

**REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
YILDIZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
PHD PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

PHD DISSERTATION

**OTHERNESS IN TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1996-1999)**

**BETÜL AYANOĞLU
11716209**

ASSOC. PROF. ÇİĞDEM NAS

**İSTANBUL
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ÖZ

TÜRK-YUNAN İLİŞKİLERİNDE ÖTEKİLİK: SİYASİ SÖYLEMDE SÜREKLİLİK VE DEĞİŞİM (1996-1999)

Betül Ayanoglu
Ağustos, 2020

Sosyal bilimlerde, bilhassa Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında, 1990'lı yıllardan başlayarak, disiplinler arası bilimsel çalışmalara hız kazandıran multidisipliner eğilimler sıkça görülmeye başlanmıştır. Bu çok yönlü sistematik yaklaşımlar bilimsel çalışmalara derinlik ve geniş bir analiz sahası sunması bakımından bilim dallarını giderek etkisi altına almıştır. Böylece diğer bilim dallarında da olduğu gibi Uİ'nin de çerçevesi genişlemiş ve çalışma birimi olarak sadece devlet aygıtının veya devlet temelli oluşumların seçilmesi ilkesi terk edilmiştir. Bu süreçte bu çalışmanın da temel dayanağını teşkil eden İnşacılık, kuramsal tartışmalara bir orta yol sunması bakımından çığır açıcı katkı sağlamıştır; kimlikleri verili ve değişmez olarak değerlendiren ve maddi unsurların analizi ile açıklanamamaları nedeniyle somut bilimsel çalışmaya uygun bulmayan ana akım teoriler ile kimlik çalışmalarını post-modern teorilerin sınırları içine hapseden yaklaşımlara üçüncü bir boyut kazandırmıştır.

Bu doktora tezinde yorumsamacı söylem analizi metodu ile Türk ve Yunan Parlamentolarında iktidar ve muhalefet partilerinin üyeleri tarafından gerçekleştirilen konuşmalar karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Çalışma, Türkiye-Yunanistan ilişkilerine en az somut unsurlar kadar etki eden soyut unsurların siyasi olayların algılanması, yorumlanması ve karara bağlanması açısından önemini ortaya koymaktadır. 1996-1999 yılları arasında iki ülke arasında vuku bulan 3 farklı siyasi gelişmenin (sırasıyla savaş, çatışma ve barış hallerinin) incelenmesine dayalı ampirik bulgular şu şekilde sıralanabilir: Birincisi, milli kimlik inşasında eylemlerden daha fazla söylemler etkili olmaktadır. Buna göre, sosyal gerçekliklerin tesisinde ve topluma yayılmasında söylemler ve anlatılar belirleyicidir. İkincisi, *biz* ve *öteki*, karşılıklı olarak, sürekli birbirlerini inşa ederler ancak bu insanın süreklilik ve değişiklik gösteren dizgelerinin fark edilmesi zaman alır. Üçüncüsü, yüzyıllarca kaynaşık bir şekilde yaşamış halkların ayrıştırılmasında kullanılan güçlü ötekileştirmelerde milliyetçilik ve din etkilidir. Dördüncüsü, bir ötekileştirmenin toplumun bütün kesimleri tarafından benimsenebilmesi için iki temel gerekçelendirme yapılmaktadır: Hukuki dayanak bulmak ve/ya tarihsel arka plan oluşturmak. Bu çalışmada, yorumsamacı söylem analizi sonucunda *biz/öteki* inşasının temel unsurları ve tarafların birbirlerine yönelik kimliksel yaklaşımlarında bir devamlılık veya değişim olup olmadığı ve var olan değişimlerin hangi sebeplerle ortaya çıktığı ele alınmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnşacılık, Biz, Öteki, Milli Kimlik Oluşumu, Türk Kimliği, Yunan Kimliği, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri, Meclis Konuşmaları

ABSTRACT

OTHERNESS IN TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1996-1999)

Betül Ayanoglu
August, 2020

In the social sciences, especially in the field of Political Science and International Relations, following the 1990s, multidisciplinary trends that have accelerated interdisciplinary scientific studies have begun to be seen frequently. These multifaceted systematic approaches have gradually influenced the disciplines in terms of providing depth and a wide range of analysis to scientific studies. Thus, like in the other disciplines, the framework of IR has also expanded and the principle of choosing only the state apparatus or state-based formations as the unit of study has been abandoned. In this process, Constructivism, which constitutes the basis of this study, made a groundbreaking contribution in terms of providing a middle way to theoretical debates; It has added a third dimension to the mainstream theories that evaluate identities as given and permanent and that do not find them worth concrete scientific studies due to their lack of providing explanations by the analysis of material elements, and to post-modern theories that confine identity studies within its boundaries.

In this dissertation, the speeches given by the members of the ruling and opposition parties in the Turkish and Greek Parliaments were investigated comparatively with the method of interpretive discourse analysis. This study reveals the importance of intangible elements at least as much as the tangible elements, in Turkish-Greek relations, which play a crucial role in the perception, interpretation, and making decisions about political developments. Empirical findings based on the study of 3 different political developments (involving the state of war, conflict, and peace, respectively) that took place between the two countries within the years of 1996-1999 are as follows: Firstly, discourses are more effective than actions in the construction of national identity. Accordingly, discourses and narratives are decisive in the establishment and spread of social realities. Secondly, the *self* and *other* mutually and continually build each other, but it takes time to notice a continuity or change in the patterns of construction. Thirdly, nationalism and religion are influential in the strong marginalization used in the separation of peoples who have lived fused for centuries. Fourthly, two basic justifications are made so that *othering* can be adopted by all segments of society: Finding a legal basis and / or creating a historical background. As a result of employing interpretive discourse analysis, this study attempts to examine the main elements of *self/other* constructions, and whether there is a continuity or change in the identity approaches of the parties towards each other and the reasons for which the existing changes occurred are envisaged.

Key Words: Constructivism, Self, Other, National Identity Formation, Turkish Identity, Greek Identity, Turkish-Greek Relations, Parliamentary Speeches

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İstanbul; August, 2020

Betül Ayanoğlu

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP	: Motherland Party of Turkey
BBP	: Great Unity Party of Turkey
BDP	: Peace and Democracy Party of Turkey
CFSP	: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHP	: Republican People's Party of Turkey
DEHAP	: Democratic People's Party of Turkey
DEP	: Democracy Party of Turkey
DIKKI	: Democratic Social Movement Party of Greece
DSP	: Democratic Left Party of Turkey
DTP	: Democratic Society Party of Turkey
DYP	: True Path Party of Turkey
EC	: European Community
EEC	: European Economic Community
EMU	: European Monetary Union
EPC	: European Political Cooperation
ERE	: National Radical Union of Greece
EU	: European Union
EYP	: National Intelligence Service of Greece
FIR	: Flight International Region
FM	: Foreign Minister
FP	: Virtue Party of Turkey
FYROM	: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GR	: Excerpt from the Greek Parliament
HADEP	: People's Democracy Party of Turkey
HDP	: Peoples Democratic Party of Turkey
HEP	: People's Labor Party of Turkey
ICJ	: International Court of Justice
IR	: International Relations Theory
KKE	: Communist Party of Greece
MHP	: Nationalist Movement Party of Turkey
MP	: Member of Parliament
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	: New Democracy Party of Greece
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OZDEP	: Freedom and Democracy Party of Turkey
OZEP	: Freedom and Equality Party of Turkey
PASOK	: Panhellenic Socialist Movement Party of Greece
PKK	: Kurdistan Workers' Party
PM	: Prime Minister

RP	: Welfare Party of Turkey
SYN/Synaspismos	: Coalition of the Left, of Movements and Ecology Party of Greece
T.B.M.M.	: Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TR	: Excerpt from the Turkish Parliament
TRNC	: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UCK	: Kosovo Liberation Army
UK	: United Kingdom
UN	: United Nations
UNESCO	: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USA	: United States of America
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWI	: World War I
WWII	: World War II

1. INTRODUCTION

Nation-state identities emerge over a historical process of state formation based on cultural, economic, and political factors inherent to the people and exchanges and interaction with other states and peoples. Identity is mostly a quite stable concept that evolves through an extensive period of time and therefore it is also quite resistant to change. However, unprecedented developments, geopolitical shifts, events leading to war or peace can have a profound impact on identities. Identities are usually shaped with reference to a competitor/adversary whose characteristics are taken to define the contours of one's own identity. *Self*-image is constructed regarding the *other*. The earliest national states such as France and Britain referred to the *other* as the basis of their own identity formation.

An individual may define herself/himself with respect to a wide variety of sources of identity. These may range from collective identities such as ethnic, religious or national, gender, or class-based identities to more limited group identities emanating from belonging to a specific group or world views such as identification with a football club, an environmentalist group or a lifestyle group such as hipsters. However, collective identities also encompass political significance since they are instrumental in determining our allegiance to a form of political organization. National identities are of paramount importance at this point since they are the basis of our relationship with the state, based on national citizenship.

National identity formation is based on a quite long and varied historical process influenced by several key factors and intervening variables. These factors may range from limits and opportunities provided by geography, social characteristics, traditions, processes of state formation, wars and struggle for independence and socio-economic developments such as early or late industrialization and effects of modernity. In any case, the interaction with the outside world and immediate neighbors can have a determining effect on the basic characteristics of national identity. The evolution of Turkish and Greek identities have also been shaped by an identity formation process where the function of the *other* have been served by the respective parties. Greek

national identity was influenced by the ancient Greek heritage, social and political role of the Orthodox Church, and the struggle for independence from the Ottomans. The struggle for independence and the national narratives associated with this struggle that included a perception of suffering under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for centuries had an important effect on the formation of the nation-state identity.

Turkish national identity, on the other hand, was based on an understanding of Turkish ethnicity going all the way back to its roots in Central Asia, Islamic cultural influences, remnants of Anatolian civilizations, and interpretations of Ottoman legacy. The formation of the modern national state by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was a new beginning where the Ottoman heritage also constituted an *other* for the new and modern Turkish identity. The deterioration and the retreat of the Ottomans since the 17th century were mostly seen as qualities inherent to the decline vis-à-vis European powers, loss of military superiority, and marginalization from trade routes. The failure of the Ottomans to reverse the course of gradual decline was also associated with incompetence, and corruption in state administration and bigotry and resistance to change that needed to be erased from the modern Turkish identity. Fighting the War of Independence against European powers, primarily against Greece, also left the imprint of a search for independence and autonomy from foreign powers. The 'Sevres syndrome' is usually associated with attempts by European powers to carve up the Ottoman Empire and left its imprint on the national consciousness. Legacy of the struggle between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean and western Anatolia left a bitter taste preventing the development of close relations based on cooperation between Greece and Turkey despite quite amicable relations between Atatürk and Venizelos in the 1920s and 1930s.

Relationships vis-à-vis Europe had an important impact on the evolution of both Greek and Turkish identities. While Greece mostly emphasized her role in Europe by focusing on the significance of ancient Greek philosophy and culture (as common and collective knowledge) on European identity, Turkish identity during the Ottoman Empire was mostly shaped in opposition to Europe both in terms of religious and cultural reference points. Starting with the Treaty of Carlowitz of 1699 Ottomans' long process of retreat and decline against Europe started. During this period Europe became a source of reforms in the Empire in the military, education, administration, and legal system. European culture was also adopted by urban and elite classes

whereby the ideas of nationalism and enlightenment were also adopted by educated elite groups such as the Young Turks. Thus the modern Turkish identity being accepted as a credible member of the European family of states and recognized as a part of Europe acquired increased salience.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, both countries became members of the transatlantic bloc, becoming members of the OECD, Council of Europe, and NATO. Steering equal relations with both Turkey and Greece was generally upheld by the US and West European powers. Both Turkey and Greece tried to convince the US and West European countries of the importance of their country for the security and defense of the Transatlantic security structures. In addition, sovereignty over Aegean islands, delimitation of territorial waters and continental shelf, Cyprus question, and the protection of minorities and the position of the Greek Orthodox Church in Istanbul became grave problems where Turkey and Greece upheld divergent and opposing positions. Such disagreements and competition between Turkey and Greece created long-term problems in Turkey-Greece relations and their lack of a resolution of bilateral disputes made it more difficult for them to change their identity perceptions vis-à-vis each other.

The entry of Greece to the European Economic Community in 1981 created an asymmetrical situation whereby Greece used this privileged position in order to place obstacles in front of Turkey's integration to the EEC. Greece's veto over the fourth financial protocol was a well-known case of the hindrance of Turkey-EEC/EC relations. The two countries came to the brink of warring with each other during the Kardak/Imia crisis of 1996. However, 3 years later, following a sudden thaw in relations between the two sides, Turkey was declared as a candidate to join the Union at the Helsinki Summit. This was possible due to the withdrawal of Greece's objection to Turkey's closer relations with the EC. Lifting her veto over Turkey can be seen as a testament to a changing approach to Turkey as the *other* of the Greek identity. While the Kardak/Imia crisis has been a lesson that taught the dangers of *othering* and fueling of enmity towards the *other*, Helsinki was a watermark in redefining Turkish-Greek relations. This change in the Greek posture towards Turkey's relations with the EU can be explained as regards different factors such as the effects of socialization and learning processes (through which Greece might develop efforts to fulfill the Union's expectations rather than maximizing her subjective desires), domestic adaptation to

EU values including good neighborly relations resulting from being part of the EU, pragmatic considerations about Cyprus' entry to the EU, and a re-evaluation of the rationality of traditional Greek policy towards Turkey. Following a constructivist approach to identity and interests, perception of Turkish identity and *othering* mechanisms vis-a-vis Turkey may have an important role in this revision of Greece's posture towards Turkey.

The main hypothesis of the thesis is that Turkey's candidacy to the EU and change in Greece's policy towards Turkey is accompanied by a change in identity perceptions of the *self* and *other*. Germane to the fact that the nationwide political discourses are customarily produced by political actors as an outcome of policies decided upon and discussed; I will study parliamentary debates in both the Turkish and Greek parliaments and intend to deconstruct the discourses employed by the members of parliament. Due to the fluctuating relations with radical changes they harbor, particularly, three important milestones are selected to be studied: Kardak/Imia crisis, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, and the 1999 Helsinki Summit. Parliamentary debates have been analyzed concerning the discourses employed on the *self-other* nexus. Studying these selected cases reflects a cross-section of Turkish-Greek relations loaded with distinguishable identity shifts where parties within a very short period of time portray their potentials of being on the edge of war, conflict, and peace, respectively. By focusing exclusively on the political discourse held in the parliamentary debates and speeches, this dissertation seeks to make an original contribution to the Turkish-Greek studies literature on understanding their perception of the *self-other* nexus and construction of national identities.

Parliamentary speeches given by the Turkish and Greek parliamentarians are analyzed with a view to reveal the underlying identity constructions and ask whether or not such discourses display any instances of a change in identity perception. By gauging language shift or maintenance in political discourse that was utilized in the process of policymaking during the selected political developments, this dissertation aims to examine how the reality of *other* is constructed and the link(s) existed between the political discourse and the *self-other* nexus for maintaining national intentions and goals (*skopos*) via common concepts, like neighbor, revisionist, European, irredentist, etc.

For the purpose of keeping the focus on identifying the continuities and changes of the Turkish and Greek identities this research attempts to find answers for the following research questions: 'How is the *self-other* nexus defined in Turkish and Greek identity?', 'What are the discourses employed by the parties during the Kardak/Imia crisis, the capture of Öcalan and the Helsinki Summit?', 'Is it possible to discern a change or continuity in identity perceptions in both parties?', 'What are the causes of change and continuity in identity perception if any?'.

Since identity conceptions are the significant factors that make an impact on states' approaches to issues, this study draws on constructivism and holds the premise that identities are not exogenously given but socially constructed and are prior to interests as no *self* can make decisions without knowing itself at first. In fact, most constructivists insist that constructivism is not a theory but an analytical framework. Constructivism diverges chiefly from mainstream IR theory with treating normative-ideational and material structures equally crucial in building national identities, and from critical theories with its emphasis on empirical analysis. Accordingly, identities determine and form interests, and in turn attitudes, behaviors, and policies, in other words, each *self* encounters an *other* without having a pre-existing set of preferences or ideas. These perceptions and ideas are constructed as a result of interactive processes and are learned consequences rooted in the acquisition process of national identity. The constructivist view underscores the discursive power of ideas, knowledge, language, and culture in comprehending and interpreting world affairs thoroughly.

As identities are intersubjectively and interactively constituted through internal and external processes, analyzing any shifts in any actors' identities requires a comparative study. This study does not address the study of Turkish and Greek identities in general but focuses on their peculiar identities in particular that they display to each other and the *othering* process in conducting their mutual affairs. It aims to evaluate the transformative effect of the contiguous countries' *self* and *other* perceptions, providing a striking representation of the Greek-Turkish identities that took place within the periods of progress or regress in their bilateral relations. The selected case studies empirically articulate why they have these discourses and how they have (re)constructed their discourses through the developments within these critical three years.

Turkey and Greece have been two countries that are affected by a series of painful and harrowing domestic and foreign policy experiences and frustration concerning their relations with the outside world. Turkey, particularly throughout her modernization years, positioned herself as a European, modern, and civilized country, although she inherited a mixed culture that includes elements from different geographies such as Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Regarding her relations with the West, Turkey had a paradoxical position due to inherent tensions in her identification. The West signified both a point of reference and source of identity yet it was also a point of internal conflict for Turkish identity. While westernized segments of the society identified themselves with the West, more conservative and devout groups felt isolated and marginalized from a westernized identity. As a significant marker of Turkish identity, the concept of tolerance going back to Rumi (Mawlana) and Turkey's hosting several civilizations throughout history were important sources of pride. Another significant factor was Turks' state-building capacity, the Turkish Republic being the 17th state (as also appears on the Presidential Seal of Turkey where a big sun in the middle, symbolizing the country, is surrounded by 16 small stars that symbolize 16 Great Turkic Empires) established by Turks.

In addition to state-building and administrative capacity, the Turkish military presence and prowess in wars and the hereditary, ethnic ties and genealogy stretched throughout the prehistoric periods and to the Anatolian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire have remained to be building blocks in cementing the nation. The foundation of the Turkish Republic was Turkey's success in catching up with the current age at the same footing with Western states. While Turkey under Atatürk engaged in a process of modernization based on several reforms embodying an adaptation to the European legal, political, and social system, she aimed to acquire an autonomous stature in her international relations. She remained neutral until the end of World War II which was culminated with a transition to multi-party politics. Following the Second World War, Turkey joined the trans-Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the conditions of the bipolar world order.

Her attitude toward the West and her pursuit of especially US-based policies drove the country into a dilemma between her own role as a model for developing countries (as a country that fought for independence against superpowers and their proxies) and the role cast by NATO in association with US priorities. A typical example of this

divergence was experienced when Turkey detached herself from the movement of non-alignment at the Bandung Conference and voted against the independence of Algeria at the UN. While Turkey stayed as a loyal member of NATO during the Cold War era and afterward, she intended to diversify her foreign policy especially in the 1970s due to disagreements with the USA and the need felt to acquire the support of developing countries in the Cyprus question. Following the ending of the Cold War, Turkey elaborated on her regional role and sought to extend her influence in Central Asia, Balkans, and later on the Middle East. Turkey's application to join the EC in 1987, her candidacy declared in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, and the opening of accession negotiations in 2005 were milestones in Turkey's Europeanization process. However, the failure of accession negotiations and the growing rift with the EU and its Member States directed the country to search for alternatives. Since then Eurasianism also began to acquire a renewed significance in defining Turkey's state identity vis-à-vis adjacent regions including Europe.

Greece, on the other hand, with her rich and adorned heritage of ancient Greek civilization went through the period of city-states, domination by the Ottomans, and nation-state formation. The heritage of the ancient city-states, Greek mythology, Athenian democracy, Spartan discipline, Stoicism, and other currents during the ancient era have inspired western thought since the Renaissance. The country, like a pendulum, oscillates between ancient Hellenes and their polytheistic theology and the Byzantines who symbolize the dominant Orthodox Christianity.

This strain could be one of the causes of the Greeks' love-hate relationship with the EU since they traditionally and historically stayed distant to Europe despite several European nations' support to their war of independence against Ottoman rule. This distancing from the West/Europe, remarkably originated in the Constantinople-Rome conflicts that took place in 326 when Orthodoxy was legalized as the official religion of the Eastern Roman Empire, also in the East-West Schism of 1054 when the Christian communion was divided into Catholic Church and Eastern Orthodox Church, and in 1204 when Constantinople was invaded by the Latin Crusaders. Therefore, the country swings back and forth between the two margins of her national history, according to her political condition. Greeks take the root of 'being the ancestors of Europeans' from their ancient heritage and of the uninterrupted

historical lineage and the daily routine of exercising social and religious life from their Byzantine heritage.

Membership into NATO together with Turkey in 1952 carried the country into the southeastern flank of the Transatlantic alliance. The membership to the European Community was made possible with the return to democracy in 1974 following the Turkish intervention into Cyprus. Greece became a member of the EC in 1981. Initially, the country was not evaluated as being ready to join the Community by the Commission. However Prime minister Karamanlis's efforts to convince European leaders that Greece as the inheritor of the Greek ancient civilization cannot and should not be left outside the EC proved to be successful. Membership to the EC altered the relationship with Europe and led to Greece's benefiting from the regional and structural funds from the EC budget. It also differentiated Greece's standing vis-à-vis Europe from that of Turkey since it was able to integrate as a full member while Turkey could not. The experiences of the 2008 global financial crisis which negatively affected the Greek economy harmed Greece's relations with the EU institutions and leading EU countries such as Germany due to the financial discipline imposed and pejorative depictions of Greeks.

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter includes an overview of the topic and its importance to the field of international relations, particularly Turkish-Greek relations. The purpose of this research, research questions, and the theoretical perspective used to analyze the corpus are presented.

The second chapter provides a detailed theoretical literature review of constructivism and identity studies that form the backbone of the study. I scrutinize major works that deal particularly with identity formation and the function of othering in self-building and self-reflection.

The third chapter is a narrative supplying a depiction of historical developments that took place while establishing the two modern nation-states. It precisely covers representations of the *self* and *other* nexus for Greece and Turkey and portrays the distinct reservoir of their antagonistic past and the web of similitudes from which they raised their modern type of nation-states and obtained their national identities. It is divided chronologically into three sections. The two elucidate the formations of Greek and Turkish national identities separately whereas the third deals with the post-cold

war political developments faced by Turkey and Greece and their search for new identities.

Following the historical and the present accounts of Turkey and Greece's role and position at the time in the international society, the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters investigate the substantive research by examining the parliamentary speeches of the Turkish and Greek politicians during the three distinguishing cases that occurred within a three-year period and eventuated in being on the brink of war, in a vexed politico-legal position, and showing signs of a growing rapprochement.

The first case is the crisis of Imia/Kardak that arose when both countries were passing through a fragile period of governmental transitions (Greece was heading for a new prime minister and ministerial council whereas Turkey was being run by a caretaker government of PM Tansu Çiller). The second case is the crisis of Abdullah Öcalan that erupted while Greece with her Simitis government was striving for economic growth and sustainability to become a core European country, and Turkey was heading for political instability; being run by a minority coalition government of ANAP, DSP, and DTP (with PM Mesut Yılmaz and FM İsmail Cem), a minority government of DSP (with PM Bülent Ecevit and FM İsmail Cem), and a majority coalition government of DSP, MHP, and ANAP (with PM Bülent Ecevit and FM İsmail Cem), respectively. These political events took place under different internal political conditions regarding governments and leaders. However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to analyze the internal political situation within the two countries. In other words, the bumpy political condition and its repercussions on countries are not taken into consideration while examining the *self* and *other* images revealed in relevant parliaments.

Likewise, the speeches and debates of parliamentarians (some of whom were desperately changing the parties they held during the period studied) are analyzed regardless of their party affiliation. A comparative analysis is conducted with regard to the studies of the cases. All these three case-centered chapters are structured in the same manner under similar headings in order to facilitate a comparison between them.

Under the section rule-based approaches, debates related to the rights and obligations arising from (international or bilateral) agreements and the alleged legal positions of *self* and *other* are covered. The culture-history-based approaches section reveals the origins of fixed-phrases and expressions in use and retrospectively studies the stereotyped and common self and other perceptions. In the third section –policy-based

approaches— the *self/other* nexus used to support the country's foreign and domestic political priorities and to diminish concerns are presented. The last section is devoted to concluding remarks where the findings from the parliamentary debates are discussed with reference to *self* and *other* perceptions within the perspective of the relevant historical events. In this section, scrupulous attention is also paid to analyze the converging and diverging identities of each self, the personification of geographies and institutions, indirect course of speech, implication, connotation, and simile (of implicit ones as in the form of metaphors or explicit ones such as analogies). Among all, similes, with their representation power (since they are the fixed universe of shared meanings among citizens), play a crucial role in (re)constructing (either literal or symbolic) meaning in societies in two ways. In the first place, while interpreting a new social context, similes used in speech lead society to establish a relationship between the present event and the common shared cultural and historical background. Comprehending the situation as a part of sharing a common fate, a high state of sympathy emerges. Given the mental processes in which information is processed, metaphors and analogies are the building blocks used for the realization of cognition. Every new development or every new situation encountered is (re)interpreted in the light of previous experiences and inferences, thus reaching an interpretive reality other than its current reality. Secondly, as the comparison takes place in between concrete existence (objective situation of the present) and interpretative judgment (subjective situation of the past), there can neither be juncture nor overlap between what is likened imaginatively and what takes place actually. Therefore, although similes inherently involve subjective perception and reaction to the given act or condition, employing them in a speech jolts the hearers (of the same culture) to internalize the matter in question that can end up with rapid general acceptance.

The last chapter is the conclusion of the dissertation and summarizes and re-states the main points and the findings of the study.

There are two major reasons why this study is important. First, this short period with the political fluctuations it harbors sheds light on understanding the representations of Greek-Turkish national identities and the prolonged instability of their bilateral relations. Second, the Turkish scholarship specialized in Turkish-Greek relations, is mainly influenced by the Western-dominated field of security studies where the overriding emphasis is on the threats and interests as a result of the self-help system,

traditionally adopted a position rooted in the realist school and its offshoot neo-realism in reading Greek-Turkish relations. Having been nourished with the constructivist vein, examining an actor's discourse provides us a hint on its way of looking at the objective world, which helps us understand the identity (re)formation, not as a given condition but a heuristic construction, of the actor. The diffusion and reflection pattern of a break (as in the form of a shift) or continuity in the *self/other* nexus of Greece and Turkey are analyzed through examining the political discourse of their parliamentarians. Identity enables the *self* to identify its interests and to comprehend the social surrounding wherein it encounters others. This process of comprehension and interpretation functions through language, therefore I examine the political discourse held in the Parliaments, where members are the active participants in (re)constructing the *self/other* nexus vis-à-vis each new political event.

Regarding the classification of parliamentary speeches, I select and organize each one thematically and chronologically. Chronological research of each theme begins six months before it reaches its peak and ends after the same amount of time following the watershed. I tend to show excerpts from the parliamentary debates to preserve the original flow of ideas where necessary. The translation of these excerpts (original material) into English is given in quotation marks and detached from the main body text. Each original material starts with a boldfaced two-letter abbreviation (GR for Greece and TR for Turkey) that is marked by square-brackets to indicate the related country and to improve readability. Omissions or revisions within the quoted material are also remarked with square-brackets.

Greek letters are conserved originally in footnotes and references with the thought that it would be better for Grecophones, and for those who do not speak Greek, it would make no difference on both counts. Within the body text, however, Greek words are transliterated in compliance with the style of the Journal of Modern Greek Studies, sans the accent marks.

No system of transliteration or transcription, on the other hand, is selected and designated as accurate while transferring Greek proper nouns into English. The names of people and places are carefully searched on the Internet to find out how they are written in Latin letters either by their possessors or the Greek-origin citizens.

2. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

International Relations, as a field of science or more precisely as a then field of rhetorical talents and knowledge about history, can be dated back to Ancient Greek and the Greek historian Thucydides. Throughout the history, particularly philosophers, historians, or sometimes international jurists and political scientists, or even sometimes orators and politicians had dealt with and utilized this unnamed and unidentified research field. It can be considered that having been a (sub)tool of other disciplines might have been the reason for suspension of its autonomy, but also it might have been its acceptance as a sister discipline of Political Science for a time. It can also be traced back to 70s where an accepted official document can be noticed, namely UNESCO nomenclature, which defines Political Science as a field and International Relations as a discipline of that field. One way or another, in the 20th century, ultimately, it was recorded and declared as a separate research field and an entirely independent academic discipline.

As has been written a great deal in the scholarly literature, IR precisely remained as an insular and protected discipline (scholars of whom were once mainly from the USA and Britain) and overwhelmingly state-centric for a long period of time. Particularly after the World War II, the thought that wars are the permanent feature of human experiences gained strength. The motive behind this proposition was the approval of the idea that communities are to expect the worst from each other and how they are organized is the evidence for that. Experiencing two world wars caused to lessen the belief in the liberal internationalist project of progression. Accordingly, the perspective of English-speaking elites that mostly leans on Woodrow Wilson's and British statesmen's assertions lost ground and consequently called into question¹.

¹ IJ Benneyworth, "The 'Great Debates' in International Relations Theory", <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/05/20/the-‘great-debates’-in-international-relations-theory/>. [19.04.2016].

The discussions regarding the distinctions on how to study the corpus of IR increased in frequency after the turn of the century. The autonomy² enabled raising questions such as “what is it that we know” (ontology), “how do we know what we know” (epistemology) and “how should we go about the business of knowing” (methodology)³.

Considering that the phenomena of international relations involves high levels of ambiguity, it is inevitable to arrive at different views or opinions. This very obscurity enables scholars to theorize issues in different ways, of which none can be identified as totally right or wrong⁴. Cases can be interpreted and re-interpreted by a good many of scholars because of the distinction between a given (natural) reality and a constructed (social) one⁵. Indeed, neither international relations (read foreign affairs conducted by either statehood or nationhood) can capture the field of IR entirely nor the way we choose can be politically neutral. Thus, shades of colors lead a study from the scratch to the end. As Chris Brown puts it, “if you want black and white, buy an old television, don’t be an IR theorist”⁶.

2.1. Situating Constructivism in International Relations Theory

The aim of pursuing a grand theory by ranking their explanatory, normative, or interpretative capacities forms another moot point –whether to evaluate theories according to their process of formation, thus, to link and limit them in times. Holding the belief in progress might have probably, if not certainly, brought up the well-known chronological order to indicate the development of international theory. In this respect, the history of the discipline was divided into phases towards dominant perspectives. These phases or so-called *great debates* that took place in IR related to the

² As accepted generally, towards establishing a separate discipline the first steps were taken by David Davies, for whom the barony was created in 1932. 1st Baron Davies endowed the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics at University College Wales, Aberystwyth, in 1919.

³ Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, “Constructing Constructivism”, *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998): 13.

⁴ See Wendt’s argumentation: “Neither approach is intrinsically ‘better’ than the other, any more than it is ‘better’ to inquire into the causes of malaria than smallpox; they are simply different”. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 34.

⁵ The first revolves around ontological objectivity, whereas the second deals with epistemological objectivity.

⁶ Brown Chris, Ainley Kirsten, *Understanding International Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 15.

aforementioned issues are tackled mainly under such titles: The first⁷ is said to occur between Realists and Idealists (or sometimes labeled as Utopians)⁸ in the 1940s, and ended up with the domination of Realists⁹. The main point of the dispute was the lack of common consideration in issues like cooperation, diplomacy, security, power-plays, etc. Although some scholars such as John Mearsheimer argues that the British scholars of IR today reserve much of Idealism,¹⁰ and the existence of several international institutions such as United Nations could be defined as success of Idealists; it may be said that realism has become a more influential theoretical approach in the IR discipline.

The second debate concluded that attaining more scientific data requires scientific testing instead of re-reading and re-constructing history¹¹. During the 1950s-1960s this methodological debate took place between Behaviouralists and Traditionalists (or Classicists). Behaviouralists assumed that the advancement of IR depends on employing methods of natural sciences (issues tested empirically through falsification) whereas Traditionalists advocated the historical-interpretive methodology (issues analyzed “in relation to other events and by taking into account their position in time and in a unique historical context”¹²). Yet, there are also some others who embrace

⁷ I see no inconvenience in appointing numbers to debates just to simplify sequencing. But I also do appreciate the debate itself on Great Debates of IR. For some -namely Miami Group of IR- there have been three debates and the first was ethical, the second was ontological and the last one was epistemological. See, Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, “Constructing Constructivism”, 13-14; See also Ole Waever’s fruitful classification of the four debates regarding their efficacy on philosophy, epistemology, ontology and methodology. Ole Waever, “The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate”, *International Theory: Positivism & Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 157.

⁸ E. H. Carr was the first to use the term Utopianism to describe Liberal Internationalism. See, especially, the chapter “The Role of Utopianism”. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939* (Oxon: The Macmillan Press, 1981), 5.

⁹ Conversely, like Lucian Ashworth, few argue that this is a distorted debate in which parties exaggerate their differences and standpoint. See, Lucian Ashworth, “Where Are the Idealists in Interwar International Relations?”, *Review of International Studies*, no. 32 (2006): 291–92.

¹⁰ John Mearsheimer, “E. H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On”, *International Relations*, v. 19, no. 2 (2005): 140. [He is recognized as the founder of offensive realism].

¹¹ The core figures of this debate were Morton Kaplan on the Behaviouralist side and Hedley Bull on the Traditionalist. For a brief summary, See, Oktay F. Tanrısever, “Yöntem Sorunu: Gelenekselcilik-Davranışsalılık Tartışması”, *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik*, ed. Atilla Eralp, 7th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004): 94–111.

¹² Russell K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research*, 8th ed. (California: SAGE Publications, 2015), 334.

these *great debates* with suspicion and/or refusal in total. As Steve Smith puts it below¹³:

“Neither *debate* was really a debate; rather, each was really only a series of statements of faith, with political or sociological factors determining which voice was heard. I do not read the *triumph* of realism over idealism as a debate; nor do I think much light was shed by the traditionalist/behaviouralist debate. Indeed, the latter *debate* shows just how limited is this conception of international theory”.

Another claim on the *greatness* of this debate can be connected with how Brown & Ainley make their position on the shallowness of the argument¹⁴:

“Positivism – the belief that the facts are out there to be discovered and there is only one way to do this, only one form of reliable knowledge, that generated by methods based on the natural sciences – reigned in both camps, and the differences were largely of style rather than substance”.

Criticisms took place throughout the 1970s, examining the Realist methodology and chastising its blindness to low politics,¹⁵ besides its vision of the world, the overemphasis on political/military aspect. The challengers were eager to introduce a pluralistic perspective that involved a much-complicated type of relations between non-state actors, interest groups, bureaucracies, or individuals rather than a bare state-to-state relationship. The emergence of new structures wherein states acted, like the United Nations or the then European Economic Community, and the transformation of traditional companies into multinational corporations revealed that states’ unitary nature and the importance attributed to states on behalf of international relations might be illusory, and although the aforementioned bodies were once created by the states they were no longer tools of them, rather, they became more or less independent organisms. During the 1980s, many Pluralists slipped towards neo-liberal institutionalists and the gap between neo-liberals and neo-realists¹⁶ narrowed. Ultimately, basic propositions of neo-realists, such as the existence of international anarchy and considering the states as rational actors, were accepted by neo-liberals to a certain extent that even in an anarchical structure and for rational egoists’

¹³ Steve Smith, “The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory”, *International Relations Today*, ed. Ken Booth, Steve Smith, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997): 17.

