being recognized as a legitimate nuclear power by the international community. The United States makes North Korean nuclear status emboldened by its strategic patience strategy, in which the United States has shifted its focus from North Korean demand for the nuclear weapons to supply side of the equation. The United States basically assumes that if they can stop materials that the North is dependent on for its nuclear program, then it would be able to slow down or stop entirely the program. Over the years since 2009, hundreds of ships from and to North Korea were inspected to this end. Yet, China holds the key to success of this strategy and China does not seem to operate in a way the United States or its allies would like to see. Therefore, China plays into North Korean hands by giving it time and space to pressure the United States and South Korea on Korean Peninsula. Meantime, despite United States long and extensive attempt to sanction and curb supply side of the North Korean nuclear program, Pyongyang was able to import sufficient technology for its growing nuclear program, which raised alarming questions about the effectiveness of the US strategy. Moreover, due to expertise gained from Pakistan nuclear scientists in 1990s, North Korea has indigenous technical expertise on centrifuge-production capacity.

In 2011, Yeonpyeong Islands was shelled by the North Korean artilleries leaving four South Korean deaths. With the increasing North Korean provocations, after these incidents, South Korea officially declared that it will respond any other attack with a retaliatory attack including use of air strikes. This marked a noteworthy change in the rules of engagement against North Korea. Given the danger of unintentional conflicts on the Peninsula, it is not easy to assume that South Korea (and the United States) can guarantee the escalation dominance and end the crisis without being entrapped a regional war. Given this regional security structure, few months after the Cheonan sinking, then South Korean President Lee openly suggested that the only way for the Seoul to strengthen its own deterrence capabilities against the North. Under Lee, South Korea appeared to be more prominent at the global stage. While making greater contribution to the US-Korean alliance, South Korea finalized OPLAN 5029, an official text that arranged procedures for crisis situations towards North Korean inflicted crisis including North Korean regime breakdown.

Then President of the Republic of South Korea, Lee, had been given assurances by America on the extended deterrence including nuclear umbrella. Yet, concern for

the latest 2010 Nuclear Posture Review remained in the South Korean policy makers as the North's capacity entail lower level conflicts are growing. With such an environment, South Korea started insisting to acquire a pyroprocessing capability, which is a fuel-cycle activity that would help to build a latent nuclear infrastructure for South Korea akin to Japan. In this sense, South Korea under Lee has extended its civilian nuclear industry in hoping relaxation of constraints on its-fuel cycle activities. On the other hand, the United States traditionally limits the spread of fuel cycle technology. Only major exception to this has been Japan (and India since 2014). What Korea would like to receive is a status given to Japan (and India) with nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. After four years-long negotiations, South Korea has struck a new deal in 2015 with the United States, yet has gained no blank consent for fuel recycling capabilities. This made South Korea more vulnerable and anxious compare to Japan in the nuclear area. There were also unconfirmed plans that South Korea request for the redeployment of the tactical nuclear weapons.(Asia-Pacific, 2016)

One part of the security dilemma other than North Korean nuclear program, which effects wider strategic stability in East Asia, is MSDs as an externality for the US-China relations. After the fourth nuclear test in January 2016, South Korean President Park Geun-hye hinted at the deployment of THAAD, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, which was the United States request for the past two years. South Korea stayed reluctant the idea due to China's warnings. Yet, China stayed quite even after the fourth nuclear test, and only made official reaction to the test after South Korean THAAD announcement. China sees THAAD undermining its security even if it is defensive in nature. The main reasoning is that once THAAD deployed on Korean Peninsula, it is irreversible and it can be used to reduce Chinese second strike capability, thereby strategic nuclear stability in East Asia. Furthermore, THAAD's radar could be used to monitor Chinese missiles and missiles facilities covering many of the Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. In this sense, China considers THAAD not just directed to North Korean threat but also China's strategic capabilities. Therefore, China argues it has right to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal even more, which at the end of the day, makes other countries, especially the US and Japan less secure. With the deployment of THAAD, the South Korea might be more secure, yet it will make China less secure. Overall, the relationship between South and North

Koreas with action reaction cycles, arms acquisitions patterns, bellicose acts and diplomacy, one of the most obvious security dilemma exists on Korean peninsula.

4.4.5 Japan South Korea Relations and Security Dilemma over Dokdo/Takeshima Islands

Three long-term strategic trends in the East Asian security complex are the North Korean nuclear threat and China's rise and diminishing US credibility. Against these three sources of uncertainties, South Korea and Japan revised alliance with the United States as well as adapt their own strategies to defend themselves. However, South Korea has another anxiety over Japanese normalizing. (Harris and Cooper ,2000, 50). Therefore, South Korea sees the United States-Japan alliance sole purpose as restricting Japan's remilitarization. As this essence of the relations has been changing, the South Korean uneasiness increases. In this sense, Japan-South Korean alliance, which is essential for the long-term stability of the region, is the weakest link in the virtual alliance network in the East Asia.(Cossa and Oxley ,2000, 83)

Japan is another source of inconveniences for Seoul even though it is part of American alliance system in the region. There are historical, cultural and current reasons for this. Japan has traditionally concerned with the possibility of Korean unification due to the fear of rising anti-Japanese sentiment. There are overlapping claims of sovereignty or jurisdiction on the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands between Japan and South Korea and this dispute escalated since mid 2000s. This territorial dispute between two Asian nations and historical grievances stemming from Japanese colonization experiences and common Japanese attitude towards avoiding this period in ordinary Japanese political elites, cause problems. The emergence of nationalist leaders and intellectuals in Tokyo raise questions in Seoul. This historical mistrust does not just explain South Korea's reluctance to join trilateral missile defense cooperation with US and Japan but also shed light on the fact that South Korean naval builds up is not only against the North but it is also against Japan.(Tellis and Wills, 2005) The fear of remilitarized Japan as it becomes a "normal power" is rising, in Korea. The record of bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan is rather far less encouraging and has experienced the worst deterioration of bilateral relations over the few years even though there is an substantial economic interdependence between South Korea and Japan.(Singh, 2015) In a sense, there is a repressed conflict between

these two US allies and the United States keep this conflict repressed for the sake of its alliance structure in the region. Korean view of US Japan alliance reflects the interpretation that one of the critical aims of the USJST is to provide support the United States efforts on the Korean peninsula. In this sense, Japan would probably be giving rear area and logistic support to the both Korean and American troops, without any combat support, which would not be welcomed in the region anyway. Therefore, the United States-Japan and the United States- South Korea alliances are mutually dependent; credible deterrence on the Korean peninsula rests as much on the United States-Japan alliance as it does on continued viability of the United States-South Korea.(Scott ,2011) In this sense, the US-South Korea and US-Japan alliance towards North Korea should speak with a single voice, however, given historical mistrust and current animosities in South Korea-Japan relations the alliance management mission fails in current US extended deterrence efforts. The first ever trilateral meeting between South Korea, Japan and the US was hold at the end of May, 2009 after North Korea's April 2009 missile test. Both Japan and South Korea was frustrated by the Washington's consent with China on UNSC President condemnatory statement and nothing else.

Besides historical and cultural animosities, Korea has territorial tensions with Japan and geo-politic tensions with China. Wirth suggests that Japan's territorial claims are more worrisome for South Korea then Chinese one.(Wirth, 2015) In this sense, South Korea keeps its focus beyond the danger of North Korean capabilities when it comes to its force posture. Every time an initiative started between South Korea and Japan, bilateral ties obstructed by the issues of history and territory. South Korea culturally and historically is an anti-Japan country, there are many issues stemming from Japan's colonial rule on the Korean peninsula such as comfort women, or controversial Yasukuni Shrine. Also, Japan Defense White paper in 2009 has underlined that disputed Takeshima/Dokdo Islands are inalienable Japanese territory, and this has created a dim view of Japan in Seoul. Indeed, as a left over from Cold War, territorial dispute over Takeshima/Dokdo Islands is the biggest source of disarray between Japan and South Korea. Takeshima/Dokdo was part of the Japanese controlled territory before WW II since the islands declared as a part of Japan in 1905 and after the San Francisco Peace Treaty, as it is the case for other territorial disputes in East Asia such as Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, or Kuril Islands, sovereignty of this

piece of islets stayed unresolved.(Hara ,2016) Divided Korea since 1951 and UNCLOS provisions regarding with islands EEZ have made the dispute even more controversial. Given historical animosities and cultural sentiments, Takeshima/Dokdo disputes become one of the central point in Korean and Japanese security relations. Until it is resolved, Japan-South Korean relations cannot be fully liberated from the conflicts and contencies. South Korea is in an advantageous position as it has historically sound sovereignty and current effective control of the islands. Thus, South Korea is not willing to accept a dispute exist over these islets even though the conflictual history of the islets. In this sense, Takeshima/Dokdo Islands disputes is very much akin to Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes between Japan and China.(Lee ,2016, 110) In 2012, Japan has declared to take the issue to the International Court of Justice while South Korea did not show a consent on the file. In Japanese reading of the dispute, if Japan shows consent on Takeshima that would impact other disputes on Senkaku and Kuril Islands. In 2012, Lee Myung-bak, then South Korean President, made a visit, the first in kind, to the islands and Japan call his ambassador in Seoul back as a response to this visit.(Carpenter ,2015) In 2014, Japan has sent to Korea its Korean Translation of its White Paper, in which the Islands depicted as Japanese territory. This has created a diplomatic stir in Seoul.(S. Korea Rebukes Japan's Territorial Claim over Dokdo Islets, 2015) Therefore, there have been sporadic flare-ups over the issues between South Korea and Japan, yet there is no militarization of the conflicts yet. In a similar sense, there is no obvious arms acquisition patterns between two countries. Thus, arguably, the conflict does not cast itself as a full-fledged security dilemma in the regions.

At this point it is also worth to mention that, as it is a case for all US alliances in Asia, South Korean contribution self-sufficiency is expected. Yet, this is also counterproductive, as it is in the case of Japan and prone to deepen security dilemmas in the East Asian security structure. Overall, due to US's pressures in the form of more contribution ablaze the flames of intermingling claims, perceptions in the region up to the points that the three opposed and conflictual dyadic relations may well produce a multi actor level security dilemma.

5. EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN ASIA

In today's Asian super-structure, there are two great powers (China and Japan) and one near peer competitor (India), four nuclear weapon states (China, India, Pakistan, North Korea) and three nuclear threshold states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan). (Buzan and Weaver, 2003) Moreover, the United States is decisively connected to the regional security with bilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea and Australia. Bearing in mind this complex and multidimensional and multi-actor structure, the US extended deterrence in Asia aims many things at the same time. First and foremost, deterrence has historically been a conflict prevention tool in the form of general extended deterrence (Lauren, Craig, and George, 1995, v-vi) as well as acted as a crisis management tool (George, 1991) when general deterrence failed and provided peace and security in the region in the form of immediate extended deterrence. Secondly, it deters North Korea's unpredictable hostile actions as well as appears to be used a balancing tool to the rising and assertive China. Third, it provides peace and security in the region by not just deterring threats but also downgrading risks. These risks do not just come from hostile states but also from conflicts among US's allies Japan and South Korea. (Weede, 1989) Finally, the United States extended deterrence is a tool for curbing nuclear proliferation in the region. That is, the United States security commitments and assurances can dissuade its allies in Asia from pursuing their own nuclear options. In this sense, there is a link between the United States extended deterrence and future of nuclear proliferation. (Crawford, 2009, 278)

For allies, there are several reasons to depend on the United States nuclear umbrella. First, besides many other important restrictions, limitations, issues such as appreciation of the related cost and unsolved technical issues regarding with delivery systems, harsh domestic and international oppositions, and status anxieties the United States extended deterrence is one of the most salute reasons to avoid taking difficult and problematic decision to commence a nuclear weapon development program. Second, allies see nuclear umbrella as an important hedging for the future of uncertainties as well as real world threats such as North Korean nuclear program and China's opaque military modernization. Third, allies see nuclear deterrence as an important factor that led them focus on economic development with a comparatively low level of defense spending. Fourth, allies see nuclear deterrence as the most

important traits of the alliance relations with the United States, without which alliance with the United States doesn't make sense. Thus, the nature and development of the nuclear part of the extended deterrence in Asia is primarily a demand-driven phenomenon and any of the allies in the region do not see extended conventional deterrence as a substitute for the nuclear umbrella and they would not be ready for giving up from the nuclear assurances. In this sense, "nuclear umbrella" is central to allies assurance mission.(Foster and Payne ,2007) However, when it comes to nuclear part of the deterrence relations, they do neither particularly contribute to nuclear deterrence posture nor command nor control mechanisms. In this sense, they are the passive objects of the extended deterrence posturing and strategizing. Therefore, allies are more interested in what happens in Washington rather than what happens in Asian capitals. The role and profile of nuclear extended deterrence in US grand strategy is most salient in Asia as given US Asia perception, and presence in the region. Washington's preparedness to reaffirm security assurances in the region to balance the role of regional rivals creates an environment where the nuclear umbrella is more likely to be reinforced rather than weakened. Bearing in mind the growing Chinese military capability, in particular to air and naval forces, and North Korean nuclear and missiles capability to alter the status quo in the Korean Peninsula, make US and its allies more rely on US's nuclear umbrella. However, in Asia, nuclear deterrence posture's management is exclusively US's hand. In Asia, there are no any consultative bodies or cooperative command and control mechanisms in US -Australia alliance while there is very superficial sort in US -South Korea and US -Japan alliances.(Rowberry ,2014, 8) The US bilateral agreements in Asia in which there is a framework for thick security alliances including numbers of bilateral defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, joint exercises and planning. However, by definition, given its superpower status, all of the United States' post-1945 bilateral alliances in Asia have been asymmetric in nature.(O'Neil, 2013, 18) That is, the United States policies towards Asia are mostly top-down, driven by Washington decision-making procedures, which makes allies assurance/reassurance mission difficult.