¹⁴ According to them “For the most part, behaviourists were realists - their aim was to fulfil the realist claim to scientific status rather than to undermine it”. Chris Brown, Ainley Kirsten, *Understanding International Relations*, 33.

¹⁵ Mainly it is used to point out concerns about social relations and economics that were once ignored by Classical Realists because of labelling them non-vital to the survival of the state.

¹⁶ It was Robert Cox and Richard Ashley who named this derivation of Realism from Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979). In addition to that, although Structuralism is generally posited opposite to Rational Choice Theory, Waltz’s version of Realism named as ‘Structural Realism’ because of his intense emphasis on ‘agent-structure’ argumentation. He is also defined as “Defensive Realist”, See, Chris Brown, Ainley Kirsten, *Understanding International Relations*, 44–46.

cooperation was possible. The 'Inter-Paradigm'¹⁷ debate lasted until the early 90s and it was mainly criticized for the camps' common ground. As Waever thoroughly reviewed in his study¹⁸:

"Did it exist, the inter-paradigm debate? Partly no, it was not actually an intense [...] debate occupying the minds of International Relationists, but an artificially constructed *debate*, mainly invented for specific presentational purposes, teaching and self-reflection of the discipline. (Just as the first and second debates to some extent were constructions.) Partly yes, it refers to a pattern of behavior and an attitude which gradually emerged in the 1970s and was given a clarifying label as the *inter-paradigm debate*".

The ones who defined the debate as 'Inter-Paradigm' asserted that indeed there is not a correct version of IR studies yet each three offers different aspects of international politics. More clearly, Realism is steeped in war and peace; Liberalism in international regimes in which states and non-states coalesced; and Marxism in global development issues¹⁹. Eventually, realism and liberalism were redressed, and their neo- forms converged to compile the 'neo-neo synthesis'. Following Waever²⁰:

"My term *neo-neo* does not refer to an idea that this is newer than the new, a reformulation of neo-realism for instance. It refers first of all to the synthesis between realism and liberalism that became possible, when realism was transformed into neo-realism and liberalism into neo-liberal institutionalism; it is the synthesis of the two neo-schools and became possible by their very neo-ness".

In the meantime, some other groups of challengers gradually urged a new debate, a much deeper and divisive one, that mainstreamers had faced ever, that shook the standard IR literature to its foundations. According to some, this was the real third²¹ or to other some simply the fourth²² debate, no doubt with different views over who

¹⁷ Michael Banks is the father of the term and needless to say this approach. See, Michael Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations*, ed. Michael Banks, John Wear Burton (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf Books, 1984): 1–21.

¹⁸ Waever, "The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate", 161.

¹⁹ To some, as all three stand on positivist zeal, "they could be seen as three versions of one world, rather than three genuine alternative views of international relations." See, Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond", *International Theory: Positivism & Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 11.

²⁰ Waever, "The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate", 164.

²¹ Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," *International Studies Quarterly*, no. 33 (1989): 235–54; Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, "Constructing Constructivism", 13; See -also- Vendulka Kubalkova, a vigorous advocate of Rule Oriented Constructivism, defines IR theory within three approaches. In figure 1.1 she claims that IR stands on three pillars (competing paradigms), namely Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. See, Vendulka Kubalkova, "Introduction", *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova (New York, London: M. E. Sharpe, 2001): 4; Alexander Wendt, additionally, argues that one of the Great Debates which is identified as third and labelled as Positivists vs. Post-positivists would better be re-named as Naturalists vs. Anti-naturalists who are the advocates of "explanation" and "understanding", respectively. Since "what divides the two camps is whether they think the methods of natural science are appropriate in social inquiry." See, Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 39.

²² Waever, "The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate", 156, 167.

its protagonists are. Ole Waever's approach to classification of debates in numbers reveals the underlying reason for cramming in holy three²³:

"According to established wisdom there is no fourth debate. We are still in or after the third, and now I even claim that we are leaving the fourth. The disagreement stems from the peculiar way of counting in International Relations: 1st debate, 2nd debate, 3rd debate, 3rd debate. There is a magic number –three paradigms, three debates. In academic debates, there always have to be three positions, three options, three scenarios. [...] I am convinced that there are (at least) four major debates".

Regardless of their enumeration, one can conclude that during the 1980s and 90s the discipline encountered a number of minor and/or major confrontation, the proponents of which challenged one another on their ontological, epistemological, and/or axiological premises. Even naming these challengers and their efforts to group them together was a challenge per se. As most were believed to have taken the linguistic turn, Hermeneutics, which was derived from the Greek god Hermes, was nominated. At first, it was accepted to be a good candidate, for the term was applied in a wide range of works in a variety of disciplines ranking from theology to philosophy with respect to its attribution of the interpretation and/or translation of any text. Yet another term, interpretivist, was offered by Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie as a better choice to distinguish those who criticize positivist stance. Although the term was related to the knower itself, the work of Kratochwil and Ruggie was mainly not on the status of the knower but on what we know²⁴. Two years hence Robert Keohane proposed the term reflectivist with the argument that scholars, allegedly of semi-rationalism or irrationalism, "emphasize the importance of human reflection"²⁵. Recalling the second great debate of IR, he suggested that the method of reflection²⁶ would definitely be a better choice for the new assumptions, as they were similar to that of historicists. Smith argues all these attempts were not only to count what is knowledge but also to make the positions of theories and theorists (mainstreamers) stay within the discipline²⁷:

²³ *ibid*, 174. See also footnote 22 on the same page: "[...] in academic debates, an author will often present the discipline in terms of three positions: the two existing views who discuss with each other but are actually both faulted -the superior alternative is a third approach, mine."

²⁴ Friedrich Kratochwil, John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State", *International Organization*, v. 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 753–75.

²⁵ Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", *International Studies Quarterly*, v. 32, no. 4 (December 1988): 382.

²⁶ In this method, the reader reflects his experiences with the readings to reach meaning, answers, and insights.

²⁷ Smith, "Positivism and Beyond", 13.

“All of this makes it very important to be clear as to how positivism operates in international theory, and to show how it is seen not merely as one explicit alternative among many but rather as the implicit *gold standard* against which all approaches are evaluated”.

Eventually, Yosef Lapid labeled the aforementioned challengers (including himself among them) as post-positivists²⁸. Would it be of the belief in progress (a secret consensus that most educated brains fall in rationally) that the prefix *post* implies a much divisive path, furthest from the past (debates), and/or of the applicability that the term captures so many untraditional and unconventional positions in the discipline at once, Lapid set *post-positivists* against positivists in his prominent work where he defined this last great debate as the third²⁹.

2.2. Philosophical and Sociological Foundations of Constructivism

As is assumed the 1980s range of debates, from rationalism/reflectivism to rational choice/deconstructivism, and the incompatibility of their epistemological positions and their refusal and resistance to believe in and to develop a common way, a ground of co-existence, emerged the content of *constructivism* wherein neo-institutionalism (from the rationalist camp) meets the reflectivist camp³⁰. As articulated by Emanuel Adler in his widely cited article³¹:

“[T]he true middle ground between rationalist and relativist interpretive approaches is occupied neither by an interpretive version of rationalism, nor by some variety of *reflectivism*, as described by Keohane, nor even by all sorts of critical theories as imprecisely portrayed by Mearsheimer, but by *constructivism*”.

Leaving behind the arguments about whether being ontologically right in the middle is possible, one can witness several *constructivisms* emerged in the field of IR studies, particularly with the end of the Cold War. As Ruggie underscores, “[t]here are sociological variants, feminist variants, jurisprudential approaches, genealogical approaches, an emancipatory constructivism and a more strictly interpretive kind”³².

²⁸ Though, there are some, like Smith, who call all post-positivist approaches as 'critical theories', but as a generic term, not with reference to Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. See, Smith, *ibid*, 12, 25.

²⁹ Lapid, *ibid*.

³⁰ Some define the protagonists -namely Ruggie and Wendt- of this position as moderate reflectivists, at least for the very first beginning. Waever, "The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate", 168–69.

³¹ Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 90. [Part 4: Seizing The Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, originally published in the *European Journal of International Relations*, v. 3, no. 3, (1997): 319-363.]

³² John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”, *International Organization*, v. 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 880.

Since both technologies –civilian & military- accelerate, the world itself either physically or socially changes ever more rapidly. After the Cold War period disputes and arguments on ideologies started to fade away whereas culture and identity based ones started to rise. The state of being such an *under construction* thus might have necessitated re-theorizing the field to grasp incidents thoroughly.

Suffering from probable concerns, in 1989, Nicholas Onuf introduced the term *constructivism* to IR in his masterpiece ‘World of our Making’³³ where he did not pretend to reveal a new theory for IR but professed a new way of understanding and ‘redescribing the world’³⁴. As Vendulka Kubalkova puts it³⁵:

“Constructivism is not a theory; it does not claim to explain why things work as they do. Constructivism is simply an alternative ontology, a re-description of the world. Thus it does not carry any inherent ideological stance. Constructivism is not an *ism* to be added to the list dominated in the IR studies by neo-realism and neo-liberalism”.

This new stance, which diverges chiefly from critical theories due to its emphasis on empirical analysis, appreciates the social world³⁶ (much as the material world), utterances, meaning, people, culture, identity, and inter-subjectivity. Alexander Wendt clearly singles out constructivists by their main standpoint³⁷:

“[I]n general, constructivists give priority to cultural over material structures on the grounds that actors act on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them, and meanings are socially constructed. A gun in the hands of a friend is a different thing from one in the hands of an enemy, and enmity is a social, not material, relation”.

Constructivism, extends the theoretical outlines of IR and rescues identity studies from post-modernism –that once seen as the only pertinent framework to investigate such³⁸. Its ontological propositions might basically be recapitulated as follows: Firstly, in

³³ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 33–65. In fact, Onuf admits that he had used the term in an article dated 1987 which was seen by only few scholars. See, Nicholas Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 28.

³⁴ Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, “Preface”, *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert (Oxon: Routledge, 2015): x.

³⁵ *ibid*, xii.

³⁶ “Social facts include money, property rights, sovereignty, marriage, football, and Valentine’s Day, in contrast to such brute observational facts as rivers, mountains, population size, bombs, bullets, and gravity, which exist whether or not there is agreement that they do.” See, Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”, 856.

³⁷ Alexander Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics”, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996): 50.

³⁸ Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, *World Politics*, v. 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 325. For Checkel, constructivism is purely a method, or an approach more than anything else.

addition to material structures, normative and ideational structures are equally crucial in shaping the behavior of actors (that are deeply social rather than atomistic egoists). In other words, they are indifferently pivotal in forming collective identity which is important both in political decisions (read actions) and in co-constitution of the relationship between agents and structures. Ideational factors such as shared ideas, beliefs, and values are infinite assets, that are utilized to constitute and reconstitute normative structures, as they are dependent on time and place. There is a cordial relation between norms, and rules, and decisions; it is not possible to conduct meaningful actions and/or behaviors without meaningful norms and/or practices within a social context.

Secondly, identities determine or shape interests and in turn deeds. That is to say, interests, and so-called actions are not exogenous elements that linger around with a pre-existing set of preferences; in contrast, they are the variables that stem from interactions, communication, experiences. In brief, they are the learned consequences through the way of collective identity acquisition of actors (be they individuals or states). In Wendt's words, "[i]dentities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a *portfolio* of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations"³⁹.

Thirdly, there is a two-way relationship in the formation of both agents and structures; and neither agent nor structure is prior to and predetermined by the other. Norms and ideas, especially as institutionalized or pattern like practices (such as legitimate conduct), or forms of appropriateness (cultural, economic, political), maintain this mutual relation. Therefore, it might be inaccurate to assume a strategic realm; instead, it should be identified as a constitutive realm that makes social and political actors (agents) who they are.

³⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, v. 46, no. 2 (1992): 398.

2.3. Key Premises of the Three Main Schools of Constructivism

Recalling E.H. Carr's⁴⁰ famous turn both in social sciences and IR,⁴¹ which was identified as 'rhetorical turn' by Beer & Hariman,⁴² years after, Onuf⁴³ and Friedrich Kratochwil⁴⁴ declared to be taking the 'linguistic turn'.⁴⁵ Kratochwil, with his "Rules, Norms, and Decisions"⁴⁶ asserted the importance of language as the main tool of the social world⁴⁷. The two might deeply be influenced by the British philosopher of language –John Langshaw Austin⁴⁸ but to different extents. Onuf set forth his first distinguishing postulate as "saying is doing", and he proceeded with "rules make rule" and "rules put resources into play";⁴⁹ whereas Kratochwil argued that "our conventional understanding of social action and the norms governing them is defective", for the function of language is misread and the positivist epistemology "treats norms as *causes*"⁵⁰. Norms or rules or principles (as used interchangeably by

⁴⁰ He has been labeled as the forefather of realism and of the post challenge, as well as a "proto" constructivist. See, Timothy Dunne, "The Social Construction of International Society", *European Journal of International Relations*, v. 1, no. 3 (1995): 373.

⁴¹ For Carr's inclusivity see also, Vendulka Kubalkova, "The Twenty Years' Catharsis: E.H. Carr and IR", *International Relations in a Constructed World*, eds. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert (Oxon: Routledge, 2015): 25-57.

⁴² Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 1–35.

⁴³ Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, "Constructing Constructivism", 19.

⁴⁴ Friedrich Kratochwil, "The Protagorean Quest: Community, Justice, and the 'Oughts' and 'Musts' of International Politics", *International Journal, Ethics in World Politics*, v. 43, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 207.

⁴⁵ John G. Ruggie names this type as neo-classical constructivism where, as well as Onuf and Kratochwil, he puts Ernst and Peter Haas, Emanuel Adler, Martha Finnemore, Peter Katzenstein, and himself, for it bases on the classical tradition. See, Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", 881.

⁴⁶ Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

⁴⁷ Underscoring the important and determining effect of language, Todorov makes the point. Supposedly, babies are born, and grow up within a culture where their initial identities are constructed and through languages values and/or norms instilled in them. "The most salient, but also probably the most determining fact, is that we are necessarily born within one language, the language spoken by our parents or the people who look after us. But language is not a neutral instrument, it is impregnated with thoughts, actions and judgements that are handed down to us; it divides reality up in a particular way, and imperceptibly transmits to us a vision of the world." See, Tzvetan Todorov, *The Fear of Barbarians*, trans. Andrew Brown (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 53.

⁴⁸ Austin (1911-1960) is associated with the philosophy of ordinary language and the view that speech is not only passively describing a given reality, but it can change the (social) reality to which it is applied through speech acts. He developed the theory of *illocutionary* according to which "to say something is to do something". In his study *locution* is "what was said", *illocution* is "what was meant", and *perlocution* is "what happened as a result". For example, when someone asks 'Have you got any money' in a shopping mall, the illocutionary act (the meaning carried) is most probably 'please lend or give me some money' although the locutionary act (the literal sentence) is to ask a question about the presence of money at that moment. The perlocutionary act (the actual result) is to make someone to give money or return the request. See, John Langshaw Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, ed. James Opie Urmson, Marina Sbisa, 2nd ed. (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975), 12.

⁴⁹ Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*.

⁵⁰ Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*, 5.

Kratochwil) are not causes, they are the means with which to make or to simplify an actor's choice.

A decade after Onuf and Kratochwil, Alexander Wendt developed a theory of the international system, which he called *social construction*, as a constructivist approach to international politics⁵¹. His version of constructivism was a 'moderate' one which was seen as a 'thin constructivism' and rejected by most radical constructivists. Wendt's description of constructivism as a kind of 'structural idealism'⁵² was even compared to Kenneth Waltz's theory. Onuf alleged that "Waltz's conception of structure suits, even supports, a strong version of constructivist social theory"⁵³ which has been espoused by Wendt⁵⁴. Another point, why Wendt has been criticized by many, stems from his reconceptualization of the national interest as an end product of *only* intersubjective processes (without domestic aspects) during which meanings are constructed. Clarified by Jutta Weldes, Wendt considered states as unitary actors wherein state officials approach other states and international politics with *a blank slate* before an interaction takes place⁵⁵:

"Wendt's anthropomorphized understanding of the state continues to treat states, in typical realist fashion, as unitary actors with a single identity and a single set of interests. The state itself is treated as a 'black box', the internal workings of which are irrelevant to the construction of state identities and interests".

The idea that constructivism is an alternative ontology rather than a theory, however, unites the disparate constructivist positions, and it encourages scholars to see that actors are social and they are socially constructed; though keeps the divergence on which actors to study, or why do they differ, or where to start.

For Nicholas Onuf, "Constructivism begins with deeds. Deeds done, acts taken, words spoken –These are all that facts are"⁵⁶. In his view, a constructivist must start his study just in the middle, "between people and society, by introducing a third element, *rules*,

⁵¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

⁵² "[T]his theory is a kind of Idealism, a Structural Idealism, although I refer to it only as a constructivist approach to international politics". See, Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, xiii.

⁵³ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 96.

⁵⁴ On the contrary, there are others, including Dune Ras, who assert that Wendt's variant of constructivism provided a basement for the further developed different constructivisms which were much closer to the post-modern camp with their concerns about intertextual and discursive premises. See, Runa Das, "Critical Social Constructivism: 'Culturing' Identity, (In) Security and the State in International Relations Theory", *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, v. 70, no. 4 (December 2009): 961–82.

⁵⁵ Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests", *European Journal of International Relations*, v. 2, no. 3 (September 1, 1996): 280.

⁵⁶ Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, 36.

that always links the other two elements together”⁵⁷ because people make society, and society makes people via *rules*.

Friedrich Kratochwil takes another approach, quite similar to Onuf’s, and maintains that “the unit of analysis is neither the structure nor the actor. It is, rather, the norms that serve to guide and justify the making as well as the explanation of decisions”⁵⁸.

As Hopf points out, there is a basic distinction between a (neo)realist and a (neo)liberal and a constructivist about how to treat norms. For the first, norms take no place in explanation of international politics and for the very same reason norms (and ideas) do not have an effect on interests, whereas the second emphasizes the importance of norms which “shape states’ behavior by matching (exogenously determined) actor’s interests and therefore by serving as a ‘resource’ with which to assert their interests”⁵⁹ and maximize utility. And the third takes norms (and rules) as preexisting essentials that are prior to structure, and prerequisite elements for building identities and conducting social actions. Therefore, “norms are collective understandings”⁶⁰ that reveal a much-deeper impact than only on constituting identities but also on shaping interests, and in turn behaviors, according to Hopf⁶¹:

“Meaningful behavior, or action, is possible only within an intersubjective social context. Actors develop their relations with, and understandings of, others through the media of norms and practices. In the absence of norms, exercises of power, or actions, would be devoid of meaning. Constitutive norms define an identity by specifying the actions that will cause Others to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately. Since structure is meaningless without some intersubjective set of norms and practices, anarchy, mainstream international relations theory’s most crucial structural component, is meaningless .

For Wendt, on the other hand, prior to “being a constructivist about anything, we have to choose *units* and *levels* of analysis, or *agents* and the *structures* in which they are embedded”⁶². Similar to Waltz, he aims at explaining neither identities nor interests that are in turn construct foreign policies, but the international system wherein international politics mingle with national ones, without turning attention to the domestic factors involved.

⁵⁷ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 4.

⁵⁸ Friedrich Kratochwil, “On the Notion of ‘Interest’ in International Relations”, *International Organization*, v. 36, no. 1 (Winter 1982): 4.

⁵⁹ Gerry Nagtzaam, *The Making of International Environmental Treaties* (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), 28.

⁶⁰ Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, 327.

⁶¹ Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, *International Security*, v. 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 173.

⁶² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 7.

2.3.1. The Power of Words and Onuf's Constructivism

Onuf's uncommon way of viewing the world, excluding the traditional terminology, supplements the field with "an analysis of speech acts, rules, practices, agents, agencies, and social arrangements"⁶³. His way of constructivism is not to supply answers for grand questions such as 'how does the world change' or 'why do societies differ', but to supply links between discrete concepts and propositions. Therefore, it has an alternative way to theorize about matters that seem to be unrelated.

In his perspective, humans are social animals and without social relations, they cannot be human beings. Accordingly, there is an inextricable constructive relationship both between human beings each other and between human beings and nature; that social relations 'make' people what they call 'we are' and that in turn those constructed people 'make' nature 'what it is'. For the reason that 'saying is doing', whatever we say 'makes' us and nature which socially (collectively) comprise the world itself⁶⁴.

All sorts of relations are conducted via rules (not limited to legal ones) without whom people will not be able to decide on 'what' they 'should' do. In the process of construction, people learn social rules, and that if they disregard following a rule then they can face undesirable consequences, or that if they do not have any opinion about the relevant rule they can safely make deduction from the (stable but never fixed) patterns of previous 'practices'. In fact, rules set a benchmark for people even while deciding 'who the active participants in a society' called 'agents'⁶⁵. For Onuf, people surely are agents, but to the extent that they represent other people in the situations restricted and determined by the rules, therefore, the terms agents and people are not completely interchangeable with each other.

Societies have rules telling their agents (e.g. governments) which goals to be achieved, and to pursue a goal is rational conduct. What makes Onuf's constructivism distinct from the rational camp is that according to him, any kind of claim to rationality can only be relative and subjective. Since agents are restricted by 'nature and society (together—always together)'; and although agents always act rationally to choose the best option available to them "viewed from outside, these choices may appear to be

⁶³ Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, "Preface", xi.

⁶⁴ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 3–4.

⁶⁵ *ibid*, 4.

less than rational, but this is due to the complexities of agency and human fallibility”⁶⁶. Thus, decisions are always rational but from the perspective of an insider, and not necessarily understandable for an outsider.

Rules are the core elements of any system that a constructivist can start with either agents (and their choices) or structures (or “social arrangements that emerge from the choices that agents are making all the time”⁶⁷ as Onuf names them), but arrives at rules as a foregone conclusion. As proposed by Onuf, alternatively, we can start from rules in between agents and social arrangements to have the chance to move in either way.

Agents of both types; that of actively conducting an action or of passively remaining as an observer, can set up a rule by creating its content. There is no difference between an act of clearly saying what a rule is and an act of speaking to have someone do something. “The act of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act is commonly called a speech act”⁶⁸. Although speech acts of any category (assertive, directive, and commissive in relation to the different functions they perform) do not suggest anything about future situations, if a particular speech act ends up with the ‘same general effect’ that constantly concludes the same cycle of speech act categories, then “the same old speech acts turn into *convention* as everyone comes to believe that the words themselves, and not the speakers mouthing them, are responsible for what happens”⁶⁹. Similar to rules (that tell an agent what it should do), conventions tell agents “what they have always done”⁷⁰.

In respect of taking the ‘linguistic turn’, Onuf’s constructivism introduced an ontology which frees the discipline from being stuck in a heated debate between positivist epistemology and post-modern methods on the one hand and in contrast to main streamers asserts a second function for languages on the other. While the positivist stance considers that language is an apparatus only for describing and defining the world, for Onuf, it is the main element of each construction, that is, language constitutes the world per se⁷¹.

⁶⁶ *ibid*, 5.

⁶⁷ *ibid*, 8.

⁶⁸ *ibid*, 10.

⁶⁹ *ibid*, 10.

⁷⁰ *ibid*, 11.

⁷¹ *ibid*, 28–29.

He claims several reasons why his masterpiece (World of Our Making) along with Kratochwil's (Rules, Norms, and Decisions) did not have the anticipated impact that they deserved to have, though they were highly esteemed and regarded foundational texts of constructivism and widely cited by scholars. These 'technically demanding' books, in addition to their close reading requirement from readers, portray 'unfamiliar worlds' to readers, and profess that IR 'is a field lacking a distinctive subject' which seemingly disturbed the ones who built their careers on the distinctiveness of the field.

In his view, there are five grave important reasons to become a constructivist. First, his type of thick constructivism nurtures a great deal of 'sensitivity to language as *doing*'. Second, it draws 'attention to process' that in turn to 'social construction' since it is an essential part to the nature of social process. Third, it fosters sensitivity to rules 'as a constant feature of social relations', that is, they turn material resources and conditions into human needs and goals (enforcement and deterrence are the given examples by Onuf to describe this process). Fourth, although Onuf claims that 'constructivism is not philosophically idealist' he consents to support Wendt's view 'that constructivism has an idealist view of the structure', as structures are sort of 'stable patterns' whose being are restricted by their 'observers' descriptions'. Fifth, 'strong form of constructivism' (as Onuf names it) supplies the field with its 'methodological openness' which covers a broad spectrum of quantitative and qualitative analyses⁷².

2.3.2. The Power of Norms and Kratochwil's Constructivism

Kratochwil, based on Aristotle, underlines the decisive role of language that it is not a combination of sounds nor is it of signals but of *reasoned speech*⁷³. Thus speaking for humans, they can utilize the same sound coming from vocal cords to utter an exclamation on one occasion while they can also pronounce a meaningful word on the other. To be endowed with such a gift leads mankind to a communicative path where they can truly share their experiences, plans, and use abstract concepts for discussing their opinions, and in turn, makes them the only political animals⁷⁴.

⁷² *ibid*, 33–36.

⁷³ It is λόγος (logos) that once used by Aristotle as an umbrella term covering such meanings as word, oration, logic, ratio, and the like.

⁷⁴ Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*, 6.

Studying norms (or rules) within a positivist framework may not be heuristically fruitful in providing explanations of phenomena, for refutation is unachievable. The explanatory value of a mainstream research tradition requires a basic formulation which comprises a condition and a hypothesis, and where the latter is tested and any counterfactual incident is deemed as refuting the assumptions of the hypothesis. Norms, however, do not maintain such a situation, they are put forward neither to be tested nor to be refuted. Thus positivist perspective is hardly applicable to the cases wherein norms are investigated and explained. In Kratochwil and Ruggie's words⁷⁵:

“[N]orms are counterfactually valid. No single counterfactual occurrence refutes a norm. not even many such occurrences necessarily do. Does driving while under the influence of alcohol refute the law (norm) against drunk driving? Does it when half the population is implicated? [...] [N]orms need not [also] ‘exist’ at all in a formal sense in order to be valid. It is often said, for example, that the Bretton Woods monetary regime did not exist prior to 1958, because only then did the Europeans assume the obligation of full currency convertibility for transactions on current account. But surely the norms of the regime guided the behavior of European states *toward* that event for some years before it actually took place. Thus, neither the violation of norms, nor, in some special circumstances, even their ‘nonexistence’, necessarily refutes their validity”.

For Kratochwil, actors (read agents) alter or transform systems (read structures) by means of their actions. Thus, though it is not easy to change a system, no system is stable at all and all are sensitive to actors, either domestic or international. Therefore, they “are not hermetically sealed within their own spheres”⁷⁶ and even domestic politics can start a change in the international system.

He paid a great deal of attention to the critique of ‘the poverty of epistemology’⁷⁷ and scientific assumptions of rationalism, and on the analyses of everyday language and norms wherein he made use of linguistic and practical philosophy, speech act theory, and jurisprudential theories. He investigates the constituents of social knowledge and social life, chastising the rationality which leaves out moral and interpretative criteria in order to attain objective analysis. He opposes the positivist formulations of knowledge that one should apply a separation between facts and values to reach an objective scientific knowledge, in his words: “One position argues that true knowledge

⁷⁵ Friedrich Kratochwil, John Gerard Ruggie, “A State of the Art on an Art of the State”, *International Organization*, v. 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 767–68.

⁷⁶ Rey Koslowski, Friedrich Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System”, *International Organization*, v. 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 223.

⁷⁷ Friedrich Kratochwil, “Errors Have Their Advantage”, *International Organization*, v. 38, no. 2 (1984): 305.

can only be gained by following a particular method”⁷⁸. In opposition to this stance Kratochwil claims that “first of all, ‘knowledge’ should not simply be identified with one mode of knowing”⁷⁹ because there clearly are many different grounds. In this respect, striving for “the development of an objectivist conceptualisation of a social system without any recourse to the ideas and values the actors themselves hold” is futile in that social reality does not exist *out there* “but is made by the actors, the concepts we use are part of a vocabulary that is deeply imbricated with our political projects”⁸⁰.

He assumes that the actors’ understanding influences the world. In other words, “the causal arrows run from our (or the agent’s) understanding *to* the world and not *from* ‘the world’ to our understanding or theory”⁸¹. In brief, neither concepts nor theory could ever be *fixed per se*. In addition to the conception that whether grasping *objectively given true explanations* are achievable, this proposition also undermines the notion that historical facts and data presumably provide a stable /unquestioned knowledge, as history is *past*, and so *objective* and *fixed* in a time and place. As he maintains⁸²:

“[A]ctual historical reflection shows that matters are quite different –history is malleable because it is always *remembered* and part of a story, which, in turn, is usually confronted not only by counter-arguments concerning this or that ‘fact’ but also by different narratives ‘contesting’ the conventional or hegemonic version of things passed”.

Kratochwil’s approach to IR, which spreads out critics about its lack of producing empirical knowledge to support his epistemological claims,⁸³ is considered to have a link with both speech act and communicative action theories;⁸⁴ and to some extent critical theories of the Frankfurt School. His three assumptions involve as follows: The first one is that “it is useful to study the role of norms in shaping decisions from the baseline of an abstract initial situation”⁸⁵. Accordingly, agents (actors as individuals and collectivities alike) that are *self-interested* with *non-identical preferences* always make choices, even under difficult or dangerous situations, via the help of rules and

⁷⁸ Friedrich Kratochwil, *The Puzzles of Politics, Inquiries into the Genesis and Transformation of International Relations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 153.

⁷⁹ *ibid*, 153.

⁸⁰ *ibid*, 185.

⁸¹ *ibid*, 187.

⁸² *ibid*, 187.

⁸³ Martin Griffiths, Steven C. Roach, M. Scott Solomon, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 127.

⁸⁴ Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*, 7.

⁸⁵ *ibid*, 10.

norms, which guide and provide them with simplification and reduction of the complex choice positions.

His second assumption is that “human action in general is ‘rule-governed’, which means that –with the exception of pure reflexes or unthinking conditioned behavior– it becomes understandable against the background of norms embodied in conventions and rules which give meaning to an action”⁸⁶. In this respect, Kratochwil escapes rules and norms from the traditional warehouse of the legal theories to a much broader sense where not only the actor itself (while making its decision) but also the observer (while decoding or interpreting an action) refer to them. In other words, rules and norms provide a sense of forum (a normative structure) where all the essentials that are required to communicate with and/or to understand each other are stored.

“Since rules and norms influence choices through the reasoning process, the processes of deliberation and interpretation deserve further attention”⁸⁷ is his third assumption. Accordingly, although the field is supplemented with different types of choice models in order to provide an explanation for the rational aspects of the choosing procedure, these models remain deficient in making further clarifications of any reasoning processes. The maximization of choices, for example, may be taken for granted as a rational action of the actor even under serious conditions such as conflict or war; but evaluating the ‘reasonableness’ or ‘appropriateness’, and the prioritization of choices cannot be explained by rational-choice models because rationality abstain itself from further deepening by requiring ‘the independent and fixed valuations of the actors’ as a precondition in the process. Kratochwil finalizes his assumption with a question: “how do we reason with rules and norms when no logically compelling solution seems possible, yet when certain decisions and their supporting reasons are more persuasive than others?”⁸⁸. The search for an answer to this question transmits us to the realm of debates about identity since it is our identity constructions that determine our choices and approach to rationality.

⁸⁶ *ibid*, 11.

⁸⁷ *ibid*, 11.

⁸⁸ *ibid*, 11.

2.3.3. The Power of Identities and Wendt's Constructivism

Wendt's ambition to formulate a social systemic theory⁸⁹ confines his constructivism within ontology⁹⁰ wherein he defines his approach as *scientific realism*, and by doing so reaching a combination of both being a positivist and a constructivist at the same time. Thus, he begins with constructivism but theorizes and makes his assumptions with positivism which he professes imbues scientific knowledge⁹¹.

Although he assumes the existence of a reality –out there– independent of human mind materially and ideationally, as a result of his 'scientific realism' which inevitably leads him to positivist camp; opposing to positivists, Wendt maintains that international relations are sustained under social (constructed) conditions rather than given (trans-historical) ones⁹².

Contrary to Onuf's claim⁹³ that "people [who act on behalf of other people] are agents",⁹⁴ Wendt purports that "states *really* are agents"⁹⁵. He argues that even though both national and international non-state actors play a vital role in contemporary world politics, states are the primary dominant units in –at least– explaining war or global violence because systems still change *through* states and they are still "the sole legitimate bearers of organized violence potential"⁹⁶. Accordingly, states are as real as humans that "we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and intentionality"⁹⁷. He draws an analogy between international politics and forests, and articulates that it is meaningless to criticize the former as being 'state-

⁸⁹ Wendt is not the only one shoots for a systemic analysis, See also Kratochwil, "On the Notion of 'Interest' in International Relations."

⁹⁰ According to Ruggie, the ontology of Wendt's constructivism differs from the others' because of its similarity with the natural sciences. In Ruggie's words, "[s]cientific inquiry of both material and social worlds deals largely in non observables, be they quarks or international structures, and much of the time even the intersubjective aspects of social life exist independently of the mental states of most individuals that constitute it". See, Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge": 882.

⁹¹ An approach opposed by Kratochwil & Ruggie, as they assert that "epistemology has to match ontology". See Kratochwil and Ruggie, "A State of the Art on an Art of the State": 768.

⁹² Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13-14.

⁹³ To the extent that individuals represent their states, Wendt agrees with Onuf but with a rejection: "I emphasize the key role that concrete individuals (who as agents form 'governments') play in instantiating states, but show that this does not vitiate a realist view of state agency." See, Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 197.

⁹⁴ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 4; See, also, Kratochwil's: "the term 'actor' refers in my discussion variously to individuals and collectivities". Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*, 10.

⁹⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 10.

⁹⁶ *ibid*, 9.

⁹⁷ *ibid*, 197.

centric’ and the latter for being ‘tree-centric’. Likewise, he maintains that ‘statism’ (in a broad sense, *state-centric systemic international relations theory*) does not pose any problem for explaining changes, the problematic proposition belongs to realism and rationalism, both of which are recognized as indispensable components of studying current issues in structural theory⁹⁸.

In his ‘synthetic approach’ Wendt combines elements from structuration⁹⁹ and symbolic interactionism¹⁰⁰ to attain a systemic theorizing. He makes three distinctions: between ‘levels’ (micro –structures of interaction such as common knowledge– vs macro –structures of multiply realizable outcomes such as collective knowledge), between ‘effects’ (causal vs constitutive), and between ‘things’ (behavior vs properties –as agents’ identities and interests)¹⁰¹:

“All three distinctions concern how reality is structured, and to that extent the ontological debate about structures and agents ultimately is an empirical debate, with rationalist and constructivist social theorists simply interested in different aspects of how reality is structured”.

Wendt agrees with Neo-realists on the determining capability of material elements, however, he admits that “material conditions by themselves explain relatively little”¹⁰² about the structure of social systems, which is not given but constructed and therefore could be reconstructed. Thus, international politics could be reshaped over and over again. Considering ‘equal ontological status’ for agent and structure, as they are mutually constituted, he emphasizes that the structure is constructed by interests which are precisely ensued from ideas¹⁰³.

In his ‘reasonable middle ground’¹⁰⁴ Wendt unites the tenets of Waltzians, of mainstreamers, and of rational choice believers, as well as of idealists. He argues that

⁹⁸ Alexander Wendt, “Identity Formation and the International State”, *The American Political Science Review*, v. 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 393.

⁹⁹ Structuration Theory, which was proposed by Anthony Giddens, is a social theory of the creation and reproduction of systems and mainly based on structure-agent analysis. It is believed that there is no hierarchy between these two and none alone is sufficient to study. So micro and macro focused analysis should be carried out together.