In 1948, the United States decided not to intervene militarily in China's civil war but two years later it defended Taiwan. In 1949, US officials seemed to be determined to stay away from a war in Korea, but next year they heavily involved. Option in Laos was not seen acceptable in Vietnam. Carter would like to reduced

troops in Korea, Nixon reversed the idea. In 1995 the United States almost did nothing when China fired missiles, but in 1996, when exactly same incident occurs, the United States declared Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) pledge to defend Taiwan. These kinds of twits and changes are very much evident in recent US political decisions too. Such erratic acts are very much common in US history and it has seen the United States freedom of being erratic as a superpower.(Zelikow ,2000, 27) In this sense, contrary to European context in Asia, the United States relations with its key allies are inherently manifested itself as constant fears of abandonment or fears of entrapment under “an under-institutionalized one-way bilateralism”. According to Glenn Snyder, what characterized modern alliances are the dual fears of abandonment and entrapment. The pawn countries is steadily focused on avert the fear of abandonment whereas major powers try to avoid being dragged into an unnecessary conflict (Glenn H. Snyder ,1984). The United States fears to be entrapped in a conflict that has no strategic significance to the United States security (like a conflict between Japan and China over an inhabitant rocks such as Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) whereas the United States allies fear to be left alone against “a would-be attacker”. In addition, given changes in strategic security environment since Russian annexation of Crimea, one of the perceptions about the United States role is that it is not easy to conclude how fast the United States is going to response a crisis in the region. In this sense, fear of fait accompli situation created by China is a real danger in Asia. These kinds of mutual concerns and fears are end result of low level of institutionalism in alliance management.

One another issue regarding with the nature of the extended deterrence in Asia, the United States prefers to see its allies have own capacities to tackle some of the crisis on their own in their immediate environment. By doing so, they can give scope for the United States to concentrate on great power issues, while providing advanced technical assistance to supplement allies’ forces in the region. This is a model partnership for the United States. However, it is always difficult to make a catalog of situation allies should handle on their own. In this sense, US is willing to provide deterrence in the form of “general extended deterrence” rather than “immediate extended deterrence” and planning, crafting and forming deterrence should be analyzed under this assumption. It is also true that historically these two things

together, both increasing alliance contribution and changing role of the nuclear weapons are core caveats that shape the Asian security environment.

Even though, the United States has strengthened its foothold and power in Asia by both increasing its forward deployed capabilities and strengthening its alliance relations, the US presence and role becomes more contested in terms of extended deterrence guaranties. Much of the concerns over the last decades has given to one of the fundamental discontinuity in the US nuclear extended deterrence, which is the fact that United States has shifted its nuclear deterrence posture towards more rapid deployed flexible forces from Cold War asymmetric escalation postures. A deterrence posture constitutes procedures governing how deterrent assets are deployed, when and under what conditions they might be used, against what targets, and who has the authority to make those decisions. In Asia, the US asymmetric escalation posture was designed to deter all levels of conventional and nuclear conflict by sustaining capabilities and posture that credibility call for the rapid use of the US forces including nuclear weapons, which reduced both frequency and intensity of conventional conflicts. It served well for allies' expectations and priorities by providing them an optimal deterrence for their security. However, due to the change in the nature of politics, balance of power, advancing technology and financial environment, the US deterrence posture becomes more inclined with the flexible and selective engagement strategy within a pivotal deterrence posture. That is, the United States starts acting more like an off-shore balancer even though it increases its presence in the region. In traditional post-Cold War extended deterrence, the United States provided security guarantee by establishing a clear deterrence posture (what and how it deters) while in the post-Cold deterrence there is ambiguity in what instances it will and will not become involved, and to what extent it will become if it chooses to be part in the certain conflicts. In the current form of pivotal extended deterrence, the United States prefers a dual-defender role to prevent two hostile adversaries, one of which its ally, from taking attacking each other and thereby breaking the stability (status-quo.) By creating uncertainty on its extended deterrence posture, the United States tries to escape moral-hazard and decoupling situations and as so becoming entrapped in an unwanted conflict. Yet, this US ambiguities on extended deterrence doesn't incorporated with Asian allies' security needs and expectations as the security environment becomes more contested and dangerous for them. In this sense, extended

deterrence in the current Asia initially is designed to deter nuclear and major conventional attacks and has offer little role to play in deterring lower level conflicts due to strategic fear of entrapment. Therefore, even though the United States remains critical for providing nuclear umbrella at the strategic levels, it shows little adherence for the lower level conflicts, which becomes more frequent and intense especially on Korean Peninsula and in East Asia, where most of the security dilemma types of situations emerge. In the absence of shared command and control mechanisms in the management of day to day extended deterrence, allies, therefore, has begun to acquire and develop advance conventional and missile capabilities to fulfill their security needs as the United States faces mounting assurance/reassurance challenges. Thus, the mismatch over expectations, priorities and posture (capabilities, deployment patterns, and command and control mechanisms) drives both Japanese and Korean increasing defense spending. Parallel with this reiteration, there are effects of changing extended deterrence on allies' behavior towards the regional tensions that constitutes cases for regional security dilemmas.

5.1 Extended Deterrence to Japan

5.1.1 Overview

Since 1868, when Japan started engaging with the outside of the world, it has successfully proved that Japan could have “the will and capacity” to shape the security environment in Asia either by force or forging alliances. Its military victory against Russia in 1905, colonization of Taiwan in 1895, and Korea in 1910, alliance with Britain in 1902, creation of Japanese hegemony in Asia by 1920s, are all evident facts of this potential. Yet, since the defeat in WW II, Japan has not just outlawed the use of force but also maintenance of a national army. Therefore, dependency on the United States by establishing an anti-war component of the Japanese Constitution becomes the bedrock of the country's political identity.(Tow ,2001, 45) Post-War Japan placed high premium on economic growth and creating a web of security through trade interdependences and alliance with the United States. In this sense, there are four essential components of Japanese security doctrine (known as Yoshida doctrine): i) The US security guarantee and the United States military forces on Japan's soil; ii) No offshore deployment of Japanese military force, which was basically search and rescue squad with the name of Self Defense Forces (SDF); iii) No defense equipment and

arms sale to the other countries; iv) Three Nonnuclear principles (No possession of nuclear weapons; No production of nuclear materials; No transition of any nuclear technology).(Kumagai, 2015) Japan had strictly attached itself to these principles up to early 2000s and these principles have been seen as a part of Japanese political culture. Thereby, Japanese so called peace constitution and its article 9 as well as Japan's domestic resistance towards remilitarization became important inputs in East Asian security architecture. That is, given hard-earned peace and stability and historical animosities among regional countries changing these inputs one way or another will affect greatly all East Asian security. Yet, these inputs are all changing in slow motion and the major drivers behind the change is the way in which the United States set its protection commitments (extended deterrence) to Japan.

Indeed, the alliances between the United States and Japan is under a reassessment since the Cold War. As Buzan noted, Japan had a good Cold War period as enjoying high growth and uninterrupted socio-political stability under the United States strategic protection.(Buzan, 1995) With the collapse of communist bloc, Japan faced with the strategic effect of Soviet dissolution as US-Japan alliance 'reason d'etre' faded away. At that times, many realists predicted that Japan and the United States would be rival rather than allies. With same token, some formal officials argued that Japan -US relation drifting into decline.(Waltz,1993; Huntington ,1991) For instance, Chalmers Johnson argued that Japan was moving towards a disengagement from the United States even in the early 1990s.(Johnson, 1995) Others considered that disintegration of the alliance now appears possible, though not yet likely in the short run.(Hyland, 1991) Kissinger believed that in the long-run Japan and the United States interests will be diverged up to the point that policy makers would not able to disregards the differences.(Kissinger, 1994, 827) In the early 2000s, some argued that if Japan would not support any US military engagement in the Korean peninsula, such a refusal would undoubtedly put at risk the continuation of the United States-Japan alliance.(Blackwill and Dibbs ,2000, 9) Many Japanese also believed that the alliance is in transition.(Sasae, 1994, 60–61) The US Japan Mutual Security Treaty (USJMST) was, however, enhanced through 1990s while geopolitical uncertainties pushed Washington and Tokyo hold their security alliance trough the 2000s. Yet, Japan's involvement in broader regional dialogue and initiatives to build and maintain regional

security and cooperation will shape its future as a significant player in the region and beyond.

Tied closely to US with 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (TMCS) that superseded the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, home to major military bases, Japan was critical importance for the United States for its military in Asia. Even though shifting from heavy reliance on basing in Northeast Asia to a more fluid and diverse set of operational options, Japan is the biggest base station for the United States in the region. In this sense, it is still critically important for the United States to project power across the region. Japan is also vital economic and politic partner for the United States in Asia. Moreover, Japan is the most important strategic assets to keep China in check policy as well as continuity of Korean and Taiwan status quo. By definition, given its superpower status, all of the United States' post-1945 bilateral alliances have been asymmetric in nature. Yet, none has been as one sided as the United States alliance with Japan. Japan have significantly benefited from the United States alliance economically, politically and militarily. The United States criticizes Japan as free riders of US security commitment with exchange of being home to strategic US bases. Even though more active Japanese role, the alliance remained asymmetrical in terms of obligations and command and control mechanisms. Japan has long continued to depend on American conventional and nuclear forces to sustain security and had traditionally been more concerned over being entrapped rather than being abandoned. Yet, recently Japanese fears of the credibility of the US deterrence has shifted towards both being entrapped and abandoned. Compare to current security environment, Japanese felt a similar sense of abandonment by the United States was the late 1980s when Japanese economic miracle slowed down. This anxiety was cured by the 1995 report, authored by then US Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joseph Nye, which assured the Japanese about the United States commitment and presence.(Nye, 2004, 143) In 1996, in a joint statement, Clinton and Hashimoto declared that the United States-Japan alliance is "the corner stone for achieving common security."(O'Neil, 2013, 81) For a matter of fact, 1995-6 Taiwan Strait crisis and Chinese assertion caused these initial change and subsequent Clinton Hashimoto statement.(Christensen ,1999) However, in the new Asian security environment, the United States sees the risk of being entrapped over inhabitant islands, and Japan sees the risk of being entrapped over a conflict between Taiwan and China.(Goh, 2011) Japan fears being abandoned

in a conflict over Senkaku Islands, whereas the United States fears being abandoned in a conflict with China. Where China pursues more assertive diplomacy in both East and South China Seas, Japanese fear of abandonment increased, and replaced traditional Japanese fear of entrapment. In this sense, the most structural problem of the alliance in the new security environment is that for both sides feel risks of either being entrapped or abandoned in a conflict due to the nature of alliance relation.

5.1.2 Normalization of Japan

Indeed, strategic uncertainties and structural changes in the post-Cold War bring Japan to reconsider its security needs in a different environment. However, reliance on the United States security guarantees are still core for Japan post-Cold War security strategies, albeit it does not reduce Japan's strategic weakness anymore. Therefore, Japan hedges against uncertainties stemming from regional countries by increasing dependency on the United States alliance, but at the same time, it hedges against uncertainties stemming from the United States' role in the region by increasing its defense spending and boosting capabilities. Nevertheless, Japan is still an abnormal state and following a long march towards normalization since the end of the Cold War. Matter of fact, as Japan gaining ground economically, there were pressures for taking more active role in providing its own security. Beside diplomatic initiatives, normalization efforts refer to the discussion on the prospect of remilitarization of Japan historically. It has been assumed, both in and outside Japan, that Japan would be a 'normal' country once the nation has the will and the capacity to defend its interests and citizens on its own where ever they are threatened. Given Japan's economic standing and its changing security necessities and due uncertainties, more outward-looking Japan has been assumed to emerge in the post-Cold War era. Even Yoshida, known as a staunch resistant to remilitarization, acknowledged that Japan normalization is inevitable in the long run.(Choong, 2015) In this sense, suggestion of the revision of the Japanese Constitution to normalize Japan through more capable SDF is a continuing debate both in and outside of Japan. It becomes sometimes toned down and sometimes contemporary again. Takashi Inoguchi itemizes five distinct phases in the United States-Japan security alliance. The first phase in the United States-Japan alliance covers the period from 1945 to 1960 where Japanese security parameters established by the American Occupation government leading Japan's peace constitution. Meantime, from 1950s onwards after the Korean War began, the

United States has started using Japan as a logistical support through its military bases. The second phase in the U.S.-Japan alliance extends from 1960 to 75. During this period, Japan preferred exclusively depended on American security guarantee as a free rider while focusing on economic development under the Yoshida doctrine. In the third phase extends from the mid 1970s to early 90s, where Japan slowly became a systemic supporter of the United States through financial and diplomatic contributions. In the fourth phase, which covers 1990–2005 period, Japan acted as a global civilian power on the global stage by broadening international contributions through financial, trade and aid assistances. From 2008 onwards, according to Inoguchi Japan becomes an ordinary global power by initiating normalization steps.(Inoguchi, 2008) With deterrence scholars jargon, becoming a normal state by developing its own defense (central deterrence assets such as conventional military forces and theatre missile defenses) will eventually give Japan means to be more assertive in the region. Indeed, it is the mere fact that Japan has gained the capacity long ago, but not the will to do so.

For a matter of fact, pressure for a rearmament mostly comes from outside, especially from the United States.(Roberts, 2013) The United States acknowledges that it is primarily Japanese responsibility and right to protect itself and being prepared for this mission.(The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 2014) Meanwhile, there are strong sentiments against rearmament of Japan within Japanese elite and society. The US policy makers are generally incline with the idea that normalized Japan is necessary to support the United States' strategy in Asia. To great deal, Japan traditionally resisted any suggestion to support the United States military engagement from Vietnam to Iraq by providing troops and limiting its participation in financial issues and peacekeeping missions at most. Therefore, the United States usually criticizes Japan as free riders of US security commitment with exchange of being home to strategic US bases in Japan. However, Japan has substantially increased its share of burden by supporting the United States forces and building up its own military capacities. For instance, in 2006, Japan spent \$10.3 billion, which was 60% of the total cost, on the United States military base in Guam.(Kan, 2014) The long-term trend continues capacity build up for Japanese military. Indeed, there are now many examples where Japan is more active militarily. For instance, in 2001, Japan gave logistical support to the US war efforts in Afghanistan; in 2004 Japan deployed up to

600 non-combat force in Iraq, for the first time in its post-war history, as part of 'coalition of willing'; in 2005, Japan sent 950 troops to Indonesia for a humanitarian mission after the earthquake that hits Aceh. With the latest revision of the United States-Japan security treaty in 2015, the more substantial contribution is in the prospect.

For Japan, the discussion is actually two folds. The first one is between domestic pacifism and strategic independence in security realm, that is whether country's development and prosperity as well as security is best pursued by self-reliance or reliance on the United States. When they rely on the United States, Japan can focus on its own development at a cost of anxieties that stems from country's essential security needs while lacking indigenous power projection capabilities. Second one is how and to what extent to normalize Japan. Regardless of the specific route taken, Japan's normalization probably be more than being able to protect its territory and population.(Metzl, 2015) Without nuclearization, Japan's normalization would be uncomplete in the absence of the US nuclear umbrella. Indeed, US nuclear extended deterrence lies at the heart of the Japanese security thinking and practice. In the absence of nuclear extended deterrence, it is assumed that Japan would go nuclear within short amount of time to counter threats coming from China and North Korean nuclear issues. In this sense, since 1950s, Japanese have had many difficulties to decide when it comes to nuclear policy. In 1957 the Cabinet Legal Bureau confirmed that nuclear weapons for self-defense were not unconstitutional. China nuclear acquisition in 1964, changed the rhetoric on the nuclear issue at the elite level. From Japan's point of view, China had numbers of incentives to coerce Japan by using nuclear option. For a matter of fact that after China's acquisition of nuclear weapons and consequent testing in 1964, Japan's then Prime Minister Sato urged that Japan felt threatened by Chinese nuclear weapon and there was no other option to builds its own nuclear weapons if the United States would not provide nuclear extended deterrence, which was not explicitly stated within the TMCS at the time. In this sense, Sato tried to gain the explicit US commitment to protect Japan with nuclear umbrella from Johnson administration. The United States, meanwhile, increasingly concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons in the region and beyond. In 1957 a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report assessed that Japan probably would build a nuclear weapon within a decade due to regional threat perceptions.(Nuclear Weapons Production in

Fourth Contries: Likelihood and Consequances, 1957). In 1961 another NIE pointed that Japan could probably have its first nuclear device in five, six years.(Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Contries: Likelihood and Consequances, 1961) With this background, in 1966 the President Johnson affirmed that US would protect allies from any Chinese nuclear blackmail.(Lyndon B. Johnson: Remarks at the State Dinner in Parliament House, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1966) Japan's seemed to be assured about the credibility of the United States nuclear umbrella and in 1968 Sato underlined that Japan's desire was nuclear power for peaceful purposes and Japan would side with nuclear disarmament. Even though this announcement was made, Sato himself ordered two top-secret reports on costs and benefits of Japanese nuclear weapons. These reports endorsed non-acquisition of nuclear weapons and noted that Japan should focus on strengthening nuclear extended deterrence even though it had limited control over it.(Alagappa, 2009, 351) Japan also saw that possible nuclearization would incur excessive financial burden. Japan had not initially initiated a nuclear weapons program in its history in spite of better technological prospects. However, the time lag between Japan's signature of the NPT in 1970s, and its eventual ratification of the treaty in 1976, was generally seen as nuclear hedging. The prominence of the nuclear umbrella in the United States-Japan alliance was strengthened considerably during the 1970s due to the United States' strategic goal of assuring its allies in Asia in the wake of defeat in Vietnam. Therefore, it was not surprising to see the United States gave formal assurances about the nuclear deterrence for the security of South Korea and Japan in 1975. Apart from being referred by the official here and there, the United States nuclear extended deterrence was explicitly confirmed for the first time by Washington in 1975 with a joint statement between President Ford and Prime Minister Miki. Further, they recognized that nuclear deterrence the United States provided as an important contribution to Japan's security. And the United States President Ford assured his Japanese counterpart that the United States would defend Japan against any armed attack whether by nuclear or conventional forces.(Japan-U.S. Joint Announcement to the Press by Prime Minister Takeo Miki and President Gerald R. Ford,1975) Moreover, 1978 Defense Cooperation Guidelines included a formal commitment by Washington that it would maintain a nuclear deterrent capability as part of the United States alliance commitment to Japan. However, Japan has not acquired the actual weapons but gained the ability to acquire nuclear weapons within a short period of time over the time.(Yoshihara and Holmes, 2009). In this sense, Japan

has traditionally attached a strategic value to the extended deterrence provided by the United States. In the absence of it, Japan has to find its own solution and probably consider its own nuclear deterrence. Thus, there is a strong link between proliferation of Japan and the preservation of the US nuclear extended deterrence.(Foster and Payne, 2007)

Nevertheless, at the moment, Japan doesn't have the necessary know-how on bomb design and preservations, dependable delivery systems, and most importantly nuclear test sites. In addition to these technical prerequisites, legal and political restraints, vibrant anti-nuclear public, restraining domestic laws and practices, and possibility of harsh-diplomatic consequences prevent Japan from becoming a nuclear power. Even though it is a latent nuclear power, and even though nuclear taboo within Japanese society has been broken, at least at elite levels, for building a full-scale nuclear weapons deterrent capacity on its own requires all of these attributions.(Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, 2009) The central concern in the current environment is that strategic stability is closely tied to the US nuclear presence and any types of reduction would have adverse effect on the security structure in Asia. In this sense, Japan prefers a visible, potent and enduring US nuclear capacity both in terms of presence and doctrine towards the region.(Jimbo, 2009)

Besides easing taboo on nuclear issue, there are other normalization efforts in Japan. In 1992, Japanese Diet accepted International Peacekeeping Cooperation Law allowing overseas deployment of Japan's SDF for the first time with a limit to peacekeeping mission. In 1997, revised guidelines for US-Japan security cooperation allowing SDF to provide logistical support and non-combat support to the United States operation in areas surrounding Japan. In 2006 elevation of Japan Defense Agency into a full-fledged ministry giving political influence. After returning power, Liberal Democrat Party leader Shinzo Abe have pursued radical economic and foreign policy agenda to challenge China's rise by strengthening the United States-Japan alliance under the rubric of reinterpretation of the constitution.(Kato, 2014) In the short term, Abe's primary goal is to remove some of the domestic constraints on security policy and reassert Japan as a normal power. In the long run, he pursues reasserting Japan's military capacity to offset the United States decline by making greater contribution to the United States-Japan alliance in the first place.(Sieg, 2015) To this end, Abe initiated a series of interlinked initiatives.(The Strategic Survey 2014: The

Annual Review of World Affairs, 2014, 332) Creation of National Security Council (NCS) with a legislation passed through Diet (Japanese upper house) in December 2013 is designed to expand the command functions of the prime minister's office in security and defense policies.(Mie, 2013) Later in December 2013 the first in kind National Security Strategy has been published stating that a more proactive Japan foreign policy as a major power is a must.(Japan National Security Strategy 2013 (Provisional Translation) ,2013). Around the same dates, a controversial state secrecy law, which could potentially be used to crack down on political dissent towards government's efforts, has been passed through Diet.(McCurry, 2013) To lay out Japan's military doctrines, Ministry of Defense has published National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which reiterates the fear of declining US while rising China. In this sense, the strengthening of military capabilities and shift to dynamic defense force Japan's defense ministry published Medium term Defense Program (MTDP), in which capabilities that are traditionally characterized as offensive were advised to Japan to have.(Medium Term Defense Program, 2013) To this end, Japan expand its naval-destroyer fleets from 48 to 54, procured amphibious vessels, submarines, light helicopter carriers.(The Strategic Survey 2014: The Annual Review of World Affairs, 2014, 332) Japan's SDF have highly sophisticated naval and air weapon systems such as one of the most advanced non-nuclear submarines, modern fighter jets, airborne refueling capabilities, amphibious operation capabilities, spy satellites, theater missile defense systems. In addition, April 2014, Abe put an end to the Japan's self-imposed four-decades old ban on selling weapons to take a hard-nosed approach to boost Japan's search for an autonomous defense industry.(McNeill, 2014). According to IISS Military Balance 2015, Japan's easing of defense export ban would eventually help it creating a national military complex and strategically strengthen Japan's military capabilities by allowing greater joint development of equipment.(Chapter Six: Asia, 2015, 207) All of these steps are indications of Abe's plan to push forward for normalization of Japan.(NSC Council Has Dangerous Flaws, 2013) Abe's latest move towards normalization is that revised Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation which was finalized 27 April 2015.(Reuters, 2015) The new guidelines takes into account that Japan's revised defense posture and its reinterpretation of constitutional restraints will allow Japan to actively participate in the military operations to support the United States. Graham assesses that the revised guidelines is a direct result of increasing Japanese concerns with regard to China. Yet,

the most important patterns in Japan's changing security understanding is that uncertainties about future of the US commitment to deter and respond to 'gray zone' contingencies.(E. Graham, 2015) All of these are all evidence of Japan's long march towards the normalization of Japan.

As it is the nature of things, racially, culturally, and economically, Japan has developed strong ties to Asia (Leitch, Kato, and Weinstein ,1995, 4). On the other hand, many Asian have feelings of hostility against Japan. Yet, Japan has a sense of vulnerability stemming from geography, history, and psychology of being left out and therefore Japan has to find a balance between securing itself without outraging other regional countries. Since the WW II, this has been maintained by the United States extended deterrence. Historically, alliance with the United States has ensured that Japan will remain an incomplete power.(Simon, 1993, 13) In this sense, the United States-Japan alliance does not just deter other threats to Japan but also serves as guarantee of limiting Japan's imperial ambitions that potentially caused wars. The effort of normalizing Japan is, therefore, historically counterproductive since securitization of Japan's military engagement is evident in the region due to historical anti-Japanese sentiments. Given history of mutual distrust, China and Korea both are reluctant to the idea of normalizing Japan and they both see increasing Japanese military capacity as a threat to regional security. Tokyo and Seoul have traditionally relied exclusively on the United States for their defense, not on each other. Although they both fear North Korean nuclear attack, each felt almost equal antipathy towards the other. In this sense, if the United States disengages from the region, the Korean-Japanese relations may well deteriorate. At a possible unification scenario, it would probably deteriorate since anti Japan stand is one of the rare things both Korea can agree on. Anti-Japan sentiment in Korea goes back to Japan's occupation of Korea from 1905 to 1945. A militarily capable Japan also raises China- Japan rivalries, which is the one of the most important factor that can affect strategic balance of power in the region.(Overholt, 2008, 224)

5.1.3 Changing Security Environment for Japan

The end of the Cold War has created a different strategic environment for Japan and its surrounding environment. One way to look at the change and continuity in Japanese reading of security, we can focus on the official documents in which Japan

shapes and reshapes its national security strategies. The main driver of the Japanese shifting national security understanding is the fact that the new era is full of uncertainty. For instance, 1995 dated National Defense Outline states that in the post-Cold War era, many complicated and diverse regional conflicts, nuclear proliferation issues, missiles threats create unpredictability and uncertainty in Asia.(MOFA: National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996, 1995). Indeed, Japan strategic assessment of post-Cold War era has positive and negative sides. Positive sides are related to the systemic changes stemming from the demise of Soviet threats and bipolar Cold War world order. Negative sides are mostly due to uncertainties and increasing proliferation of dangerous technologies. Most important uncertainties to Japan are, yet, anxiety about the future of US presence in Asia, relations with China and North Korean nuclear threats. Territorial conflict over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as well as China's indigenous military built-ups, North Korean continues nuclear program has made these uncertainties even more potent. 2010 dated National Defense Council outline states that increasing military activity in the environment that surrounds Japan makes regional security more complex and contested for Japanese national security.(MOFA: National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond, 2010) The most important official document is that the 2015 White Paper in which Japan explicitly refers to its long and short-term threat perceptions and the way Japan deal with them. In this sense, in the post-Cold War era, three major factors shape the Japanese strategic understanding of the regional security. First one is that China's rise has created a direct threat to its great power status and its territorial and economical integrity. Second, North Korean increasing nuclear and missile capabilities. The last one is the way alliance with the United States evolve in the post-Cold War era. White paper states that Chinese opaque military modernization and assertive diplomacy in the East and South China Seas raise security concerns in Tokyo and other capitals.(“White Paper 2015: Defence of Japan” 2015)

Historically, with the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972 Sino-Japanese relations were normalized through the 1970s and 1980s with growing trade and economic relations. Yet, this honeymoon period was not a product of a mutual understanding or reconciliation of the conflicts. Matter of fact that, Sino-Japanese relations have always been complicated and are generally defined by mutual suspicion and competition as well as restrained conflict and tacit cooperation. Japan and China

were historically mirror images of each other in the East Asia and they have historically competed for the influence and regional dominance. In this sense, one of the characteristic of Sino-Japanese relations is that domestic politics in both countries use other as a reference point in the formation of their national identity. China uses Japan and Japanese history as a 'victimizer' while Japanese advocating their particular historical narratives and threat perceptions to normalize (militarize) the country.(Samuels, 2011, 120–27) Furthermore, Japanese fear of China is not limited to Chinese flexing muscles. Japan fears also the way in which the future Sino-American relations evolve. On the one hand, as the United States- Chinese interdependencies grow, the Japanese questions if there would be drift in the United States policy towards China. On the other hand, as China becomes more powerful both in economic and military terms China political ambitions threaten Japan security. Against this background, Chinese declared doctrine of Anti-Access-Area-Denial (A2/AD) and its growing capacity to deny the United States navy access to key littoral areas across the so-called first islands chain has raised doubts about the US military intervention in future regional crisis. Additionally, to Japan, China's rise does not just threat Japan's territorial integrity, it also threatens its status and Japanese standing at the time of economic slowdown. In the past, while Japan had been experiencing high growth, Japan found ways to promote its standing with financial contributions and aids. Yet, Japanese economy has been experiencing wide and rapid economic decline since early 1990s.(Pempel, 2011) Japanese economic decline has been underscored by Chinese economic miracles. At such point, the vision of China overriding Japan has created harsh anxieties in Japan. In another word, China becoming Asia's dominant power has echoed in Japan in general rather dauntingly. One of the most controversial elements of the Sino-Japanese disputes is, thus, the historical background. Besides the row around Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the issue over Taiwan and Taiwanese relations with the US and Japan, there are also other diplomatic rows on issues such as official visits to the Yasukuni shrine or the controversy over history textbook and nationalist bickering between two neighbors. A review of both countries' official papers, leaders' statement and series of diplomatic act and counteracts is evident of the increasing tensions and mutual suspicions. China's contemporary narratives is a derivative of the past insecurity and vulnerabilities. Due to the past, China has a sense of strong emotions about the country's sovereignty, national independence and integrity of its territory.(Callahan, 2004). In this sense, Sino Japanese war of 1894-95, and following

treaty of Shimonoseki, is seen one of the darkest hour in the 'century of Humiliation.' Therefore, China interprets contemporary interactions with Tokyo through a historical lens and securitization of Japan is high on the Chinese agenda. Sino-Japanese relations are historically multidimensional including territorial disputes, historical animosities, and strategic rivalries in the region as conflictual status seeking powers. (C. Rose and Sýkora, 2016) Given rising uncertainties and historical and mutual suspicions, the relationship between China and Japan seems increasingly to be governed by a security dilemma in which parties are driven by a spiral of circumstances to increase their military capability at the expense of decreasing the security of others.