¹⁰⁰ It is a sociological perspective applied mainly in microsociology and social psychology. George Herbert Mead, who was the founder of this tradition, argued that people’s selves are social products, though purposive and creative. According to his student, Herbert Blumer, who took this perspective a step forward claimed that people act toward things. And their actions determined by the meaning that those encountered things have for them. People get these meanings from their social interaction and modify them through interpretation.

¹⁰¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 143.

¹⁰² *ibid*, 189.

¹⁰³ Interests are truly ideas. See, *ibid*, 98.

¹⁰⁴ As Kratochwil calls it. See, Kratochwil, *The Puzzles of Politics, Inquiries into the Genesis and Transformation of International Relations*, 154.

the main debate between idealists and materialists is not about to what extent do ideas or do power and interests constitute social life, but, rather about the contribution of brute materials to power and interests. He, then, clears his position of scientific realism¹⁰⁵ (opposition to the view that what there is in the world is somehow dependent on what we know or believe)¹⁰⁶ and posits his ‘rump materialism’ instead of brute materialism. His ‘rump materialism’¹⁰⁷ is related to material capabilities with “some intrinsic causal powers” and their effects on “interests (and shared ideas or culture)”¹⁰⁸ whereas brute material forces are the “things which exist [...] independent of ideas, like human nature, [and] physical environment”¹⁰⁹. Therefore, Wendt, as a soft constructivist, avoids himself to be identified with either radical camps (idealist and materialist)¹¹⁰:

“The claim is *not* that ideas are more important than power and interest, or that they are autonomous from power and interest. Power and interest are just as important and determining as before. The claim is rather that power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up”.

Unlike radicals, as a soft-constructivist, he accepts the vital importance of material forces but also underlines that it is less than the importance of meanings that individuals construct around them. As stated by Wendt, any material explanations will inevitably fail unless discursive conditions involved. Realists, for example, evaluate multi-polarity in relation to war and view it as a dangerous situation that may create a volatile international system prone to war. Liberals state the crucial role of economic interdependence and relate the existence of economic interdependence as a condition that is conducive to peace. And Marxists criticize capitalism emphasizing the relation between capitalism and formation of states. Social constructivists, however, inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute “the poles as enemies rather than friends”, or “state[s] with identities that care about free trade and economic growth”, or “capitalist relations of production”¹¹¹. Hence they evaluate the same terms and

¹⁰⁵ Although he clearly states several times that interests are ideas he claims that international life cannot be ideas all the way down. Thus his scientific realism justifies that “ideas are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical reality”, drawing on John Searle’s statement that “brute facts have ontological priority over institutional facts”. See, Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 110.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid*, 51.

¹⁰⁷ Taking the idealist aspect and defending that interests are constitutive ideas Wendt, also, defends the rump materialist aspect that “they nevertheless must ultimately hook on to a material ground, human nature”. See, *ibid*, 129.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid*, 98.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid*, 94.

¹¹⁰ *ibid*, 135.

¹¹¹ *ibid*, 135-136.

concepts as the rival theoretical approaches but mostly focus on how these terms and concepts are evaluated and which meanings are attributed to them.

2.4. Roots of Identity Studies in International Relations

The interest in identity studies in the discipline of IR has started to gain importance during the 1980s and early 1990s. The reason for taking identity formation (or self/other conceptions) within the borders of IR studies could have stemmed from a search to find out and interpret the international system of states, and give an ontological status to the subjects of world politics. As Iver Neumann puts it, “the general uncertainty of a discipline which feels itself to have spent the 1980s barking up the wrong trees”¹¹² would have caused this development.

Mainstream IR studies approached *others* mostly as given and indigenous, thus not hypothetical, and their law-like propositions could not adequately explain variations in state preferences regarding policies towards what are considered as others. Having been nourished by the positivist ontological and epistemological premises (such as the existence of the objective reality and its accurate and truthful representation) mainstream scholars argued that IR studies should focus on anything only if observable and/or measurable. So states are treated as *actors* corresponding to *humans*, and their *rational choice* analogous to people’s *behavior*. With the aim of making IR more scientific, so-called non-scientific elements such as mental processes, motives, cultures and identities are intentionally ignored. This reached a conclusion that “IR’s *raison d’être* was the study of states, and thus the study of *raison d’état*”¹¹³.

Another aspect of understanding why the studies of *self/other* are kept out of realist attention is posited by Jean Paul Sartre¹¹⁴:

“It is strange that the problem of Others has never truly disturbed the realists. To the extent that the realist takes everything as given, doubtless it seems to him that the Other is given. In the midst of the real, what is more real than the Other”?

¹¹² Iver B. Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations”, *European Journal of International Relations*, no. 2: 139 (1 June 1996): 140.

¹¹³ Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, “Constructing Constructivism”, 9; Interestingly, Wendt underlines the necessity of state-centricism and explains why a theory of international politics should be state-centric on the same page number in his study. See, Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 9.

¹¹⁴ Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Pocket Books, 1978), 223.

Just as selfishness and malignity (because a peaceful world was a fiction and universal moral principles were a matter of degree)¹¹⁵ *others also* would have been given. From this point of view, investigating ways not to eliminate but to manage wars/conflicts and to treat the *other* not as ideational but as factual¹¹⁶ would be more valuable and to the point¹¹⁷:

“[T]he existence of Other is certain, and the knowledge which we have of them is probable. We can see here the sophistry of realism. Actually we ought to reverse the terms of this proposition and recognize that if the Other is accessible to us only by means of the knowledge which we have of him, and if this knowledge is only conjectural, then the existence of the Other is only conjectural and it is the role of critical reflection to determine its exact degree of probability. Thus by a curious reversal, the realist because he has posited the reality of the external world, is forced to return to idealism when he confronts the existence of others”.

Although the *self* and *other* were considered as given, it was not until Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel that no conceptual relation was set forth between them. Hegel, in his way of dialectical¹¹⁸ approach to identity formation,¹¹⁹ raised the idea of mutually complementary character of the *self-other* pair that corresponds to each other,¹²⁰ which are required forming and integrating the *self* with *other*¹²¹:

“Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another”.

¹¹⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 8–9.

¹¹⁶ Yet, latest developments about re-writing national history textbooks –paying heed to eliminate insulting or humiliating attributions for *Others*– can be seen as an improvement within this field. Although there are many projects to be listed one of them appreciates much more attention due to its host institution –World Bank– which is located in the motherland of Realism: “Wolfgang Höpken (Georg-Eckert-Institute for International Textbook Research, Braunschweig, Germany) History-Textbooks and Reconciliation – Preconditions and Experiences in a Comparative Perspective, World-Bank meeting, November 11th, Washington, D.C.”, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1121703274255/1439264-1126807073059/World_Bank.pdf [22.01.2010] 10.09.2020 23:53:00 10.09.2020 23:53:00

¹¹⁷ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*, 224.

¹¹⁸ A method of classical philosophy based upon dialogue of proponents and opponents of an argument, which dates back to Socrates and might be best exemplified by Plato’s “Republic”. And Hegelian dialectics is a threefold process wherein theses (be they ideologies or paradigms) and their counter-theses (read antitheses) merge into a compromise called syntheses, in virtue of the tension in between.

¹¹⁹ For Hegel the “self-Other relations are framed within the individual’s striving for unity and coherence. [And] [t]he unity of the self results from the dynamics of negation”. See, Michael J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies* (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 41.

¹²⁰ Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations”, 141.

¹²¹ A. V. Miller, trans., *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 112.

Building on Hegel's formulation of the *other*, Karl Marx excluded dialogical¹²² readings of identity constitution, in total, and advocated dialectical ones in his 1844 Paris Notebooks where he discussed self-alienation. Several but similar questions had been asked during this period of time, and such can be aligned as; 'Who is other', 'What is it made up of', 'How to identify the otherness of the other'. Consequently, Hegel's or Marx's, in part, with his reformulation of Hegel's, version of understanding and formulating identity became dominant and prevailed during 20th century¹²³.

In the field of social sciences, Michel Foucault is one of the eminent scholars referred to regarding discourse. In his view, discourse determines anything related to a speech, including attribution of a quality to a subject as well. As regards Europe or Europeanness, for example, discourse "determines what can and cannot be said about Europe (e.g., a continent, an organization, an order, but not a company), [or] who is European and who is not"¹²⁴. In this context, a final conclusion on the discourse on Europe could be reached through analyzing what has been said about it, regardless of who has said it. Contrary to what was proposed by the Foucauldian approach, John Langshaw Austin, who held the view that speech does not only passively describe a given reality, but it can also change and constitute a (social) reality through speech acts, considered discourse "as a product of individual discursive practices in the context of social norms and rules"¹²⁵.

Lengthy studies addressing the *self* and the *other* concerns within the discipline of IR are undertaken by the so-called *post scholars*, and might arguably be dated back to James Der Derian, who has been influenced by Michelle Foucault and Jean Baudrillard, and to some extent by his mentor Hedley Bull of English School¹²⁶. In his prominent book 'On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement' besides his ambition to combine international relations with political science and to develop the

¹²² It is an interpretative methodology originated in the studies of George Herbert Mead and Bakhtin, which is based upon analyzing human communication (that is spoken or written utterances or actions) as they are assumed to be embedded in a socio-historical context.

¹²³ Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations", 141.

¹²⁴ Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Bahar Rumelili, "Discourse Analysis: Strengths and Shortcomings", *All Azimuth*, v. 8, no. 2 (2019): 286.

¹²⁵ *ibid*, 287.

¹²⁶ Martin Griffiths, Steven C. Roach, M. Scott Solomon, *ibid*, 270; Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations", 155.

types of diplomacy,¹²⁷ Der Derian might definitely be the first to introduce the *self/other* nexus to IR and to reach a dialogical conclusion by dialectical readings of the state-*selves* and the state-*others*. He maintains that although diplomacy is not the only way to achieve a desired consequence for the *self*, yet it is the safest one “until we learn how to recognize ourselves as the *other*”¹²⁸.

Michael J. Saphiro is another early IR theorist who scrutinizes identity formation in international relations by exploring textualism. Drawing heavily on Saussurean linguistics that “meaning emerges from the relational structure of signifiers”¹²⁹ Saphiro underlines that language is not a set of symbols instead it is a set of values “embedded in the process of signification which is responsible for producing the objects, acts, and events we entertain in our conscious awareness”¹³⁰. Thus, for Saphiro, it is textualism that frees IR scholars to study discourse and enables them to take objects and subjects “as productions rather than as natural phenomena, lying outside of human productive activity”¹³¹.

According to Iver Neumann, Saphiro tackles the *self/other* issue as “aspects of historically contingent ideas of self, which again are rooted in historically contingent ideas about time and space” and reaches to the conclusion that “foreign policy generally is about making an other” in order to sustain the *self* against *change*¹³².

Concomitantly, in his “Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity”¹³³, David Campbell –an eminent scholar of reflectivist/post-structuralist camp– pursues the practice of US foreign policy soon after the Cold War and points out the importance of *change* in forming enmity and reformulating otherness. For Campbell, identities (whether personal or collective) are an ‘inescapable dimension’ of beings/entities and they are constructed through a two-way relationship between the *self* and its difference (the *other*). Since neither identities nor their differences are

¹²⁷ Der Derian, in his genealogy of diplomacy, describes six types of diplomacy according to the situation wherein they are conducted: Mytho-diplomacy, proto-diplomacy, diplomacy, anti-diplomacy, neo-diplomacy, techno-diplomacy.

¹²⁸ James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 209.

¹²⁹ Michael J. Shapiro, “Literary Productions as a Politicizing Practice”, *Language and Politics*, ed. Michael J. Shapiro (New York: New York University Press, 1984): 222.

¹³⁰ *ibid*, 223.

¹³¹ *ibid*, 223.

¹³² Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations”, 156.

¹³³ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

‘fixed’, ‘given’, or ‘planned’, “[t]he problematic of identity/difference contains, therefore, no foundations which are prior to, or outside of, its operation”¹³⁴. *Self* and *other* are performatively constituted, are not fixed and achieved through the ‘inscription of boundaries’ which mark the differentiation between the two concepts. The discursive interaction between *self* and *other* is also important for the study of international relations since the approach of a state and state actors to international relations is based and influenced greatly by understandings of *self* and *other* which form the basis of identity.

2.5. Notions of Self/Other and Discourse in Constructivism

The growing attention of the identity studies undermined the state’s privileged position as a unit of analysis that “[t]he state appear[ed] to be more moveable, malleable, and contestable than ever”¹³⁵. This new perspective which normalizes the over-emphasis on states, also, facilitated approaching to any issues as negotiable between relating parties (be they states, institutions, any forms of organizations, aggrieved groups, etc.). Eventually, it came to be expected by the international society¹³⁶ that the state should resolve issues via non-violent and relieving measures.

States, for constructivists, are neither endogenous nor exogenous to structure but “constructed by historically contingent interactions”¹³⁷, as are identities and interests. Since foreign policies are shaped either by ideas or identities, besides objective realities (read facts), it is not the international system that determines interests, but “ideational processes at either a domestic or international level. In short, ideas and identities determine interests”¹³⁸ that are always in process (not fixed), sustained by practice¹³⁹.

Wendt, for example, compares rationalists and constructivists on their ontological difference approaching to international system. While Rationalists take identities and interests as given, or as fixed object, constructivists, in contrast, assert an endless process of reproduction of the *self* and the *other*. Even if taking identities and interests

¹³⁴ *ibid*, 8.

¹³⁵ Franke Wilmer, “Identity, Culture, and Historicity: The Social Construction of Ethnicity in the Balkans”, *World Affairs*, v. 160, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 3.

¹³⁶ It is used without emphasis on the English School.

¹³⁷ Wendt, “Identity Formation and the International State”, 385.

¹³⁸ Andrew Heywood, *Global Politics*, 2nd ed. (China: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 138.

¹³⁹ Wendt, “Identity Formation and the International State”, 387.

for granted might have arisen from methodological issues (that it is not possible to problematize everything at once), Wendt opposes rationalist ontology since such position could conceal the answers to the questions on what happens when actors interact. Wendt's core argument is thus "interaction at the systemic level changes state identities and interests"¹⁴⁰.

Onuf, on the other hand, asserts that considering identities as a process of an unending "social construction involving agents' choices for themselves" implies treating the *self*, though unintentionally, 'as an unproblematic primitive term' (similar to that of rationalists) because "the process itself presupposes participants already aware of themselves"¹⁴¹. Following Rene Descartes and his self-conscious *self*¹⁴², Onuf states that although he is reluctant to study identity he places his limited attention on personal identities rather than collective ones. He deals with the *self* that is at work while one becomes conscious of the world, which he calls 'the indexical self'. In his words: "It is mine alone, indubitably experienced here and now, imperfectly remembered as there and then in any future here and now that I consciously experience"¹⁴³. Human beings are social and sociality entails subjectivity; that each is indispensable to the being of *other*; that they constitute each other; that humans convey their subjective experiences through language (without which no activity is fully social) in the context of socializing.

Conversely, setting up identities and confining them into an innate position might exhibit a safer world for rationalists where actors (agents/ states/ individuals/ institutions as a whole) would have the chance to predict *the future* of themselves and of *others* within a particular context—an approximation. In Hopf's words¹⁴⁴:

"Durable expectations between states require intersubjective identities that are sufficiently stable to ensure predictable patterns of behavior. A world without identities is a world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy".

The *self* strives to infer implicit meanings from the *other's* speeches or actions, both of which are assumed to root in its identity. No doubt about it, the identity of a state gives some clues on its preferences and decisions, and in turn actions, however, "the

¹⁴⁰ *ibid*, 384.

¹⁴¹ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 75–76.

¹⁴² "Descartes created the conscious self by strictly separating consciousness from the world of experience." See, *ibid*, 77.

¹⁴³ *ibid*, 79.

¹⁴⁴ Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", 174–75.

producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning”¹⁴⁵.

Although post-modern scholars are skeptical about ‘objective accounts’ of human involved events and regard identity ‘as a collective delusion’, there are few similarities between post-modernists and constructivists that both ‘tend to treat self as an unproblematic primitive term’ and place *self* prior to its interests/goals with the belief that knowing/identifying *self* comes before deciding –a type of positioning that makes *self* ‘an unexamined primitive term’ which act on its preferences and interests¹⁴⁶.

Constructivist view underlines the discursive power (ideas, knowledge, language, culture) other than material one (military or economic or both) in understanding world affairs thoroughly. Thus identities and interests are inextricably linked together and not reducible to one another, however, identities can be prior to interests since no actor can make decisions without knowing itself at first. As Wendt articulates, “[i]dentities refer to who or what actors *are*. They designate social kinds or states of being. Interests refer to what actors *want*. They designate motivations that help explain behavior”¹⁴⁷.

On epistemology, on the other hand, Wendt introduces two empirical issues. First one is “to what extent are state identities and interests constructed by domestic vs. systemic structures?”¹⁴⁸. The domestic path leads to the answer that state identities and interests are exogenous to the international system whereas the latter reaches the opposite. The second one is “to what extent are state identities and interests constant?”¹⁴⁹. Although rationalism, unlike constructivism, falls short of analyzing endogenous preferences and identities are constructed not by but within the international system, Wendt claims that the results of construction process are highly stable. The inference on stability leads Wendt to rationalist camp as it assumes constancy to the extent that it is empirically warranted. In other words, while he criticizes rationalism as an ontology, adheres it as an epistemology, in his words below¹⁵⁰:

¹⁴⁵ *ibid*, 175. This quotation shall be enlarged with various examples one of which could be the USA’s ideal of bringing democracy to the Middle East and its misconception as waging a war among average citizens in the region. Thus, one’s own identity is structurally constrained by others, and intersubjective context assigns eventual meaning.

¹⁴⁶ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 75.

¹⁴⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 231.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid*, 37.

¹⁴⁹ *ibid*, 38.

¹⁵⁰ *ibid*, 39.

“Given my idealist ontological commitments, therefore, one might think that I should be firmly on the post-positivist side of this divide, talking about discourse and interpretation rather than hypothesis testing and objective reality. Yet, in fact, when it comes to the epistemology of social inquiry I am a strong believer in science –a pluralistic science to be sure, in which there is a significant role for *Understanding*, but science just the same. I am a *positivist*”.

As he argues an idealist ontology does not require a post-positivist epistemology, thus, there is a hope for reconciling so-called incompatible ontological and epistemological standpoints by which he aspires to create a *via media*. Constructivism should be taken narrowly as an ontology, as he clears, not broadly as an epistemology¹⁵¹.

In respect of identities, Wendt asserts their peculiarity that roots in both subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, as well as *self*- and *other*- understandings. Therefore, two kinds of ideas, those constituted by the *self* and those constituted by the *other*, shape identities. So, it is pertinent to mention that an identity is constructed by both external and internal contexts¹⁵².

Drawing on George Herbert Mead’s dichotomy between *I* and *Me*,¹⁵³ Wendt suggests four types¹⁵⁴ of identity:¹⁵⁵ personal or corporate identity, ‘type’¹⁵⁶ identity, role identity, and collective identity¹⁵⁷. The first one presents a material base for the other types of identity, and individuals (as a personal identity) or states (as a corporate identity) can only have one such. This type of identity presupposes its entities’ *consciousness* and *memory of self* that are indispensable in forming a collective form of identity. It also has an ‘auto-genetic’ feature and is ‘constitutionally exogenous to Otherness’¹⁵⁸:

“As postmodernists have emphasized, constituting an actor as a physically distinct being depends on creating and maintaining boundaries between Self and Other, and to that extent even personal and corporate identities presuppose *difference*”.

Although Wendt overlooks it, awareness and the ability to make categorizations as well as comparisons, without whom no identification of difference will be available,

¹⁵¹ *ibid*, 41.

¹⁵² *ibid*, 222.

¹⁵³ ‘I’ is related to *inner self* in other words it is the *ego* aspect of an individual whereas ‘me’ is the outer aspect or *social self* that is to say what is learned in interaction with the environment and the others/society.

¹⁵⁴ His earlier reviews on identities also involves four types but with some differences about their labels, namely personal or corporate identities, social identities, state identities, and collective identities. See, Wendt, “Identity Formation and the International State.”

¹⁵⁵ Wendt clearly states that the book is not about state identity formation, but to the extent that it is related to culture, he develops identity conceptions on pages 43, 130, 317. See, Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

¹⁵⁶ Wendt, as states, borrowed the term from Jim Fearon.

¹⁵⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 198.

¹⁵⁸ *ibid*, 225.

should be taken for granted. Since it is entirely endogenous to individual, this is the only type that might be taken as given, such as one's gender or nationality (read place of birth).

Type identity, the second type, is a generic term that encompasses any sort of identical characteristic or characteristics with social content or social meaning, such as language, knowledge, opinion or even being a teenager, a member of a political party, and heterosexual as Fearon exemplifies. Unlike personal or corporate identity, an individual may have several type identities at once, and their social content should be restricted by formal or semi-formal "membership rules that define what counts as a type identity and orients the behavior of Others toward it"¹⁵⁹. Wendt takes the example of sexuality (sexual identity) a step further and adapts it to homosexuality to show how these rules are bounded historically and/or culturally. Following his words: "There have always been people who had sex with other members of the same sex, for example, but they only became *homosexuals*, with its attendant social consequences, in the nineteenth century"¹⁶⁰.

Although being homosexual need not to be named or recognized by *others*, so to say it is *intrinsic to the individual* itself at base, yet still, membership rules which grant an individual with a certain social type entail involvement of *others*, at least during the process of their constitution. Hence, one can only become a homosexual when such a category emerges as a source of identity, and society in which the person resides assigns a specific category to this type of conduct.

Role identity, the third one in Wendt's alignment, furthers the degree of involvement of *others* because it engages a conceptual position that is *extrinsic* to the individual. To clarify the difference between an intrinsic and an extrinsic position, one might compare the examples of being a mother with being a teacher. In the first situation if a woman gives birth to a child she becomes a mother needless of any recognition by *others* as it is entirely pre-social whereas the latter necessitates either recognition by or *counter-identity* of *others* (being student, for the given example), as it is totally

¹⁵⁹ *ibid*, 226.

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*, 226.

social. Role identities, therefore “exist *only* in relation to Others”¹⁶¹ and “the degree of interdependence or *intimacy* between Self and Other” sets the most of roles¹⁶²:

“When intimacy is high, as in Arab-Israeli conflict, role identities might not be just a matter of choice that can be easily discarded, but positions forced on actors by the representations of significant Others. In this situation even if a state wants to abandon a role it may be unable to do so because the Other resists out of a desire to maintain *its* identity”.

The last one, collective identity¹⁶³ is the combination of the second and third types, and ends up with *identification* which is a cognitive process wherein collectivity and collaboration involved, and the *self-other* division blurred and merged in a socially constituted *we* (as in general, or much specifically ‘me’ as in Mead’s). Similar to ‘type’ and ‘role’ identities, there might be multiple collective identities simultaneously attributed to the same individual or actor but come into play in a logical order. In other words, they are issue-based, and it’s the contextual situation that selects and imposes the right one at the right time. The formation process might hardly be defined as fixed, yet, shared narratives, deriving from collective understandings, play a key role in depicting the endless picture of the *self* and *other*. Thus collective identity formation entails domestic determinants.

For Wendt, identities are foundational, thereby “whether or not the structure of a state system is anarchic is intimately tied to the distribution of state identities”¹⁶⁴. Accordingly, since structures would not exist without agents, identities constitute the state-systems as anarchic (as oft-cited) when member states embody juridical independence and governance. Therefore, all –hegemon, balancer, liberal, communist, revisionist, and so on– are the attributions of state-identities. Hence his famous quote “Anarchy is what states make of it” should be understood as a focus on the difference between an anarchy of friends and an anarchy of enemies. How the state approaches the other actors in the international system is linked to its own identity perceptions and the kind of self and other conceptions also determine the kind of relations in the system.

¹⁶¹ *ibid*, 227.

¹⁶² *ibid*, 228.

¹⁶³ It is also named as Social Identity in the Social Identity Theory. For a counter assesment of Wendt’s, with a neo-realist standpoint, See, Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity”, *International Organization*, v. 49, no. 2 (1995): 229–52.

¹⁶⁴ Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics”, 47. It is a modified version of the author’s another article titled “Collective Identity Formation and the International State” which published in American Political Science Review in June 1994.

2.6. Interpretive Discourse Analysis in Comparative Perspective

Discourse might simply be defined as an exchange of shared meanings between parties. In this sense, whether a discourse might begin depends on the common rules and norms that are peculiar to those parties. A strong set of shared socio-cultural understandings will serve as a basis for meaningful discourse. The higher the degree of commonality in between the parties, the lesser the communication will be open to misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

According to Milliken, discourse studies are “criticized as bad science, because of [their] lack of testable theories or empirical analyses, and instead, as a dangerous science, seductive but ‘prolix and self-indulgent’”¹⁶⁵. Discourse analysis has become a widely employed method especially in qualitative studies, dealing to reveal the meaning concealed in speeches. As the term discourse is used and defined in several distinct ways because of its abstract features, there is a variety of discourse analyses that some are supplied with charts and tables whereas others with interpretation and elucidation. Since the 20th century, discourse (or within a strict view; a conversation or discussion between two or more parties) –as a newly discovered infinite source for the research– has been analyzed by different disciplines. Although diverse ways of discourse analysis have been done for more than a century yet there has been no particular way of doing it in relation to fields of study, let alone a standard version.

In the field of IR studies, three phases might be mentioned of discourse analysis considering the range of scholars employ it: poststructuralists with their post-positivist epistemology, and constructivists (of all versions) with their positivist and post-positivist epistemology, and any scholars (who do not directly belong to a camp of thought), respectively. Such recognition ended up with a broad spectrum of application, ranging from qualitative to quantitative approaches where it was considered “as part of a wider mixed-methodological toolkit”¹⁶⁶ to conduct research. The second camp (a few exceptions aside) which this study also belongs to, follows an interpretive path rather than a critical one in that to display the efficacy of the ideational factors in building meaning and shaping a conceptual map on the national or international level, needless to say, missing the historical authenticity, receptivity,

¹⁶⁵ Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”, *European Journal of International Relations*, v. 5, no. 225 (1999): 227.

¹⁶⁶ Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Bahar Rumelili, “Discourse Analysis: Strengths and Shortcomings”, 286.

and influence of the narration. Matheson, while criticizing critical path¹⁶⁷ argues that it is at most accused of “misreading or over-reading its object of study in terms of the analyst’s own politics”¹⁶⁸ since ‘external perspectives’ are inevitably reflected to the language material investigated. In his opinion, similar to the situation that was faced by Marxist¹⁶⁹ sociology, this type of study is ‘guilty of not listening’ which is visible in ‘its emphasis on critique rather than understanding’¹⁷⁰. Following his words¹⁷¹:

“While I would not want to critique the political goals of this school of research, I make two specific criticisms. First, this approach, in looking for evidence of imbalances of power, is at risk of missing other aspects of the context of language use. Second, the approach’s root in the functional linguistics of Halliday exacerbates that neglect of how meaning arises in local contexts, and indeed leaves the social or political theory at times dissociated from the analysis of language use. As a result, assumptions about how society works may not be revised in the analysis”.

The interpretive approach mostly concentrates on shared meaning and common effects of the verbal and/or visual representations¹⁷² embedded in codes (messages). Therefore, the level of analysis should not be limited to the language (or lexis), instead, words and accompanying images (be they signs, photographs, or else) should be analyzed concomitantly, for we read both words and images, such as the traffic signs.

¹⁶⁷ Although Critical Discourse Analysis is usually taken as a method for discourse analysis by most of its supporters there also others who criticize this approach. Teun A. Van Dijk, for example, states that it is not a method, “but rather a critical perspective, position or attitude within the discipline of multidisciplinary Discourse Studies”. Since it is not a method but rather a perspective there are several different methods borrowed from other disciplines to study discourse critically. “The critical approach of CDS [Critical Discourse Studies] characterizes scholars rather than their methods: CDS scholars are socio-politically committed to social equality and justice”. According to this opinion, these scholars “are typically interested in the way discourse (re)produces social domination, that is the power abuse of one group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse”. See, Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse, Cognition, Society”, *The Discourse Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis*, ed. Johannes Angermüller, Dominique Maingueneau, Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014): 389.

¹⁶⁸ Donald Matheson, “Critiquing the Critical: A Reflection on Critical Discourse Analysis”, University of Canterbury Research Repository, (2008), 4 https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10092/2669/12611999_matheson-CDA-finalproof.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. [03.04.2019].

¹⁶⁹ Critical Discourse Analysis heavily draws upon the textual analysis of the Marxist critical linguistics school that emerged at the University of East Anglia and was embodied especially by Roger Fowler. For a brief and fruitful history of this school, See, Michael Billig, “The Language of Critical Discourse Analysis: The Case of Nominalization”, *Discourse & Society*, v. 19, no. 6 (2008): 783–800.

¹⁷⁰ Matheson, “Critiquing the Critical: A Reflection on Critical Discourse Analysis”, 8.

¹⁷¹ *ibid*, 5.

¹⁷² According to Hall “[r]epresentation means using language to say something meaningful about, or to represent, the world meaningfully, to other people”. That is to say it “is the production of the meaning of the concepts in our minds through language. It is the link between concepts and language which enables us to refer to either the ‘real’ world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary worlds of fictional objects, people and events”. See, respectively, Stuart Hall, “The Work of Representation”, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, ed. Stuart Hall, 8th ed. (London: SAGE Publications, 2003): 15, 17.

Generally speaking, the approaches to discourse studies vary based on some schools that actually somehow mingled with each other. The first name that should be noted is Ludwig Wittgenstein with his concept of the language-game philosophy where he argues the discourse is a context-based utterance (even a word or a sentence) in which meaning is conveyed according to the 'rule' of the 'game'. The second name is John Langshaw Austin with his speech act theory where he maintained that discourse is a product of individual discursive practices linked to a context of social rules and norms. Third name is surely Foucault with his Order of Things where he claims that the discursive practices determine what can or cannot be said about a particular topic¹⁷³.

The interpretive investigation is mainly employed under two (macro and micro) levels of analysis. A broader aspect of discourse analysis is carried out by macro-level inspection that involves context-based content whereas a narrow aspect is engaged micro-level of analysis that is solely based on word-units. In other words, in the first level analysis, which this study also utilized, the discourse (not limited to words) that covers a wide range of representations ranking from a fixed phrase, such as stereotypes or idioms, to a full sentence is examined within a particular context to detect othering. While doing so macro-level analysis interestingly (being opposite to its name) employs a more meticulous process than micro-level analysis since it requires different functions such as reading thoroughly, reading between the lines, reading restricted to the topic, the scopos (aim) of the utterance, etc.

Parliamentary speeches, which bear significant differences from written materials and require discourse analysis (not textual analysis), can involve three phases of transmitting messages. On the primary level, the MPs address the limited audience and channel their messages to all those present at the time of the given speech in the parliament. On the second and third levels, via the mass media, the ideas and opinions of the MPs are conveyed to national and international circles, respectively. Therefore, parliamentary speeches and (spontaneous) debates do not necessarily appeal to neither

¹⁷³ Foucault's theory of discourse involves mainly three points: Firstly, it has to be born in mind that "[a] discourse can be produced by many individuals in different institutional settings (like families, prisons, hospitals and asylums)". That is to say the coherence of the discourse linked neither to its locus nor to its speaker. Secondly, "[d]iscourses are not closed systems" and mingled with other previous sets of discourses to form "its own network of meanings". And lastly, "[t]he statements within a discursive formation need not all be the same" which means "the relationships and differences between them must be regular and systematic, not random". See, Stuart Hall, "The West and The Rest: Discourse and Power", *Formations of Modernity*, ed. Stuart Hall, Bram Gieben, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995): 292.

the given country's parliamentarians nor their citizens. In the case of Greek-Turkish parliamentary debates, wary eyes can quickly discern similarities in both parliaments, where common statements flow one after another, or explanations and counterclaims appear, like in response to talks from a previous session of the other side of Aegean. In chapters four, five, and six, where the selected discourse topics (Imia/Kardak, Öcalan/PKK, and the Helsinki Summit, respectively) appear, the Turkish and Greek political discourses studied with the tendency to reveal the hermeneutic aspects of the parliamentary speeches via applying macro-level analysis.



3. NATIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION IN GREECE AND TURKEY

Prolonged interaction of Byzantine-Ottoman social structures enables and provides a vast number of representations of the *self* and *other* nexus for the modern nation-states –Greece and Turkey. The very repository of representations, most of which are stored in myths and stereotypes or by state-institutions, are utilized in (re)constructing meanings, beliefs, and ideas, dealing with political and cultural issues. As Martin O. Heisler puts it; “[t]he current politics of the past deals with history, engages memory, and may invoke aspects of identity, but, in fact, it is *a practical matter that unfolds in the present*”¹⁷⁴.

Although identities truly are unstable, they are not that much malleable that can undergo an irreversible transformation within a single day. Since identities are shaped throughout centuries and otherness, enmity, and hatred are sticky concepts that are molded deep in identity perceptions, it would take a long time to notice an identity alteration that marks a permanent change. One of the indicators for the change might be a shift or a clash in the act that overarches far beyond the expected projections and intentions. Profound changes, for Anthony D. Smith, particularly occur in due course of wars and protracted conflicts, “exile and enslavement, the influx of immigrants and religious conversion”¹⁷⁵. Transferred to the context of Turkey and Greece, in particular, traumatic events may have a deep impact on identity such as Greek independence, Turkish War of Independence or the population exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities. As is the subject matter of the thesis, Greece’s membership to the EU and more importantly Turkey’s candidacy and start of accession process to the EU may also exert a defining and changing influence on identity formation.

The conflict-prone relationship between Turkey and Greece stems at most from their antagonistic past wherein they have obtained “their national identities by fighting

¹⁷⁴ Martin O. Heisler, “Challenged Histories and Collective Self-Concepts: Politics in History and Time”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, v. 617 (2008): 201. Italics in original.

¹⁷⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 36.

against, and interacting with, each other”¹⁷⁶, and which has long been under amendment and construction in accordance with their conjectural interests. To this end, citizens of any age have been educated at every level to maintain the state’s continuity and national self-consciousness (strengthened by learning the national determinants: *self* and *other*)¹⁷⁷. In this sense, history, for Greece and Turkey, does not belong to the past because the past lives in the present¹⁷⁸ and references to history form an important part and basis for present political debates.

As also claimed by Kratochwil, the engagement with history is not about ‘distilling some *lessons*’ or about encountering ‘historical *facts*’ from it, rather, “it is through historical reflection that we become aware of the ‘dialectic of choice’ in which from the present the past is recollected and joined with the future by means of a political *project*”¹⁷⁹.

In the case of Greece, Turkey’s image –weaved with stereotyped memories and narratives– reminds the years of *subjugation and oppression* under the Ottoman rule, therefore, modern Turkey is also characteristically viewed as *an aggressor state* that cannot be trusted to be a reliable partner and secure neighbor. This image conveniently masks Greece’s interest-oriented approach since the disagreements between the two countries over the Aegean and about Cyprus can be evaluated as a clash of interests

¹⁷⁶ Mustafa Aydın, “Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities”, *Turkish Greek Relations The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, ed. Mustafa Aydın, Kostos Ifantis (London: Routledge, 2004): 23.