In Japan, much of the nationalist far right group are oppose to the United States alliance, but the bigger political parties such as Social Democrats and especially Liberal Democratic Party strongly supports alliance. Domestic support for alliance remains strong and even it received an increasing support due to increasing risks stemming from North Korea and China. China threat is a common phenomenon among Japanese elites and policy makers too. In the longer term, although Japan is anxious about how China might develop, generally its fear is not that China would attack Japan one way or another. Its concerns about China becoming aggressive and risk taker in the new era. Therefore, to Japan, the United States-China relations and how the United States will respond Chinese assertions is critical. Yet, the dilemma for Japan is that when the United States-China relations are good, the region is more stable and balanced and when the United States-China relations are tense the prospect of regional peace and stability is weaker. However, Japan worries about a prospect of good US China relations since when the United States-China relations are not good, Japan-US relations are up beating. Therefore, stable and good Japan-China relations are key to solve Japanese dilemma towards Sino-US relations. (Harris and Cooper, 2000, 46)

5.1.4 Diverging Priorities and Expectations for the Extended Deterrence

In such a complex regional security structure, an in-depth analysis of both anecdotal and empirical evidences of Japanese case reveals that strategic priorities of extended deterrence differs between the United States and Japan.

Table 24: Extended Deterrence Differences between Japan and the United States

	Japan	The United States
What to Deter? (Priorities)	China's Rise North Korean Conventional Threats North Korean Nuclear Threats and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Deter North Korean Conventional (missile) threats Deter North Korean use of Nuclear Weapons China's Rise
How to Deter? (Expectations)	The US immediate NED The US general ED Self-Reliance Bilateral/Multilateral Engagement	Push for Self-Reliance (for the lower level conflicts) Push for more contribution Push for integrated RMA Bilateral/Multilateral Engagement The US general NED The US immediate ED
Danger (Fears)	Abandonment/Entrapment Decoupling	Entrapment Moral-Hazard
Effected Sub-Regions and Countries	China: Modernization of Conventional and Nuclear Forces, which overall effects Japan's security dilemma South Korea: Buildups in maritime and conventional forces, which overall effects North Korean security dilemma	
Prepared by the Author		

On the top of the Japanese list lies China as there is a territorial conflict over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as well as China's indigenous military built-ups creates alarm bells in Tokyo. Since 2010, two critical junctures with regard to China's growing assertive diplomacy towards Japan occurred in the East China Sea. After series of lingering incidents, finally, 2015 Japanese White Paper explicitly counts on China as a direct threat. Although, China is on the United States (nuclear) deterrence list when it comes to this part of the region, it is at the bottom of the priorities in terms of nuclear extended deterrence. The US sees China a long-term rival rather than a target of the immediate nuclear extended deterrence. Main driver of these differences stems from: i) Japanese fear of abandonment and Decoupling (being left alone against China in a confrontation, or the conflict over some inhabitant islands in the East China Sea will not be interest of the United States decision making. Moreover, Japanese elites afraid of being entrapped if ever the United States seek help from Tokyo in a dispute with China over Taiwan, or Korea); ii) The US fear of entrapment and Moral-Hazard (being entrapped in a nuclear-conflict that doesn't serve the United States interests, and by biding itself to secure Japan that could potentially make Japan more assertive). Moreover, on the question of how to deter China, there are obvious and self-standing differences between Japanese and American perspectives. Japan continuously asks for

clear and credible nuclear form of the extended deterrence towards Chinese intimidations (especially in the East China Sea), which sets in motion as an increasing trend in the region. While Tokyo highly values Washington's assurances that article 5 of the TMCS applies to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, policy makers feel uncomfortable about the possibility that the United States administrations will provide the needed "stand-tall" against China when a conflict eventually happens in the East China Sea. Furthermore, Chinese declared doctrine of Anti-Access-Area-Denial (A2AD) and its growing capacity to deny the United States navy access to this area (Chinese increasing capability of deterrence by denial) has raised doubts about guaranteed US military intervention in future regional crisis. Therefore, Japan hedges by taking steps such as:

- Revision in treaty in 1995-1997-2015: Japan's role expanded first to non-combat military support, then combat role.
- Legislative changes in 2001-2003-2014-2016: allow Japan deploy forces to support US military mission in other regions and extending Japanese SDF's role in and around the region.
- 2003: Decision for acquisition of BMDs
- 2005: Decision for base right for nuclear powered aircraft carrier.
- 2006: Decision for increasing military presence of the United States and military interoperability between Japan and the United States
- 2015 Decision to build a joint venture Theater Missile Defense with the United States.
- AD\A2 capability: maintaining air and maritime superiority over China in the East China Sea.
- Strengthening alliance relations with the United States (and Australia, Philippines, India)
- By increasing its defense spending even though its economy faces structural challenges.

Japan has enacted 21 major pieces of security related legislations since 1992 moving beyond its traditional institutional, cultural and financial constraints. Historically, Japanese security policies have been exclusively defensive, yet since

2010, and with newly revised Security Guidelines, this line has become more blur. Even though changes the new documents call for are more conceptual than tangible, it is clear that they are designed to shift Japan's traditional exclusively defensive posture into more proactive defense force structure. More importantly, Japanese defense posture and procurement patterns suggest that spending and allocation of resources are shifted towards offensive capabilities such as maritime amphibious capabilities, missiles, fighter jets, submarines etc. The Self-defense forces now has missiles, bombers, long-range fighter jets, submarines, and light carriers, which ten years ago it did not have. While it is getting difficult to demarcate these forces either offensive or defensive as RMA making this mission almost impossible, it is clear in Japanese case that the long-term trend is more offensive capable Japanese Self Defense Forces.

The most major turning point is that the United States support and encouragement for the Japanese development of offensive capabilities. To the US strategic calculations, a stronger, more capable Japan would contribute more to regional stability and most importantly the US fear of entrapment -the fear of being dragged into an unwanted escalation between Japan and China- would be reduced. Some of the defense modernizations Japan has undertaken are driven by North Korean missile threat (at least on rhetoric), yet many of them a direct response to China. Lack of transparency in Chinese military modernization and procurement patterns and Chinese opaque doctrine that command the Chinese military activities in and around the region aggravates Japanese concerns about Beijing. Therefore, an array of new military hard-wares, systems, structures and platforms aim at defense against China's potential military activities.(Takahashi, 2013) Against this background, the United States follows a rhetorically staunch but practically consolatory tone towards China while trying to reassure Japan about its deterrence through public statements and revisions of alliances as well as increasing its technology transfer in terms of defense equipment (Hagel ,2014; Klare ,2001).

The top priority of the United States lies mostly proliferation of nuclear weapons to Japan and its potential domino effects throughout the region. Matter of fact that Japan is a virtual nuclear power, meaning technologically capable of acquiring nuclear weapons within a short amount of times once it needs weaponization of nuclear technology. In this sense, the United States extended deterrence to Japan does not just aim at deterring threats against Japan, but also aims at keeping Japan in check and

within NPT. However, maintenance of the nuclear deterrence lies at the center of Japan's understanding of peace and security. That could be either in the form of extended deterrence or Japan's sovereign nuclear deterrent. (DiFilippo, 2006, 196) Therefore, rising discussion on the nuclear weapons is a clear evidence that the credibility of the United States nuclear extended deterrence is diminishing. When it comes to the question of how to deter, Tokyo continues to rely deeply on the United States security guarantees including nuclear extended deterrence.

When we think how critical the role of nuclear weapons is to assure Japan, we can appreciate how Japan's defense depended on the United States nuclear extended deterrence. For instance, in one of National Defense Council report dated 1976, it is stated that Japan depend on the US nuclear deterrent. In a similar direction, 1996 National Defense Council report states that against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan relies on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Precisely the same wording can be found in the subsequent National Defense Council reports, dated in 2005 and 2010. Acknowledging, threats from North Korea and China, these reports suggest that Japan would continue to be depended on the nuclear deterrence that the United States provide to protect Japan. (National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2005-, Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004. ,2004, 2005). With same token, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recognized that the US nuclear umbrella is indispensable for Japan's security. (Yukio ,2014)

Washington affirms and reaffirms many times its resolve to provide extended deterrence to Japan on a highest level. (O'Neil ,2013, 84) For instance, then Secretary of State, Rice tried to assure Japan by saying that the United States has will and capacity to protect Japan with all available means. (Rice Discusses North Korean Threat on Asian Trip ,2009) In a similar manner, at 2007 Security Consultative Council (SCC) meeting, SCC members stressed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities (nuclear and conventional) is on the service of protecting Japan. (The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, May 1, 2007) Obama also, as many other president have done, affirms the United States' commitments including nuclear forces to defend Japan. There can be found numbers of other interpretations that acknowledge the importance of nuclear extended deterrence in the Japanese eyes. Even though recent developments of relaxed self-imposed defense export ban, reinterpretation of Japanese constitution to move in direction of collective self-defense, and increasing

defense spending and military built up, Tokyo continues to rely deeply on the United States security guarantees including nuclear extended deterrence for its national security. The US presence neutralizes Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea, provides extended conventional (in form of MDSs) and nuclear extended deterrence for nuclear and ballistic missile threats coming from North Korea and enables Japan access to advanced US military technology.(Harris and Cooper ,2000, 36).

United States, on the other hand, persistently underlines that Japanese participation and contribution is vital for the alliance's long-term endurance. To the United States officials, not just Japan, but also other allies should be self-reliant to protect themselves for the crisis and conflicts in their near abroad as well as assisting the United States to manage broader strategic affairs. In this sense, making Japan more self-reliant and more contributing to the United States actions in Asia is the number one priority of the United States Post- Cold War strategies. In this sense, Japanese SDF have potent capabilities but defense priority lies in enhancing surveillance and maritime capacities to deal with small-scale aggression without US assistance in its near environment. However, as there are growing numbers of signs that hinders the United States credibility, even most of them are in other regions, Japan's anxiety keeps on growing. Furthermore, the United States policy towards pushing allies for more contribution and self-reliance hinders wider power balance in Asia thereby empower security dilemma. Therefore, as the United States policy towards pushing allies for more contribution and self-reliance, that hinders wider power balance in Asia.To overcome growing security dilemma between Japan-China and US-China dyads multilateral regional organization could be an answer. Yet, even existing multilateral organizations become contentious platforms due to growing uneasiness in different capitals towards each other.

Other important dangerous aspect related to nuclear issue is the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, which is shared by both Japanese and Americans alike. Currently, Japan legitimize its military modernization under the cover of North Korean threat, yet for China it is China up on Japan's list of targets. The US offers Japan a joint venture US-Japan Theater Missile Defense system against North Korean bellicose provocations, which is also disruptive when it comes to US-China-Russia strategic deterrence in the region. Indeed, missile defenses provide a good illustration of the action-reaction cycle problem. For Japanese and US official, these systems are

defensive in scope and character. Yet, for Chinese and Russians, they are just another brick on the wall to alter the strategic stability between the United States and themselves. Especially China staunchly opposed these systems independent of where they are planned to be deployed in the region, it could be Korea or somewhere in Japan or mobile. To respond to BMDs, China extensively modernize its nuclear forces, engage anti-submarine and anti-satellite systems to increase its A2/AD capacities.

Briefly, the US nuclear extended deterrence to Japan, in Japanese assessment: i) It is cost effective; ii) It is more appropriate with the nuclear resistant Japanese image; iii) The domestic constituencies is not favorable for that decision of having nuclear weapons program; iv) Appropriate under the current Japanese constitution. Yet, the fundamental problem with the current form of nuclear extended deterrence stems from assurance mission. Indeed, Japan's doubts on the credibility of the United States extended deterrence increase as the United States reduces the role of nuclear weapons in its wider deterrence posture. Japan's has been relatively anxious about the credibility of the United States nuclear deterrence for at least three reasons: i) There is no presence of US's tactical nuclear forces deployed in Japan; ii) Lack of any consultative mechanism; iii) Perceptions of American retrenchment. Yet, the fundamental problem between the United States and Japan on extended deterrence is the priorities and expectations. Fukuyama and Umebayashi argues that the US extended deterrence posture should shield against any types of attacks against Japan in Japanese understanding. (Fukuyama and Umebayashi, 2009) From a US perspective, extending nuclear deterrence to Japan has been more about assuring Tokyo of the depth to Washington's commitment to defend Japan's ultimate security, and less about conveying an immediate threat of punishment to regional adversaries. In this sense, the United States expects Japan to be self-sufficient to protect its own immediate environment on its own. This expectation is a common for all of the United States allies, and unique to post-Cold War era. The United States shows Australian alliance as a model to other allies in the region due to Australian have "will and capacity" to bear the cost when it is necessary (and fight shoulder to shoulder everywhere in the world when the United States request to do so.) In the past, becoming a normal country for Japan meant basically greater involvement in security cooperation, albeit within a UN peacekeeping context, which were consistent with Japan's pacifist constitution. Today, Japan has set for historic shift in its defense and security posture despite public

protests and objections from other regional countries.(Pilling, 2015) When it comes to Japan and Japanese security, this also includes becoming offensive military in the region.(Kubo, 2014) Japan indeed building potent military force to defend its near environment. The United States reaffirmed its support for more strategically capable Japan that pledged to develop a more symmetrical alliance relationship with more substantial Japanese input. For a matter of fact, Japanese SDF have potent capabilities but defense priority lies in enhancing surveillance and maritime capacities to deal with small-scale aggression without US assistance in its near environment. To this end, with legislation in 1999 allowing Japanese SDF to give “rear-area” support to the United States troops if they were needed to stop North Korean aggression, Japan made another legislative opening. Defense Cooperation Guidelines is a 1999 dated document, which is for the first time allowed Japan aerial support for the United States operation in near abroad. In a similar direction, through security bills passed by Diet in 2015 allows Japan provide logistical support to the United States, and even the scope of the support could be overseas operations (especially in South China Sea).(McCurry, 2015) In this sense, Japan has slowly developed a degree of foreign policy autonomy in the last decades as the United States pressure for greater Japanese contribution to the Japan's own defense and alliance's objectives. Emphasizing more proactive responses to contingencies around Japan, 2013 the new security guidelines refine further dynamic defense force posture.

American bases in Japan are the most important assets in alliance relation between Japan and the United States. There are five major US bases in Japan; 3 on Honshu, 1 on Kyushu, 1 on Okinawa. Okinawa is the biggest base in Asia covering 20 percent of the whole island. Okinawan base became contentions in domestic politics in many cases.(Mullen, 2014) For the United States, bases are strategically far more valuable than anything else in the United States-Japan alliance. One another extended deterrence assets is the missiles defense systems (MDSs). Japan’s national BMD is based on an effective multi-tier defense system which is also interconnected to the US theater missile defense systems (TMDs). Because of potentially dangerous North Korean ballistic missile threats, Japan collaborates with the United States on TMDs. In 1993, Japan and the United States had started talking on a joint venture for TMDs. But in 1997, Japan postponed its commitment to the project because cost factors (minimum cost would be around 1 trillion yen) and wide range of issues such as

weapons system viability, intelligence management and political constraints. Yet the most important factor was TMD would be coordinated by the United States satellite systems in the absence of Tokyo's capabilities. In 2002, Japan finally launched 4 reconnaissance satellites of its own. Just then Japan finally collaborates with the United States on TMD. This is a staunch indication of Japanese trust deficit towards the US initiatives. North Korea, China and Russia are all against the United States-Japan TMD systems since it would change strategic stability in the region in the long run. China in particular views it as an integral part of a long-running containment strategy directed towards China in the region. A pursuit of such missile defense might create an incentive for China to develop its own missiles to counter a US-Japan missile defense system in the region. This would create a missile-building spirals. However, ballistic missile defenses (strategic, theater and tactical) reinforce extended nuclear deterrence in the short run as they were seen as an insurance against North Korean missile attacks(Yukio ,2009). It is evident from the way discussion on the MDSs evolves that Japan continues to be depended on American conventional and nuclear forces to sustain its security. For the time being, Japanese course is to reinforce the alliance relations with the United States and increase its own conventional capabilities.(Mochizuki, 2007) Yet, this course of action means Japan's normalization and it is counterproductive in terms of emerging security dilemma in the region.

5.2 Extended Deterrence to South Korea

5.2.1 Overview

Korean Peninsula is one of the dangerous security complexes in East Asian regional security structure. Since the early 1950s, the divided Korea and since the early 2000s, North Korean nuclear issue and various responses to these crises continue to be the most pressing issues in the regional security architecture. Historically, the rivalry between the South and the North had started after the end of the Japanese colonial rule. Soviets and the United States divided the peninsula as a way of demilitarizing Japan in 1945. Later on, as Cold War gaining ground, this temporary division of the peninsula turned to be permanent one. In 1948, the Korean nation literally divided as two sides held election on their own and started separated nation buildings as they relied heavily on their superpower patrons in creating one of the most militarized and dangerous borders. With Washington disinterests, Soviet and Chinese sponsored North acted to

invade whole Korea in 1951 resulting a war on the peninsula involving the United States and later China.(Cohen, 1995, 69) Against the invasion, the United States refocused its effort to defend the South. Brief and inconclusive Korean War did not alter the status quo ante. The conflict was prolonged because superpower rivalry sustained. (Olsen, 1993, 90) On the Korean peninsula, division even seems to be frozen as a hard-core status quo as no great power, let alone regional powers, would prefer to see a reunited Korea right now. In the post-Cold War era, there are four great powers involving the conflict and total six parties (Two Koreas+ the United States, China, Russia, Japan) and all of them have different agendas and expectations for and from a united Korea. Therefore, unification is dependent on a mutual agreement of all these great and regional powers. China prefers a future Asia where China plays a dominant role instead of the United States, where no military alliances exist, where a reunified Korea opt for China instead of the United States, where no US military deployed.(Cossa and Oxley, 2000, 72) The United States would like to see a united Korea under the South administration remaining in the US orbit. Besides these geopolitical desires, given economic and social difficulties, a united Korea is not possible in foreseeable future. The cost of reunification will be tremendous on South Korea. According to one of the estimations, it requires one-third of the whole South Korean annual budget for over a decade. In this sense, even South Korea looks for an incremental unification rather than a sudden collapse of the North.(Jwa, Moon, and Roh, 2002, 1:109) Therefore, the division has arrived to the post-Cold War era, even though one of the power poles collapsed.

At the end of the Korean War in 1953, the United States and South Korea signed Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) which is still a base for the United States-South Korean Alliance. Initially, the alliance was formed in the 1950s to counterbalance superiority of North Korea (with Chinese and Russian supports) over the South. After the war, North Korea recovered at a much more rapid pace by building its heavy industry and manufacturing sectors as the South experienced systemic corruptions and large-scale inefficiencies until the late 1970s. However, since the early 1980s, South Korea has managed to reverse this and turned to be a powerhouse as an open market and export-led economic giant whereas North Korea plunged into nepotism and failures as an outdated socialist-dictatorial model of economy. (Roehring, Seo, and Heo ,2007, 2). Thus, the North has fallen behind the South by almost any measure. On

economic terms, South Korea is well-integrated international stakeholders of the United States led international order, the seventh largest exporter, the tenth largest importer of goods and services in the world, founding member of G20, embedded in many international organizations from IMF to UN, active in regional organizations such as ASEAN, APEC etc. According to latest data, China, North's oldest and the single most important ally, becomes the South's top trading partner over the years as well as the biggest export market, trade volume between the two countries reached at around \$235.3 billion in 2014. South Korea is also one of the biggest foreign investors in China, pumping in some \$1.6 billion in the first quarter of this year. (Tiezzi, 2015) They have also formally signed a free trade agreement (FTA) on 1st June, 2015. (S. Korea, China Formally Sign Free Trade Pact, 2015). South Korea has also negotiated and finalized substantially successful FTAs with the United States, EU, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, New Zealand, and Indonesia.(Mundy, 2013) Supporting numbers of multilateral forums, it is an active participants of the international relations. Militarily, South Korea much capable forces and advanced latest technology equipment as well as a formal treaty allies with the United States and one of the crucial partner of the United States bilateral alliance system in Asia. In this sense, South Korea is one of the United States longest standing allies and for an ordinary South Korean, alliance looks like the natural order of things.(Suh, 2004, 135) Becoming a significant military power, South Korea is also a contributor to international stability and peacekeeping mission operations, counter piracy operations, joint maritime operations from Haiti to Lebanon.

Pyongyang response to this shift in the balance of power equilibrium has been its nuclear weapons program, as its long-term goal turned from victory to survival. Admittedly, there are certain reasons behind North Korean nuclearization besides changing military and economic balance. One of them is the fact that with the end of the Cold War, North Korea has lost its traditional allies, China and Russia. In political terms, North Korea's traditional allies Moscow and Beijing entered diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1990 and 1992 respectively as a result of Roh Tae-woo's Nordpolitik. This effort to improve ties with the Soviet Union and China has bearded fruit within the last decades and now China is South Korean largest trading partner replacing the United States as of 2013. Both China and Russia have pragmatic cooperation with North Korea yet, neither China nor Russia willing to support bold

North Korean provocations and adventurist moves in the current environment, yet in similar roots they will not allow an un-negotiated settlement through the collapse of the regime in the North. Unlike the past occurrences, North Korea could not also count on a guaranteed military support from China and Russia as much as it did during the Cold War era. Historically and culturally there are some similarities between South Korea and China such as similar Confucian heritages, mutual antipathy towards Japan, growing links. Nevertheless, China's attitudes regarding with the North Korean provocations make uncomfortable attitudes towards China in Seoul. Rise of China and Chinese unwillingness to condemn North Korea's provocations create overlapping fears in the South. China is Seoul's largest trading partner and it has huge leverage on Korea, yet it has not used this leverage as South Korea wish to see. Meanwhile, continuation of the United States-South Korean alliances with an expansion into more institutionalized way by burden and command and control sharing has created a difficult strategic environment for the North. Performance of US air power in Iraq, in the Balkans, later the course of events in Serbia, Libya and Syria made also the North Korean think again. During the 1990s, many were heralding the imminent demise of the North Korean regime and speculating on the future course of a unified Korea. However, North Korea has shown an uncanny ability to survive and has managed, along the way, to devote the necessary resources to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

There are potent reasons for the South Korean feels threatened and seek extended deterrence against strategic rival North Korea and its indigenous nuclear and missile program. North Korea has committed numbers of provocative risky action against South Korea including threatening rhetoric, nuclear tests, missile and rocket tests, etc. North Korea advanced its nuclear and missile programs while its young leader, Kim Jong-un, has been showing heightened rhetoric of military threats and bellicose acts by even executing 70 senior officials including its own family members since taking over power in December 2011.(Keck, 2015) Neither has the attempts by the main players including China made substantial improvements in North Korean nuclear danger nor has North Korean own economic reforms yielded much needed outcomes to overcome endemic famines and economic difficulties.(The Economist 2016) Facing with unstable and dangerous neighbor, South Korean 2014 Defense

White paper argues that “The threat to security on the Korean Peninsula has never been greater.”(Defense White Paper 2014, 2014)

5.2.2 Divergence in Extended Deterrence Aims and Scope

In current environment, everyone agrees on the threat from the North, yet, disagree on the best way to cope with it. In the post-Cold War era, extended deterrence is important for deterring high-level threats while it is less operational in deterring lower level provocations of the North, as the North has formidable capacity to forge continuous lower level provocations. Furthermore, North advancing nuclear and missile program has already started creating a stability-instability paradox, where the North becomes more and more confident in its provocations. The increasing numbers of nuclear and missiles tests are the obvious evident of this situation. South Korea pursues endless diplomatic and economic openings to the North while strengthening alliance with the United States as well as making its military capacities more potent. Meanwhile, the United States moves toward pressuring/containing the North via sanctions as assuring the South via extended deterrence. The US has so called “strategic patience strategy” believing that the regime in the North would eventually collapse and adds some restraint (i.e. staying out in many lower level conflicts) and add some muscle (i.e. sending B-52 bombers and the Stealth fighter jets to the region) to this approach, should the situation require.(MacAskill, 2013) According to Morgan the divergence between South Korea and the United States reflects two broad elements. The US interested in more elimination of the North’s nuclear capacity and bring it back in NPT in the long run and in the short term to deter North Korea and prevent its wider effects on the proliferation trends in the region. The ultimate objective of South Korean foreign policy is, however, to elimination of barriers to unification to led an incremental unification.(Morgan, 2007) The divergence is evident that even some circle in South Korea tends to assess that American continuing nuclear extended deterrence would give North Korea a good excuse to claim itself to have to be a nuclear power.(Sung-ki, 2009a) In this sense, South Korea has still an acute sense of strategic vulnerability and dilemma. On the one hand, North Korea possess the greatest threat to the South and it has no intention to disarm and open the way for peaceful unification. More importantly the South needs more not less of the United States extended deterrence to deter the North. On the other hand, South Korea itself fears that as long as the United States extended deterrence intact there is no way to

accomplish unification without sustaining peace between the United States and North Korea, which is not on the horizon as long as the North keeps failing to give away its nuclear ambitions. In this sense, as the need for alliance has increased, the divergence among allies widens too. Indeed, South Korea has been increasingly reassured over time concerning the credibility of US nuclear extended deterrence against North Korean nuclear attacks, if it ever happens, or full-fledged invasion attempts, even though force reductions and removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula. That is, South Korea has no credibility shortages of extended deterrence when it comes to strategic level conflicts. Yet, when it comes to lesser level non-nuclear issues, the South Koreans are not that much assured even though the United States extended deterrence force posture has been tailored through gradual changes including more conventional and defensive capabilities. Indeed, RMA and MDS play much greater role in the United States force posture now in the Korean context. Moreover, rhetorically 61 years old alliance is now the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. (Joint Statement of the 2014 United States - Republic of Korea Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting, 2014) In this sense, as O'Neil also pointed out, in the post-Cold War era, extended deterrence has become more rather than less important both to the United States and to South Korea. (O'Neil, 2013, 68) However, it is not that crystal clear that the alliance serves everyone as their wishes. For instance, Justin Chapman argues that the US-South Korean alliance has long been distracted by other issues from focusing on its primary and initial mission, that is deterring North Korea and turned to be a manivella that aligns China. (Chapman, 2014)

The nuclear part of the alliance in the form of nuclear extended deterrence is the most important and controversial aspects of the relations. South Korean policy makers regarded nuclear weapons as beneficial for their security in the new security environment as the nuclear umbrella is the only available option against the North Korean nuclear, chemical, biological and missile attacks threats. For the record, the nuclear umbrella goes back to early 1950s, and nothing to do with the WMDs threats from the North. On the peninsula, nuclear weapons were first deployed for potential use against Chinese aggression and stayed there until eventual removal in 1991. (H. Kristensen, 2004) Therefore, during the Cold War era, on a strategic level, nuclear umbrella served more to the United States to contain communist threat in Asia with a minimal cost than it did to South Korea to deter the North. Indeed, even the term

“extended deterrence” is relatively new and it appeared for the first time at the 38th Consultative meeting just after the first North Korean Nuclear test in October 2006. Kristensen argues that the statement explicitly mentioned extended deterrence rather than the more ambiguous nuclear umbrella, which was the term used in the 2005 communiqué. Presumably, the intension has been to make the reaffirmation more a little more explicit given the new circumstances.(H. Kristensen, 2004) According to Choi, however, extended deterrence had specifically been used instead of nuclear umbrella to assure South Korea, who was seeking more potent assurances at that time. That is, extended deterrence was more than just nuclear umbrella by probably including conventional deterrence in South Korean’s eyes.(Choi, 2011) That is, it is assumed (by South Korean) that extended deterrence would include deterring all sorts of threats at all level by every available means. For instance, the United States FK Commander General Sharp underlined that BMDs, RMA and other advanced weapons systems and even tactical nuclear weapons are part of the United States nuclear extended deterrence posture to South Korea.(Sung-ki, 2009b) This commitment repeated at the subsequent Consultative Meeting between American and South Korean. In 2010 at the 42nd Consultative Meeting, it is reaffirmed that the full range of military capabilities including nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities are all parts of the United States extended deterrence.(The 42nd Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué, 2010) In 2014, the same wording had been used once again.(The 46th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, 2014) Indeed, at the rhetorical level since 1975, the United States has openly tried to assure South Korea about the United States commitment to defend South Korea with all available options including nuclear weapons, if it is necessary. Yet, towards these South Korean priorities, the US signals no "redlines" but rather offers bolstering South Korean Military readiness to face with these provocations. North Korea’s provocative attacks are part of the US-ROK security dialogue, but never find its deserved priorities in the US extended deterrence concerns. The US simply willing to help South Korea to deter and defeat these types of provocations, yet not make them parts of its extended deterrence mission. This leave South Korea boosts its own military capabilities through acquisition and production of new type of military hardware.(Jackson ,2012) Furthermore, nuclear dimension of the alliance has long been managed by Washington with no input from Seoul. In the early 1970s, when Nixon triggered new China policy and later Carter administrations scaled back US security commitments and presence

in Korean Peninsula, which followed by the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula, South Korea felt insecure and started developing an indigenous nuclear program. With that fear and historical doubts about the United States security commitment, South Korea sought for its own nuclear option. Later, the United States' enshrining of the extended deterrence to South Korea was a result of the fact that CIA's discovery of South Korean nuclear weapons program.(Hayes and Moon, 2011) To overcome this, in 1978, at 11th Security Consultative Mechanism meeting both sides were agreed to insert specific wording in the joint communique that reaffirms the nuclear umbrella and enhanced conventional deterrence by joint military exercises and sharing intelligence and selling special equipment to the South Korean defense forces. This was also a period in which the United States assessed the role of nuclear weapons in war fighting as well as North Korean decline in conventional military capabilities. This was important since the nuclear deterrence logic in the Korean Peninsula was based on the fact that South Korea had conventional weakness in relation to the North. North's diminishing capabilities whereas South Korean increasing economic and military advances created a diluted rationale for the extended nuclear deterrence. As a result, with the end of the Cold War, the logic of the nuclear deterrence had started shifting towards conventional deterrence in Korean Peninsula. In 1991, Bush announced the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons -ground based, surface ships, submarines, and land based naval air crafts- globally. This meant that the United States would completely withdraw its entire nuclear forces from Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, South Korean President Kim Tae-woo pursued a 'Nordpolitik' through which he managed to reach a joint declaration for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was signed in 1992. Under this provision both sides committed to not test, manufacture, receive, or use nuclear weapons or not possess nuclear processing or uranium enrichment facilities. Thus, the expectation after both the United States decision to removal of nuclear forces and South-North joint declaration on denuclearization was that nuclear weapons had expired in the Korean Peninsula security environment. However, by 1993, there was genuine skepticism about the North Korean sincerity since its constant failure to open its declared nuclear sites to IAEA and no progress with the implementation of joint declaration.(Mack, 1993) The very same year, North Korean announcement of withdrawal from the NPT was not big surprise for any one, yet it triggered a crisis in the Korean Peninsula, which led to enshrining the United States South Korean alliance including permanent basing in