¹⁷⁷ According to Zervas, nations are qualified in creating their other in relation to their self formation. During this formation process, in case there might not be a real enemy, “[n]ations have always found a way to invent an enemy even if that enemy is vaguely defined”. He names this condition as “Bogeyman Syndrome”, and asserts that “[a]n abstract enemy could also be instilled in the minds of a nation. In this case, the nation almost always becomes fearful of the enemy. The ‘other’ or the ‘unknown’ causes a people of a community to wonder what this enemy looks like, acts and what the enemy’s true intentions are”. See, Theodoros Zervas, “Rethinking the Past, Reforming the Present: Reflections on Greek Educational Change and the Future of a Greek Identity”, 10, https://www.academia.edu/9358083/Rethinking_the_Past_Reforming_the_Present_Reflections_on_Greek_Educational_Change_and_the_Future_of_a_Greek_Identity [13.10.2019]; Millas points out that both modern-nation-states placed significant importance on their national education systems, especially during the period of industrialization. Attempts could have been rooted in the need for an educated workforce to employ, but unintentional returns varied from standardization of citizens to development of monotype identities. The nationwide standard free education made it possible for the nation-states to raise generations with similar views and visions. Therefore, industry or more precisely -the weapons industry- could have enabled such regulations and implementations. See, also Herkül Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), 17–25.

¹⁷⁸ Şükrü S. Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), 10.

¹⁷⁹ Kratochwil, *The Puzzles of Politics, Inquiries into the Genesis and Transformation of International Relations*, 182.

where any one-sided approach risks neglecting the legitimate interests of one of the two parties.

For Turkey, in turn, bilateral conflicts with Greece are linked with the defense of the national interests that are embedded in the notion of *self* and *other*. The image of Greece has been closely associated with the Greek *occupation* of Anatolia, rooted in their *eternal irredentism* –Megali Idea– and with their *defeat* during the Turkish War of Independence. In the more recent era, Greece’s *intransigence* with regard to the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Aegean or about the Cyprus question engages Turkey’s reaction to Greece on a case-by-case basis rather than constituting a more general and comprehensive stance of the country in Turkish foreign policy.

No national-*self* can truly be identical to the *other*. Yet, Turkey and Greece share a web of similitudes¹⁸⁰ acquired in due course of their centuries-old intertwining history, and most of their political interactions might be related to how they deal with their resemblance; whether to utilize them as an instrument to unite two nations (condition of rapprochement and reconciliation) or to separate one from other (condition of divergence and conflict). Adopting overlapping state-policies or perceiving joint external threats might activate the first condition. The intriguing relationship between Venizelos and Atatürk might be given as an example to elucidate the point¹⁸¹. Following the Turkish War of Independence and the population exchange¹⁸², which took seven years (three and four years, respectively) and made an indelible impression on both nations; Turkey and Greece managed to start political contacts and signed several agreements of friendship and cooperation which might have been due to distancing themselves as much as possible from the impaired traditional Ottoman

¹⁸⁰ The deceased Turkish prime minister and poet –Bülent Ecevit– wrote a poem while he was in London in 1947, named ‘Turkish-Greek Poem’ which starts with the lines as follows: “You become aware when you feel homesick / That you are brothers with the Greek”. See, Bülent Ecevit, *Turkish Greek Poem*, https://www.siiir.gen.tr/siir/b/bulent_ecevit/turkish_greek_poem.htm. [05.08.2019].

¹⁸¹ This period of cordial relations between Atatürk and Venizelos and a growing rapprochement between the two countries is viewed as ‘astounding’ by Heraclides, that following his words: “Kemal was on record as saying that ‘the Turkish- Greek friendship is eternal’; Venizelos went so far as to suggest Kemal for the Nobel Peace Prize; and more strikingly he even toyed with the idea of a Greek-Turkish confederation”. See, Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 68.

¹⁸² Due to the compulsory population exchange, Turkey experienced a huge loss in qualified work; that during the mid 1920s there were even no plumber and shoemaker left in the country. See, Feroz Ahmad, *Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye*, trans. Sedat Cem Karadeli (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006), 112.

structure so as to achieve a modern contemporary state¹⁸³. Some remarkable attempts were: on 30 August 1928 the PM Venizelos wrote a letter to the PM İnönü right after the Greek general elections, on 25 March¹⁸⁴ 1930 Turkey's Ambassador to Athens (Mehmet Enis Akaygen¹⁸⁵) –for the first time– attended the celebrations for the anniversary of the Greeks' independence from the Ottomans which was held in Messolonghi, on 10 June 1930 Turkey and Greece signed the Ankara Convention¹⁸⁶ (by which an agreement was reached upon the misconduct of the population exchange and the repercussions of the Lausanne Treaty), on 27 October 1930 Venizelos made a state visit to Ankara and during his trip (on 30 October 1930) three agreements were

¹⁸³ Other possibilities might be the strained relations between the European states; or the global economic slowdown.

¹⁸⁴ According to Grigoriadis, “While the outbreak of the revolution in the Peloponnese appeared rather decentralized and disorganized, Greek history books have presented a completely different picture. According to the official narrative, the revolution officially began on March 25, when the Bishop of Old Patras Germanos summoned all the leading revolutionaries in the monastery of Agia Lavra near Kalavryta. [...] Yet contemporary historic accounts confirm that such a meeting never happened”. Grigoriadis asserts that this perfect match originated in the Christian calendar. “On March 25 Christianity celebrates the Annunciation of Virgin Mary. According to the Christian tradition, Archangel Gabriel visited Virgin Mary and announced to her that she would conceive a son, and that son would be Jesus, the son of God. As Virgin Mary received the good news about her immaculate conception and bearing the Son of God, the Greek national narrative built a myth of ‘national annunciation’. The Greek nation –or patrie in its female reincarnation– received the good news about its liberation on the same day. The Patrie is juxtaposed with Virgin Mary, while Greek Nationalists undertook the role of Gabriel who communicated the good news”. See, Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, *Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism: A “Sacred Synthesis”* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 31–32; Countless examples can be found even in the current history textbooks that offer ample attestation of Grigoriadis’s this opinion. A clear shift is observable that in time attributions of national and religious aspects were replaced with each other, in tandem with the common spirit of the nation. For example, all levels of history textbooks involve references to ‘the Sacred Band’ (Ἱερός Λόχος, Ἱερολογίτες) instead of a ‘national’ one while narrating the so-called ‘Greek national movement’. See, respectively, Dionysios Aktypis et al., *Sta Neotera Chronia: Istoría St’ Dimotikou (In Modern Times: Grade 6 History)* (Athens: Organismos Ekdoseos Didaktikon Vivlion, 2009), 93,95; Evangelia Louvi and Dimitrios Chr. Xifaras, *G’ Gymnasiou - Neoteri Kai Synchróni Istoría. (Modern and Contemporary History: Grade 9)* (Athens: Organismos Ekdoseos Didaktikon Vivlion, 2009), 29, 36; Ioannis Koliopoulos et al., *G’ Taxi Genikou Lykeiou - Istoría Tou Neoterou Kai Tou Synchrónou Kosmou / History of Modern and Contemporary World: 3rd Grade High School* (Athens: Organismos Ekdoseos Didaktikon Vivlion, 2009), 21; In the 6th-grade textbook, the Patriarchate excommunicated Alexandros Ypsilantis and his movement for the fear of retaliation against the Greeks by the Turks, and in the 9th-grade textbook, it refused the Greek movement with the purpose of not to lose its power over the community or in state affairs but to save the Greek population. In the 12th-grade history textbook, the attribution of Apostles to members of Filiki Eteria, with the meaning of pioneering missionaries of the nation who caused the revolutionary outbreaks. See, respectively, Aktypis et al., *Sta Neotera Chronia: Istoría St’ Dimotikou (In Modern Times: Grade 6 History)*, 93; Louvi and Xifaras, *G’ Gymnasiou - Neoteri Kai Synchróni Istoría. (Modern and Contemporary History: Grade 9)*, 23; Koliopoulos et al., *G’ Taxi Genikou Lykeiou - Istoría Tou Neoterou Kai Tou Synchrónou Kosmou / History of Modern and Contemporary World: 3rd Grade High School*, 17.

¹⁸⁵ For a fruitful study on the mentioned period and the political developments, see, Enis Tulça, *Atatürk, Venizelos ve Bir Diplomat Enis Bey*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Simurg Yayınları, 2015).

¹⁸⁶ For the original Greek letter and its translation into Turkish, see, Damla Demiröz, “Megali İdea’dan Ankara Antlaşması’na (1930) Eleftherios Venizelos”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, no. 35–36 (November 2005): 291–312.

signed (including ‘Friendship, Neutrality, Compromise and Arbitration Agreement’, ‘Protocol on the Limitation of Naval Forces’, and ‘Residence Commerce and Navigation Agreement’), on 5 October 1931 PM İnönü and the FM Tevfik Rüştü Aras paid a return visit to Athens, on 14 September 1933 the PM İnönü and the new PM Panagis Tsaldaris signed the Greco-Turkish Entente Cordiale reaching its peak of their mutual friendship and sincerity that in 1934 Venizelos nominated Atatürk for the Nobel Peace Prize¹⁸⁷. Subsequent to the series of mutual agreements and protocols their bilateral relations were flourished and improved rapidly; in consequence, initiated the Balkan Pact between Greece, Turkey, Romania, and Yugoslavia, on 9 February 1934¹⁸⁸.

Another example of rapprochement could be the period between the Cold War years and the 70s’ détente¹⁸⁹. The existence of the Communist Soviet Union as an external *threat*, and of the NATO as an external encouragement which served as a *safe harbor for liberal democracies* could have made them move towards each other without being stuck in their historical entanglements. Confidence-building measures can also be referred to as initiatives of peace and tranquility and signs of rapprochement, if only they had not been taken on the basis of political and strategic calculations, unfortunately, all those started were ended up with failure and setback, thus led parties into disappointment.

Needless to say, the relations were characterized by disagreement and conflict more than cooperation and convergence. Underneath the conflict-ridden nature of the relations, one can discern the influence of culture and history as embedded in the respective national identity configurations. There were also some recent significant events that were particularly effective in determining the route of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, which led to a political gridlock rather than a political flourish; first of which might truly be the İstanbul riots against the Greek minority on 6-7 September

¹⁸⁷ For the original Greek letter and its translations See, Elefterios Kyriakou Venizelos, “Nomination Letter by Eleftherios K. Venizelos for the Conferral of the Nobel Peace Prize upon Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ataturk)”, 12 January 1934, <https://greekworldmedia.com/2017/03/19/nomination-letter-by-eleftherios-k-venizelos-for-the-conferral-of-the-nobel-peace-prize-upon-mustafa-kemal-pasha-ataturk/>. [20.05.2018].

¹⁸⁸ Melek Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler (1923-1939: Görelî Özerklik-1)”, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919-1980)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 13th ed., v. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008): 344–53.

¹⁸⁹ Previous to this period, it has to be noted that Mussolini of Italy and his ‘notion of the Mediterranean as an Italian sea (mare nostrum)’ functioned as another trigger for another moment of reconciliation. See, Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*, 68.

1955. According to Melek Fırat, it is a mutual rule of traditional Greek-Turkish relations that the government policies on their relevant minorities (the Turkish minority in Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey) have always been adopted and carried out in tandem with their bilateral relations. Similarly, the relationship between the Cyprus conflict of Turkish-Greek relations and the ‘plot’¹⁹⁰ against the Greek minority in Turkey followed this mutual traditional rule. The September events sparked with the news that ‘Atatürk’s house was bombed in Thessaloniki’, and within 48 hours, approximately thousands of Greek minority properties were ransacked by hundreds of Turkish looters¹⁹¹ –a bitter blow which left the Greek minority of Turkey pecuniary, emotional, and political wrecks¹⁹².

As to the more concrete nature of the current disagreements, one can note the existence of a conflict of interests, sovereignty, and sharing of resources in the joint neighborhood of the two countries: Territorial waters, continental shelf¹⁹³,

¹⁹⁰ According to the Head of Special Warfare Department of the Turkish Army –Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu– it was a perfectly planned, perfectly executed special warfare operation that reached its aim. See, “‘6-7 Eylül Muhteşemdi’ Diyen Yirmibeşoğlu Öldü,” *Cumhuriyet*, 3 January 2016, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/457938/_6-7_Eylul_muhteşemdi_diyen_Yirmibesoglu_oldu.html [23.08.2019]; “‘Karakutu’ Yine Ağzından Kaçırıldı,” *NTV*, 23 September 2010, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/karakutu-yine-agzindan-kacirdi,3Q5dK4I350OStXhyyXNcJg> [21.08.2019]; Tolga Korkut, “Istanbul Riots 1955: What Happened on 6-7 September?”, *Bianet*, 8 September 2009, <https://bianet.org/english/minorities/116914-what-happened-on-6-7-september>. [21.08.2019].

¹⁹¹ For striking details about the event and the looters such as “The assaults were carried out by organised units consisting of twenty to thirty people who can be subdivided into provocateurs, leaders, and destroyers. In many cases the provocateurs carried Turkish flags, or busts and photos of Atatürk and Celal Bayar. They also distributed KTC badges and rosettes and appealed to people to identify their homes, shops and cars with Turkish flags” See, Dilek Güven, “Riots against the Non-Muslims of Turkey: 6/7 September 1955 in the Context of Demographic Engineering”, *European Journal of Turkish Studies* (December 2011): 4.

¹⁹² Although the perpetrators of this horrific incidence have not been found yet several were said to organize or get involved in the riots. For example, the then PM Adnan Menderes of the Democrat Party blamed the communists of Turkey for committing this crime, whereas the then Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was found guilty of carrying out this political plot by the Yassıada Courts (as was declared he was responsible for instigating a student of western trace who was allegedly also working for the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey to plant a bomb at the house where Atatürk was born in Thessaloniki and conducting the following provocation in İstanbul). See, Melek Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler (1945-1960: Batı Bloku Ekseninde Türkiye-1)”, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919-1980)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 13th ed., v. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008): 601; See also, Mete Tunçay, “Siyasal Tarih (1950-1960)”, *Türkiye Tarihi 4 - Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, ed. Sina Akşin, v. 4 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989): 184.

¹⁹³ In 1959, Greece for the first time granted oil exploration licenses in its Official Gazette without any Turkish objections. In 1972 when a possibility of the petroleum extraction surfaced near the Thasos island, Turkey took action in retaliation and granted license to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation for an area covering the back sides of the nearby Greek islands to the Turkish coasts and declared that the Greek islands close to her coastal (such as Samothrace, Limnos, Agios Efstratios, Mytilene/Lesbos, Chios, Psara, and Antipsara) could not have their own continental shelves, but only territorial waters. This conflict also remained unsolved between the two countries.

demilitarization of the Aegean islands¹⁹⁴, the national airspace delimitation¹⁹⁵, the Cyprus question, and others¹⁹⁶. Among all, especially the first one raised many concerns that also prompted the subsequent others. In a friendly atmosphere between the Greeks and Turks, on 17 September 1936, probably triggered by an increased threat perception from the Mussolini's Italy, the 4th of August Regime of Greece (or as commonly cited 'the Metaxas dictatorship') passed a decree and unilaterally extended its territorial sea from 3 to 6 nautical miles, and Turkey raised no objections¹⁹⁷. With the eruption of the Cyprus concerns, on 15 May 1964, Turkey issued a decree delimiting its territorial waters and declared that it would be based on the principle of reciprocity. Accordingly, in the Black Sea, the Turkish territorial sea extended to 12 nautical miles, considering the limitations of Bulgaria and Romania, whereas, in the Aegean Sea, it reached to 6 nautical miles corresponding to Greece's territorial waters at the time. Following the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (entered into force in 1994), Greece declared that she has the right to extend her territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. Turkey did not become a party to the UNCLOS III and the Turkish Grand National Assembly declared *casus belli* against possible Greek expansion on 8th June 1995. Since then it remained as one of the protracted conflicts between the two countries, which can be seen as the root cause of the problems in the Aegean¹⁹⁸.

The 2002 exploratory dialogue, on the other hand, between the FM's of Greece's George Papandreou and Turkey's İsmail Cem was started to focus on their innate differences of the *self/other* nexus. In effect, as the process was triggered and

¹⁹⁴ The first fortification of the Greek islands (Rhodes and Kos) took place in 1964, which in return, accompanied by a Turkish diplomatic note on 29 June 1964. Following the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, Greece accelerated arming the Greek islands close to the Turkish coast. It remained as another stalemated issue between the parties.

¹⁹⁵ In 1931, during the period of rapprochement, Greece, probably holding concerns about the Mussolini's Italy, declared that she expanded her sovereignty above the Aegean Sea to 10 nautical miles that would cause a deadlock later because of a mismatch between the width of the territorial sea (6 nm) and the airspace (10 nm) over it.

¹⁹⁶ Such as Flight International Region (FIR), issued related to NATO command and control, sovereignty issues of the islets and rocks that have not mentioned in any agreement or protocol, etc. For all the problematic areas and issues, see, Fuat Aksu, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri* (Ankara: SAEMK, 2001), 27–112.

¹⁹⁷ Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler (1923-1939: Görelî Özerklik-1)": 356.

¹⁹⁸ According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, such an extension from 6 to 12 nautical miles "would decrease the ratio of the high seas from almost 50% to 19% and would significantly restrict Turkey's access to the Aegean". Therefore, this Turkish act is considered a 'reaction' to Greece's decision for the unilateral extension. It is also underlined that however "[t]he Greek side have been intentionally portraying this as 'casus belli', a concept forbidden by the UN system, with the aim of playing down the significance of its own parliamentary decision". See, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/questions.en.mfa> [09.01.2020].

facilitated by Turkey's candidacy to the EU and up to this day no tangible achievements were marked neither with the Turkish membership of the EU nor with the attempts that could lead to settlement of the bilateral issues, consequently, the exploratory talks were stifled.

Rather than the actual content of these problems, the thesis' approach is related to the influence of identity perception, the *self* and *other* mechanisms, on how the two countries approach them. i.e. whether they see these problems as very serious and unsolvable existential problems or problems that create a nuisance but which can be lived with. And also how they approach engagement with each other, whether they risk going to war in order to preserve their stance *vis-à-vis* each other or they are open to negotiations and dialogue with the other party. It is the assertion of this thesis that avoiding a clash of interests between the parties or resolution of contentious issues necessitate a shift in perceptions of *self* and *other* between the parties.

Although their threat perceptions are not symmetric and not corresponding to each other (might be of differences in their history, human resources, population, surrounding neighbors, etc.) "*neither lacks examples to cite of the other's perceived intransigence or paranoia*"¹⁹⁹. Since their bilateral relations are traditionally based on conflict or competition rather than cooperation, any action taken to reduce the fear of being attacked by the *other* or to construct good neighborhood could simply be undermined in consequence of populist clout.

As has been the case, overcoming mistrust, prejudice, stereotypes (based on hearsay and misinformation) and achieving the formation of a spirit of cooperation and reconciliation between the two countries would take a long period of time. Both Greece and Turkey have to be resolute and sincere in tackling their disputes and resolving their histo-cultural grievances rather than "running after magical formulas for rapid reconciliation"²⁰⁰. One of the questions that the thesis aims to answer is whether the EU process and Turkey's endeavors for membership to the EU achieved a lasting reconciliation between the two countries.

¹⁹⁹ Aydın, "Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities": 24.

²⁰⁰ *ibid*, 22.

In this chapter, the formations of Greek and Turkish national identities are elucidated separately under independent sections, whereas political developments following the end of the cold war and search for new identities are analyzed under a joint section.

3.1. Construction of Modern-Greek Identity

Although there is no ‘scientific definition of the nation’ –not as an *ideology* but as a *phenomenon* (that is to say recognized as an existing reality)– Benedict Anderson offers an anthropological context of understanding it. Following his words: “[I]t is an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”²⁰¹. It is limited because all nations have boundaries whereby they separate themselves from the *others*, and it is sovereign because within the spirit of Enlightenment and Revolution “the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm”²⁰² was destroyed.

Drawing on Anderson’s claim, Millas argues that the popular concept of nation is *flawed*. Since it is *imagined*, no members know exactly each other, as well as, their fellow-members, but have their ‘communion image’ stored in their minds, thus even the new-emerging nations could have the opportunity to imagine themselves antique. Belonging to ancient times is the *sine qua non* of all nations, and these roots need not be real or provable. Millas concludes that the ‘uninterrupted nation’ argument extending from Ancient to Modern Greece and the debates on whether Modern Greeks are the legatees of Ancient Greeks by kinship were both emerged by the same *flawed* discourse of nation²⁰³.

This futile attempt of proving or refuting the unbroken lineage of the Greek nation became the most exhausting scientific journey of the establishing years of the Greek Kingdom. In addition to the kinship arguments, another moot point that aroused

²⁰¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 3rd, Revised ed. (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 6.

²⁰² *ibid.*, 7.

²⁰³ Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 25; In a similar vein, Koliopoulos and Veremis argue that the logic of the nationalization applied to a nation’s past, by claiming to be the only settlers in the region, is harmful to international society. Following their words: “A nation’s ‘historic right’ to the past is the product of a national approach to that past -a process which involves the use of ‘ethnic truth’ and, as such, rights such as be claimed by all nations that have shared the lands associated with it. In this sense, the nineteenth-century preoccupation to put forward the oldest possible historic right to land cannot be of any use in an international community which recognizes effective possession as the most conclusive argument in any claim”. See, John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present* (London: Hurst & Company, London, 2002), 262.

intense sentiments of conservatives and modernists was determining the official language of the nation. The first circle espoused the ancient language (of Attic dialect) while the second advocated the demotic Greek of the time. Yet in time, these linguistic conflicts between parties would be eased, and paradoxically, as pointed out also by Clogg, language would become the less important part of being Greek. Since Greeks were a nation of diaspora, whose descendants barely spoke Greek, Greekness did have not much relationship with the language, but it was ‘something that a person was born with’ that neither easily be lost nor ‘be acquired by those not of Greek ancestry’²⁰⁴. However, it was not until 1976 that the Greeks obtained their demotic language whereby they had long been speaking with each other, singing their songs, and telling their stories, etc. In other words, the *semi-artificial* Katharevousa language stayed to be the country’s official language as a compromise between the parties involved in harsh arguments over ancient and common (everyday speech) languages. Millas describes the difference between these two as; “in those years, the languages used at schools [Katharevousa] and at homes [Demotic/Dimotiki] were like totally different languages”²⁰⁵.

Actually, there are three spheres of influence clearly observable in the making of modern Greece. The first two mentioned above were stemmed from the ancient heritage and took place in the early phases of the movement, whereas the last one became effective at the end of the 19th century and tightly connected the rings of language, history, and religion of the Greek nation. It was the re-invention of the Byzantine period which was highly mingled with the history of Christianity, especially with the Orthodox Church²⁰⁶. In 326, it was legalized as the official religion by the

²⁰⁴ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5; Koliopoulos and Veremis also question who were called Greeks while displaying the others of the country. The last part of their findings belongs to Turks living in Greece, following their words: “Lastly, were indigenous Muslim Turks as Greek as the rest if they chose to convert to Christianity, as many did to avoid being slaughtered or to keep their lands? Yes and no: Orthodox prelates welcomed such converts, but lay revolutionary leaders were reluctant to consider them as more than opportunists, who would turn against the Greeks as soon as the opportunity arose; only children converted under the age of twelve were thought to be meeting the qualifications of a Greek”. See, John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, 250.

²⁰⁵ Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 36.

²⁰⁶ “The Orthodox tradition developed from the Christianity of the Eastern Roman Empire and was shaped by the pressures, politics and peoples of that geographical area. Since the Eastern capital of the Roman Empire was Byzantium, this style of Christianity is sometimes called Byzantine Christianity”. See, “Eastern Orthodox Church,” *BBC*, 6 November 2008, https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/subdivisions/easternorthodox_1.shtml. [11.09.2019].

Empire Constantine and all the other sorts of religious affairs and practices were proscribed. Language and religion as the constituting parts of the national culture provided the glue to bind the newly establishing state together into a monolithic entity.

In this sense, it has to be noted that countless religious practices and traditions have stayed alive embedded in the Greek identity²⁰⁷. Many examples can be referred to at this point; such as the language at use in the Patriarchate of Konstantinoupoli / İstanbul²⁰⁸. Since 325 Greek has been the language of Christian Orthodox religion; the medium of prayers and religious ceremonies. This strong bond between the Greek language and the Orthodox religion has remained intact without any interruption or alteration²⁰⁹ and saved a potential link between Modern Greece and the Byzantine Empire since the very beginning of the founding years, though unintentionally, via Christmas carols²¹⁰ and hymns²¹¹ that are inherited from the Byzantine period.

The matter was not only about religious factors but also the continuity of Greek history, which eliminated the possibility of disregarding the past of some 12 centuries. Put differently, despite ‘the Enlightenment’s contempt for Byzantium’ and its heritage

²⁰⁷ According to some, religion and religious links and affairs played the greatest part in building the foreign policies of the country. This situation also voiced by Miller, who argues that apart from its benefits over the country’s foreign policy, a national Greek church in the hands of the Greek government had also been very beneficial in preventing possible Ottoman intervention in her “internal affairs through their control of the patriarchate”. Following his words: “the Greek Orthodox Church became a critical tool in the government’s efforts to establish the legitimacy of its claims to further expansion. In 1883 the U.S. minister in Greece observed that the “Hellenic point of view, although plainly contradicted by the facts, is that the population of Eastern Roumelia and Macedonia is entirely Greek, chiefly on the ground that hitherto they have been included in the Greek church [of Constantinople]”. See, James Edward Miller, *The United States & The Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 12.

²⁰⁸ Except having been called Constantinople by some insistent voices, which meant the city of Emperor Constantine (272-337), the city has been called Istanbul, in time, following its take over by Turks -Fatih Sultan Mehmet (or Mohammed as Greeks name him). Despite all those hundreds of years, Greeks continued to call the city Constantinople whereby formulated a policy of reminding the historical roots of the city to the others. At some points in history, changing names of places utilized as a part of establishing and conducting nation-state policies, such was the case with the name dispute over the name of Konstantinoupoli/Istanbul, which was also initiated verbal duels in between some songs' lyrics. See, for example, the lyrics of Paul Whiteman's "Constantinople" and Jimmy Kennedy's "Istanbul not Constantinople".

²⁰⁹ Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 37.

²¹⁰ The one especially chanted by the children strolling around at Christmas nights known as the ‘Kalenta of the New Year’ or ‘Saint Basil coming from Caesarea’ (Αρχιμηνιά κι αρχιχρονιά / Aziz Vasilis Kayseri’den geliyor). For its Greek original and translation into English, See, “Archiminiá Ki Archichroniá”, <https://www.mamalisa.com/?t=es&p=5166>. [01.10.2019].

²¹¹ For example, the one known as ‘Το Τροπάριο της Κασσιανής’ (The Hymn of Kassiani) and chanted on Great Tuesday evenings (at matins on Holy Wednesday) in the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Churches that follow the Byzantine Rite is dated back to the 9th century. For the original of the hymn, See, “Το Τροπάριο Τis Kassianís,” Ορθόδοξος Συναξαριστής, <http://www.saint.gr/5/texts.aspx>. [13.10.2019].

as ‘an aberration in the development of Greek civilization’, and the national revival’s attempts to eradicate the traces of Byzantine from the Greek life, “the problem of establishing the modern Greeks’ historical lineage made it impossible to ignore this phase of the history of the Greek East”²¹².

3.1.1. Influence of the Ancient Greek Heritage

The sensibility of appreciating ancient roots was considered as a ‘practical necessity’ to achieve a modern society with secularized historical consciousness. The traditional Greek mind of ‘biblical lineage’ was replaced by the conception of a ‘distinct nation’ whose ancestors were the founders of ancient Hellenism. According to Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “[t]he transition from religious to secular time and the new sense of historical identity it fostered was obviously the product of influences from contemporary European classicism”²¹³. Therefore, through the insights gained from enlightened Europe, the classical roots of the state were constructed long before the state itself established.

According to Koliopoulos and Veremis, the surprise was not identifying modern Greeks as the offspring of the ancient world (for there were continuities of similarities in between them like the language they talked, etc.) but “turning this assumption of identity into one of the principal features of the national myth on which the modern Greek nation was founded”²¹⁴. In other words, although the ancient Hellas might have been only one of the constituents of the new nation (the others were the Byzantine Empire, Orthodoxy, the Ottoman State, and Europe), it was suggested as the principal part by enlightened Europe because of the popular thought of the era, which espoused the ancient Hellas as the latest peak of human civilizations.

In this period, the Hellenization of the territories and of the inhabitants located on these territories were considered as a part of the nationalization process of the newly established Greek Kingdom to create a much homogenous nation-state, both in abstract and concrete terms²¹⁵. In a hope to find out Hellenic remains, ancient sites had been carefully excavated by the archeologists, following the openings of western

²¹² Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 2013), 77.

²¹³ Kitromilides, 76.

²¹⁴ John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, 242.

²¹⁵ *ibid*, 243–44.

archeological schools across the country. In Koliopoulos and Veremis's words: "The drive to Hellenize the country turned archeology into a major discipline of national importance. Archeology and history considered as a crucial in cultivating awareness of past civilisations and for solving modern problems"²¹⁶.

The Age of Pericles and his Athens including inspiring monuments and especially the temple Parthenon at the Acropolis were a source of emulation in Greeks' choice of Athens, which was designated capital of the Greek Kingdom in 1833 although "in the early 1830s [it was] little more than a dusty village"²¹⁷. As stated by Koliopoulos and Veremis the modern Greek was not re-born but just born with close resemblance to his father who was a well-known ancient intellectual, so what could have been more natural for a Greek in such a situation than giving his son his father's name? During those years, the ancient spirit obsession was reached to an extent that national subjects of the Greek Kingdom named their children ancient Greek names rather than Christian ones. It was such a period that whatever defined as bad was identified with the conservative and predominantly religious Byzantium and its extension –Ottomans²¹⁸.

Ancient roots became a pillar of support for the ideological consolidation of the country where both familiar and unfamiliar customs and traditions to Greek society were unearthed by the Enlightenment, which would somehow inspire the concept of Europeanization that would refashion the link between the Ancient and the Modern Greeks. Throughout the 80s, Greece's restored bonds with the Ancient Period played a crucial role also in her admittance to the European camp, in receiving full membership in the EEC during the second enlargement in 1981. In Clogg's words²¹⁹:

"For instance, Ian Gilmour, at the time minister of state at the Foreign Office, in moving in the House of Commons in 1980 the ratification of Greece's treaty of accession as the tenth member of the then European Economic Community, intoned that Greek entry could be seen as a 'fitting repayment by the Europe of today of the cultural and political debt that we all owe to a Greek heritage almost 3000 years old'. In similar vein, the French president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, arriving in Athens to sign the treaty, declared, amid much acclaim, that France as 'the daughter of classical Greece' should now act as the sister of the modern country".

In Greece, correspondingly, although there were dissenting voices raised especially by two opposition parties at the time –PASOK and KKE–, the ratification done by the

²¹⁶ *ibid*, 244–45.

²¹⁷ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 50.

²¹⁸ John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, 227; Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 28; Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 54.

²¹⁹ Richard Clogg, *Greek to Me: A Memoir of Academic Life* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 236.

three-fifths majority of the parliament. It was the percentage constitutionally adequate, despite the boycott of voting by the ‘ninety-three deputies of PASOK’ and ‘eleven deputies of KKE’²²⁰.

3.1.2. National Independence and the Establishment of Greek Nation-State

Throughout the founding years of Modern Greece, each step was taken with hardships, factions, and fragmentation which left significant marks on the national identity. The Greek national awakening did not take place by way of a systematic effort on the part of Greek political actors; it involved struggles with interior and exterior difficulties. In this vein, similar scenes, which were to reappear for the Turks approximately a century later, were experienced by the Greeks²²¹. Such discernible conflicts²²² were noted mainly in two areas: over struggle for political power and leadership (disagreements between those who contributed to the Greek Revolution) and over the disputed origins of the Greek nation (disagreements between the Greek and non-Greek scholars²²³).

²²⁰ Eleni Panagiotarea, *Greece in the Euro: Economic Delinquency or System Failure?* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2013), 34.

²²¹ Grigoriadis claims that there exist more similarities than differences in the construction of Greek and Turkish national identities. For example, both movements had started up with secularism, but later reached a compromise with their religions. Following his words: “the incorporation of religion into Greek and Turkish national culture followed a parallel track, with a time lag of approximately one century. It was not only Turkish but also Greek nationalism that departed from an inimical position toward religion. Greek and Turkish urban elites perceived religion to be one of the key pillars of the ancient regime they aspired to demolish. Both concealed their views and intentions about religion during the time of nationalist struggle, not wanting to alienate the bulk of their national populations. After independence, as soon as they consolidated their undisputed power, the assault against religion began. While in Turkey this turned into a full-fledged secularization campaign aiming to control and eventually erase religion from the public sphere, in Greece the aim was limited to complete subordination of the church to the nascent nation-state and emphasis on the classical Hellenic heritage against the medieval Romaic. Within a few decades, however, both Greek and Turkish national ideologies had to modify their positions vis-à-vis religion and take a conciliatory approach”. See, Grigoriadis, *Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism: A “Sacred Synthesis”*, 5.

²²² During the Ottoman period, apart from having been practicing the same religion, Greeks were segregated along socio-cultural, socio-economic, and linguistic lines, according to Millas. See, Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 57. This type of multi-layered community structure might have been the main cause of these clashes, for, in the new nation-state, Christianity (the only cement of the Greek society until then) played a minor role, and the European ideals unfamiliar to society played a major role.

²²³ Two prominent non-Greek scholars might epitomize the arguments faced by the Modern Greeks and the advocates of Ancient Greek Civilization. The first name is Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer who asserted a discontinuity theory concerning the racial origins of the Modern Greeks as an outcome of his studies on the Empire of Trebizond with the name –Geschichte des Kaisertums von Trapezunt (1827)– and on the Morea –Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters (1830). The second name was Martin Bernal who argued that important figures like Wilhelm von Humboldt and Barthold Georg Niebuhr played major roles in inventing the ‘Science of Antiquity’. Accordingly, Humboldt contributed to the idealized image of the Germans and Greeks, whereas Niebuhr filled the writing of history with Romanticism and racism. Following Bernal’s words: “After Niebuhr’s death in 1831 it became hard, if not impossible, for ‘sound’ scholars to argue that Egyptians had colonized Greece or played an important role in the formation of Greek civilization”. Stressing the relationship between politics and history underlined that a year after the publication of “Orchomenos und die Minyer” of Karl Otfried

The first instance might be exemplified by the disagreement between the Patriarchate or the Phanariots (the Ottoman-Greek aristocrats and statesmen) and the *freedom fighters*²²⁴. This clash was probably due to the fact that in the Ottoman era the Patriarchate was furnished with more power and privileges compared to its Byzantine period²²⁵. Elçin Macar points out that the Byzantine Emperor had restricted the faculties and permission of the Church only to officiate at the service of ecclesiastical affairs whereas Sultan Mehmet II granted the Patriarch the right to exercise both spiritual and earthly practices²²⁶. Richard Clogg, on the other hand, underlines that in course of time interests of the Church and the State appeared to be alike and in consequence, this close relationship led the former to get addicted to the latter's power²²⁷. As a strategic response to the Greek independence movement –either due not to lose its higher authority or to save rest of the Orthodox subjects from being enmeshed in this difficult struggle– the Patriarchate condemned the Greek Revolution and anathematized and excommunicated the seditionists (including their leader Ypsilanti²²⁸). Moreover, the Patriarch himself “swiftly denounced the ‘evil spirit’ of an upheaval that transgressed God’s will, namely, the sultan’s divinely ordained and imperishable sovereignty”²²⁹. However, such efforts could not save him, authority brought responsibility; having been blamed for the revolts, the Patriarch Gregory V

Müller, in 1821, “the Greek War of Independence broke out and Western Europe was swept by Philhellenism”. His striking views on the ancient history and philosophy caused a protracted controversy among scholars especially of Classics; a good example might be Mary Lefkowitz. See, respectively, Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization - Volume I: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785-1985*, vol. 1 (New Brunswick & New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 282–83; Mary Lefkowitz, *Not Out of Africa: How Afrocentrism Became an Excuse to Teach Myth as History* (New York: BasicBooks, 1996).