South Korea of US Patriot anti-missile systems. Clinton reaffirmed the United States commitment to protect South Korea by stating any North Korean use of nuclear weapons would be end of their country as they know it.(Clinton's Warning Irks North Korea ,1993) It is difficult to assess whether or not enhanced nuclear umbrella (without nuclear presence) had something to do with the North Korean decision to stand off and limit its provocations but it is relatively easy to evaluate how South Korean response to the nuclear assurances from the United States. During the crisis, the South Korea was not actually skeptical about the credibility of the United States commitment, yet they were more anxious about the United States unilateral decision for a preventive war for the sake of preventing North Korean proliferation. There was, indeed, some preparation on the United States side by 1994 including call for US citizens leave the South Korea. In 1994, the United States reached an Agreed Framework with Pyongyang, yet North Korea kept failing to fulfill its commitment under this framework as well. This reinforced the perception that North Korea was actually acquiring a nuclear capacity in a gradual way. For a matter of fact, Agreed Framework aimed at delaying North Korean nuclearization rather than preventing it due to believe in the United States' circle that North Korea was actually collapsing with failing economy under international isolation and pressure. Notwithstanding its vulnerabilities, North Korea proved to be extraordinary resilient and continued its nuclear program up to the date.(Pollack, 2003) Matter of fact, North Korean race towards nuclearization has entered its final stage as of 2016. Since 2011 when Kim Jong-un reigned power after his father passed away, North Korea has accelerated its nuclear and missile programs. The North has conducted five nuclear tests, (two out of five occurred in 2016, and three of them occurred since Kim Jong-un has taken power) dozens of missiles tests with varied results.(Fields ,2016) As North Korea advances its nuclear and missile capabilities, the need for credible nuclear deterrence increases for South Korea.

With this historical context at hand, it is easy to see that the issue of the United States credibility is contentious one in Korea and it is more about North Korean lower level provocations rather than nuclear programs. Despite the fact that the United States fought a war to defend Korea under a shared commitment against the spread of communism, South Korean policy makers has continuously had doubts about the credibility of the United States nuclear extended deterrence commitment under the

MDT against North Korean conventional attacks. Meantime, there are some fears of entrapment within an escalating nuclear war between South and North Korea, which would be devastating for both Koreas as well as for the entire region. Equally, some argues that as North Korean space program moves forward with more satellites in orbit, the US would choose preemption before North Korea becomes capable of hitting continental US with ISBM. In this scenario, the South (and possibly Japan too) would be entrapped in a devastating escalation even though it could guarantee the escalation dominance at the end. In this sense, vulnerability and insecurity are quintessential traits of South Korea's strategic approach towards the alliance.

There are many ups and downs in alliance history. More recently, for example, it was "closer to a divorce" in 2006, yet it was exalted as the "linchpin" of security for the Pacific in 2010. Historically speaking, the sense of strategic vulnerability peaks whenever South Korea feels diminishing US commitments to its security. And hypothetically whenever the sense of strategic vulnerability peaks in South Korea, pro nuclear sides have been given better voice. The best available indicator regarding this issue is the South Korean nuclear program. South Korean indigenous nuclear program had continued until Park's assassination in 1979 in spite of significant pressure and threat to cease all economic and military aid from the United States. However, gradual rise of democracy in South Korea after Park's death and post-Vietnam US policy towards region strengthen the alliance between Seoul and Washington. In this sense, despite many ups and downs, the United States military alliance with South Korea become tighter and better shaped than over decades due to democratic transition in the South Korea. Compatibility of ally's domestic systems of governance is an important factor for alliances according to Stephen Walt. Walt calls this as an ideological solidarity.(Walt, 1990, 33–34) However, increasing North nuclear capability and prolonged resilient against all kinds of pressures have reversed the debate again and again. Even, assured at the highest level extended nuclear deterrence, there are views that argue, "South Korea should be able to enjoy the nuclear sovereignty to the extent that Japan has."(Choi ,2011). In this sense, the link between the United States extended deterrence and nuclear proliferation is also evident in Korean case.

Table 25: The Extended Deterrence Differences between South Korea and the United States

	South Korea	The United States
What to Deter? (Priorities)	North Korean Conventional Threats North Korean Nuclear Threats Japan’s Remilitarization	Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Prevent large scale militarized aggression on the Peninsula Deter North Korean use of Nuclear Weapons Deter North Korean Conventional (missile) threats China’s Rise
How to Deter? (Expectations)	The US immediate NED The US general ED Self-Reliance Bilateral/Multilateral Engagement	Push for Self-Reliance (for the lower level conflicts) Push for more contribution Push for integrated RMA Bilateral/Multilateral Engagement The US general NED The US immediate ED
Danger (Fears)	Abandonment Stability-Instability Paradoxes	Entrapment
Effected Sub-Regions and Countries	North Kore: Buildups Nuclear and missile capabilities, which overall effects both North Korean and Chinese security dilemma. China: Modernization of Conventional and Nuclear Forces, which overall effects Japan’s security dilemma.	
Prepared by the Author		

For the United States, South Korean contribution to second parts of the deterrence (conventional deterrence) and self-sufficiency for lower level conflicts is expected. For deterring North Korean use of WMDs, the threat of retaliation in kind (extended deterrence by punishment) and continuing reassurance signaling through reminding "redlines" are parts of the extended deterrence mission for the United States. Plus, advancing MDSs on the peninsula to prevent North Korean missiles arriving their target plays crucial role in assuring South Koreans on the credibility and capability of the United States extended deterrence. Yet, to prevent North Korean provocations, which is at top of the deterrence expectations in South Korean priorities, the United States signals no "redlines" but rather offers bolstering South Korean Military readiness to face with these provocations. This difference is the most contentious aspect of the United States-Korean alliance. American officials fear of entrapment within an escalating war between South and North Korea, in which nuclear weapons could potentially be used, which would also be devastating for both Koreas as well as for the entire region. Presently, the United States has a mix of B-52 and B2 bombers, and F-22 fighter aircrafts as well as radar and missile defense system as a

deterrent posture on the peninsula as deterrent forces against North Korea (DeYoung, 2013). However, the United States stationary forces, US South Korean Combined forces and forces in Japan and other bases could be used in theory, should the situation dictate. With this force posture, the United States does not aim to deter North Korean limited provocations rather it aims at deterring North Korean total war aims. In US perceptions, with limited help from the United States in surveillance and intelligence sharing, the South Korea would be able to deter the North's lower level actions on through upgrading its power projection and precision-target capabilities.

On the surface, the immediate purpose of the 1954 Mutual Security Agreement between South Korea and the United States is to deter nuclear aggression from North Korea. However, as Hayes points out that given North Korean limited nuclear capability, this aim is not an accurate overlook. (Hayes, 2009) Therefore, the actual aim of the United States extended deterrence is to force the North Korea to turn back into the NPT and comply with its non-proliferation commitment. However, to get back North Korea into the NPT, which is explicitly noted in 2010 NPR, is a compellence mission, is not a deterrence mission. Therefore, by definition, such a mission cannot be a deterrence objective. For North Korea, nuclear capability, even in its current opaque version, is a critical benchmark for domestic and international politics. It is useful to sustain legitimacy and order inside and deterrence for the regime survival outside. Moreover, thanks to the Libya's ousted leader Kaddafi's example, the chance for Pyongyang negotiating away missile and nuclear capabilities is null and void. In this sense, while the US extended deterrence, at least on theory, prevent South Korean nuclearization, it surely pushes North Korean nuclear program.

In the new security environment where a nuclear capable North Korea lives beside the South, the Seoul has following declared priorities in the Korean Peninsula: i) Curb and if possible cancel off entire North Korean nuclear program by engaging North Korea through dozens of carrots and sticks; ii) Preventing North Korean collapse, which is widely shared by China as well since China will be most affected country in terms of both economically, and politically if North Korea collapses; iii) Curb Chinese influence over the peninsula thorough North Korea. The US shares almost all of these priorities with the South, but two of additional the United States priorities on the peninsula are: i) To prevent South Korean possible nuclearization by providing assurances and credible extended deterrence; ii) Prevent proliferation of

nuclear to non-state actors through North Korean program. Except pressing and challenging North Korean issue, uncertainties about China's rise and in tensions in the East and South China Sea are threatening developments in the Korean eyes. Equally, the historical enmity towards Japan, and the fear stemming from normalizing Japan is one of the important parts of strategic security calculations in Seoul. In the long term, historically, the South is also concerned about the rise of Japan as a normalizing (militarizing) power in the region. Even though Japan and South Korea have many similarities, contentious bilateral relations, having common advisories as well as common alliances with the United States, similar threat perceptions, territorial disputes between the two states (Dokdo/Takeshima Islands) and historical grievances stemming from Japanese colonization experiences and common Japanese attitude towards avoiding this period in ordinary Japanese political elites, cause problems. In this sense, South Korean naval builds up is not only against the North but it is also against Japan and China. Yet as it always perception streets are a two-way road. As Endicott suggest military spending does not necessarily determine the military strength. For instance, combined South and North Korea have more powerful army than what Japan has.(Endicott, 1990) In this sense, South Korean military spending is equally counterproductive in the region and indeed creates questions marks in Tokyo.

One of the important long-range concerns for South Korea, China's enduring relations with the North. China's attitudes regarding with the North Korean provocations, think Cheonan and Yeonpyeong attacks for instance, boosts these interpretations. China refused explicitly condemns the attacks. Since young Kim Jong-un has reigned the power, the relations with China has strained. After North Korean third nuclear test and rocket launch even warnings coming from Beijing, China publicly expressed it's discontent and even joined international sanctions against the North. After Kim Jong-un brutally executed his own uncle Jang Song-thaek, a close personal contact for China, relations deteriorated rapidly. In contrast to deteriorated relations with the North, China has improved maintained close relations with South Korea. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Seoul first before Pyongyang has been seen as a strong sign of Beijing's displeasure with Pyongyang.(Page and Gale, 2014) Yet, China considers still North Korea as a strategic buffer zone to manage and check the United States alliance with South Korea and Japan. Besides China's current strategy of preserving and protecting if necessary the North Korea as strategic assets,

potential Chinese attempt to dominate the region as a hegemon concerns South Korean strategic thinking.(Sang-hun, 2010) Given growing importance of China in the trade and potential unification with the North, South Korea has a strategic dilemma towards Chinese rise. On the one hand, it benefits from China's rise both economically and politically, yet at the same time, it creates more uncertainties for middle power Korea in the regional security environment. Therefore, China is potentially counted as a mid-to-long-term threat in South Korea.(Suk-hee, 2012)

5.2.3 South Korean Response to Divergences in the Question of What and How to Deter?

In the new security environment, when it comes to question of how to deter, South Korea remains to stay under the United States nuclear umbrella against North Korean nuclear attack (if it is possible at all), yet hedges against growing uneasiness stemming from the danger of increasing lower-level conflicts by improving its military capacities. In this sense, just as like Japan does, South Korea follows a double-hedge strategy. It hedges against North Korean threat by strengthening alliance with the United States while hedges against uncertainties in the regional security by various measures designed to boost its own military capacities.

For the South Korean part of the equation, on the other hand, the extended deterrence must cover first and foremost lower level provocation of the North since actually nuclear danger is not as crucial as it is generally hyped by public. Yet, at the level of sub-limited conflicts, it cannot be sure that Washington would do something to defend South Korea, let alone employ nuclear option. This is the most important current in the alliance and the United States extended deterrence to South Korea. O'Neil notes that the United States's failure in preventing North Korea to engage in lower level conventional provocations escalates tensions on the peninsula.(O'Neil, 2013, 144) These type of provocations attacks is part of the US-ROK security dialogue, but never find its deserved priorities in the US extended deterrence concerns. The US simply willing to help South Korea to deter and defeat these types of provocations, yet not make them parts of its extended deterrence mission. This leave South Korea boosts its own military capabilities through acquisition and production of new type of military hardware.(Jackson, 2012)

In short, Seoul's security objectives are limited to the efforts of avoiding a war with North Korea. Indeed, two Koreas, from a technical point of view, are still at war. Thus, swinging between acute tensions to reconciliation the relationship between two has many different faces. In a similar direction, within South Korean community and policy makers there are two distinct views on how to deal with North Korea. First suggests that North Korea is best dealt with through a conciliatory policy that address North's security concerns, second argues that North Korean threats is best to be contained by counter deterrence. Post 1953 South Korean strategic planning has primarily been aiming at deterring a full-scale invasion from the North. To this end, South Korea has built up ambitious military forces and national capabilities and alliances with the United States from the 1970s onwards. As a result, the shift in the balance of power incentives North Korean nuclear acquisition. Over the past decades, South Korea has become more concerned about the lower level provocations of the North assuming that the North may not be capable of all-out-war with the South but its acts more emboldened after its nuclear acquisition towards the South. Matter of fact, the South Korean's question in mind is not whether North Korea has the ability to deliver its nuclear weapons or not, but rather they ask whether North Korea tries to dominate escalation during any crisis, of which there is no shortage, because it won't be an easy decision taking risk against North Korea even without nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are interpreted as a factor that makes North Korea more bellicose and provocative. Accordingly, the peninsula is coming under the influence of the so-called stability-instability paradox, whereby firm mutual deterrence at the nuclear level would embolden Pyongyang to engage in conventional military adventurism that falls below the threshold of certain retaliation. North Korea has a large stockpile of chemical weapons, which is probably the world one of largest stockpile. Apart from nuclear and chemical weapons danger, North Korea possess conventional threat capability in military terms. It has over 6000 tanks and over 13000 artilleries. According to Mark Fitzpatrick "North Korea's greatest advantage is that its artillery could initially deliver a heavy bombardment on the South Korean capital." (Kim, 2013) North Korean latest provocations and rhetoric, including sinking South Korean navy destroyer, the Cheonan, and increasing numbers of missiles tests, artillery attacks against South Korean islands, nuclear tests are all in this direction. These kinds of lower level conflicts are at top of the deterrence expectations in South Korean priorities

whereas the US signals no redlines but rather offers bolstering South Korean Military readiness to face with these types of provocations.

Presently, the United States has a mix of B-52 and B2 bombers, and F-22 fighter aircrafts as well as radar and missile defense system as a deterrent posture on the peninsula as deterrent forces against North Korea.(DeYoung, 2013) However, the United States stationary forces, US South Korean Combined forces and forces in Japan and other bases could be used in theory, should the situation dictate. The United States forward deploys about 28,500 troops on the peninsula in addition to about 52,000 troops in Japan and about 5,000 in Guam. Including personnel on ships at sea, the US has upwards of 100,000 military personnel in the region, the number peaking during major training exercises. With this force posture, the United States does not aim to deter North Korean limited provocations rather it aims at deterring North Korean total war aims. For instance, McDevitt from Brookings Institute once wrote that the United States response to these kinds of provocations has been very similar to each other: sanctions, pressure, and show of strength.(McDevitt, 2011)

In US perceptions, with limited help from the United States in surveillance and intelligence sharing, the South Korea would be able to deter the North's lower level actions on through upgrading its power projection and precision-target capabilities. To this end, the United States provides advanced weapons system to the South as well as jointly projects a MDS on the peninsula. The South Korea, on the other hand, searches for greater security guaranties in the form of nuclear deterrence. This is logical for South Korea since the United States extended deterrence in its initial form is just a declaration without any detailed guidance and planning. Without it, the credibility of extended deterrence fades away in Korean eyes. According to Jong Kun Choi current deterrence offers little against North Korea as they are mostly operationilized within great power compettions.(Choi ,2011) In a similar direction, according to Hayes, classic extended nuclear deterrence will not be successful to deter North Korean lower level provocations. Only conventional deterrence is likely to curb the the North's lower level provocations. However, in the short run, more conventional oriented deterrence may be able to deter North Korean provocations but in the long run it will not just lead to eventual nuclear proliferation by the allies themselves, but also lead an arms race among the East Asian nations. The only way out to deter North Korean WMDs threats without antagonizing a security dilemma, cascading an eventual arms race in the

region, and assuring allies and partners about its credibility is turn back to classic deterrence strategy by having tactical nuclear weapons in the South, which is believed to be impossible and unattainable by many. Yet, even small numbers of tactical nuclear weapons could easily neutralize North Korea's nuclear threat without harnessing any future complications. Furthermore, redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula will not just enhance credibility to the U.S. deterrent and but also foster China's pressure on North Korea. Overall, tactical nuclear weapons could provide better deterrence against North's nuclear as well as conventional threats. Against this background (different actors and different expectations), on the one hand, South Korea has been building enough conventional capability to deter North's conventional attacks (and other regional occurrences). On the other hand, Seoul seeks a "nuclear sovereignty" through which South Korea's desire to exercise more control over the scope of its nuclear energy activities.(Dalton and Francis, 2015) This means that South Korea wants to be a threshold nuclear power just as like Japan does. The main drivers for this desire is stemming from the gap between the aim (and necessary capacities) of the extended deterrence in the American eyes and in the South Korean eyes.

North Korea is believed to possess sufficient fissile material to manufacture several nuclear weapons more if they have already not done so. Yet, as I have pointed out earlier, a long-range North Korean nuclear attack with ICBMs is not credible at this point. Yet, they have proven missile capacity to carry the attack, which might be nuclear, covering whole South, Japan's territory as well as some part of the United States territory. This makes over all missile defense capability more necessary. In this sense, THAAD is better option, yet it has potentially irks China and Russia (Griffiths ,2016). Assistant Secretary dealing with arms control in Obama administration, Frank A. Rose recently stated that THAAD is a purely defensive system and affect broader strategic stability with Russia and China.(F. A. Rose, 2015) Yet, it has a greater effect on Chinese security considerations than what usually assumed. There are two points to highlight here. First of all, the United States reiterates the missiles threat coming from North Korea and tries to establish a missile defense system as a deterrence by denial capacity. It is obvious that allies do not have potent capacity on their own in term of MDSs and dependent on the United States backing in this area. Yet, again, the

United States pushes its allies to contribute more. Second, the United States sees side effects of these advanced systems on strategic stability in the region.

To cope with North Korean threat other major tool that has been employed both by South Korea and by the United States is diplomacy. The followings are major diplomatic initiatives in this sense: i) The Agreed Framework ii) KEDO, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization iii) Four Party Talks: North and South Korea, The US and China; iv) Constructive Engagement: Constructive engagement or gradual opening towards North Korea is still an ongoing approach to cope with North Korea. This policy later called as trust politic in the post-Cold War era, which aims at engaging positively with the North. Accordingly, the South Korean priority is make sure the North understand that they will suffer real consequences when it threatens peace and security of the South. But, the South is open to boost cooperation with the North via inter-Korean dialogue and enhanced international cooperation. This approach includes economic and humanitarian aids as well as working together within bilateral and multilateral institutions. This is a policy of leaving door open for dialogue while strengthening deterrence. In this sense, there are several round of Korean negotiations; 1st round 1971, 2nd round 1984, 3rd round 1990. The only break through because in 1991, the United States removed all tactical nuclear weapons and announced troops reduction. Moreover, North Korean increased sense of isolation and vulnerability with demise of Cold War and losing its traditional allies Russia and China pushed the regime in the North made took some consolatory steps. This third round could be a successful, but the performance of the United States military in Persian Gulf conflict and in Bosnian conflicts demonstrated the ability of modern command and control systems and advanced weapons to the North Korean leaders leaving them strategically vulnerable. At this point, they followed the nuclear suit; v) Perry initiative as an American initiative.(Niksich, 2005)

All in all, there is two things come out of Korean case above. First one is the fact that the United States nuclear extended deterrence is the only way out for South Korea against possible North Korean escalation. But in general, there is debate over how and with which tools the extended deterrence preserved. Tailored deterrence, more conventional depending on advanced weapons systems, or classic nuclear deterrence with tactical nuclear weapons on site boosted by missile defenses, is not a question of how the extended deterrence will provide security but also a determinant

of the wider security structure in the region. The first, currently pursued by the United States, is potentially counterproductive and incentives the security dilemma in the region. The second seems more practical yet unattainable in the short run. It is also clear that without nuclear extended deterrence independent of which form the South would be looking for its own nuclear option, as it is the case for Japan and Australia.

6. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research is to synthesize, update, and contextualize extended deterrence in Asia and its broader effects on some tensions that might be characterized as security dilemma situation. Therefore, the dissertation presents a combination of theoretical and empirical evidence that either supports security dilemma propositions over following issues: i) Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue; Taiwan Issue; North Korean Issue; Korean Japan Relations and then analyzes extended deterrence to Japan, and South Korea. Applying the Security Dilemma Theory to these cases, the aim of this assessment to show the link between extended deterrence and security dilemma in Asia. All security dilemma cases are selected based on relevance to the main hypothesis that the way the United States propose and implement its extended deterrence positively affects security dilemma types relations among regional countries. The dissertation argues that the US extended-deterrence priorities, principles and the way in which the United States puts it into practice profoundly shape the entry security structure. In this sense, there is a causal link between the United States nuclear extended deterrence and emerging security dilemma in Asia. The logic behind this hypothesis is the following: In Asia, which is one of the most vibrant and complex security environment in the world, by virtue of its bilateral alliance agreements, the United States is obliged to provide nuclear extended deterrence to its three core allies, Japan, South Korea. These two countries represent different environments where different sets of deterrence instruments, policies and broader strategies are tailored according to characteristic of the target state by the United States. Indeed, on both theoretical and practical deterrence studies, known as fourth wave of deterrence investigation of such a tailored approach is the current agenda of deterrence studies. Thus, the United States pursues different deterrence strategies and postures for dealing with different threats in all of these different (sub)regional contexts. However, all of these differences in strategies and postures are not generally compatible with each other in terms of the effects on the wider Asian security since

they counterproductively cause a multiactoral and multilevel security dilemma among regional countries. To operationalize the assumed causality between security dilemma and the extended deterrence, the research underlines complex relations between deterrence, assurance and reassurance missions to investigate changing behavior and understanding of security needs for Japan and South Korea. In this sense, the dissertation overall intends to contribute to both understanding and explaining the theory of deterrence and practical use of nuclear extended deterrence in Asia.

The end of the Cold War radically transformed deterrence practice and thinking into an era of strategic uncertainties/discontinuities leaving the so-called perfect condition for nuclear deterrence known as ‘one size fits all’ has gone. Therefore, today’s deterrence mission requires tailored strategies using an amalgam of conventional and nuclear forces as well as active and passive defense/offense tools. Many of these new strategies have number of differences compare to what classical deterrence theory and practice suggests. To understand these changes and their effects on the traditional security issues including role of nuclear weapons, both theory and practice of deterrence has to be looked from an innovative and comprehensive perspective. Looking at extended deterrence as a function of deterrence-assurance-reassurance is one the innovation dissertation proposes. Deterrence, assurance and reassurance, all of these three concept, are often improperly used interchangeably within deterrence related literature. These concepts are, indeed, related to each other but they are neither synonymous nor absolutely inseparable. Thus, any extended deterrence mission’s success or failures depends on these three missions’ success or failure. Without having applicable deterrence capacity and transmitting these capabilities in forms of threat to potential adversaries thereby convincing both allies and adversaries about the credibility of the deterrence, extended deterrence mission’s success cannot be guaranteed. On theoretical front, conceptually:

- Extended deterrence is to protect another’s territory, interests, safety and security (protecting allies and partners) by deterring potential adversaries.
- Deterrence is a strategy directed to adversaries that seeks to convince them not to do a certain act by threatening them harming retaliation (deterrence by punishment) or active denial through defense (deterrence by denial).
- Assurance is a strategy directed at allies that seeks to convince them of about the credibility of the extended deterrence.

- Reassurance, on the other hand, is a strategy that can be used to convince both allies and adversaries. When it is directed to allies, the mission is about to reassure an ally during a crisis where reassurance is needed (known as positive reassurance). When it is directed to adversaries it aims to convince them that military component of extended deterrence is not there to harm them as long as they refrain from aggression (known as negative reassurance).

In this sense, it is not possible to have a working and succeeding extended deterrence without having a successful assurance and reassurance missions. Therefore, for having a successful extended deterrence in place these three missions should work just like a clockwork, which is made of many moving parts in a simultaneous and mechanical way. This conceptual revitalization is important to systematize the research question of the link between extended deterrence and security dilemma.

A security dilemma refers to a situation where a state feels threatened from other state's actions and to make itself more secure, it builds up arms and alliances. Thereby, the other states interpret this reciprocal act as threatening and they follow the same path to make themselves more secure. Thus, attempts to enhance security by one brings mutual insecurity for all. This cycle of action reaction is the simplest definition of the phenomenon that is known as security dilemma in International Relations jargon. In this dissertation, security dilemma is defined and used in a similar way. Only difference is that here, we talk about a multi actor security dilemma structure, where externalities of other issues hinders/creates security dilemma type relations over other issues. In a multi-actor level security dilemma structure takes into account numbers of interactions and becomes much more complex than a bipolar dyadic version. Here, the most important point is that one actor's actions have been met reciprocal reactions in kind (generally, in forms of arms acquisitions and thereby arms race) by other actors, even though they are not immediate target of the initial acts. Moreover, in Asian security environment, security dilemma has two main attributions. First, it generally sets in motion "paradoxical situations" where every actor has many reconcilable aims and priorities. For instance, the United States would like to deter North Korean missile threat by building a missiles defense system on the Korean peninsula. Yet these attempts create a situation where the United States assurance to South Korea about its credibility of extended deterrence and reassurance China (and Russia) about its intention becomes irreconcilable. Second, it generates "a

reciprocity situation” where simply one actor’s actions in one region drive others reciprocity reactions in other regions (a spiral of action reaction cycle). That is, no matter what you do in one regional context does not stay there isolated and effects others’ perception towards your intentions. For instance, the United States extended deterrence in East Asian context requires Japan’s military contribution, yet Japan’s militarization drives Chinese and South Korean concerns and thereby their counter military acquisitions and modernizations follow the suit. Thus, the dissertation tries to show that the way the United States use its extended deterrence posture, strategies, tools generates uncertainty; uncertainty leads to fear in the absence of pacifying institutions; fear then leads to power accumulation and eventual power competition; power competition activates the security dilemma among Asian nations.

Traditionally, security dilemma is supposed to occur in the absence of the United States military presence in Asia. In this sense, the United States historically plays an outside mediator role that helps alleviate potential security dilemma spirals by lessening Japan's and South Korean military build-ups while protecting them against attacks. In the post-Cold War era, this traditional role has been changing as both Japan and South Korea pursues military capabilities for different reasons. On rhetoric, Japan acts against China's increased militarization and belligerent acts, while South Korea sees no other way around against North Korean increasing nuclear, and conventional threats. However, these countries are initially acting against the uncertainties that stems from the US extended deterrence policies and posture in the post-Cold War era.