²²⁴ As noted by Herkül Millas, the relationship between the Patriarchate and the Kingdom of Greece was disrupted for some thirty years. During the founding years, with regard to Modern Greeks, the first defended the importance of Byzantine and Christianity and the latter advocated the roots of Ancient Greece. See, Herkül Millas, *Geçmişten Bugüne Yunanlılar: Dil, Din ve Kimlikleri*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 166; Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 54-55.

²²⁵ This situation could clearly be followed up in the lines of a 6th-grade history textbook: “The Sultan at the same time recognized the Patriarch as the religious and political leader of all Orthodox origins. The clergy was also assigned to the judiciary, mainly on the issues concerning divorce, inheritance, and others. Sometimes, the Turks also resorted to these ecclesiastical courts because they trusted them more [than theirs]”. See, Aktypis et al., *Sta Neotera Chronia: Istoria St’ Dimotikou (In Modern Times: Grade 6 History)*, 27.

²²⁶ The most significant practice of the Church might have been the right to adjudicate on daily issues of its Christian subjects which even led it to contain a prison available in itself. See, Elçin Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 40.

²²⁷ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 13.

²²⁸ Aktypis et al., *Sta Neotera Chronia: Istoria St’ Dimotikou (In Modern Times: Grade 6 History)*, 93.

²²⁹ Theophilus C. Prousis, “British Embassy Reports on the Greek Uprising in 1821-1822: War of Independence or War of Religion?”, *University of North Florida - History Faculty Publications*, no. 21 (2011): 177.

was executed²³⁰ at the onset of the Greek rebellion in Peloponnesus. This execution had a profound impact that has remained alive²³¹ on the Greek identity, where it piled and intensified emotions of hate and disgust against the Ottomans and in turn Turks. A current example, which provoked a strong reaction from the mass media²³², might be given to show the political repercussions of this situation which still leads parties into misinterpreting each other. The Patriarch Vartholomeos (Bartholomew) expressed his feelings of living in a country of 99% Muslim population, in an interview he gave to CBS that in his words: “we prefer to stay here, even crucified sometimes. Because in the gospel, it is written that it is given to us not only to believe in Christ, but also to suffer for Christ”²³³. In return, the then FM Ahmet Davutoğlu swiftly censured the ‘unfortunate statement’ of the Patriarch that he felt ‘crucified’ or as ‘second class’ living in Turkey, following his words: “We consider the cross analogy as an extremely unfortunate analogy. There has never been and will never be a cross in our history and tradition”²³⁴.

As to the disagreement between the Greek rebels and the Greek Phanariots, although it has to be noted that in March 1821, that the Greek enlightenment in the form of a rebellion was started by a Phanariot –Alexandros Ypsilantis– in Wallachia- Moldavia, for Clogg, they were also “largely identified their interests with the preservation of the integrity of the Empire and few took an active part in the struggle for independence”²³⁵.

Another example of the same type might be the disagreements between the notables (or ‘politicians’) and peasants (or rebels) and their attempts of marginalizing each other with the premise that they deserved more authority and respect in the new state

²³⁰ Until the Greek Revolution, 4 of the Patriarchs of Constantinople were executed, 137 Patriarchs ran the course of their duty until they died. See, footnote 38 in Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, 44.

²³¹ In his memory, the Saint Peter Gate where the Patriarch was hanged was welded shut since 1821. See, Aktypis et al., *Sta Neotera Chronia: Istoria St’ Dimotikou (In Modern Times: Grade 6 History)*, 99.

²³² Engin Ardiç, “Patrik Grigorios’u Nasıl Öldürmüştük?,” *Sabah*, 26 December 2009, https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/ardic/2009/12/26/patrik_grigoriosu_nasil_oldurmustuk [12.09.2019]; “Ankara’da Çarmih Rahatsızlığı,” *T24*, 20 December 2009, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/ankarada-carmih-rahatsizligi,64670> [12.09.2019]; “Davutoğlu’ndan ‘Çarmih’a Sert Tepki,” *Posta*, 20 December 2009, <https://www.posta.com.tr/davutoglundan-carmiha-sert-tepki--12170> [12.09.2019]; “‘Çarmiha Gerilme’yi Zor İzah Edecek,” *Haberler.Com*, 19 December 2009, <https://www.haberler.com/carmiha-gerilme-yi-zor-izah-edecek-haberi/>. [12.09.2019]

²³³ Harry Radcliffe, “Patriarch Bartholomew Feels ‘Crucified,’” *CBSNews*, 17 December 2009, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/patriarch-bartholomew-feels-crucified-17-12-2009/4/>. [05.09.2019].

²³⁴ “Umarım Dili Sürçmüştür,” *Hürriyet*, 20 December 2009, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/umarim-dili-surcmustur-13255727>. [13.09.2019].

²³⁵ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 23.

under construction. Several times the revolutionists immersed in internal strife whereby even some important figures like Panos Kolokotronis²³⁶ or Ioannis Kapodistrias²³⁷ were killed in an ambush in 1824 and 1831, respectively. In addition to the struggles in between the Greek founding leaders, another political resistance was against the Bavarian King Otto who acceded to the Greek throne in 1832 following the London Conference which was held between Britain, Russia, and France to negotiate the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece,²³⁸ in the absence of Greeks who were considered not a party to the treaty. Due to their lack of empathy, King Otto and especially his Bavarian retinue caused irritation and chagrin among the Greek population of the new state. Following Clogg's words: "The regents had little sympathy for the aspirations of those who had actually fought for independence and who felt cheated of the spoils of victory"²³⁹.

Additionally, throughout the nineteenth century, there was a deep-seated anger and bitterness within the aggrieved groups whose members (kleftes and armatoloi²⁴⁰) were

²³⁶ A Member of the Filiki Eteria and the eldest son of Theodoros Kolokotronis who was a kleft (a Christian bandit belonged to an armed mountain gang) and acquired his fame by fighting in Kalamata, Valtetsi, Tripolitsa, Akrokorinthos, Anapli and wealth by stealing and marrying the daughter of a wealthy Peloponnesian family. See, Dimitris Keridis, *Historical Dictionary of Modern Greece* (Lanham, Toronto, Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, 2009), 94-95.

²³⁷ He was born to a distinguished Kerkiran (Corfu) family and studied law and philosophy which brought him a distinguished career as a politician and diplomat. Prior to the Greek Independence, he was serving for the Soviets as a Foreign Minister whereby he acquired necessary experience in statecraft. In 1827, during the Third Greek National Assembly he was elected the Governor (the first head) of Greece and identified as the founder (the architect) of the new state. Soon after he accepted this onerous responsibility the revolutionists immersed in a rift and political strife; particularly of Kapodistria's authoritarian style and derogatory language against the (inside) others. See, Keridis, *Historical Dictionary of Modern Greece*, 27-28; In Clogg's words: "He made no secret of his contempt for the elites of Greek society. He dismissed the primates as 'Christian Turks', the military chieftains as 'robbers', the intelligentsia as 'fools' and the Phanariots as 'children of Satan'. See, Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 46.

²³⁸ During the Greek independence movement and the founding years of the Greek Kingdom, Greek capacity had been grossly underestimated and deemed not worthy of establishing or running a new state and its institutions on its own; as a result, not only the King was exported but also the political parties were constructed in line with those founding powers, like the UK, French, or Russia. These early Greek parties followed policies in line with these countries and nicknamed as English Party, French Party, and Russian Party.

²³⁹ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 50.

²⁴⁰ According to Phillips, "[t]o be a Klepht was, in the popular view, a glory rather than a disgrace; and for whole decades before the war of independence the Klephts were, in the eyes of their countrymen, the defenders of faith and fatherland against the Turk; though, to tell the truth, they plundered Christian and Mussulman with a commendable impartiality". See, W. Alison Phillips, *The War Of Greek Independence: 1821 to 1833* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), 10; In addition to Phillips's opinion about kleftes, according to Clogg, they were causing problem and threat not only to the newly founded Greek kingdom but even "in 1870 April they kidnapped and killed a group of English aristocrats at Dilessi in Boeotia". See, Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 66; Yet for other some, apart from their early position of being brigands who robbed Christians and Muslims, after the break of the Greek Independence War, kleftes and armatoloi changed and became 'a continuous headache for

indignant of the lack of appreciation and recognition of their contribution to the war effort and caused a major threat both socially and politically to the Bavarian reign over the Greek Kingdom. These “[b]rigands, however, had their uses to the government when, at times of crisis in relation with Turkey –and these were numerous– they could be used to stir up trouble across the frontier”²⁴¹.

Regarding the disputes over ethnicity and the origins of the nation, controversial scholarly arguments that whether or not Greeks of today bear an uninterrupted history of national lineage and a direct link of kinship with the Ancient Greeks might be given as an example. The assumption of “the existence of a ‘Greek nation’ since the days of Homer”²⁴² was proposed by Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos,²⁴³ who devoted himself to (re)include the Eastern Orthodoxy in the Greek identity and (re)fill the gap in the continuity of the Greek nation that was caused by another Greek scholar –Adamantios Korais.

Previous to two prominent scholars of the Greek culture and historiography –Spyridon Zambelios²⁴⁴ and Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos²⁴⁵ – Korais asserted that the Greeks of the newly founded Kingdom of Greece were reborn descendants of the Ancient Greeks and had no ties either with Macedonians or the Byzantine Empire, which was allegedly lapsed into the moral and cultural decline of the East –an inappropriate condition for

the Turks’. See, Costas G. Fountzoulas, “The 25th of March, 1821 - Greek Independence Day”, *Hellenic News of America*, 20 February 2016, <https://hellenicnews.com/the-25th-of-march-1821-greek-independence-day-by-dr-costas-g-fountzoulas/>. [01.09.2019].

²⁴¹ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 49.

²⁴² Alexis Heraclides, “The Greek-Turkish Antagonism: The Social Construction of Self and Other”, *Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation: From Europeanization to De-Europeanization*, ed. Alexis Heraclides, Gizem Çakmak Alioğlu (London and New York: Routledge, 2019): 43.

²⁴³ Despite his great efforts in the conceptual and philosophical accomplishment of the Greek movement, Paparrigopoulos was harshly criticized because of his way of interpreting the Greek Revolution. Ioannis Kordatos (1891–1961), for example, who was the founder of Greek Marxist historiography, criticized him (including some other historians as well) for misinterpreting the Revolution, regardless of whether Paparrigopoulos was mistaken erroneously about the historical facts or he misled the public purposefully. Kordatos asserted that the Greek Revolution was mainly originated in the economic concerns and neither because of ‘Christ’s religion’ nor because of ‘freedom’. He argued that without economic unrest, there were no revolutions on earth inspired by the motive of ‘liberty’. See, Ioannis K. Kordatos, *I Koinoniki Simasia Tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos Tou 1821 (The Social Significance of the Greek Revolution of 1821 / Η Κοινωνική Σημασία Της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως Του 1821)* (Athens: Georgiou I. Vasileiou, 1924), 3–4.

²⁴⁴ During the 1850s, having the goal to achieve constructing continuity of the Greek nation’s narrative and culture, Zambelios published both ‘Collection of Greek Folk Songs’ and ‘Byzantine Studies’ where he integrated and construed the Middle Ages as part of the Modern Greek history that in turn led an uninterrupted concept of Greek identity.

²⁴⁵ In his masterpiece ‘History of the Hellenic Nation’ (1853), Paparrigopoulos, drawing on Zambelios’s conceptualization of the uninterrupted Greek culture, claimed the concept of an uninterrupted Greek history wherein he incorporated the Macedonian, Christian, medieval and modern ages which correspond to more than 3000 years of Hellenism.

the ancestors of the West²⁴⁶. Korais was one of the formidable figures of the Greek Enlightenment like Rigas Velestinlis. He was a polyglot of nine languages and credited with laying the foundations of Modern Greek literature and a strong advocate of Katharevousa –a purified version of Greek language with heavy borrowings from the ancient language. His bad memories of the traumatic Ottoman past (of his birthplace İzmir/Smyrna) accompanied by his intolerance of lack of education revealed in his memoir. The reason for the lack of education among the Orthodox subjects during the *Tourkokratia*²⁴⁷ was not the Church, but the Ottoman slavery, according to Korais, in his words; “Turk and wild beast were synonymous words in my mind”²⁴⁸ and “the innate hatred in my soul against the Turks, as the cause of this lack”²⁴⁹.

Accordingly, by obstructing important Western periods and developments to be spread throughout the country (such as the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, etc.), the Ottoman State kept its Orthodox subjects aloof from the European intellectual movements,²⁵⁰ hence led them to get stuck in a sort of socio-cultural backwardness. Clogg asserts that this reason might have caused the Greek identity to be woven without the core elements and aspects of a European country that for example although

²⁴⁶ Adamantios Korais described Byzantium as a ‘stupid’ and ‘mindless’ period. Accordingly, the Byzantine Empire was a tyranny that damaged and destroyed the Greeks. See, Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 211.

²⁴⁷ “Tourkokratia refers to the ‘400 years of bondage’; the expressions ‘invasion’, ‘slavery’ and ‘Turkish yoke’ are also used to refer to the same concept. Tourkokratia is always unfavourable: in school books, in historiography, in literature, in the discourse promoted by politicians representing the whole political spectrum (from the extreme right to the left). In all cases, Tourkokratia is presented as the Dark Age of the Greek nation and everything is assessed as negative in this period: the leading Turkish (Ottoman) dignitaries, the legal system, the economic situation, the daily life of the subjects. The Greeks suffer; they are condemned to ‘darkness’ and backwardness; they are not respected; the Other humiliates them”. See, Iraklis Millas, “Tourkokratia: History and the Image of Turks in Greek Literature”, *When Greeks Think About Turks: The View From Anthropology*, ed. Dimitrios Theodossopoulos (Oxon: Routledge, 2007): 50.

²⁴⁸ “Αυτοβιογραφία Κοραή Τόμος Α,” 20–21, https://www.oodegr.com/oode/sygrafeis/korais_kata_pagan1.htm. [30.08.2019].

²⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 12.

²⁵⁰ In fact, the Ottoman State did not only affect the evolution of its Orthodox subjects but also its Muslim subjects’. If an effect of influence was in issue it was applicable to all subjects of the state without any discrimination. For example, the effect of the French Revolution not only motivated the Serbian or Greek revolts in the Ottoman State, but also activated the Muslim intellectuals to adopt the premises of a nation-state and to adapt the French style to Ottoman realities. Following Toprak’s words: “The intellectual vistas of Tanzimat reformers from Mahmud II onwards, then of the Young Ottomans in the second half of the nineteenth century, and finally of the Young Turks in the early twentieth century were all imbued with the ideas of the French Revolution or, at least, the philosophy of the Enlightenment”. See, Zafer Toprak, “From Plurality to Unity: Codification and Jurisprudence in the Late Ottoman Empire”, *Ways To Modernity In Greece And Turkey: Encounters With Europe, 1850-1950*, ed. Anna Frangoudaki, Çağlar Keyder (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007): 27.

their country was in Europe Greeks did not feel as Europeans and “talked of traveling to Europe as though their country was not in fact European”²⁵¹.

Apart from the Western initiative and willpower in Greek modernization, the political tradition of the country continued to bear some resemblance to the Ottomans’, as the Greek memory was much fresh in remembering the Ottoman style of governing a state, rather than the style of Byzantine Greeks’. Konstantinos Karamanlis, for example, who was elected Greek President for the second time in 1990, was born as an Ottoman citizen in 1907 and became a Greek citizen only after the Balkan Wars which ended up with the annexation of the region by Greece. Put differently, in the Greek Kingdom, most of the Ottoman impact was on the state affairs, whereas considerable cultural and religious influence was stemmed from the Byzantine heritage. Clogg, asserts that those ‘prophetic and apocalyptic beliefs’ such that the Greek escape (Εξοδος) would not be made by human efforts but divine powers were instilled in the Greek identity. In his opinion, these peculiarities of the Greek culture were the reflections of the ‘Byzantine modes of thought’. One of the well-known myths, for example, is the legend of blonde nation (ξανθός γένος) narrated by Matthaïos Metropolitan of Myra in the 17th century, which involved frequent passing reference to the Russians to deliver the enslaved Greeks from the Ottoman yoke. Below is the translation of Clogg²⁵²:

“We hope for the fair-haired races to deliver us,
to come from Moscow to save us.
We trust in the oracles, in false prophecies
And we waste our time on such vanities.
We place our hope in the north wind
To take the snare of the Turk from upon us”²⁵³.

Actually, similar connotations but with critical remarks are visible recently in the Greek media, whereby an intense debate was launched following the S-400 deal signed between Russia and Turkey²⁵⁴. This might, in a way, indicate that enshrined Orthodoxy

²⁵¹ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 6.

²⁵² *ibid*, 19.

²⁵³ In original: “Ελπίζομεν εἰς ξανθὰ γένη να μας γλυτώσουν, νά 'λθοῦν ἀπὸ τον Μόσκοβον νά μάς ελευθερώσουν. Ελπίζομεν εἰς τοὺς χρησμούς, στες ψευδοπροφητείες, καὶ τὸν καιρὸν μας χάνομεν στες ματαιολογίες. Εἰς τὸν Βορρὰν τὸν ἀνεμοὺν ἔχομεν τὴν ἐλπίδα, νά ἄρουν ἀπὸ πάνω μας τοῦ Τούρκου τὴν παγίδα.” See, Ματθαῖος μητροπολίτης Μυρέων, “Ξανθὸς Γένος”, Σπουδαστήριο Νέου Ἑλληνισμοῦ: Νέα Ἑλληνικά Λογοτεχνία καὶ Πολιτισμὸς / Modern Greek Studies: Modern Greek Literature and Culture, (Ἑτέρα Ἱστορία τῶν κατὰ την Οὐγγροβλαχίαν τελεσθέντων, 2329-2334. 1682. Émile Legrand, Bibliothèque Greque Vulgaire, II, 1881. 314.) <http://www.snhell.gr/references/quotes/writer.asp?id=201>. [30.08.2019].

²⁵⁴ “Οἱ S-400 Που Δίνει Το «ξανθὸ Γένος» Στους Τούρκους Θα Σημαδεύουν Ἑλληνικοὺς Στόχους (The S-400 Missile That the ‘Blonde Nation’ Gives to Turks Will Aim the Greek Targets),” ΚΟΣΜΟΣ Tribune, 15 April 2019, <https://www.tribune.gr/world/news/article/570105/oi-s-400-poy-dinei-to-xantho-genos-stoys-toyrkoys-tha-simadeyoyn-ellinikoys-stochoy.html> [31.08.2019]; “ΣΟΚ.!!!!!!

and Byzantinism in the Greek tradition are the common tools also utilized by the Greek political culture while making policies. Even though myths differ greatly in terms of their content and genealogy, their location of origin, and locus of enunciation, they are the strongest instruments that “played a vital formative role in identifying the nature of ‘Greek’ character and guiding its regeneration in the light of their theories of origins”²⁵⁵.

Although the influential ideal of the Ancient Greek and Byzantine periods truly generated the lion's share of successful formation of the modern Greek identity, liberal wings of the European countries, especially of Britain, were also distinguished extremely valuable for Greeks in terms of facilitating the speedy adoption of their national identity, including Greek culture and civilization which harbored the ancestors of the Europeans²⁵⁶. In the wake of Greek movement, these philhellenes (the people who admire Greeks and Greek culture) –one of a significant volunteer of whom was Lord Byron²⁵⁷– considered the Greek freedom as an escape of the ancient world from *the dilapidated Ottoman state*²⁵⁸ structure, and felt the responsibility of any support either material or moral. Greek independence was obtained following a period of bloodshed and violence or conflict with the Muslim subjects of the Ottomans²⁵⁹

ΣΥΓΚΛΟΝΙΣΜΕΝΗ ΟΛΗ Η ΕΛΛΑΔΑ! ΕΤΣΙ ΜΑΣ ΠΟΥΛΗΣΕ ΤΟ ΞΑΝΘΟΣ ΓΕΝΟΣ (SHOCK!!!!. ALL GREECE IS SHOCKED! THE BLONDE NATION SOLD US”, Μαΐαντρος, <https://www.omaian-dros.com/post/4629-sok!!!!-sygklonismeni-oli-i-ellada!-etsi-mas-poyl>, [30.08.2019].

²⁵⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 79.

²⁵⁶ According to Heraclides, contrary to those who paid great efforts in inventing a ceaseless history flow of their nation, the Greek intelligentsia was fully supported through a ready-made solution by the Europeans. Greeks were only supposed to remember the bright ancient Hellenic civilization and by exploring Europe, they were actually discovering the new Greece. The great admiration Europeans had for the ancient Greeks provided the new state with ‘an ideal national identity’ but also with ‘superiority obsession’. See, Alexis Heraclides, *Yunanistan ve “Doğu’dan Gelen Tehlike” Türkiye*, trans. Mihalıs Vasilyadis, Herkül Millas, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 51.

²⁵⁷ He was also the historical leading figure of the Romantic movement in Britain.

²⁵⁸ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 7.

²⁵⁹ Toynbee considers that the main responsible for these massacres was ‘Western formula’. The Western political idea of nationality, in his opinion, “is the contemporary basis of Western states and, owing to the ascendancy of the West in the world, the relations of non-Western peoples to each other and to Western Powers have to approximate to the forms which the Western world takes for granted”. However, ‘Western formula’ is not of universal application because it asserts a sovereign independent territorial state with a single language while the populations of Eastern civilizations “speaking different languages have been intermixed geographically, and do not represent local groups capable of independent political life so much as different economic classes whose co-operation is necessary to the well-being of any local state”. Therefore, the Greek War of Independence “produced by a conscious application of the Western national idea, occasioned massacres of Turks throughout the Morea and of Greeks at Aivali and in Khios”. See, Arnold Joseph Toynbee, *The Western Question In Greece And Turkey: A Study In The Contact Of Civilisations* (London, Bombay, Sydney: Constable And Company Ltd., 1922), 18-19.

living in the geography wherein the Greek Kingdom was intended²⁶⁰. Following *the great massacre of Muslims in Tripolitza* (1821), a year later, *the great massacre of Christians on Chios* (1822) took place²⁶¹. The ‘philhellenic agitation’²⁶² strengthened its degree and flourished in the Battle Navarino (1827) where the naval forces of the Great Powers (Russian, British, and French) united to completely destroy the Ottoman navy²⁶³. It was noted “the last great battle of the age of sail and characterized as one of peaceful interference by British”²⁶⁴ forces.

While these developments exacerbated the Greek revolutionary spirit and established the Greek Kingdom with the full support of Britain, Russia, and France; the fact that the Greek subjects of the Ottoman State were left outside the newly determined Greek border evoked feelings of acute nostalgia for Ancient Greece. Although the cultural orientation during the founding years was limited to the classical past, in the second half of the century, this limitation was removed and in a sense, peace was achieved between the Ancient Greek roots and the Byzantine past. The unbroken linkage between its ancient roots and the newly established modern state led to a sort of emulation which was particularly strengthened by the unfortunate conclusion of the ‘Hellenic territories’ of which only a small part was set free²⁶⁵.

Considering that Ancient Greece was a civilization rather than a state in modern meaning, the commonalities such as language and traditions were the main

²⁶⁰ Phillips wrote that starting from March 1821 “[e]verywhere, as though at a preconcerted signal, the peasantry rose, and massacred all the Turks –men, women, and children– on whom they could lay hands. ‘In the Morea shall no Turk be left, Nor in the whole wide world’. Thus rang the song which, from mouth to mouth, announced the beginning of a war of extermination. The Mussulman population of the Morea had been reckoned at twenty-five thousand souls. Within three weeks of the outbreak of the revolt, not a Muslim was left”. See, Phillips, *The War Of Greek Independence: 1821 to 1833*, 48; In Stavrianos’ words: “The Greek successes were stained by large-scale massacres of defenseless Turks – an inevitable accompaniment, perhaps, of a struggle that pitted, at one and the same time, Greek subjects against Turkish overlords, Greek peasants against Turkish landowners, and Greek Christians against Turkish Moslems”. See, Leften Stavros Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, 3rd ed. (London: C. Hurst & Company, 2002), 284.

²⁶¹ Phillips, *The War Of Greek Independence: 1821 to 1833*, 59–66, 92–96, respectively.

²⁶² Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 37.

²⁶³ “England, France and Russia were irritated of the presence of Mehmed Ali Pasha, being a powerful commander and administrator, at an important position in the Mediterranean and sent an corporate navy to the Navarin Harbour to organize a unexpended attack to the Ottoman Navy although there was no state of war and burnt the whole naval force. This attack had caused considerable losses and damages regarding the Ottoman State”. See, *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Balkanlar’da ve Anadolu’da Yunan Mezalimi: I Balkanlar’da Yunan Mezalimi*, v. 1 (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü - Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 1995), XXX.

²⁶⁴ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 42.

²⁶⁵ Nikos Svoronos, *Çağdaş Hellen Tarihine Bakış*, trans. Panayot Abacı (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1988), 52-53.

determinants in designating these city-states' frontiers²⁶⁶. The *dangerous situation* that most of the Greek-speaking population had still been under the Ottoman rule loaded new responsibilities and national duties on the free Greeks' shoulder. Therefore, "re-Hellenisation of the *unredeemed* Greek populations²⁶⁷ of the Ottoman Empire"²⁶⁸ and liberating those enslaved Greeks and places to be included in the Greek Kingdom were endured throughout the first century until the policy of 'Great Idea' was terminated by the Asia Minor Catastrophe (Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή) in 1922. In other words, the 'Great Idea' which was described as the 'post-independence irredentist aspirations' of the newly founded country ruled ceaselessly throughout the 19th century. Since "over three-quarters of Greeks at the time lived outside the borders of the Hellenic kingdom, it became the policy of most governments to unite and incorporate all territories which were home to unredeemed Greeks"²⁶⁹.

In fact, the first irredentist endeavor to revise the country's borders was detected during the Crimean War (1854) wherein King Otto strived for the Megali Idea, by exploring the opportunity that the Ottomans were fighting the Russians²⁷⁰ and that supporting Russia would have brought the annexation of Thessaly and Epirus. Although this effort produced inconclusive results, the new state succeeded in taking the United States of the Ionian Islands²⁷¹ (Corfu/Kerkyra, Zakynthos, Ithaca, Paxoi, Cythera/Cerigo, Leucas, Cephalonia) that the UK ceded seven islands to the Greek Kingdom in 1864 under the Treaty of London. Second annexation was the cession of both the region of Thessaly and Arta district (a prefecture of the southern Epirus) which was ratified in 1881 (Convention of Constantinople between the Ottoman State

²⁶⁶ Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor 1919-1922*, 3rd ed. (Malaysia: Hurst & Company, London, 2000), 21.

²⁶⁷ Actually, this task was previously delegated to Klephts (brigands). See, John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, 222.

²⁶⁸ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 50.

²⁶⁹ John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, 231; Clogg recapitulates the irredentist project of the Megali Idea as "the grandiose vision of restoring the Byzantine Empire through the incorporation within the bounds of a single state of all the areas of compact Greek settlement in the near East, with Constantinople as the capital". For him, the reason behind the adoption of this idea and its domination over the new state's foreign policy stemmed from the Greek "the messianic longings of the prophecies that enjoyed such wide currency during the period of Ottoman rule". See, Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, respectively, 60, 48.

²⁷⁰ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 55.

²⁷¹ Ἡνωμένον Κράτος τῶν Ἰονίων Νήσων.

and the Kingdom of Greece), not of a war but of Great Power intervention and mediation²⁷².

The next accession of territory was planned to be Epirus (an area located between Greece and Albania, alongside the Ionian Sea) but the Ottoman State²⁷³ – Greek Kingdom War in 1897 ended in an overwhelming shock and grief that Ottoman troops were barely stopped by the involvement of Czar Nicholas II of Russia who had also kinship with the Greek dynasty. The defeat resulted in a drastic revision of both the national ‘Great Idea’ and the foreign policy strategy of the country. Following Clogg’s words²⁷⁴:

“The crushing defeat of 1897 was to usher in a period of introspection and self-doubt, for the clear lesson of the war was that the single-handed pursuit of the ‘Great Idea’ was doomed. Whatever the weakness of the Ottoman Empire in its decline, Greece was likely to come off worse in any armed conflict. Some intellectuals, indeed, argued that the country’s future lay in some kind of condominium with the Ottoman Turks”.

Therefore, after King Otto, the second king –George I of the Hellenes– was also caused a big disappointment in pursuit of the Megali Idea which damaged the national identity and self-confidence. Although irredentism in the formulation of the Great Idea, was seemingly the dominant ideology throughout the founding years of the Greek Kingdom it was a distant dream belonged in the realms of national fantasy and the restoration of this national ideal was possible not until Eleftherios Venizelos,²⁷⁵ who was “the most charismatic protagonist of a *Greater Greece*”,²⁷⁶ appointed to the

²⁷² There were two more extensions that in 1913 Crete ceded to Greece under the Treaty of London Peace Conference and the capital of Epirus –Ioannina– captured by the Greek troops during the First Balkan War. See, Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 81.

²⁷³ During this period the Ottoman State was being ruled by Sultan Abdülhamid II who bore conflictual opinions about his conduct. For some, he was forced to implement reforms by the collective coercion of the British and Russians, and was the subject of massacres after which he was nicknamed as ‘Abdul the Damned’, ‘monster of Yıldız’, or ‘the blood-red Sultan’. See, Alan Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1994), 175–88; For others, due to the fear of failure to cope with military threats, he had no intentions to go war neither with any country nor with the Greek Kingdom thus he conducted diplomatic initiatives and endeavors to benefit from the Great Powers’ multilateral suspicion over each other’s objectives in policy to survive the State. See, Feroze A. K. Yasamee, “Ottoman Diplomacy in the Era of Abdülhamid II (1878- 1908)”, *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, ed. İsmail Soysal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999): 227–28; Sultan Abdülhamid also considered diplomatic initiatives and political measures instead of military forces as a way of settling disputes thus resorted to concessions in several losses of territory such as in 1881 Tunisia ceded to France and Thessaly to Greece, a year later in 1882 Egypt ceded to Britain, and in 1885 the Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria. See, Süleyman Kocabaş, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid: Şahsiyeti ve Politikası* (İstanbul: Vatan Yayınları, 1995), 205.

²⁷⁴ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 71.

²⁷⁵ Venizelos –the leader of the Liberal Party– was elected to the premiership of Greece for eight times, served intermittently between 1910 and 1933. Being a key figure in constructing the Greek political identity, he had a profound influence in constructing the internal and external images of the country.

²⁷⁶ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 107.

premiership. The third venture at *redeeming* the Greek nation and the respective territories from the Ottomans began to intensify and gain speed in this period, though the emotional trauma of defeats was still very much a part of the country's politics. There is a general tendency, claiming a correlation between the Ottomans' Young Turk Revolution of 1908²⁷⁷ and the Greeks' Goudi Coup of 1909²⁷⁸ (which also led Venizelos to the office) that the latter was the reactive aggression to the policy of Ottomanization²⁷⁹. 'The maker of Modern Greece' (as often he was referred to) – Venizelos – placed great importance on saving Greeks from the forced Ottomanization movement, which allegedly, in turn, revived the conduct of Megali Idea²⁸⁰. When the First WW broke out, Greece was torn between her PM's aggressive policy in the prosecution of the 'Great Greece' and her King's moderate foreign policy of 'a small Greece' which aimed at consolidating the country's sovereignty over new territories before engaging in new irredentist ventures²⁸¹. This national division (*ethnikos dikhasmos*) or as named in general 'national schism' between the king and the prime minister and their supporters, especially on whether Greece should enter the war, reached its peak in the period of 1910–1922²⁸².

The rapid deployment of Italian troops in the Anatolia (Antalya/Attaleia) and their possible move towards İzmir/Smyrna alarmed PM Venizelos about implementing a

²⁷⁷ For a fruitful research and study on this subject, See, Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, *Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008).

²⁷⁸ Actually, it was not the first coup of modern Greek history; instead, the first one was staged only after 13 years (on 3 September 1843) following the establishment of the new state. See, Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 53.

²⁷⁹ The Young Turk Revolution has a considerable place in the national historiography. The Greek history textbooks, for example, articulate the opinion that the Young Turks intentionally used specious arguments about the Sultan's unfair and discriminatory practices. Reportedly, especially at the beginning, the Greeks were deceived by their expression of disapproval and censure for the Sultan, but in the course of time, they changed and showed their true color. They seemed to adopt the motto of the French Revolution (freedom, equality, fraternity), however, they deported and expelled non-Muslim subjects of the State –especially the Greeks and the Armenians– and conduct a policy of homogenizing the society by eliminating differences. In this vein, in addition to his unique skills of successful diplomacy and his skillful manner of manipulation, the Young Turks' conduct of Ottomanization had gravely affected Venizelos's aggressive pursuit of Megali Idea and Hellenization of the Rums. See, Evangelia Louvi, Dimitrios Chr. Xifaras, *G' Gymnasiou - Neoteri Kai Synchroni Istoria. (Modern and Contemporary History: Grade 9)*, 103; Koliopoulos et al., *G' Taxi Genikou Lykeiou - Istoria Tou Neoterou Kai Tou Synchronou Kosmou / History of Modern and Contemporary World: 3rd Grade High School*, 67.

²⁸⁰ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 77–79.

²⁸¹ According to Vlavianos, the majority of the Greek bourgeoisie that backed the charismatic Venizelos "invoked social Darwinism to support Venizelos' expansionist ambitions in Turkey, arguing that Greece had a right and a duty to retake Constantinople from the Turks and to create a 'Greater Greece' in the image of the Byzantine empire". See, Haris Vlavianos, *Greece, 1941-49 From Resistance to Civil War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 9.

²⁸² *ibid*, 12.

final expansion through which the western parts of Anatolia alongside İzmir/Smyrna planned to be freed from the Ottomans. On 15 May 1919 with the pretext of protecting the Greek subjects, Greek troops escorted by allied warships landed in İzmir/Smyrna and occupied the city. This landing of Greek troops in İzmir/Smyrna as part of the invasion of Ottoman State left deep marks and a bad memory both on the Turkish and the Greek identities. While the first Greek step on the *enslaved soils* was very precious to Greeks and devastating to Ottomans; the recapture of the city by the Ottomans caused the opposite.

Although the Treaty of Sevres was gratifying for PM Venizelos and his supporters that they “talked excitedly of his having created a Greece of ‘the two continents and of the five seas’, the two continents being Europe and Asia and five seas being the Mediterranean, the Aegean, the Ionian, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea”²⁸³ it was not ratified by the Ottoman-Turkey.

The Greek irredentist edifice in Anatolia started to be damaged when other invaders gave up their claims over the Ottoman territories and made peace agreements with Mustafa Kemal in 1921. Greeks were left alone by their traditional friends that even David Lloyd George²⁸⁴ of the UK did not support and abandoned the country in her hour of need²⁸⁵. Due to the lack of ammunition and necessary supplies, Greek forces had to withdraw from Anatolia following the Turkish massive offensive. This full-scale evacuation of the city by the Greek forces and the other concomitant traumas – such as the Great Fire of Smyrna, the displacement of the Greek population and quarters²⁸⁶, the long anxious wait of the Greek subjects on the shore of the city²⁸⁷ –

²⁸³ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 95.

²⁸⁴ He was a pillar of support in an Anglo-Greek entente, in Smith’s words: “the idea of an Anglo-Greek entente in the Eastern Mediterranean took root in Lloyd George’s fertile mind, and never left it thereafter. (The case was not the same with Churchill, who was [...] in any case less inclined to write off the Ottoman Empire, even at the time of the Balkan Wars, than was Lloyd George)”. See, Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor 1919-1922*, 37.

²⁸⁵ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 100.

²⁸⁶ An incident which was reminiscent of The Great Fire of Thessaloniki in 1917 whereby the Turkish and Jewish quarters were highly affected. For more information on the Jewish population of Selanik/Thessaloniki, See the Caption for Plate 42, Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 131. “These Sephardic Jews were the descendants of the Jews expelled from Spain in 1492 who had been offered refuge in the Ottoman Empire. They worshipped in over thirty synagogues in the city and spoke Ladino, or Judaeo-Spanish, essentially fifteenth-century Spanish which they wrote with Hebrew characters”.

²⁸⁷ In the Greek historiography, the government considered as the main responsible for the wait. Allegedly those who were the Ottoman-Greeks ignored on the shore and left on their own desperately, while the others from either Greek military headquarters or national bank were immediately loaded onto the ships sent by the Greek Kingdom. For national history and narrative, See Aktypis et al., *Sta Neotera Chronia: Istoría St’ Dimotikou (In Modern Times: Grade 6 History)*, 227; Evangelia Louvi, Dimitrios

caused the most permanent damage to the relationship between the Greek-Turkish peoples and ignited the hatred of Greeks against Turks. This final battle (between Greeks and Ottomans), since then, has remained to be a source of great sadness and euphoria, for respective parties. In constructing the Greek identity, it stayed as one of the cornerstones²⁸⁸ referred by laconic phrases ‘Mikrasiatiki Katastrofi’ or ‘Megali Pirkaya tis Smirnis’ (Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Great Fire of Smyrna, respectively). For the Turkish identity, on the other hand, it was construed to be kept alive either by a laconic phrase as ‘Yunan(lı)ları denize dökmek’ (pouring the Greeks into the sea –also became a collocation in Turkish ‘düşmanı denize dökmek’, driving the enemy into the sea) or by using the date to name a university in İzmir/Smyrna ‘9 Eylül Üniversitesi’ (9 September University).

Apart from the grief it caused, the WW1 had serious repercussions on the national identity. Signing the Treaty of Lausanne, for example, meant general acceptance of giving up the visionary nationalist aspiration –the irredentist concept of Megali Idea, and as a result of abandoning all pretense of trying to succeed in expanding the territories, compulsory population exchange implemented on the basis of religion aiming at purifying or homogenizing the population bilaterally. The First WW remained to be the final war of aggression in the country’s history; but unfortunately, it was not going to be the last war she got involved in. During the Second WW, the country would experience a series of military attacks; that in 1941 the whole of Greece would be under a ‘tripartite German, Italian and Bulgarian occupation’²⁸⁹.

3.1.3 NATO and the EU Dimensions in Greece’s International Relations

With the outbreak of WW II, Greece took her place on the side of allied states and despite her comparatively weak and poorly equipped army won the first victory of the allied forces in October 1940: by repulsing the Italian troops that had attacked through Albania. Although Hitler was on his way through to invade Russia, the defeat of

Chr. Xifaras, *G’ Gymnasiou - Neoteri Kai Synchroni Istoría. (Modern and Contemporary History: Grade 9)*, 107.

²⁸⁸ For Koliopoulos and Veremis, the Turkish Independence War and the compulsory population exchange made Turks –the feared contiguous enemies– in the eyes of Greeks. Greeks ‘demonized’ Turks, considering that they have all the negative aspects such as arbitrary rules, backwardness, and corruption. “The Turks were what the Greeks wished to leave behind; they represented the barbaric East, which had destroyed their ‘own’ idealized East”. See, John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, 260.

²⁸⁹ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 123.

Italians diverted him into Greek territories. The German occupation of Greece started on 6 April 1941 and led massive bouts of high inflation, thriving black-market and a tragic period of mass starvation.

The decade of the 1940s stayed to be the darkest period in the country's history. The Axis occupation of the country engraved on the Greek national memory and stored in such images like the Great Famine (Μεγάλος Λιμός), Civil War (Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος),²⁹⁰ and the Anglo-Soviet *percentages deal* made by Churchill and Stalin. The German withdrawal from Greece took place in 1944 and Georgios Papandreou as the PM-in-exile and his government set foot on liberated Greek soil on 18 October, "having delayed [their] arrival by twenty-four hours to avoid landing on a Tuesday, always of ill omen in the Greek world as the day on which Constantinople had fallen to the Turks"²⁹¹. Although the foreign occupation was ended, the country was still facing the bitter war ever between her citizens with their highly polarized ideals that can be narrowed as pro-communism and pro-monarchy. The Civil War between the leftists and rightists triggered the Truman Doctrine that on 12 March 1947 the US Congress declared to make a grant to Greece to alleviate the widespread communist threat and support 'free peoples' in the country and to avoid the remaining problem of returning the American munitions to the USA²⁹².

²⁹⁰ Vlavianos's fruitful study provides detailed information about the topic. See, Vlavianos, *Greece, 1941-49 From Resistance to Civil War*. Accordingly, the Greek Civil War connotes armed conflicts between the communists and the royalists (supported by the United Kingdom) of the country, which took place between 1943-49 intermittently. Throughout the struggle, Joseph Stalin had deliberately refrained from providing any Soviet support to the Greek Communists. Generally speaking, during the WWII the KKE and communist-resistance groups, respectively, the National Mutual Aid (EA), the National Workers Liberation Front (EEAM), the National Liberation Front (EAM) and its military wing Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS) resisted the invasion and soon afterward EAM/ELAS (with more than 2 million members, nearly 30 % of the population) struggled against the pro-Britain government (the PM Georgios Papandreou was an anti-communist of Venizelist background) and the king in exile (George II) and his collaboration with the Metaxas dictatorship. With the help of the UK and the USA, the Greek military forces hardly managed to suppress the communists of the country; See, also Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 133-141. According to Clogg, "Stalin had made clear his view that, given British and American naval domination of the Mediterranean, the communist cause in Greece was lost"; "Greek Civil War", *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Greek-Civil-War>. [13.12.2019].

²⁹¹ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 136.

²⁹² "The Truman Doctrine, 1947", Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine> [14.09.2019]; Baskin Oran, "1945-1960: Batı Bloku Ekseninde Türkiye -1", *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919-1980)*, ed. Baskin Oran, 13th ed., v. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008): 485. As implied on the same page, because of the harsh postwar conditions in the country, the amount granted to Greece (USD 300.000.000) was 3 times the amount granted to Turkey (USD 100.000.000).

In the aftermath of WW II, while other European countries were trying to heal their wounds and rejuvenate their international relationships, Greece found herself suffering from another grieving period –a second war that was much more violent than that fought against the Axis forces. According to Koliopoulos and Veremis, the country's post-war period therefore started on 30 August 1949 when the final operation against the communists in the northwest completed by the government. The repercussions of the civil war on the domestic affairs lasted for nearly 'four decades', during which the country endured bitter inner turmoil that conferred a sort of popular political legitimization on the US involvement in Greek undertakings by the Truman Convention and the Marshall Plan²⁹³. During this period, concerning the country's national preference, two major themes were prioritized: making progress towards economic reconstruction and being under the umbrella of the western defense system. Since Greece surrounded by pro-communism countries such as Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, security issues had the top priority, whereas efforts at facilitating political reconciliation with the West remained the second on the national agenda of the country. Consequently, as constituting the key area of confrontation against communism, both Greece and her neighbor Turkey, on 22 October 1951, concomitantly got admitted to NATO though neither of them was a North Atlantic country. It was an anti-communist structuring whereby the two countries' leaderships would tilt themselves towards the glowing USA in that not only because of the US funds and resources but also of the policies it conducted. US concerns and interests were in tandem with their national strategies. Speaking for Greece, "Americans, who were perceived to be more sympathetic to the Cypriots' desire to be rid of colonial rule, had displaced the British" that had long been her 'external patron'²⁹⁴.

Greek Cypriot aspirations, however, were counterbalanced when Britain encouraged and motivated Turkey to claim an interest in the issue²⁹⁵. The 1955 Greek-Cypriots' riots demanding *enosis* provoked Turks, subsequently to ease the strained relations on the island, in 1959 Menderes and Karamanlis signed an agreement that upgraded their

²⁹³ John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Modern Greece: A History since 1821* (Malaysia: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 127 On the same page: "Greece's total share of the Marshall Plan, which was proclaimed in June 1947, was \$1.7 billion in economic aid (loans and grants) and \$1.3 billion in military aid between 1947 and the 1960s".

²⁹⁴ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 148-150. It should be noted that their official membership would be on 18 February 1952.

²⁹⁵ *ibid*, 154.

positions towards Cyprus as the co-guarantors of the proclaimed independent Cyprus Republic. Yet, during the Greek coup of Colonels, when Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis declared *enosis*, which meant the abolishment of the London-Zurich Agreements, Turkey launched a military landing to save Turks living on the northern part of the island, which was perceived that “the US had ‘tilted’ towards Turkey, [and] prompted violent demonstrations in which the US ambassador was shot dead” by the Greek-Cypriots²⁹⁶.

The military dictatorship or as commonly cited ‘the Regime of the Colonels’²⁹⁷ ruled Greece between 1967 and 1973. The coup d’état of the far-right military figures seized power on 21 April 1967, precipitated by Turkey’s Cyprus landing on 20 July 1974), and entirely toppled down on 24 July 1974. Mainly, there were two grave repercussions of the military junta: the start of the presence of the Turkish army on Cyprus and the re-structure of the the Communist Party of Greece. Although the coup had produced the pretexts of an imminent communist seizure of power, stripped of such embellishments, the fact was seemingly just the opposite. According to Clogg, neither Greece was on the brink of a Communist take-over nor the Greek Communists were ready for such a venture, and conversely, this very ‘unpreparedness’ precipitated the eminent split in the exile leadership of the communist party the following year (1968) into two factions, one unwaveringly loyal to the Soviet Union, the other (KKE Interior) to ‘Eurocommunists’ in orientation²⁹⁸.

Broadly speaking, during the 70s and 80s Euro-Communists formed a distinct current that criticized Soviet-type communism and corroded its influence in Europe. Greek Communists were also affected by the Cold War division between East and West following the Prague Spring (1968) and the Greek Communist Party (KKE) was divided into two factions: KKE Interior and Exterior. The first group, favoring a more pluralistic approach to socialism and supporting Alexander Dubček (the secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party), forged a close bond with Eurocommunism, while the second one remained loyal to the Soviet ideal.

Prior to the dictatorship, to strengthen and secure the country’s bonds with the West that were forged by the NATO membership in 1951, PM Karamanlis following the

²⁹⁶ *ibid.*, 170.

²⁹⁷ Other names are ‘The Junta’, ‘The Dictatorship’, and ‘The Seven Years’.

²⁹⁸ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 163.

Treaty of Rome of 1957 placed Greece's application for becoming a member of EEC in 1959. The Greek government of the time (ERE²⁹⁹) succeeded in signing the Association Agreement (as commonly cited the Athens Agreement) on 9 July 1961 but due to the military takeover the process was 'freezed' until 1974. According to Kassimeris, the background motive of the country in her application for a membership was "to secure her position and status within the Western camp, improve her economy and contain communism"³⁰⁰. Among these objectives, particularly the third one might have been considered far more important since the country was surrounded by three communist states, fighting in the civil war, and witnessing her leftists' strong ties with Moscow. Following the topple-down of the junta and the restoration of democracy, in 1975 PM Karamanlis of the ND government applied for the full membership in the EEC; holding the belief that becoming a part of the western would strengthen democracy, political stability, and economy. It was regarded as a new period wherein the relations with the West that embodied in the NATO membership would be balanced and to an extent replaced by the newly established bonds with Europe, for the country withdrew from NATO's military wing after the Turkish military movement against Cyprus³⁰¹.

Getting admission in the EU, however, was not an easy prospect for Greece since there were intense concerns among the existing members about the country's economic and political capability, and the common values she shared with other member states. The Greek government of the time, took a further step to restore the democratic structure of the country, and in 1974 following the national elections, PM Karamanlis called another monarchy referendum that would be the sixth in the country's history (after 1920, 1924, 1935, 1946, and 1973) and would formally abolish the monarchy. PM Karamanlis conducted skillful diplomacy and exploited Europe's sensibility caused by its inertia during the Greek dictatorship, which led the members "to ease the path to entry of the country which they liked to hail as the fount of European civilization"³⁰². Thus after a six-year intense negotiation process, Greece got admission to the Community as the tenth member in 1981³⁰³.

²⁹⁹ Ἐθνικὴ Ῥιζοσπαστικὴ Ἐνωσις (National Radical Union).

³⁰⁰ Christos Kassimeris, *Greece and the American Embrace: Greek Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, the US and the Western Alliance* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 139–40.

³⁰¹ *ibid*, 147.

³⁰² Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 177.

³⁰³ Official website of the European Union. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en

Greece's EU journey towards becoming a core member, however, took more than anticipated or according to some others never achieved at all. Throughout the 80s until the collapse of Yugoslavia Greece described as a 'footnote state' and in during the period of 90s as an 'irrational state'³⁰⁴. It was a fact that national and emotional positions of the country, especially her high level of support for Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic and her confrontational approach to the Republic of (North) Macedonia/FYROM led Greece to a state of *loneliness* where her arguments about the both political events were interpreted in relation to her national historiography and concerns by the *others*.

According to some, Greece had never got a chance to fully Europeanize her foreign policy due to the fact that she had to deal with the so-called 'national issues' such as Turkey, Cyprus, and the Balkans (i.e. Macedonian Question)³⁰⁵. Having been a member state in the Community, Greece followed three interrelated policies towards Turkey-EU relations. Throughout the 80s, Greece strictly obstructed any possible negotiations between Turkey and the EEC/EC regarding the customs union. Secondly, during 90s, Cyprus and the Aegean issues constituted the top priority of her foreign policy agenda, and thirdly, she stayed intransigent and uncompromising in her policies towards Turkey's possible membership in the Community (including also the prevention of Turkey from the EU funds and aid under the Fourth Financial Protocol)³⁰⁶. However, following some striking events such as the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, who is notorious for being a 'baby-killer' and the ringleader of a separatist Kurdish terrorist organization in Turkey, in the residence of the Greek ambassador to Kenya, the solidarity among Greece and Turkey aroused by the earthquakes, and the approach that a positive stance on a *Euro-Turkey* might contribute to the process of Cyprus's membership in the Community, during the second half of the 1999, Greece portrayed a clear shift in her foreign policy towards Turkey's EU route.

³⁰⁴ Charalambos Tsardanidis, Stelios Stavridis, "Greece: From Special Case to Limited Europeanization", *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization*, ed. Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 111. It has to be noted that the terms given in single quotation marks were used by the writers to define the country's position within the EPC, which was superseded by the CFSP following the Maastricht Treaty of 1993.

³⁰⁵ Charalambos Tsardanidis, Stelios Stavridis, 113.

³⁰⁶ *ibid*, 116.

3.2. Construction of Modern-Turkish Identity

Turkish identity displays historical legacies, cultural characteristics and indicators of the perception of the *self* in relation to the *other*. The Ottoman heritage with its centuries long sovereignty over three continents where today Turkey and most of her neighbours located is one of the effective parts in building Turkish identity.

Another one is religion, which played an important role as an essential component of identity during the Ottoman State wherein the non-Muslim subjects were classified under the system of ‘millet’s. The attempt to unite the Muslim subjects of the State under ‘pan-Islamism’³⁰⁷ during the final years of the Ottomans was an endeavour to save the unity and prevent the loss of territory in the Muslim-majority parts of the country. However, the growing influence of nationalism prevailed over religious unity. Nevertheless, religion assumed a vital role as a marker of identity against non-Muslims such as Greeks and left its imprint in public attitudes and lifestyle and worldview.

The retreat of the Ottoman State against European powers, the loss of much of its territories in the Balkans and the Middle East starting in the 18th century, the fight to save the homeland against invasion during the War of Independence, were also effective in identity formation, as they remained to be sources of suspicion against foreign powers. Moreover, the Treaty of Sevres which divided the Ottoman State into several zones of occupation following the First World War I has stayed visible especially in the collective memory, a phenomenon called as the ‘Sevres Syndrome’.

Atatürk’s legacy and his revolutionist idea, which marked a clean break with the traditional and Islamic-oriented Ottoman structure, is another cornerstone, particularly throughout the years of formation of the Turkish Republic after fighting a war of independence against Greeks and other European powers. Atatürk’s endeavour to save the remaining territories of the Ottoman State and establish a modern nation-state aimed at achieving equality with the superior powers of Europe. In the spirit of the ideas of Enlightenment; such as belief in progress, the human mind, and rationality; revolutions were carried out which intended to change the external appearance and also minds of the Turkish people. Science was central to the new Turkish Republic

³⁰⁷ Defined by Zürcher as an attempt “to regenerate the empire on the basis of Islamic practices and of solidarity within the Islamic Ümmet (Community)”, See, Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 127.

rather than religious identifications, as was expressed by Atatürk “Our true mentor in life is science”³⁰⁸.

In an effort to construct the roots of the new Turkish identity, the Turkic roots of Central Asia and their journey towards Anatolia to become settlers and rulers over these territories employed as a basis of allegiance. Ethnic groups other than Turkish were also deemed as citizens of the Republic provided that they felt they belonged to the Turkish identity, hence the maxim “How happy is the one who calls herself/himself a Turk”³⁰⁹.

Such traits form important vantage points to understand and analyze Turkish national identity. The depiction of the *self* is very much related to the perception of the *other*. Throughout the recent history of the Turkish Republic, identity perceptions have changed. Important events and milestones, such as the formation of the Republic, the renunciation of the Caliphate, joining the NATO alliance, ending of the Cold War etc., play critical roles in the understanding of identity. For example, the Turkish identity in the first years of the Republic was mostly characterized by being superior to the Ottomans (which at the time was depicted as the *other*), whereas during the recent era—especially under the governance of Justice and Development Party—this attitude has changed and differed from the general sense presented by the founding elites; consequently, the new reformulation has begun to appreciate the Ottoman heritage and develop towards a much more positive understanding of the Ottoman era.

3.2.1. Influence of the Ottoman Heritage

Transforming a traditional society into a modern state entailed numerous attempts and initiatives which embarked particularly on the Tulip Era of the Ottoman State and continued throughout the first decades of the Turkish Republic. The two crushing defeats in the battles of Zenta (ended up with the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz) and of Petrovaradin (concluded with signing the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718) revealed that modernization and adoption of the superior European technics were indispensable processes at least for military purposes at the beginning. Therefore, discernible signs

³⁰⁸ In Turkish original: “Hayatta en hakiki mürşit ilimdir” which was translated as “the truest spiritual guide in life is science” and “the torch that the Turkish nation held in its hand on its road to progress and civilisation, is exact science”. See, Erik J. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and National Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 112.

³⁰⁹ In Turkish original: “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene”.

and initial secularizing tendencies (such as employing foreign officer corps or building Western style military structures or raising embassies in the European capitals) were noted in the early 18th century³¹⁰. Signs of cultural secularization endeavors, on the other hand, date back to the 19th century when the Ottoman State introduced several regularities, such as rearranging the criminal code in 1843 (by which Muslim and non-Muslim subjects became equal before the court), or in 1844 abolishing the capital punishments for the apostates, or in 1867 implementing a new law that enabled foreigners to own land, or in 1869 raising secular courts (called Nizamiye) that dealt with the cases of both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the State³¹¹.

During this period, as the Ottomans started to lose their European provinces, the loss of ground against modernizing and developing European countries began to be acutely felt. Due to the influence of European civilization and the hegemonic power of European powers across the globe, modernization came to be synonymous with Westernization. Modernity and civilization were linked up with the Western world and philosophy (excluding the other geographies and cultures of the world). Both concepts were framed to accommodate a linear process of Western progress furnished with the liberal ideal that was wrapped as a universal goal to be achieved. Nilüfer Göle defines this image of Europeans as ‘the antithesis of barbarians’³¹². This basic traditional *othering* between the East and the West had survived until the late Ottoman era when by an odd coincidence of history, the same Ottomans that had long been labelled *barbarians* by their counterparts in the West, were impelled to introduce Western reforms to ameliorate the situation and conditions of their military and weakening state. The Ottoman elite made a bold change and shifted their intransigent position against the *infidel* West and started to emulate the Western model, which was also followed by the newly founded Turkey’s ruling elite and bureaucracies in order to reach *the level of contemporary civilization* –in Atatürk’s famous speech of the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic: “We shall escalate our national culture above the

³¹⁰ Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity* (New York, London: Routledge, 2003), 34.

³¹¹ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 61.

³¹² Nilüfer Göle, “Modernleşme Bağlamında İslami Kimlik Arayışı”, *Türkiye’de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan, Reşat Kasaba, trans. Nurettin Elhüseyni, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998): 74.

level of contemporary civilization”³¹³. It has to be noted that Westernization was seen as a means of modernization in the Ottoman State, whereas it became the overarching aim and structural determinant *per se* in the Republic of Turkey. In other words, speaking for Turkey, Westernization was not a matter of identity, it was the key motivation of transformation –from an underdeveloped country into a developed one.

Şerif Mardin defines this new way of perception about the westernization as the first shift whereby the West’s superiority over the East was admitted. Thus, the Ottoman perception of Europe changed drastically from a traditional foe to a role-model in modernization³¹⁴. This new impression about the West, however, did not reflect the general opinion, at least during the Ottoman State, and the society did not internalize it. The attempts at westernization especially in attire and manners came to be ridiculed in literary works such as ‘Araba Sevdası’ (Love of Car) a novel written in 1898 by Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem. Put differently, although constructing a modern civilized society was a ceaseless desire of both the Ottoman and the Turkish authorities, many reforms were not accepted by their respective society and remained limited to the outward aspect; such as the appearance of people, architecture, and institutions³¹⁵.

Generally speaking, the Turkish revolution aimed at constructing a modern state based on the model of European nation-states. Therefore, during the construction of the Turkish nation,³¹⁶ European judiciary, education, bureaucracy systems were adopted and even surpassed in some cases; such as the elevation of women to a more equal status with men, clearly perceivable in the Kemalist reforms, which were embodied in the idea of ideal Euro-style women³¹⁷. As Göle describes it, “The project of modernization in Turkey considers the emancipation of women equal to the progress

³¹³ In Turkish original: “Milli kültürümüzü muasır medeniyet seviyesinin üstüne çıkaracağız”. See, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, “The Speech of the Tenth Anniversary of the Turkish Republic,” October 29, 1933, <http://itumdusa.org/AtaturksSpeech-10YilNutku.htm>. [30.08.2019].

³¹⁴ Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), 12.

³¹⁵ Reşat Kasaba, “Eski ile Yeni Arasında Kemalizm ve Modernizm”, *Türkiye’de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan, Reşat Kasaba, trans. Nurettin Elhüseyni, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998): 21.

³¹⁶ The term nation, as an ethnic gathering loaded with secular overtones, not with a religious connotation, came up to be used for the first time at the end of 19th century. See, Turgay Uzun, “Ulus, Milliyetçilik ve Kimlik Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme,” *Doğu Batı*, no. 23 (July 2003): 132.

³¹⁷ In his fruitful work on this topic, Yenal argues that “the reconstitution of the women’s role through emulating Western norms facilitated the development of new ideals, forms and norms of domesticity as an integral part of the modernization project”. See, Zafer Yenal, “Cooking’ the Nation: Women, Experiences of Modernity, and the Girls’ Institutes in Turkey”, *Ways To Modernity In Greece And Turkey: Encounters With Europe, 1850-1950*, ed. Anna Frangoudaki, Çağlar Keyder (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007): 191.

of the nation”³¹⁸. In other words, the reforms and structural adjustment of the Republican period were in the interests of women³¹⁹ and aimed at their full participation in social life³²⁰. Various examples can be given to strengthen this view; such as creating equality before the law between men’s and women’s rights and obligations by enacting the Turkish Civil Code in 1926³²¹ or the enfranchisement of women,³²² etc.

In terms of technological advancement, on the other hand, both the Ottoman State and the Republic of Turkey had similar tendencies not only to develop their own military equipment but also to construct railway lines as an indicator of modernization and civilization. Sultans Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz, for example, were railway fans. Similarly, in the Republic’s 10th Year Anthem it was declared that ‘every part of the motherland was weaved with iron threads’³²³.

In the Ottoman State, modernization (as an identity re-formation) in respect of both military and state-based issues provoked opposing views wherein three different schools of thought gained strength and validity: Young Ottomans, Islamists, and Young Turks³²⁴. Although none was against importing Western science or technology, they differentiated about how to achieve the modernity.

The first group with leading figures like Şinasi, Namık Kemal and Suavi (though all three were non-identical in their opinions)³²⁵ advocated unification of peoples of all kinds of communities under the roof of Ottoman State. They claimed that the Tanzimat reforms were nothing more than a series of cheap cultural imitation of the West that shook the foundation of the Muslim community. Accordingly, all those pro-western

³¹⁸ Göle, “Modernleşme Bağlamında İslami Kimlik Arayışı”: 75.

³¹⁹ Although the first attempts of women’s emancipation took a start in the 19th century efforts remained limited to a handful of Ottoman intellectuals.

³²⁰ For a good comparison of early republican women’s different views (ones expressing their gratitude for Mustafa Kemal while the others their critics) on the feminine identity of the newly established Turkey, See, Yeşim Arat, “Türkiye’de Modernleşme Projesi ve Kadınlar”, *Türkiye’de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan, Reşat Kasaba, trans. Nurettin Elhüseyni, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998): 82–99.

³²¹ In reference to the focus of this study, it should be noted that similar rights were granted women with the Greek Civil Law adopted in 1946.

³²² It was 15 years earlier than Greece when the Kemalist movement hastened to grant the women the right to vote.

³²³ İlber Ortaylı, *Gelenekten Geleceğe*, 23rd ed. (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2017), 27.

³²⁴ In Tunaya’s original classification it is as follows: Garpcılık (pro-westernism), İslamcılık (pro-Islamism), and Türkçülük (pro-Turkism), See, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi*, 2nd ed., v. 1 (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988), 9–11.

³²⁵ Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 90.

efforts remained shallow and barren in meaning because of the fact that they lacked a corresponding philosophy appertaining to that of Islam,³²⁶ which had all the features to establish ‘political democracy’³²⁷.

The second school with its Naqshbandi³²⁸ remarks was settled by pro-Islamists like Cevdet Pasha and Şirvanizade Rüşdü Pasha who criticized the Ottomans on the ground of losing their cultural identity and demanded the values of sharia³²⁹ be replaced with the Tanzimat³³⁰.

The last circle with its influential doctrine and ideology in the subsequent factions of Turkish nationalism identified themselves as belonging to the Turkish nation, to the Muslim umma(h), and to the Western civilization, respectively³³¹. More broadly, they asserted that the Turks resided in the Ottoman State should have gained national consciousness³³² and sloughed off this heterogeneous structure to form Turan³³³ –a great country of which denizens were comprised of all sorts of Turkic peoples. Its main leading figures were Ziya Gökalp³³⁴ and Yusuf Akçura.

³²⁶ Similar opinion was argued by Gellner. He asserted that the distinctive feature of Islam derives from having its own tradition. Accordingly, Islam has never been in need of imitating others’ tradition, and has the modern characteristics in reference to Weber’s; such as simple, Unitarian, individualist, egalitarian, devoid of religious hierarchy, devoid of magic, etc. See, Ernest Gellner, “Karşılaştırmalı Perspektiften Türk Seçeneği”, *Türkiye’de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan, Reşat Kasaba, trans. Nurettin Elhüseyni, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998): 191; It was also argued by Kabağağaçlı that since there were no holy clerics in Islam it was a secular religion; but when the opinion that Islam’s language should be Arabic also for the non-Arabic peoples purported, it started to be a religion based on the priesthood. See, Musa Cevat Şakir Kabağağaçlı, *Halikarnas Balıkcısı: Düşün Yazıları*, ed. Azra Erhat (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1981), 107.

³²⁷ Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 89.

³²⁸ The Naqshbandi *tariqa* is a major Sunni spiritual order of the Sufi doctrine.

³²⁹ The Islamic Law based on the Koran.

³³⁰ Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 92–93.

³³¹ Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi*, v. 1, 10.

³³² It has to be stated that neither in the Late-Ottoman State (because nationality was an invention of the 19th century) nor in the Turkish Republic the concept of citizenship referred to any ethnicity-based approaches, instead, it was a generic term including all sorts of Etnies such as Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Turks, etc. See, Ahmad, *Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye*, 98–100; For a similar opinion with details, See, Metin Heper, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Tarihi* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011), 50.

³³³ Originally, the land of the Tur in Iranian language which connotes a historical region in Central Asia covering the Mount Kopet-Dag region, the Atrek valley, the eastern Alborz mountains, the Helmand valley, Bactria and Margiana in the Persian mythology. Following the process of Turkification in the aforementioned areas in Central Asia, during the late Ottoman era some Turkish nationalists adopted the term by forming a linkage (though not cultural but ideational) between the original Turanians with the Turkic peoples to express their Turanism doctrine which ascertains the main aspect for the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

³³⁴ He was also the prominent member and the chief thinker of the then ruling Committee of Union and Progress or as later named the Party of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti/Fırkası).

The first name was mainly inspired by Emile Durkheim and his social idealism and proposed the concept of national solidarity, which was also pursued by Mustafa Kemal and nurtured the nucleus of Turkey. Accordingly, the Turkish national solidarity was a replacement of the interests of individuals by the interest of the nation as a whole³³⁵. Contrary to the then-popular classifications of the concept of nation among sociologists,³³⁶ Gökalp claimed that nation was neither related to politics nor decisions, but cultures. He argued that Turkish culture and the Islamic tradition should have been intermingled with Western civilization to lay the basis of national identity. Accordingly, culture was closely associated with education that had to be common and compulsory among the members of the nation. Following his formulation; “genealogy is not sought in nationality. Only education and ideal are sought to be national”³³⁷. In the republican era the same perspective was maintained and national education became the backbone of the reforms since it was regarded as the best instrument of socio-cultural reforms.

The second name³³⁸, on the contrary, was highly impressed by Karl Marx’s historical materialism and Charles Darwin’s struggle for existence³³⁹. Akçura argued that historical events should have been explained by focusing on their economic aspects. By the effect of his highly cited ‘Three Policies’³⁴⁰ he was recognized as the father of ‘Pan-Turkism’. In brief, it meant Turkification of the Muslim communities³⁴¹, as well

³³⁵ In this vision, the society’s interests were placed prior to others’ (such as interests of privileged groups, or any profession, or classes). Atatürk did not raise class struggle and claimed that “Turkey did not have classes in the European sense”, See, Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 182; Moreover, Kemalism was an alternative for Marxism, which studied the society based on class struggles, and Mustafa Kemal refused to confront it. See, Ahmad, *Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye*, 113.

³³⁶ Those were race-based, tribe-based, geography-based, Ottoman-nation/subject-based, umma(h)-based, or individual-based.

³³⁷ Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul: Bordo Siyah Klasik Yayınlar, 2003), 48.

³³⁸ Yusuf Akçura was also a prominent politician and a professor at Istanbul University.

³³⁹ Actually, Mustafa Kemal was also seemingly influenced by Akçura’s drawing on Darwin, following his words: “Gentlemen, as you know, life means struggle and combat. Success in life is only possible with success in struggle”. See, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Gençler İçin Fotoğraflarla Nutuk*, 16th ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018), 296; In addition, it has to be reminded that for some the Speech (Nutuk) was the first initiative to write a national history on purpose for the newly established republic -as “a vindication of the purges of 1925-26”, See, Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 175; According to Koçak, Nutuk was not only a document of military, political, and diplomatic history of the Turkish national struggle, but also an interpretation and an evaluation of the history by the cadres of the national struggle. See, Cemil Koçak, “Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)”, *Türkiye Tarihi 4 - Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, ed. Sina Akşin, v. 4 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989): 106.

³⁴⁰ Originally in Turkish ‘Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset’.

³⁴¹ Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 73–74.

as, the unification of the Turks in Russia³⁴² and China under the roof of the Ottoman State³⁴³.

3.2.2. Republican Era and Atatürk's Reforms

In contrast to the reforms of the Ottoman period,³⁴⁴ the republican reforms of Turkey strived for creating a national identity that was harmonized with the European norms and values. Providing a Western foundation for the newly established nation-state, successive reforms were undertaken by Atatürk and the founding elite to overcome the *obstacle* of the old Ottoman identity on the new Turkish perspective and its progress³⁴⁵.

During the Ottoman era, the state and religion were considered to be identical to each other even though the state acquired a superior commanding authority over the people³⁴⁶. Since Islam's umma(h) system considered all Muslims as constituting one single entity and minimized racial and ethnic differences of the subjects, the regime stayed detached from the rising nationalism and its overtures in the West³⁴⁷. As a result, contrary to its earlier examples in the West³⁴⁸, the Turkish national awakening

³⁴² He claimed that the Russian domination against Tatars and Turks in Russia could have been overcome by uniting with each other and the whole Muslims in the region.

³⁴³ Pan Turkism was an opposite positioning of Turanism which implied the unification of peoples of Turks, Finns, and Hungarians and criticized by Akçura as including romantic and mystic overtones. See, François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, trans. Alev Er, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), 2–50.

³⁴⁴ Reforms of this era were aimed heavily at science and technology for the reason that the target was the survival of the state; not the alteration of the religious and political identity of its subjects. Although the Westernization attempts of the Ottomans were limited, Toynbee considers them successful at least in extending the State's survival for a further century. As is accessible from Toynbee's words: "In fact, though the Ottoman Empire, by adopting Western methods, has achieved what seemed impossible a century and a half ago and has survived—even though with diminished territory and sovereignty—until our day, it has never so far gone much beyond the minimum degree of Westernisation necessary to save it, at any given moment, from going under. It has borrowed more technique than ideas, more military technique than administrative, more administrative than economic and educational". See, Toynbee, *The Western Question In Greece And Turkey: A Study In The Contact Of Civilisations*, 15.

³⁴⁵ Heper, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Tarihi*, 46.

³⁴⁶ Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 83.

³⁴⁷ "Nationalism denotes a change in the way in which people thought of themselves and their relationship with existing institutions. With the emergence of nationalism, people stopped defining themselves primarily as members of a certain religious belief or of a familial lineage but rather as a distinctive group that spoke a particular language, practiced certain customs, and possessed a history of its own". See, Rey Koslowski, Friedrich Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System": 223.

³⁴⁸ The idea of nationalism, popularized by the French Revolution, influenced the East of Europe and triggered national movements in the Balkans (such as the Serbian revolt of 1804) over the territories of the Ottoman State.

and national historiography (as its seedbed) were late to construct a national identity and consolidate the nation³⁴⁹.

The newly founded Turkish Republic by removing religion out from state affairs and politics and by confining it within a framework of belief systems as befits a secular-nation-state supplied its citizens with a national identity and history, which was especially affected by the French and German movements and historiography, wherein clear attributes, such as ‘self-determination’ and ‘sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation’, were perceivable³⁵⁰.

Therefore, the intimate relationship between historiography and nationalism was undetectable not until the first decade of the newly established Turkish Republic³⁵¹. The sources of inspiration for at least the first ten years of the republican period historiography were romanticism, positivism³⁵², and the German historiography. The first one was effective in creating a national mythos and moral substances, the second was for pragmatic and laic objectives of the short-term politics, and the third one was related to foster grounding that ‘ideal-state-power’ were identical³⁵³.