Even though, the United States has strengthened its foothold and power in Asia by both increasing its forward deployed capabilities and strengthening its alliance relations, the US presence and role becomes more contested in terms of extended deterrence guaranties. Much of the concerns over the last decades has given to one of the fundamental discontinuity in the US nuclear extended deterrence, which is the fact that United States has shifted its nuclear deterrence posture towards more rapid deployed flexible forces from Cold War asymmetric escalation postures. A deterrence posture constitutes procedures governing how deterrent assets are deployed, when and under what conditions they might be used, against what targets, and who has the authority to make those decisions. In Asia, the US asymmetric escalation posture was designed to deter all levels of conventional and nuclear conflict by sustaining

capabilities and posture that credibility called for the rapid use of the US forces including nuclear weapons. This Cold War posture had reduced both frequency and intensity of conventional conflicts in Asia. It served well for allies' expectations and priorities by providing them an optimal deterrence for their security. However, due to the change in the nature of politics, balance of power, advancing technology and financial environment, the US deterrence posture becomes more inclined with the flexible and selective engagement strategy within a pivotal deterrence posture. That is, the US starts more acting as an off-shore balancer even though it increases its presence in the region. In traditional post-Cold War extended deterrence, the United States provided security guarantee by establishing a clear deterrence posture (what and how it deters) while in the post-Cold deterrence there is ambiguity in what instances it will and will not become involved, and to what extent it will become if it chooses to be part in the certain conflicts. In the current form of pivotal extended deterrence, the United States prefers a dual-defender role to prevent two hostile adversaries, one of which its ally, from taking attacking each other and thereby breaking the stability (status-quo.) By creating uncertainty on its extended deterrence posture, the United States tries to escape moral-hazard/decoupling situations and as so becoming entrapped in an unwanted conflict. Yet, the US ambiguities on extended deterrence doesn't incorporated with Asian allies' security needs and expectations as the security environment becomes more contested and dangerous for them. The US extended deterrence initially is designed to deter nuclear and major conventional attacks and has offer little role to play in deterring lower level conflicts due to strategic fear of entrapment and moral hazard. Therefore, even though the United States remains critical for providing nuclear umbrella at the strategic levels, it shows little adherence for the lower level conflicts, which becomes more frequent and intense especially on Korean Peninsula and in East Asia around Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In the absence of shared command and control mechanisms in the management of day to day extended deterrence, allies, therefore, has begun to acquire and develop advance conventional and missile capabilities to fulfill their security needs as the United States faces mounting assurance/reassurance challenges. Thus, the mismatch over expectations, priorities and posture (capabilities, deployment patterns, and command and control mechanisms) drives both Japanese and Korean increasing defense spending. Parallel with this reiteration, the research intent to unpack the effects of changing extended

deterrence on allies' behavior towards the regional tensions that constitutes cases for regional security dilemmas.

The United States has relied on extended deterrence, allied assurance, and adversary reassurance since the Cold War. All these missions are closely linked, yet none of them is subset of the other. Since the end of the Cold War, the ground on which all of these missions practiced, has fundamentally changed. Therefore, the research primarily focuses on these changes and the way in which extended deterrence posture in the new era effects allies' decisions over the cases where security dilemma is suspected. Matter of fact, no one questions extended deterrence credibility over Washington's commitment to protect Tokyo or Seoul. However, for the lower level conflicts over remote inhabitant islands or conventional fire exchanges, the US intervention cannot be so easily presumed. Moreover, deterring such conflicts over small offshore islands are far more difficult to deter major wars. In this sense, the dissertation deals with crises torn situations in Asia. It applies security dilemma theories to these junctures in order to test the link between extended deterrence and security dilemma. Over all, when security dilemma hypothesis over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is duly tested against the key variables identified here, it is arguably true that there is an increasing security dilemma in this context. Since the 2010s, maritime and territorial disputes in the region have presented unique challenge to extended deterrence and the US-Japan alliance. As China's more assertive stance since then caused concerns in Japan, Japan has raised the defense of the Senkaku to a national strategic priority. Along the way, the United States has showed waffling behaviors over the conflict, while Japan and China have showed an action reaction cycles of rhetoric and armaments patterns. When security dilemma hypothesis over Taiwan issue is tested, it is arguably true that there is an increasing security dilemma type of relations among the United States-Japan and China in this context, yet it remains short of full-fledged security dilemma situation. China continues to increase its military deployments towards Taiwan even though Cross-Strait relations was path forward through political and economic issues over the years, while the US arms sales to Taiwan and US-Japan alliance attitudes towards Taiwan has raised concerns in Beijing. Especially, the missiles defense issue is one of the contentious one embracing security dilemma among actors. When security dilemma hypothesis over the relations between South and North Korea is tested, it is arguably true that there is a security

dilemma. In 2010, the Cheonan, a South Korean navy corvette sunk by a North Korean submarine torpedo fire. Since then the provocative North Korean actions are on the rise pushing South Korean taking more assertive stand against its Northern part. Japan-North Korean relations are the less likely case for security dilemma types of relations, yet North Korean missiles and nuclear test are the one of the main drivers of Japanese normalization. In this sense, even they cannot be characterized as a cycle of action reaction in the forms of security dilemma, they are part of the broader security dilemma as externalities. Numbers of steps have been taken to ratchet up Japan's defense posture in a direction to improve mobility and effectiveness against North Korean bellicose actions effects the strategic stability between Japan and China.

Therefore, the first argument here is that the United States tailors its deterrence strategies to comply with its own deterrence priorities in different parts of the region, yet these differences cause uncertainties through following interactions. First, the United States deterrence priorities does not overlap with its allies' priorities. The question of what to deter and how to deter varies between the United States and its allies and without NATO type management of force postures, assuring allies becomes a difficult endeavor. Second, the United States way of doing things in terms of (regional) management of deterrence feeds anxieties between US- China, Japan-China, Japan-Korea and South-North Korea dyads (both a positive and negative reassurance missions).

The US strategy towards Asian allies has been shifting from comprehensive assurance/ reassurance towards a more conditional (selective) assurance/reassurance. The most indicative factor in this sense is the role of nuclear weapons and US "redlines" that scope for all audiences what the United States is willing to risk conflict for (Morgan ,2003, 66–67). Matter of fact for everyone in any extended deterrence relations, strengthening deterrence by defining, cultivating, and reinforcing norms for appropriate behavior and drawing redlines while enforcing punishment as these norms are crossed and rewarding behavior when these norms are endorsed is the foundation of deterrence credibility. Yet, there are apt questions over the United States extended deterrence in terms of both i) What are the role of nuclear weapons in current extended deterrence missions; ii) What the United States is willing to risk a conflict (let alone a nuclear conflict) for? None of the United States' allies in the region is against to tailoring deterrence in the face of uncertainties of the new security environment but

rather allies are mostly interested in which tailored deterrence postures and strategies have the greatest applicability for their security and how well their voice and concerns are heard in Washington with regard to managing these deterrence instruments. Thus, the question is not the poor fit of the tailoring approach of the United States extended deterrence, rather it is about how the United States do it. In the current form, the United States extended deterrence structure in Asian “hub and spoke format”, where both size and specific elements of postures are driven mainly by the United States own defense priorities, is far from achieving these vital missions of assurance/reassurance. The United States has been trying to escape from facing an assurance crisis by increasing consultations and dialog with its allies in the region. Here is the main drawback is the fact that the United States has had no formal consultation channels similar to what it has under NATO with its allies in East Asia to discuss nuclear policy. To fill the gap, the United States has worked with Japan to establish the United States-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) and with South Korea the United States-Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) in 2010. Indeed, these efforts of institutionalization of extended deterrence by enfranchising matters to allies is a way forward to enhance the credibility of the United States extended deterrence. Obama administration has equally tried to enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence by deepening politic and economic relations through increasing economic, political, diplomatic, cultural and military channels with allies and partners in the region since 2008. However, even though the Obama administration has made great efforts to strengthen the belief in its deterrence in the region, both Japan and South Korea has increasingly doubted about the United States extended deterrence. First reason is that in the new security environment, extended deterrence is needed more to deal with lower level issues, where the United States wants its allies self-sufficient. On the one hand, the United States appears to give political commitments at rhetorical level by addressing issues and reiterating US extended deterrence guarantees. For instance, Obama publicly state that the United States extended deterrence covers contested islands of Japan or reassure South Korea every time the North tests its missiles, rockets or nuclear weapons by flying some of its nuclear capable bombers or introducing a new cycle of sanctions. On the other hand, the United States has also increased allies’ capabilities and joint capabilities for intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission to countering lower level conflicts. Yet, fearing to be entrapped in an escalating conflict on lower level provocations, the United States

remains reluctant giving binding commitment, which push allies to hedge against the uncertainties of the United States future role in the region. Overall, this is the dynamics that reengineers the first part of the vicious cycle of action-reaction among the regional countries in Asia in terms of assurance. In the second part of the cycle, regardless of the United States and its allies' true intentions (Japan's over China and Korea in particular) associated policies and rhetoric appears threatening to China, leaving China (and North Korea, even though it has other major reasons to act the way it acts since the end of the Cold War) to react in kind. In another word, the United States strategy of sustaining allies having credible central deterrence on their own creates mutual suspicion in other capitals. Even small technology transfer to this end endangers Chinese and North Korean security by leaving them to react as much as they can.

Here, one of the important explanatory variable in the equation is the role of the secondary countries (pawn countries in extended deterrence relation) and their hedging strategies against the strategic uncertainties and discontinuities. The dissertation argues that all secondary countries, Japan-South Korea, follow a double hedge strategy by hedging against immediate uncertainties stemming from the changing security environment by strengthening their alliance relation with the United States while hedging against the fears stemming from the United States future role in the region and due power vacuums by buildings up arms. Hedging is a rational response for these countries as they face with multiple kinds of uncertainty as there are multiple, compounding incentives compelling Asian states to follow a hedging strategy.

The first and the most important regional contexts for the United States extended deterrence is the case of Japan and the alliance between the United States and Japan is under a reassessment since the Cold War. Indeed, strategic uncertainties and structural changes in the post-Cold War bring Japan to reconsider its security needs in a different environment. However, reliance on the United States security guarantees are still core for Japan post-Cold War security strategies, albeit it does not reduce Japan's strategic weakness anymore. That is, the United States traditional role have been undermined in a substantial way. Therefore, Japan hedges against uncertainties stemming from regional countries by increasing dependency on the United States alliance, but at the same time, it hedges against uncertainties stemming from the United States' role in the region by increasing its defense spending and

boosting capabilities. In this sense, normalization of Japan steps up through numbers of legislations and force posturing. More importantly, Japanese defense posture and procurement patterns suggest that spending and allocation of resources are shifted towards offensive capabilities such as maritime amphibious capabilities, missiles, fighter jets, submarines etc. The Self-defense forces now has missiles, bombers, long-range fighter jets, submarines, and light carriers, which ten years ago it did not have. While it is getting difficult to demarcate these forces either offensive or defensive as RMA making this mission almost impossible, it is clear in Japanese case that the long-term trend is more offensive capable Japanese Self Defense Forces. The most major turning point is that the United States support and encouragement for the Japanese development of offensive capabilities. To the US strategic calculations, a stronger, more capable Japan would contribute more to regional stability and most importantly the US fear of entrapment -the fear of being dragged into an unwanted escalation between Japan and China- would be reduced. This policy changes are direct response to changing Japanese threat perceptions that are compounded by uncertainties about how the alliance can effectively deter and respond to 'gray zone' provocations. Therefore, in the new security environment, Japan has a double hedge strategy due to the increasing "gray-zones" to which current form of the United States extended deterrence has little to be credible.

Korean Peninsula is another strategic location where the United States extended deterrence play an important role in the region. Facing with an unstable and dangerous neighbor, South Korea becomes more reliant on the American nuclear extended deterrence. Yet, here again, the United States and its ally agree on the threat from the North, yet, disagree on the best way to cope with it. In the post-Cold War era, extended deterrence is important for deterring high-level threats while it is less operational in deterring lower level provocations of the North, as the North has formidable capacity to forge continuous lower level provocations. Thus, main differences between the United States and South Korea lies on the role of extended deterrence against lower level conflicts. As a response to this divergence in the aim and scope of the extended deterrence, South Korea boosts its own military capabilities. North Korean's nuclear push and the United States reluctant selective assurance against the North Korean danger is triggering military buildups in South Korea and even rising the debate over South Korean sovereign nuclear option. Another area of

concern from North Korean threat is its world largest ballistic missiles inventories, which include short and medium range missiles, long-range systems and space launchers. In this sense, THAAD is one of the current option, yet it has potentially irked China and Russia as a security externality. Both missiles defense systems and proliferating RMA and advanced military equipment on Korean peninsula creates questions for China. Korean peninsula is a core security interests in Chinese understanding of regional security. Therefore, occurring in this part of the region greatly enhances the security dilemma between US and China. Equally, the historical enmity towards Japan, and the fear stemming from normalizing Japan is one of the important parts of strategic security calculations in Seoul. Therefore, modernization of South Korean navy and other military assets goes beyond North Korean dangers.

In all of these different deterrence environment, the United States desire to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in defense and deterrence posture by developments and expansions of missiles defense systems, by increasing development of offensive conventional missiles strike capabilities, by funding and developing advance weaponries, special forces, drones, precision guided munitions, lasers, command and control systems, satellites, intelligence, surveillance units, the United States pursues a new types of deterrence relations, which overall staunchly effects strategic stability throughout the region. The end result is exactly what theory of security dilemma argues. An action of one of the actors to enhance its security creates insecurity and drives counteraction of others in kind.

This dissertation aims at exploring this link between the United States extended deterrence and the emerging security dilemma in Asia through Japan and South Korea. The result of the anecdotal and empirical survey of the causes and consequences of military competition in the region show us that the way in which the United States uses its extended deterrence instruments, policies and broader strategies and management of alliance relations play a catalyzing role in growing security dilemma among regional actors. There are three broad findings and these could set also further research agendas. First, the nature and practice of deterrence has been changing. In this sense, many other factors that are not considered within deterrence practice by the classic deterrence theory, such as positive inducements, conventional and defensive forces etc., are now parts of the deterrence theory and practice. One of the most important point here is that the role of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence posture

diminishes, even though the role of nuclear weapons in Asian context is not vanishing but increasing unlike the contrary trend in other regions. The second finding is the fact secondary powers' strategies become important part of extended deterrence. In the past, deterrence scholars tend to minimize the role of the secondary powers in extended deterrence relations as pawn countries. However, within Asian context, what secondary actors do and do not effects entire regional security structure. In this sense, the US allies hedge against uncertainties by both increasing their alliance relations with the United States and by building up their own capacities, which at the end of the day enforces disruptive action reaction cycles of security dilemma. Third, the rising effectiveness of US weapons technology, proliferating RMA, missiles defense systems, the United States led Japanese remilitarization, the United States led conventional capacity buildups on Korean Peninsula reinforce US extended deterrence in Asia in the post-Cold War era. However, these capacities have been seen equally a disrupting element of strategic stability in the region. China has seen these attempts as dangerous and attempts to break out the United States' and its allies' capabilities (in particular Japan) by enhancing its own military capabilities. As cycle goes on and on, Chinese attempts are also counterproductive and creates larger incentives in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Sydney, and in many other capitals to do more to cope with China. That is, all this creates a vicious cycle of action reaction in the form of arms race throughout the region.

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