The young republic adopted the European model of nation-state and the European civilization as the guiding principle even though the Italians, Greeks, French, and British had invaded parts of the Ottoman territory, following its defeat in the First World War, and the cadres of the republic had fought a war of independence against the European powers. This might look like a paradox since it was the same European powers that the war of independence was fought against. The republican cadre aimed to become European not only in attire but also in terms of rationality, attachment to science and cultural life due to the wish to achieve the same level of development as these European powers. They thought that only if they could reach the same level of

³⁴⁹ In the Ottomans, the concept of ‘other’ was not developed, not until the late 16th century. See, Doğan Ergun, *Kimlikler Kıskaçında Ulusal Kişilik* (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 2000), 114.

³⁵⁰ Büşra Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*, 4th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), 22.

³⁵¹ *ibid.*, 23.

³⁵² The positivism mentioned above also stemmed from the Ottoman reforms (from Mustafa Reşid to Mustafa Kemal) that were based on Auguste Comte’s positivism and Emile Durkheim’s solidarity. See, Şerif Mardin, “Modern Türk Sosyal Bilimleri Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler”, *Türkiye’de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan, Reşat Kasaba, trans. Nurettin Elhüseyni, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998): 59.

³⁵³ Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*, 26; In the Ottomans, a similar understanding that the welfare of society depend highly on the power of the state was notable. See, Heper, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Tarihi*, 40.

development and modernity as advanced European nations would they be able to protect their independence and sovereignty as a free nation³⁵⁴.

In the founding years, all the efforts were focused on the domestic policies and progress³⁵⁵. The fast pace of developments and comprehensive nature of reforms, thus aroused conflictual sentiments both among the public and the authorities about how to make progress in modernization. The first camp claimed that considerable scientific and technological progress could be achieved through the selective adoption of appropriate aspects of the West³⁵⁶. In this view the main responsible for the backwardness was not the religion-based culture of the Ottoman State, it was the mismanagement of the state, *per se*. The second camp, of which Mustafa Kemal was the leader³⁵⁷, on the other hand, advocated the full adoption of all aspects of European civilization. These holists supported a radical change instead of slight rearrangements, holding the opinion that culture and civilization were inseparable. In this context, the West was regarded as a ‘mentality’, ‘soul’, ‘contemporary civilization’, thus it had to be adopted as a whole otherwise it would be no more than being an imitation³⁵⁸.

The transition period from the-then-present identity to the intended European one could have led to discrepancy or identity conflict in society unless socio-religious institutions and establishments of the Ottoman State were eliminated within a specific plan and order. According to Fuat Keyman, during this period, two levels of secularization implemented: objective secularization –meant removing religious influence, power, or control from state affairs, and subjective secularization –which was the exclusion of religion from the modern-identity construction process. Following the outset of the republican era, an apparent shift was observed on the exercise of the ruler's authority. During the sultanate, religion was allegedly to govern

³⁵⁴ Pınar Bilgin, “Securing Turkey Through Western-Oriented Foreign Policy,” *New Perspectives on Turkey*, v. 40 (Spring 2009): 103–23.

³⁵⁵ Particularly, until the end of the 1930s, high levels of production rates and diversification of products recorded compared to 1920s. In 1923, for example, when the republic was just newly established the country could not even produce matches, whereas in 1935 many factories were built, producing goods such as sugar, paper, cement, and textiles. Turkey was no longer an import-dependent country, but a self-sufficient one that was surprisingly exporting some products to Europe. See, Ahmad, *Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye*, 112.

³⁵⁶ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri* (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), 146.

³⁵⁷ Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 45.

³⁵⁸ Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, 130–31.

the state, whereas in the new secular-state positive law (that is, man-made law) and legal order were to govern both the state and the religions³⁵⁹.

The country's foreign policy, on the other hand, was based on maintaining the *status quo*, and benefitted from the Ottomans' experiences. The founding cadre drew important lessons from their political and military failures in order not to be doomed to a similar collapse. Atatürk espoused the maxim 'Peace in the country, Peace in the world'. This point can be exemplified with Turkey's reluctance of not intervening in a war between other countries without being under the risk of invasion; for the founding cadre of politicians had to contend with the consequences of Ottomans' involvement in the First World War. Likewise, the republican political culture and its precedent bore a close resemblance, and the Ottoman norms and values were quite visible in the new country's foreign-policy-making processes³⁶⁰ that modern Turkey took over the Ottoman State's ministry of foreign affairs and its political memory, and employed one-third of its ambassadors and envoys in the first years of the republican period³⁶¹.

The formation of modern Turkish identity was highly affected by the developments on its East and West that drove the world into a new war, which was expanded to five continents. During the six-year-period of WWII, Turkish foreign policy steered a course of neutrality between the Allied and Axis forces avoiding entering into the war on either side. Foreign policy of the country displayed a delicate balancing act in order not to antagonize any of the warring parties so as to avoid a comprehensive mobilization for the war which would drain the country's already scarce resources or a possible invasion of the country. Since Turkey had not yet recovered neither socially nor economic³⁶² and had still been bearing marks from the independence war when faced with intense threats of invasion and violation of her territorial integrity and sovereignty, avoiding war at all costs remained the highest on her agenda.

³⁵⁹ Fuat Keyman, "Türkiye'de 'Laiklik Sorunu'nu Düşünmek: Modernite, Sekülerleşme, Demokratikleşme", *Doğu Batı*, no. 23 (July 2003): 115–18.

³⁶⁰ Heper, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Tarihi*, 37.

³⁶¹ Baskın Oran, İlhan Uzgel, "Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği", *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919-1980)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 13th ed., v. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008): 75.

³⁶² During the period between 1923-1939, most sources were allocated to develop the newly founded nation-state and as a result, the military forces had been inevitably neglected.

Throughout the war, the language of political discourse was volatile and subject to sudden shifts and changes. To give an example, when the German troops were in an advantageous position against the Soviets and advancing on Stalingrad, the Turanian wave, which was funded and supported by the Germans,³⁶³ was being praised by the government, but when it appeared that the Germans would be defeated then the Turanian groups started to be described as ‘racist traitors’,³⁶⁴ and even blamed by the President İnönü himself on 19 May 1944, in his official speech given during the anniversary of Youth and Sports Day. Leaders of the Pan-Turkism movement were arrested in those days, but their trials were started in 1947 when the enemy was no more Germany, but Moskva; As a result, the Turanian defendants were acquitted and praised as the *patriots fighting against communism*, and Pan-Turkism stayed valid as a sound element of the domestic clash in the Turkish identity³⁶⁵.

Although it was not participated in the war,³⁶⁶ the country seemed like transformed into another one at the end of the war, of which political repercussions were opened old wounds of the republican cadres, increasing tension between the government and opposition. In brief, Turkey's founding characteristics were derailed and impaired, and the public became alienated to the regime. Consequently, “the socio-political agreement, which was constructed with enormous efforts to form the basic fabric of the nation-state during the period of 1923-1939, was broken”³⁶⁷.

3.2.3 Aftermath of WWII and the Transatlantic Alliance

The factors driving Europe into a second war, provoked the traditional political culture wherein not institutional but personal attitudes, passions and choices dominated the state affairs³⁶⁸. This tendency was ended up with the leaders’ acquisition of a deepened and expanded freedom which sidelined institutionalization and led them into a position where statespeople were shielded by privileges and immune to the rule of laws. The ones engaged in politics and public administration and management had their

³⁶³ Ahmad, *Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye*, 121.

³⁶⁴ Baskın Oran, “1939-1945: Savaş Kaosunda Türkiye: Görelî Özerklik- 2”, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919-1980)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 13th ed., v. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008): 397.

³⁶⁵ Ahmad, *Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye*, 121.

³⁶⁶ It has to be noted that since the country signed an alliance agreement with Britain and France on the eve of war (on 19 October 1939) Turkey is defined as non-belligerent, not a neutral country.

³⁶⁷ Oran, “1939-1945: Savaş Kaosunda Türkiye: Görelî Özerklik- 2”: 391.

³⁶⁸ Heper, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Tarihi*, 43.

inclination to exhibit a position of all-or-nothing; that they had never been seeking to reach a common decision or solution³⁶⁹. This peculiar type of doing politics stimulated political figures to criticize others' failures and mishaps not for finding a middle ground but for the other's defeat. The Turkish political leaders that once they were elected, remained in the office until they were toppled; due to the weak democracy the resignation remained not very common in the Turkish culture³⁷⁰.

War conditions and her decision of avoiding it precluded Turkey from starting any attempt or initiative concerning the events in her neighborhood, thus her involvement remained limited with non- military forms of intervention such as humanitarian aid. In the perspective of Greek-Turkish relations, such cases were recorded during the Great Famine in Greece, between the 1941-1942 German occupation³⁷¹.

Although, she stayed neutral during much of the war, Turkey declared war against Germany on 23 February 1945 approximately 2 months before the end of the WWII. Turkey aimed to guarantee her place in the emerging international system following the war and be a member of the United Nations together with the Allied countries that were the victors of the war. İnönü's decision to make a transition to multiparty politics can also be evaluated in this light, i.e. as an effort to side with the USA and Allied powers. Democracy was emerging as a predominant value of the US-led Western system following the defeat of fascism. Although Turkey succeeded in her commitment to stay out from war, the economic and social conditions of the country worsened than ever³⁷². As a result of mobilizing approximately one million men for the possible war, Turkey's production rates decreased and even the most essential agricultural products went on the black market. Consequently, at the end of the war, a new bourgeois class consisted of those accumulated their capital through the war took their place on the scene of politics³⁷³. Moreover, in the post-war period, the links with the West strengthened, and Turkey established closer ties than ever; not only

³⁶⁹ Baskın Oran, İlhan Uzgöl, "Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği", 20.

³⁷⁰ *ibid*, 37.

³⁷¹ About the destructive effects of the mass starvation in Greece and the humanitarian relief supported by Turkey via the famous Turkish cargo ship –Kurtuluş–, see, Elçin Macar, *İşte Geliyor Kurtuluş: Türkiye'nin II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Yunanistan'a Yardımları (1940-1942)* (İzmir: İzmir Ticaret Odası, 2009).

³⁷² As to exemplify the condition of the country; it has to be recorded that in 1945 the country's agricultural production ratio was 60 % less than the rate of 1939; moreover, in 1942 the inflation rate soared to 93,7 (a year ago it was 38,5%). See, Oran, "1939-1945: Savaş Kaosunda Türkiye: Görelî Özerklik- 2", 389–90.

³⁷³ *ibid*, 391.

ideological but also economic and military. The strong desire to become an integral part of the West stayed as the main motive behind the Turkish foreign policy decisions during the Cold War years –under the threat of the Soviets³⁷⁴. To this end, the Turkish bureaucracies and elites fostered a sort of positive tendency towards the West and took a position against communism in order not to get *shattered* up to their country's foundations. The Turkish identity and nationalism, therefore, nurtured mainly with anti-communist premises of the Western Bloc³⁷⁵.

In 1947, when the Truman doctrine was introduced, Turkey's western alliance became cemented and furnished with further developments including her acceptance to OEEC³⁷⁶ in 1948 and to the Council of Europe in 1949, and eventually to NATO in 1952, which was instilled as an utmost important membership of the country in the traditional Turkish nationalism. In fact, not only her zeal for westernization but also her perception of the intense Soviet threat had been effective in determining international relations of the country get anchored in the western camp³⁷⁷.

During the Cold War era, including three military coups³⁷⁸ (in 1960, 1971, and 1980), a common understanding was formed about the reliability and consistency of the

³⁷⁴ Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 58.

³⁷⁵ In fact, confining Turkish nationalism only within the right-wing nationalist parties would not display the true image of the country's nationalistic overtones. The Republican Peoples Party and afterward The Democratic Left Party, for example, were left-wing parties with nationalistic preferences observable in the speech of the latter's leader -Ecevit, following the Cyprus movement of Turkey, he makes reference to the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel during whose government poppy planting was banned, and to the Nationalist Movement Party of Alparslan Türkeş- for explaining the distinctive nature of his nationalism. In his words : "We do not take nationalism lesson from Demirel and Türkeş. Dear sisters and brothers, we had written the nationalism, not on the street walls, but on the lands of Cyprus, on the seabed of the Aegean. We had written the nationalism on the poppy fields of Western Anatolia". See, *Bülent Ecevit'in Tarihi Konuşması*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZzBkG8EEzU>. [13.08.2019].

³⁷⁶ Re-organized and re-named as OECD in 1961.

³⁷⁷ Turkey's allegiance to NATO and the West continued relentlessly; that when the USSR, following Stalin's death in 1953, tried to forge a close bond with Turkey, the government replied that there was no one –neither in the Democrat nor in the Republican Peoples Party– who would take a step that would damage her relations with the USA. Another Russian attempt to restore friendly relations and launch peace offensive with Turkey took place shortly afterward the fall of PM Adnan Menderes. In response, PM İsmet İnönü stated that Turkey was integrated into the Western system and therefore it would be impossible for her to become neutral or an ally and cooperate with the USSR. According to Feroz Ahmad, post-27 May coup period was more dependent on NATO and America than the Democrats had been, following his words: "Turkey had opted for the hard American position in the cold war and was reluctant to abandon it even after Washington had done so". See, Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977), 393.

³⁷⁸ Although the military had been kept out of politics during the rule of Mustafa Kemal, following his death they got involved in taking necessary measures "for the protection of the existence and independence of the State, the unity and indivisibility of the country, and the general interest, and peace and security of society" as part of their intrinsic task. See, Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (North Humberstone: The Eothen Press, 1985), 126.

country's security arrangements that were almost completely backed by NATO forces, with the exception of two events: The Cuban Missile Crises of 1962 and the Cyprus Crisis of 1964 (and so-called Johnson letter³⁷⁹). Turkey, for the first time, questioned her rigid Western alliance, especially her NATO membership and the assurance given to her, and the disadvantages of pursuing US-based interests and policies³⁸⁰. In other words, the western bonds of the Turkish identity and the sense of trust were bruised. These developments, especially the obstruction of the US President Lyndon Johnson on Turkey's accessibility to the NATO ammunition and equipment in a struggle for her individual interests (namely intervening in the conflicts so as to secure the Turkish minority in Cyprus) formed the basis of the long-term Anti-American sentiment in the country.

In fact, leaving its neutral stance and balance foreign policy, her pursuit of US policies gave the impression that Turkey was an American satellite country. This opinion led the country to get isolated and diminished its efficacy and role of inspiration among the other countries that were struggling against the Western world for their independence³⁸¹. Turkey was left alone in the UN (most Third World countries did not support Turkey³⁸²), on 18 December 1965, about the resolution of General Assembly to restrict the limits of Turkish rights and interests on Cyprus.

During the coalition government of Republican Peoples and National Salvation Parties, in 1974, after the first and the second ones (in 1964 and 1967, respectively) suppressed –in a sense abated; the third Cyprus crisis sparked, with riots and revolts

³⁷⁹ For a detailed study on the effects and repercussions of the Johnson letter in the Turkish foreign policy and society, see, Haluk Şahin, *Gece Gelen Mektup: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Dönüm Noktası* (İstanbul: Cep Yayınları, 1987); On the other hand, another derogatory statement, by the same name, was being screened for Greece: "F*** your Parliament and your Constitution, America is an elephant, Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If those two fleas continue to itch the elephant, they just may get whacked by the elephant's trunk, whacked good". These intemperate words were reportedly spoken to the Greek ambassador in Washington by President Johnson in 1964. See, William Mallinson, *A Modern History: Cyprus* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 1.

³⁸⁰ Until then Turkey did not distinguish any conflict between her own role and the role cast by NATO for her and see no harm in leaving her neutral policies. Such examples could be as: Turkey detached herself from the movement of non-alignment at the Bandung Conference, Turkey voted against the independence of Algeria at the UN, etc.

³⁸¹ Baskın Oran, "Bağılantısızlar ve Türkiye", *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919-1980)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 13th ed., v. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008): 677.

³⁸² Due to the fear of being dragged into a new war and Stalin's threats, Turkey adopted anti-communist government policies as a state tradition. Thus, it continued as a routine of governments until the detente. For a brief list of the western-oriented activities of the governments, see, Tunçay, "Siyasal Tarih (1950-1960)", 180.

that disrupted public order. This time the attempt to land Turkish troops on the island succeeded and Turkey confronted the arms embargo imposed by the USA which caused shortages of military supplies and equipment and rocketing of their prices. In this period of détente, Turkey embarked on forging a healthy relationship and closer ties with the USSR to re-maintain her traditional balance-diplomacy between the two superpowers. According to Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, this re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy “was not a result of an identity crisis” and “Turkey’s identity crisis was in most part related to her relations with Europe rather than the United States”³⁸³. Not only the US embargo but also the decline both in the Soviet threat perception and in the strategic importance of Turkey could have caused this shift and provided appropriate conditions to adopt a much neutral stance in her international relations. Yet the country was both not sure and not ready to retreat into neutrality. According to Feroz Ahmad, “[t]he East-West détente always worried Ankara, for the foreign policy specialists argued that Turkey’s geographical position was too delicate to enable any government to pursue neutrality”³⁸⁴. Therefore, for a long time, the country had retained to be the only one within the other NATO members that had not improved her relations with the USSR³⁸⁵.

In the wake of her foreign policies’ reversal, Turkey was trying to balance her relations with western and eastern initiatives and commitments, by keeping a high profile in the NATO missions and supporting the US policies, as well as, making several agreements with the USSR³⁸⁶ especially on trade and technology³⁸⁷. Westernization throughout the Cold War was not limited to NATO affiliation, Turkey in order to obtain a formal western identity decided to follow a second track shaped by long-term foreign policy calculations of the country. This decision, however, would lead her into a ceaseless pursuit of Europeanization that was maintained also in the difficult times of the country; such as the periods of fragile coalition governments and of coups. Probably

³⁸³ Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, 67.

³⁸⁴ Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, 402.

³⁸⁵ Erel Tellal, “SSCB’yle İlişkiler”, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919-1980)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 13th ed., v. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008): 775.

³⁸⁶ Although several Russian-Turkish attempts recorded in this period, according to Feroz Ahmad ‘Turkish foreign policy changed its structure but not its foundations’ because ‘Ankara’s relations with Moscow were modified, in keeping with guidelines established by NATO’. See, Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, 421.

³⁸⁷ Such were also included funds for the establishment of Aliğa Oil Refinery, Seydişehir Aluminum Factory, Bandırma Sulfuric Acid Factory, Artvin Timber Factory, İskenderun Iron and Steel Factory. See, Tellal, “SSCB’yle İlişkiler”, 782.

of the belief that the country was a sound member of the West, under the premiership of Adnan Menderes, subsequent to her NATO membership, Turkey made an application for associate membership of the European Economic Community in 1959. Apart from reasons such as strengthening the economic development or proving the Europeanness of the country, the ‘Greek factor’ as has been marked by a good many of scholars could have been another motive that triggered Turkey to apply for an association agreement only after two months later than the Greek application. The-then FM Fatin Rüştü Zorlu stated that “If Greece is jumping into a swimming pool, it is essential to follow her even though that pool is empty”³⁸⁸. However, in this period, Turkey’s European venture remained limited and problematic due to political turmoil and economic downturn in Turkey which made the fulfillment of commitments under the Association Agreement and Additional Protocol impossible.

The most important political development during the cold war years, with its transformative effect on the Turkish identity can be the 1980 coup. In Turkey, although the military had ousted the democratically elected governments for two previous times the 1980 takeover left behind a painful scene which was like ‘a battlefield’; that it approximately blacklisted two-millions of citizens –ranging from trade unionists, politicians, teachers to journalists; in brief almost anyone with leftist or right-wing worldview³⁸⁹. With the 1980 coup, the military was such strongly aspired to make *a new start* in Turkish politics³⁹⁰ that even the archives of the political parties “disappeared and were probably destroyed”³⁹¹. Traditionally, the military professionals were barred from involving in statecraft by the Ottoman dynasty and the Turkish bureaucracies, respectively. This attempt, however, had never succeeded and the coup’s grievous damage to the democratization of Turkish identity³⁹² resulted in

³⁸⁸ Sadık Rıdvan Karluk, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: Beta Yayınevi, 2002), 465.

³⁸⁹ Bülent Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980-1995)”, *Türkiye Tarihi 5 - Bugünkü Türkiye 1980-1995*, ed. Sina Akşin, 2nd ed., v. 5 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997): 92.

³⁹⁰ According to Akşin, 12 September made the most brute Atatürk enmity while saying that they were the Atatürkist. During this period, they also attempted the Turkish-Islamist synthesis to become the state’s official ideology. See, Sina Akşin, “Düşünce Tarihi (1945 Sonrası)”, *Türkiye Tarihi 5 - Bugünkü Türkiye 1980-1995*, ed. Sina Akşin, 2nd ed., v. 5 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997): 221.

³⁹¹ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 279.

³⁹² The 1980 coup d’état imposed many prohibitions and restrictions on the young Turkish democracy, with the promise of ensuring the safety of citizens in the public sphere such as universities or streets. This new secure freedom zone –the 1980s Turkey– brought limitations on personal freedoms, which was particularly perceived by the detention and arrest in the name of security investigations. Among others striking ones could be listed as; freedom of religion and belief (by forcing the students of primary and secondary education to take compulsory course of Religious Culture and Knowledge of Ethics based on a single sect which would paradoxically be propagated as the secular state’s religion), freedom

re-wakening of armed authority fear among the citizens and raising apolitical generations³⁹³. Consequently, the Turkish culture and the everyday life were extraordinarily depoliticized; that making politics was confined between the politicians and paradoxically the military of the country.

The 1980's junta took significant steps also in the Turkish foreign policy, such was the case with Greece's re-admission to NATO's military wing³⁹⁴. Previously, Turkey had demanded from Greece to demilitarize the Eastern Aegean island in compliance with the Treaty of Lausanne but the Turkish demand was refused by the Greek authority declaring that Greece had a right to defend her territory. Subsequently, NATO Alliance excluded Limnos (located on the northeastern part of the Aegean just off the Turkish shores) from its 'threatened area' assurance because of Turkey's objections to fortification of the Greek islands. Due to its condition of unanimity, decisions on admitting new members to the Alliance had to be taken unanimously, as was laid in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. This condition caused another deadlock between Turkey and Greece when the latter's request for re-entry into NATO had been blocked by the refusal of the first since 1976. Subsequent to the 1980 Turkish coup, the-then Greek Foreign Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis extensively aired the Greek warnings to NATO and threats to the USA that if a solution for the Greek re-admission to the Alliance could not have been achieved the American military bases in Greece would have been removed³⁹⁵.

of mass media (firmly cemented with the establishment of Radio and Television Supreme Council in 1994), freedom of science and arts, freedom of association (including right to strike and syndicate), freedom of assembly and demonstration, and the state of emergency implementations became common and continual. See, Tanör, "Siyasal Tarih (1980-1995)", 91-98.

³⁹³ Contrarily, Göle points out that the post-1980 period was not apolitical, instead, it was a harmonious period where the old polarization and conflicts of the 1960s and 70s between the right and left wings of the country were replaced by coexistence and consensus. See, Nilüfer Göle, "80 Sonrası Politik Kültür", *Türkiye'de Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme*, ed. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2000): 425.

³⁹⁴ In 1974, As a protest Greece left the military wing of NATO following the Turkish Operation of Atilla in Cyprus

³⁹⁵ In Mitsotakis's words: "We do not want to do it. We do not want to be De Gaulle, but Greece must return to the alliance, or it must withdraw its application for a return before the Greek elections next year. [...] It is crucial that the United States try to persuade Turkey to reach a solution in the next few weeks. The new military government will be taking a position during that time, we are not trying to set deadlines or employ blackmail, but this has to be settled well before the election campaign begins" See, Jim Hoag, "Greece Threatens to Cut Ties to NATO", *The Washington Post*, 1 October 1980, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/10/01/greece-threatens-to-cut-ties-to-nato/76ba0fc5-b937-4ab4-8d33-146630b7aadd/>. [21.08.2019].

Following these developments, the Turkish junta broke the deadlock and lifted the veto on Greece's re-entry into the military wing of NATO, holding hopes for a political return in favor of Turkey that was allegedly promised by General Bernard W. Rogers of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe to General Kenan Evren of Turkey³⁹⁶.

The relations with the EC, on the other hand, after the coup, were suspended until 1986³⁹⁷. One year after the restart of relations, Turkey made a formal application to join the EC which caught the European by surprise since they were involved in the task of completing the internal market and had already expanded to include Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The Commission prepared its opinion on Turkey's application which put forth that Turkey was not yet ready to become a member. The then PM Turgut Özal in an effort to support Turkey's application to join the EC published a book in French³⁹⁸ and distributed throughout Europe. It is worth mentioning that according to the official Turkish view in the book, the roots of the European civilization had not nested in the geography of Modern Greece but in Anatolia and Mesopotamia wherein Turks had long settled as 'home' since the prehistoric periods. Reportedly, Hittites, Ions, and the first Anatolian Christians were the ancestors of Turks, as by marriages the descendants of the Turks were mingled with the descendants of the Christians³⁹⁹.

³⁹⁶ Answers of Kenan Evren –Chief of the General Staff of the 1980 Coup– to the questions asked (31 years after the coup) by the prosecutor of the coup investigation that took place in 2011 also covered the abovementioned Rogers Plan. His explanation –an extended public hearing– about the developments that could be simplified as 'NATO decision was a mistake' were as follow: "Question: Turkey has experienced problems with Greece in the Aegean for years. After the coup, the USA and the states that were effective in the region such as Britain reacted positively to the September 12 military coup. Accordingly, was Greece's return to NATO promised, before the coup? Answer: [This question] had always been asked to me. Before September 12, Turkey had been under intense pressure, also from NATO's Supreme Commander Rogers, for Greece's return to NATO. And the government was sending a delegation to NATO to negotiate these issues, from time to time. This delegation also included the-then Deputy Chief of General Staff Haydar Saltık. The government was stipulating certain conditions for Greece's return, but NATO did not accept it. After the seizure of the government, pressures continued on this issue. Rogers said "[if] you let Greece return to NATO, I will make Greece accept your terms. We obtained a promise from them." I trusted in him and approved Greece's return to NATO. However, after our approval, there was a change of government in Greece; [that] Papandreou came and did not accept our terms. We were assured that Greece would sign the conditions we had given Rogers in written. It was a mistake to allow Greece's return to NATO without a written assurance. See, "İşte Kenan Evren'in Sorgudaki İfadeleri", *İnternet Haber*, 18 June 2011, <https://www.internethaber.com/iste-kenan-evrenin-sorgudaki-ifadeleri-354051h.htm>. [22.08.2019].

³⁹⁷ "Türkiye Avrupa Birliği Kronolojisi (1959-2015)", TC Avrupa Birliği Başkanlığı, https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/5%20Ekim/turkiye_avrupa_birligi_iliskileri_kronolojisi.pdf. [22.08.2019].

³⁹⁸ Turgut Özal, *La Turquie En Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1988).

³⁹⁹ Etienne Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine*, trans. Ali Berktaş (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 357–59.

Although Turkey would struggle to proceed with her Europeanization at all costs⁴⁰⁰ she would not achieve as much success as she did with her NATO relations. Turkey somehow sustained stable and close relations with NATO, but could not perform a similar basis for her Euro-relations, for NATO was a strategic partnership based especially on military purposes whereas the European Community appeared to be a socio-economic alliance based on the cultural harmonization as a whole. The customs union between Turkey and the EC that was based on the decision of the Association Council in 1995 had an important effect on Turkey's adaptation to EC norms and standards in areas such as consumer rights, competition policy and production standards and led to integration into EU value chains. However, Turkey became one of few countries –Turkey, San Marino and Andorra– that entered into a customs union with the EU before becoming a member of the bloc. This situation created problems in sustaining a close economic integration with the EU. As Turkey proceeded in the path of EU accession during the 2000s, the process was mostly dependent on Turkey's fulfilment of the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria⁴⁰¹.

In addition to the country's domestic turmoil after the coup, the ending of the cold war also had an overbearing effect on Turkish national identity. The dissolution of the Soviet Union meant the loss of the number one enemy of the NATO Alliance of which Turkey was a member. The formation of new states in the former Soviet territories and the emergence of Turkic republics which were culturally and ethnically affiliated with Turkey meant a complete transformation of Turkey's geography. These areas which were formerly shut away from any kind of close contact and interaction were now opened to exchanges including trade, finance, culture and tourism. Moreover, the ending of the cold war also meant the ending of the bipolar World system opening of new possibilities and also new security risks as best exemplified in the eruption of the Yugoslav civil war⁴⁰². These tectonic changes which had an enormous yet gradual impact on Turkey's national identity and her relations with Greece, for example they

⁴⁰⁰ Turkey encountered severe financial problems and economic deterioration in some phases while adapting herself to the Common Market.

⁴⁰¹ Senem Aydın Düzgü, E. Fuat Keyman, "Turkey and European Integration: Toward Fairness and Reciprocity", *Globalization, Alternative Modernities, and Democracy: Remaking Turkey*, ed. E. Fuat Keyman (Lanham - Boulder - New York - Toronto - Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008): 246–48.

⁴⁰² Çiğdem Nas, Yonca Özer, *Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 9–10.

differed in their chosen positions (Turkey supported Bosnia and Herzegovina whereas Greece supported Serbia), are all elaborated in the next section.

3.3. Ending of the Cold War and the Search for a New Identity in Greece and Turkey

The Post-Cold War period brought discordant opinions on Turkey's and Greece's new roles and levels of significance within the new world order. While Turkey had long been the *bulwark* of NATO against communism during the Cold War, the new period revealed unforeseen conditions. There were conflicting forecasts about NATO's significance in the international arena where Warsaw Pact was no more in existence, thus NATO was expected to lose its ground. Facing concerns about sustaining her high-level geostrategic importance of being adjacent to the USSR, as a compensation, Turkey conducted a more moderate and inclusive foreign policy towards the newly independent Turkic states which formed an arc from Central Asia to the Caucasus. With this in mind, Demirel⁴⁰³, the seasoned Turkish Prime Minister at the time, came up with the phrase *Turkic world from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China*⁴⁰⁴.

In the Post-Cold War period, the Greek politicians predicted a much lesser strategic role for Turkey⁴⁰⁵, due to the dissolution of the arch-enemy of NATO –the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. It was also thought that the Gulf War would provide an appraisal for Cyprus's geographical position in the near future. These changes in strategic calculations led to ascendance in the role of nationalism in the Greek foreign policy. Greece prioritized her national heritage in developing politics. The post-cold war atmosphere exacerbated ethnic clashes and nationalistic politics; such as the resurgence of Greek minority conflict between Greece and Albania, and the name dispute with Macedonia. Greece's close relationship with Milosevic's Serbia –due to possibly of historical, cultural, and religious factors– initiated long-lasting adverse effects and left negative marks on Bosnia. Greece remained the only NATO member

⁴⁰³ It has to be noted that the pioneer of this active policy might be Turgut Özal, the then President of Turkey, who maintained that “the 21st century would belong to Turkey and Turks”, by referring to the country as a regional power. See, Gencer Özcan, “Türkiye Dış Politikasında Oluşum Süreci”, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: DER Yayınları, 2004): 832.

⁴⁰⁴ Çiğdem Nas, “Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy and the European Union”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, v. 9, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 119–21.

⁴⁰⁵ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: DER Yayınları, 2006), 608.

to express her disapproval and condemnation of NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Greece's efforts of reshaping her notion of West, as balancing the EU with the USA failed, and Greece went off pursuing more achievable goals within the EU. In other words, the disappointment, and in turn the distancing of the USA enhanced adopting and following pure Eurocentric policies, and strengthening Greece's role in Europe achieved a new priority. 'Modernization' became the key term during the 90s in Greece since it was considered the only path towards a Europeanized Greece. As the new reformist PM Simitis declared in the parliament⁴⁰⁶:

[GR] "To create a modern, strong Greece... For the equal participation of the Country in European integration... For the security of the country with a policy of actively promoting national laws, rights and interests... To develop a competitive and dynamic economy... For a social state... For the modernization of the State and the Administration... The Greek people have given us the commandment to realize all these goals in order to ensure and complete our work: For a society with a patriotic conscience inspired by Solomos's saying 'National is true'⁴⁰⁷. [...] Many circles of missed opportunities have been opened and closed in the past, as national egoisms and rough heroisms often led to incomplete deeds".

Greece was set back by nationalist perspectives for so long that most of her then-problems were due to not conforming to government programs, administrative reforms, and to regulations on economic and political life, and on many major projects. PM Simitis, in his allegory, anthropomorphized the situation of the country in which it was desperately struggling and starting over and over again: "Sisyphus"⁴⁰⁸ is a mythical model that does not suit us and should not be followed. We must in all ways avoid it".⁴⁰⁹

Further steps were expected to be taken and Greece proceeded with 'equal integration into the EU' which was of vital interest, for the EU was considered something beneficial to states that wanted to improve themselves so to be competitive in the new world order after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and bipolarity. Therefore, Greece did not feel any pressure or coercion coming from the EU in implementing *Brussels*

⁴⁰⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 1st Session, 4th Sitting, (10.10.1996): 22, http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/10_10_96.pdf [29.10.2017]. [Konstantinos Georgios Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁴⁰⁷ "Εθνικόν το αληθές" (ethnikon to alýthes) is a well-known phrase of Solomos taught at schools, means that 'a nation should consider as national what is true'. According to analysts what Solomos says is an antidote to nationalism. He tries to put an end on every national myth in which nationalism is built. If we consider as national what is true, then for all persons there will be one country: the truth.

⁴⁰⁸ Sisyphus or Sisyphos is a mythological character punished for being boastful and fraudulent. He was convicted to roll a boulder up a steep hill and let it roll down when it is on top and re-start the action for eternity. It represents the endless, meaningless, and painful labour.

⁴⁰⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (10.10.1996): 22. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

recipes since they were evaluated as the Greek national strategy. As it was repeatedly stated by PM Simitis, if a state wants to ensure its development of either economic or social policies it should follow a full commitment to the EU but it “must not be a follower like a tail, it must be an equal [member] country of the European Union.”⁴¹⁰

The absolute stabilization of the economy would be the first measure to be implemented for the country’s development. The EU did not need to get involved in the process since “they [were] dealing with themselves and not with [Greece]”, and the common interest was to build up a system that the European centre would utilize. The policy of securing national interests within Europe was believed not possible without a general understanding of Europe. As a result, clarified by the Foreign Minister, “Greece [was] not bound by any foreign economic policy, any economic policy due to pressure or the membership of the European Union”⁴¹¹.

Challenges and opportunities –stemming from continued volatility and instability in the Balkans, the Middle East, Caucasus, and the growing international competition for industrialized countries’ access to Central Asia’s natural resources– were expected to raise the geo-strategic importance of the two countries. In this respect, Greece took measures for strengthening its security, with regard to the central geopolitical position of herself and to the shift of international security from East-West to North-South relations. The international position of Greece, expected to gain special emphasis, as the focus of international security was shifting from Central Europe and from the outdated East-West conflict to the periphery of the European continent and especially to the warm waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Both Greece and Cyprus were, therefore, claimed to be the new most crucial elements in shaping regional security conditions⁴¹²:

[GR] “Over the next few years, our country can capitalize on its unique strategic position so that Greece becomes a central stabilizing factor in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as a vital link of this region with Europe. Therefore, the developments [...] have created new facts and orientations regarding the Greek defense strategy. [...] That is part of the strategy that aims to strengthen Greece’s position in the near as well as in the wider international area”.

⁴¹⁰ *ibid*, 23. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM]

⁴¹¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 1st Session, 6th Sitting, (12.10.1996): 111, http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/12_10_96.pdf [29.10.2017]. Theodoros Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

⁴¹² *ibid*, 119. [Apostolos-Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

Turkey, on the other side, was making new policies to become a regional power in the short run and a global one in the long. As was declared, saving the strengthened geo-strategic position of the country necessitated high level of globalization which was hidden behind the gates of the EU. Accordingly, the EU was considered an asset and a precondition for having a say in the international balances.

[TR] “Turkey is the pioneer of a world in the newly formed world. This world’s name is ‘Eurasian World’, which has Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, on one side, and Mongolia [of] today’s Mongol nation, on the other. On these [lands] there are those who are Turks and who are not, but the Turkic world is the pioneer and the potential leader of the Eurasian world”⁴¹³.

[TR] “Our country has entered a historical period in the process of globalization and integration with the world. This gives the opportunity to benefit highly from the advantages of the customs union and globalization to be realized in line with the goal of full membership with the European Union”⁴¹⁴.

The relationship with Greece was critical in Turkey’s relations with the EU⁴¹⁵. Turkey would have to achieve strides in resolving her disputes with Greece if she wanted to progress in her goal of accession to the EU. This process would therefore necessitate an alteration of identity notions of *self* and *other*, a more Europeanized national identity and Greece at worst as a ‘friendly other’⁴¹⁶.

Turkey’s rapprochement with Europe and actively seeking the goal of EU membership increased the EU’s and thereby Greece’s leverage on Turkey. While the European dimension of Turkish identity became more pronounced during this period the so-called Eurasianist dimension receded. Secretary-General of the National Security Council of Turkey, Tuncer Kılınc, proposed to be part of an alternative alliance composed of Russia and Iran as opposed to the EU path⁴¹⁷. However, the declaration

⁴¹³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 6th Session, v. 1, (30.01.1996): 87, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c001/tbmm20001006.pdf> [24.08.2017]. [Namık Kemal Zeybek, DYP, the then MP].

⁴¹⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 21st Session, v. 2, (10.03.1996): 94-95, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c002/tbmm20002021.pdf> [26.02.2018]. [Saffet Arıkan Bedük, DYP, the then MP].

⁴¹⁵ During this period, initiatives of rapprochement or reconciliation between the governments were receded by some sad incidents, such as the one occurred in İstanbul. On the 9th of April 1991, a Greek tour bus burst into flames, which, according to the Turkish authorities, was supposedly ignited by gas leakage. Unfortunately, 36 Greek tourists died and this bad event was alleged to be an attack on Greeks by the nationalist Turks. See, <http://www.gecmisgazete.com/haber/otobuste-yangin-36-turist-feci-sekilde-oldu>; <https://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/sayfa/1991/4/10.xhtml>. [02.08.2019].

⁴¹⁶ The term is borrowed from Risse’s fruitful study on the European integration of Britain and the correlation between the British and the European identities. See, Thomas Risse, *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2010), 83–84.

⁴¹⁷ “MGK Sekreterinden AB’ye Tepki”, 7 March 2002, <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/128420/mgk-sekreterinden-ab-ye-tepki> [16.02.2020]; Mustafa Kınalı, Levent Arslan, “AB Dışında, Rusya ve İran’la Yeni Arayışa Girilmeli”, 8 March 2003, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ab-disinda-rusya-ve-iranla-yeni-arayisa-girilmeli-58466>. [12.04.2019].

of Turkey's candidacy to the EU in Helsinki in 1999 and the 2001 economic crisis were instrumental in forging a consensus among the major parties regarding EU induced reforms. The ascendance of the European dimension in Turkish identity also led to an improvement in relations with Greece and elevated the European dimension in Turkish national identity.

The second half of 90s –for the EU– was a period involved several fields of negotiation, the results of which decisively influenced the members' positions, the prospects for enlargement, and the foreign and security policy of the Union, as well as the responsibility for peacekeeping and humanitarian work. Amending the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam which enacted member states to delegate certain powers from their national level to the EU's supranational level (the European Parliament), signed in 1997 after a long ratification process. Within this period, Greece paid special attention to the enlargement policy concerning Cyprus, and to the reform of the structural funds and the Union's budget, and in turn to the transition to the Economic and Monetary Union, which would open up a new period of economic growth, employment and social protection. In PM Simitis's words⁴¹⁸:

[GR] “If we fail to secure our interests, if we fail to strengthen our position in these [...] crucial negotiations that will come in the future years we'll risk what we've built for so many years. [...] For next year, budget issues and macroeconomic planning are particularly crucial. [...] 1997 will clearly show whether the growth and stabilization of our macroeconomic data is firmly established. Greece [...] will be judged in the coming years for our participation in the Economic and Monetary Union. [...] It's our firm decision to complete the conditions for the country's accession to EMU by the end of the decade. For our government, the budget problem has a national priority. [...] We should not forget that only the interest paid by the State is more than the expenses for defense, education, health and welfare all together”.

Greece fiscal consolidation was therefore a basic precondition for the country's participation of the European unification. For the success of entire state policies, a governmental action based on five pillars was organized. As the traditional equilibrium that existed during the Cold War was disrupted, new dynamics were purportedly being developed where each state were rebalancing its conduct and interest. In this respect, PM Simitis positioned Greece as surrounded by a world where everyone develops action in every direction and set the country's first pillar as foreign policy and national security. The economic gap that separated Greece from the developed industrialized countries considered to have a direct impact on Greece's international relations and an ability to defend her national laws; as stated by Simitis: “One can't be effective on the

⁴¹⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament* (10.10.1996): 25. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

international scene, which constantly borrows, looks forward to financial support and constantly calls for exceptions to existing rules. This gap must be closed. And it must be closed immediately”⁴¹⁹. Since Greece was being “the subject of severe criticism from her European partners for being a drag on the European economy”⁴²⁰ achieving economic conditions and getting admission to the Economic and Monetary Union became *a matter of pride and prestige* for the country.

The changing circumstances of the ending of the Cold War brought about new threats and opportunities for both Turkey and Greece. While Greece aimed to consolidate its position within the EU and struggled not to fall behind the accelerated pace of European integration, she also did not abandon her adherence to nationalistic policies against her eastern neighbor Turkey. However, Greece’s dropping her veto against Turkey in the EU and opening the door to Turkey’s candidacy was *an important game-changer*. Greece preferred to extend a hand and include Turkey into the process of European integration aiming to pacify Turkey and eliminate threats that may emanate from a resurgent Turkey isolated from Europe.

Turkey, on the other hand, struggled to find a new identity and strategic role in the Post-Cold War order. While her relations with the EU dated back to 1959, the Central and East European countries that engaged in a process of liberal reforms after 1989 jumped ahead of the queue for EU membership. Turkey’s strategic significance on the southeast border of the NATO area was also evaluated under a new light due to the demise of the ultimate enemy, the USSR. Turkey felt the need to reinforce her ties to the EU and take care that she was not left behind the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the enlargement process. Candidacy to the EU came with some conditions including the Copenhagen criteria. In addition, resolution of bilateral disputes with neighboring countries, i.e. Greece and supporting the resolution of the Cyprus issue were also additional requirements for Turkey. Hence for Turkey a process of Europeanization started that also necessitated a socialization process involving a change in values and shift in identity constructions.

⁴¹⁹ *ibid*: 22. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁴²⁰ Bahar Rumelili, “The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict”, *The University of Birmingham*, 12 January 2004, <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/polis/research/2006/eu-border-conflict/wp06-eu-impact-on-the-greek-turkish-conflict.pdf>. [16.06.2018].

4. TURKISH AND GREEK PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE KARDAK / IMIA CRISIS⁴²¹

Imia/Kardak incident, which is a very good recent example that displays the *delicate and susceptible relations* between Turkey and Greece, proves how –even– two barren islets could bring two countries to the brink of war. There would be several more crises on Imia/Kardak after this first one, took place in 1996, yet without getting into a state of armed conflict⁴²².

It was just a few months after the EU General Affairs Council's approval of the decision for a customs union with Turkey (on 6 March 1995), when a Turkish registered freighter, Figen Akad, ran aground on the rocks of Kardak/Imia and erupted a crisis. Following the day of 1995 National Assembly elections in Turkey, on 25th of December, the SOS⁴²³ signals of the vessel prompted both the Greek and the Turkish Coast Guards who had discordant opinions on the uninhabited islets in the Aegean Sea. Eventually, the ship escaped the rocks on its own and made the Turkish port of Gulluk, escalating a long-standing deadlock over Aegean⁴²⁴ which was in sort of a

⁴²¹ It appears that the Greek parliamentary sessions during the incident are blocked, with a posted message saying the pages regarding these minutes are under construction. Therefore, the relevant Greek parliamentary speeches are carefully collected from two special sessions where the new PM reads the Government's programmatic statements, and related discussions take place on 10.10.1996 and 12.10.1996.

⁴²² During the conduct of this study further incidents occurred such as in 2018 the Greek warship –Nikiforos– and the Turkish patrol boat collided on the east of the disputed islet. See, Yorgo Kırbaki, “Tam O An! Kardak Açıklarında Sıcak Temas”, *Hürriyet*, 18 January 2018, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/tam-o-an-kardak-aciklarinda-sicak-temas-40713488> [24.03.2018]; The Minister of National Defence of Greece –Panos Kammenos– threw a wreath from a helicopter over Imia, in honour of the three Greek navy officers Christodoulos Karathanasis, Panagiotis Vlahakos. See, “Στεφάνι από ελικόπτερο θα ρίξει ο Καμμένος στα Ίμια, 19 χρόνια μετά την κρίση”, *Protothema*, 29 January 2015, <http://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/447044/sta-imia-o-panos-kammenos-gia-to-mnimosuno-ton-pesodon/> [24.03.2018]; A photo of the Greek Chief of the Hellenic Armed Forces with the background of Imia released in the Greek press which is interpreted as provocation by the Turkish media. See, “Τουρκικά ΜΜΕ: προκλητική η φωτογραφία του Έλληνα Αρχηγού ΓΕΣ με φόντο τα Ίμια”, *antenna.gr*, 16 April 2017, <http://www.antenna.gr/news/Politics/article/471321/toyrkika-mme-proklitiki-i-fotografia-toy-ellina-arxigoy-ges-me-fonto-ta-imia>. [24.03.2018].

⁴²³ It was a distress signal for maritime, until the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) came into use and replaced SOS in 1999.

⁴²⁴ Several Diplomatic Notes were exchanged between Greece and Turkey in the course of event; on 26.12.1995 Greece's note to Turkey, on 29.12.1995 Turkey's note to Greece, on 10.01.1996 Greece's note to Turkey, on 29.01.1996 Turkey's note to Greece. See, Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes* (London and New York: Routledge - Cavendish, 2012), 824.

deep winter sleep⁴²⁵ since the last Taşoz/Thassos Island Crisis of 1987⁴²⁶. It did not, however, draw any public interest for a month, not until the day after Kostas Simitis was appointed as prime minister to form the new government when a subscribed-periodical (Gramma of Alexis Starkas) reported the issue on 20 January 1996.

The incident took place while both states were passing through a fragile period of governmental transitions, Greece was heading for a new prime minister and ministerial council while Turkey was being run by a caretaker government⁴²⁷.

The Greek and the Turkish media got involved and intervened directly in the incident to such an extent that they did not only take part in it but also carried nationalistic overtones and exploited stereotypes to evoke the representations of the parties' antagonistic positions⁴²⁸. On 26 January, videos and photos were released showing a Greek flag waving on the East Imia/Kardak (the larger one of the two islets) which was apparently planted by the mayor of the neighbouring Greek island Kalymnos – Dimitris Diakomichalis⁴²⁹ and a police superintendent –Yorgos Riolas– and the priest

⁴²⁵ Actually, the influence and tradition of the Greek military junta did not cease its presence in the making of Greek foreign policy, and the country's relations with Turkey remained susceptible to crisis. In 1976, for example, when Turkey sent her seismic research vessel named Hora / Sismik 1 into the Aegean waters that was claimed by Greece (regarded as a part of her continental shelf) the then opposition party (the third in the parliament) PASOK's leader Andreas Papandreou criticised the ruling party ND and PM Karamanlis for not conducting the necessary forceful reaction. Papandreou's opinion was broadcast by the Greek mass media as "Sink the Hora". In Clogg's words, it was "a move, which had it been implemented, would almost certainly have precipitated outright war between the two countries". See, Richard Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1987), 139; See, also, Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*, 88; This survey ship was given to Turkey by Germany with the name Hora in 1942. Turkey renovated her in 1976 and renamed as Sismik 1. See, General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration of Turkey, <http://www.mta.gov.tr/v3.0/arastirmalar/sismik1>. [10.01.2020]

⁴²⁶ Greek attempts for oil exploration erupted a crisis and Turkey responded in sending her own petroleum exploration vessel –Piri Reis. On the eve of war, the USA issued diplomatic demarches against the two NATO members, and the crisis was overcome.

⁴²⁷ The first female Prime Minister of Turkey, Tansu Çiller of the True Path Party, served between 25 June 1993 to 6 March 1996. Her last tenure, the 52nd government of Turkey, was the third in the history of the Turkish Parliament that could not receive a vote of confidence and lasted for five months.

⁴²⁸ It has to be noted that there are many valuable works carried out by the Greek-Turkish initiatives to raise awareness of othering; one of which was represented by the participants of the 7th International Meeting of Cinema and History held by TURSAC (Turkish Foundation of Cinema and Audiovisual Culture) and NPI (Nicos Poulantzas Institute) together. The bilingually published (in Turkish and Greek) proceedings of the 'Greek-Turkish Citizens Dialogue: Media's Influence on 'Unofficial History' symposium are worth reading, especially on pages 54-56 of Michalis Mitsos (Newspaper Ta Nea) and on 57, 58, 60, 61 of Zafer Atay (Vice President of the Journalists Association of Turkey). See, *Γράφοντας Για Την Ειρήνη Στις Δύο Πλευρές Του Αιγαίου / Suyun İki Yakasındaki Barış Kalemieri* (İstanbul: TURSAC, 2004).

⁴²⁹ Dimitris Diakomichalis has recently been accused of supplying financial aid to a shepherd between 1989-1996 for herding his goats in Imia/Kardak. The Greek Chamber of Accounts imposed the former mayor a fine of 50.000 Euros for allocating fund from Kalymnos municipality budget to the shepherd. "Kilimli Eski Belediye Başkanı Diakomichalis 'e Kardak Şoku",

of Kalymnos, escorted by a few Kalymnos residents and their children, singing the Greek national anthem⁴³⁰. The next day two Turkish journalists were broadcast lowering the Greek flag and hoisting a Turkish one on the islet⁴³¹. Following the incident, the Greek troops disembarked and replaced the Turkish flag with a Greek one, which prompted an immediate response of the Turkish armed forces.

The growing public attention and the aroused nationalistic sentiments⁴³² overshadowed diplomatic efforts and heightened expectations of military action. Reaching its peak on the 30th of January, the Greek flag was swaying on the east Imia/Kardak while the Turkish one was on the west, accompanied by their respective commandoes and battleships. Hence, the issue became a matter of *sovereignty* and *invasion of the homeland* that escalated the tension between the contiguous states' governments and army. The diplomatic path was sidelined; the officials of the two sides were not speaking directly to each other when US envoy Richard Holbrooke, as an intermediary, held phone-calls to defuse the threat. In the wake of the US involvement,⁴³³ the crisis abated and the confrontation of the Greek and Turkish naval

<http://www.fmedya.com/gundem/kilimli-eski-belediye-baskani-diakomichalis-e-kardak-soku-h47994.html> [21.10.2017]; “Πρόστιμο 50.000 Ευρώ Από Το Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο Στον Πρώην Δήμαρχο Καλύμνου Γιατί «έστελνε» Βοσκό Στα Ίμια!,” <http://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/694433/prostimo-50000-euro-ston-proin-dimarho-kalumnou-giati-estelne-vosko-sta-imia/>. [21.10.2017].

⁴³⁰ “IMIA: Ο Άνθρωπος Που Κάρφωσε Την Ελληνική Σημαία Εξομολογείται | Thessi.Gr”, <http://www.thessi.gr/?p=183930>; Λουκάς Δημάκας and Νότης Παπαδόπουλος, “Βρέθηκαν Σε Θέση Μάχης,” *Ta Nea*, January 29, 1996, 12, 13 [20.10.2017]; Nikoleta Kalmouki, “Imia 18 Years Later | GreekReporter.Com”, <http://greece.greekreporter.com/2014/01/31/remembering-the-rocks-of-imia-18-years-later/> [20.10.2017]; “Kardak Krizi Görüntüleri 19 Yıl Sonra Yayınlandı,” *Ensonhaber*, 1 February 2014, <http://www.ensonhaber.com/kardak-krizi-goruntuleri-19-yil-sonra-yayinlandi-2014-02-01.html> [20.10.2017]; Çağıl Kasapoğlu, “Turkey-Greece Island Dispute, Witness - BBC World Service”, *BBC*, 21 December 2016, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p04km4gd>. [22.10.2017].

⁴³¹ “Hürriyet Gazetesi’nin Manşetlerinden Kardak Krizi /1- Foto Haber Galeri”, <http://fotogaleri.hurriyet.com.tr/>, <http://fotogaleri.hurriyet.com.tr/galeridetay/27880/2/1/hurriyet-gazetesinin-mansetlerinden-kardak-krizi>. [20.10.2017].

⁴³² There is an Imia Memorial in Athens where every year commemoration is organized on the last Saturday of January, by mostly the Golden Dawn party members.

⁴³³ Seemingly, the US did not truly understand the incident and responding reactions, in his memoir, Clinton made fun of the occasion by demeaning the problematic bonds of the parties. Following Clinton’s words: “On January 30, [...] I spoke to President Suleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of Turkey. They told me that Turkey and Greece were on the brink of military confrontation and implored me to intervene to stop it. They were about to go to war over two tiny Aegean islets called Imia by the Greeks and Kardak by the Turks. Both countries claimed the islets, but Greece apparently had acquired them in a treaty with Italy in 1947. Turkey denied the validity of the Greek claim. There were no people living there, though Turks often sailed to the larger islet for picnics. The crisis was triggered when some Turkish journalists had torn down a Greek flag and put up a Turkish one. It was unthinkable that two great countries with a real dispute over Cyprus would actually go to war over ten acres of rock islets inhabited by only a couple of dozen sheep, but I could tell that Ciller was genuinely afraid it could happen. [...] [I] placed a series of calls, first to Greek prime minister Konstantinos Simitis, then to Demirel and Ciller again. After all the talk back and forth, the two sides agreed to hold their fire, and Dick Holbrooke, who was already working on Cyprus, stayed up all night to get the parties

forces ended by returning to the *status quo ante* that led the withdrawal of both troops and the removal of the flags.

4.1. Rule-Based Approaches

Raising consciousness about the *self's* legal claims and conceptual position on the dispute, either domestically or internationally, and by explicitly stigmatizing the *other* as unlawful, the two countries implicitly strove for shaping international public opinion to take judicial action against the *violator*. As it was extrinsic to the *self*, further efforts were needed to delineate the possibilities of the *other*, calculating all its identifying factors and its influence on shaping the ideational structure. The main arguments held in the Turkish parliament were on *de facto* – *de jure* distinction about the status of the islets, whereas in Greece it was about whether to involve a legitimate, recognized third party –namely the International Court of Justice– in the issue. Both states utilized statements exemplified with their prior experiences that distinguished themselves, apparently far more, as the rightful owner of Imia/Kardak islets.

4.1.1. Bilateral Confrontation on the Grounds of Jurisprudence and Legislation

In Turkey, politicians explicated their political contention via two legal documents believed to regulate the sovereignty of the Aegean formations. The first one was the Treaty of Lausanne and the other was the Treaty of Paris signed in 1947. As asserted by the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs –Deniz Baykal– “These two treaties [were] essentially basic international documents which settle[d] the sea borders in the Aegean and the sovereignty of the islands”⁴³⁴. Accordingly, the Treaty of Lausanne

to agree to resolve the problem through diplomacy. I couldn't help laughing to myself at the thought that whether or not I succeeded in making peace in the Middle East, Bosnia, or Northern Ireland, at least I had saved some Aegean sheep.” See, William Jefferson Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 654–55; On the other hand, the-then Greek Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pangalos stated that “the area doesn't have maritime borders, they have never been fixed by an agreement between the two countries”, contrary to Clinton, and quotes a memory of a later discussion with Holbrooke, in an interview to BBC: “[S]ome years after [...] I met Mr. Holbrooke in New York [...] we're talking about this event and I said to him [...] I'm very happy about something that nobody was killed, so we finished that night that was very dangerous for both people for the Turks and the Greeks and nobody was killed not a single person; then Halbrook smiled and said 'you know, Theodore nobody was going to be killed'; I said but how we were confronting each other; said 'you were confronting with American ships, American munitions and American intelligence systems and two small ships that we had going between the Greek fleet and the Turkish fleet manage to disrupt your technological and electronic horizon, so firing your rockets would lead to kill some fish and nothing else.’” See, Kasapoğlu, “Turkey-Greece Island Dispute, Witness - BBC World Service.” [22.10.2017].

⁴³⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996): 75. [Deniz Baykal, CHP, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy of Prime Minister of Turkey].

arranged the sovereignty status of the Dodecanese which were ceded by Turkey to Italy and the Treaty of Paris, on the other hand, transferred those 12 islands and their adjacent islets from Italy to Greece. Reportedly, in the meanwhile, another development emerged in 1932, and Turkey decided to conduct “legal studies” to organize the relations between these transferred islands and her own seashores. One of these legal studies, in 1932, became a treaty between Turkey and Italy, which set the maritime boundary between the shores of Turkey and Meis [Kastellorizo]⁴³⁵ Island. Besides, a similar study on the rest of Dodecanese was given a start in December 1932 and a general understanding achieved on the transfer of Kardak [Imia] Rocks to the Italians. In the words of FM Baykal⁴³⁶:

[TR] “[B]ut that study hasn’t been brought to the point of legal validity, the agreement hasn’t reached its final stage, [it] hasn’t been published in our Official Gazette, [it] hasn’t entered into force; in other words, no binding international document [between] Turkey and Italy has come into existence. [...] [And] Italy who knows this, in 1935, appealed to Turkey via [diplomatic] note stating that ‘we haven’t brought this issue to a final stage; do come, let’s mutually conclude this matter’”.

According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, only one of these agreements could be considered valid. Greece, however, allegedly attempted to combine these valid and invalid agreements, which were rooted in the negotiations of 1932, and integrate them into the Treaty of Paris in 1947. Reportedly, even the Russian delegates present during the negotiations in Paris, including also some other commissaries, declared that the only agreement which had come into force was the one about Meis [Kastellorizo] Island, and the other was not signed thus had not legally become a binding document. As articulated by Baykal below, the Greek denials and issued appeals in 1950 and 53, in addition to Italy’s in 1935, were seemingly evaluated as an affirmation of the suspending Kardak/Imia conflict by the Turkish authorities⁴³⁷:

[TR] “As a result, in 1950, Greece appealed to Turkey stating: ‘Let’s take care of this matter; with the Treaty of Paris in 1947 Italy transferred [these] 12 islands to us; but we need to mutually negotiate from where does the coastline between these islands and Turkey pass, this issue is pending. The study done with Italy also failed, let’s conduct a mutual study [and figure out] which rock, which islet, which island belongs to whom; where will be the border, what’s the maritime boundary between Turkey and Greece, let’s set [all of] them together.’ [...] In 1953, Greece appealed to Turkey again for the second time to solve the issue, yet obtained no result”.

Conversely, Greece presented her legal arguments against Turkey under the UN Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 and the UN Convention on the Law of

⁴³⁵ One of Dodecanese Islands.

⁴³⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996): 75. [Baykal, CHP, the then FM and Deputy PM].

⁴³⁷ *ibid*, 76. [Baykal, CHP, the then FM and Deputy PM].

the Sea of 1994,⁴³⁸ which recognized that islands intrinsically generate continental shelves. As “the world's first shipping country”⁴³⁹ and a member of the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea which faced a bold issue, Greece, tending to stabilize the condition in the Aegean Sea, on the one hand, reserved her right to apply twelve miles rule for the future and on the other hand set the territorial margin of twelve miles as non-negotiable. The Greek claim, rooted in the UN Conventions, regarded as a legal right (though not enforced), which should have been kept due to Greece’s enduring relationship full of mistrust and threats with her ‘twin-born *other*’⁴⁴⁰ –Turkey.

Generally speaking, in both parliaments, the Imia/Kardak issue was identified as a conflict over the existing territorial boundary. Therefore, breaching the aforementioned agreements aroused their primal insecurities and read as an attack on the *self*, which was historically attached to that piece of land.

Turkey, with a threat perception that the control over the Aegean would be transferred to Greece, and that in turn, the Aegean Sea would transform into a ‘Greek Lake’, declared that Greece's possible territorial extension would constitute a *casus belli*. Greece, reversely, sought possible solution under the umbrella of the International Court of Justice. In this period, aiming at the US support, Simitis (as the PM of the country) made his first official trip to the USA and held a meeting with Clinton on the 9th of April. The meeting revealed the US government’s recently adopted policy⁴⁴¹ on the Aegean; that disputes had to be settled in The Hague⁴⁴².

The US proposal led a controversy in the Greek parliament and opposing views were exchanged, based on politicians' personal opinions, which shared no common ground. Although these initiatives might have stemmed from the concerns about the country’s economic progress, PM Simitis displayed reconciliatory efforts with neighbouring

⁴³⁸ Turkey has not yet ratified the treaty, therefore, does not consider herself bound by it. United Nations, “Oceans & Law of the Sea,” http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea. [23.02.2018].

⁴³⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 100, [Christos Kypourous, PASOK, the then MP].

⁴⁴⁰ The term originally used by Wilmer while explaining object relations theory. Wilmer, “Identity, Culture, and Historicity: The Social Construction of Ethnicity in the Balkans,” 4.

⁴⁴¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 112-14. [About Clinton’s initiative on Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue, see, parliament speech of Ioannis Varvitsiotis, the then Vice President of the ND].

⁴⁴² *ibid*, 117-18. [It was quoted by Miltiadis Evert who was the then President of the ND from the Ministry of Press & Media of the USA. It was the declaration of the PM of Greece, Konstantinos Georgios Simitis, immediately after his meeting with the US President Bill Clinton, in Washington on 09.04.1996.]

countries, including Turkey. Greece performed a dramatic U-turn on her Serbian policy and distanced herself from Slobodan Milosevic's conduct and sent peacekeeping troops to Bosnia. Reportedly, Simitis even thought about Greece's loss of a right over the extension of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles, and "Turkey's resort to [The Hague] also for the [other] rocky islands and the possible military presence of Greece on the islands"⁴⁴³. In other words, the PM maintained his composure with the aim "to encourage the US investors to make use of Greek expertise in the Balkans by channelling funds to the region through Athens-based subsidiaries"⁴⁴⁴. The Greek government had a tendency to accept the USA's stabilizing strategy in the Aegean that held no threat of violence and weapons. Accordingly, if there were disputes, they should be resolved by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Following Simitis's declaration, made in Washington, on 09.04.1996, that was quoted by Miltiadis Evert of the ND in his parliamentary speech⁴⁴⁵:

[GR] "We request Turkey to appeal to The Hague. It isn't Greece which has to go to The Hague, because Greece doesn't assert [any] claims. And Greece has already accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague on all issues since 1994, so any country including Turkey can have recourse to The Hague and ask the International Court of Justice to give a ruling on the issue. Greece has already said that if someone makes a claim against us, [s/he] can appeal to the International Court of Justice, so why should we apply and ask the Court to rule on our issue with Turkey while Turkey hasn't yet accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It's up to Turkey to take this step".

Contrary to PM Simitis's declaration in the USA, Theodoros Pangalos, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Greek parliament, stressed that Greece "in principle d[id] not ask Turkey to apply to The Hague tribunal; [but] ask[ed] Turkey to abandon her unreasonable and illegal demands"⁴⁴⁶.

Those demands which seemed to be *unreasonable* on the Greek side were appeared to be very sound and logical on the Turkish side⁴⁴⁷ since Kardak/Imia was considered too close to the Turkish coast. As declared by MP Gül: "There are a set of events taking place on the islets that are 3.8 miles away from Turkey, [and] 6 miles away from –not

⁴⁴³ *ibid.*, 111. [Theodoros Pangalos, PASOK, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs].

⁴⁴⁴ Kerin Hope, "Simitis to Stress Role in Balkan Stability in Talks with Clinton: Greece Tries to Get US on Side", *Financial Times*, 9 April 1996, https://archive.org/stream/FinancialTimes1996UKEnglish/Apr%2009%201996%2C%20Financial%20Times%2C%20%239%2C%20UK%20%28en%29_djvu.txt. [26.02.2018].

⁴⁴⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 117. [Miltiadis Evert, ND, the then MP].

⁴⁴⁶ *ibid.*, 111. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

⁴⁴⁷ There is a point that has to be noted about their bilateral Aegean dispute. Turkey threatens Greece's claims of sovereignty since she does not recognize the Greek claims over the Aegean, on the contrary, Greece claims that Turkey very often poses a threat to Greece's sovereignty in the Aegean. Şule Kut, "Türk Dış Politikasında Ege Sorunu", *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: DER Yayınları, 2004): 522.

the shores of Greece, not the Greek coast– but the Greek islands that are underneath our nose”⁴⁴⁸.

Voices of apprehension were rising in the Greek parliament among the ruling and the opposition party members⁴⁴⁹ who were hesitant particularly on the question of whether Turkey would apply to The Hague, where possible delimitation of the territorial sea might also be adjudged. MP Papatthemelis of the governing party, for example, clearly stated his hesitation about the adjudication of a higher court on the issue⁴⁵⁰:

[GR] “[D]on’t make reference to Turkey in The Hague, [you] mustn’t refer to Turkey in The Hague for the continental shelf⁴⁵¹ because the continental shelf without extending to twelve miles –an extension for which the Nation must be homogeneous and cohesive to get prepared with the fastest possible pace– there’s no such thing”.

On the eastern side of Aegean, contrarily, the USA’s proposal (having recourse to The Hague) was assessed as an *innovation*, and for the first time, this type of third party arbitration was welcomed on condition that the applicant would be Greece. Purportedly, Turkey and Greece could have agreed upon an arbitrator and undertaken to accept that arbitrator’s decision, or with a consensus view, they could have jointly filed a lawsuit for adjudication. Since two sides shunned the consequences of failing to secure a positive result out of The Hague, and of being singled out and labelled as an *international violator*, both discussed the possibility of applying to The Hague, however, without actually filing an application. It remained a possibility that has never been realized and used as an object of political speculation and a device for political leverage. In the statement of the PM of Turkey –Mesut Yılmaz– below, the Turkish

⁴⁴⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996): 83. [Abdullah Gül, RP, the then MP].

⁴⁴⁹ Parliament speeches of Ioannis Varvitsiotis and Maria Damanaki might be given as examples. Varvitsiotis was the then Vice President of New Democracy Party, and Damanaki was the member of parliament of PASOK. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996).

⁴⁵⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 96. [Stylios Angelos Papatthemelis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁴⁵¹ Although there are clear differences between the terms territorial waters and continental shelf, in the Greek Parliament they are used interchangeably. Yet territorial waters are a juridical term for coastal waters of a state which can extend up to 12 nautical miles (approx. 22 km) from its baseline. When this margin overlaps with a contiguous state’s then as a solution either the median point between these states’ baselines to be taken or to mutually agree to apply smaller territorial waters. Continental shelf, on the other hand, can be used as a geographical or as a juridical term. Geographically, the continental shelf is defined as the natural extension of the coastal state under the sea. As a legal concept, it refers to the baseline and the earth that goes beyond the territorial waters and goes to a certain distance and depth which extends from 200 nautical miles (approx. 370 km) to 350 nautical miles (approx. 650 km).

inertia of being a claimant was implied, by drawing the importance of mutual negotiations as the best start for reaching a solution⁴⁵².

[TR] “Dear deputies, here, there’s a new thing compared to Turkey’s previous attitude; but, this doesn’t mention any inconsistency in relation to Turkey’s previous attitude. Greece wants us to go to the International Court of Justice on Kardak. Greece, for the issue of Kardak, with reference that Kardak belongs to her, wants us to go to the International Court of Justice. We, however, propose to negotiate all disputes between us, but for the issues in which we can’t agree, we propose [solution] through justice, to go to the International Court of Justice”.

The *self* and *other* nexus purports a two-way relationship that unites the *other*’s allies on the one side and the *self*’s on the other. Thus, any third party affiliation (either as a country or as an institution) is evaluated with regard to its conduct towards the *self*. Ally or non-ally or enemy are vague concepts; their bonds with the *self* and *other* are temporary, especially issue-based. Considering the previous occasions, one might conclude that the ground *rule* on the Aegean dispute is to *prolong the conflict* to the point that resolution is indispensable and can no longer be postponed. Thus, placing a third party as a new rule-maker was an undesirable solution that should be avoided because it could break the *rule*, which both *selves* were intent on preserving in its present condition. Therefore, a neutral stance, which has not been recognized as white or black, but grey, could pose a threat to this two-way relationship since parties could not know where to place the new role taker. In other words, why neither Turkey nor Greece did not want to be the first to take a step toward the involvement of a third party in their dispute is understandable.

4.1.2. State Sovereignty as a Normative Conception in the International Law

Modern states revised the traditional understanding of sovereignty, which was limited to mutual recognition of claims and considered as a material fact. Particularly, following the end of the Cold War, state-agents started to foster a new understanding of sovereignty. It was transformed into a social construction with a malleable structure rather than a rigid formation, wherein nation, boundary, authority, and recognition reside. Parallel to this new conception, threats to state sovereignty were reformulated

⁴⁵² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 38th Session, v. 3 (17.04.1996): 523-24, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c003/tbmm20003038.pdf> [27.02.2018]. [Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz, ANAP, the then Prime Minister of Turkey].

since the knowledge of old school became incapable of interpreting the political events and making projections⁴⁵³.

In both parliaments, views of a threat to sovereignty were not regarded as confined to the deeds and words of the disputed *other*. In other words, a threat of being subject to uncalculated binding decisions on the international level as a result of The Hague's ruling was considered more dangerous than bilateral confrontations. Thus, not being a claimant in the Imia/Kardak lawsuit but instead claiming a legitimate superiority against the *other*, by arguing that the *other's* position was not in line with the established rules and was against *de jure* position, and that the *other* was infringing on the *self's* rights seemed much safer.

In the Turkish parliament, as being the violator of the international rules and law and the intransigent party that refrained from bilateral negotiations –the *other*– was clearly responsible for causing instability in the region. Allegedly by creating unacceptable *de facto* situations, Greece, compelled Turkey to “respond effectively and decisively, with all possibilities of a state”⁴⁵⁴. The below statement of Gül (an MP of one of the opposition parties) can be an example to uncover how politicians, regardless of their differing political positions, strictly advocate the state opinion and vision when they perceive any violence or threat to state sovereignty⁴⁵⁵:

[TR] “Certainly, Turkey won’t accept these de facto situations. Yes, there’s a government gap in Turkey right now; However, in Turkey, there’s certainly state continuity, there’re institutions of the state, whenever necessary, there’re armed forces that will do the task falls upon them. Everyone, certainly, needs to know that; Greece needs to know that, too. [B]ut, it’s a fact that, especially after 1978, Greece began arming the islands in violation of all international treaties”.

As Todorov clearly puts it, a fear of any threat stalls the negotiations and eventuates in harsh actions like menacing, arming and besieging. Following his words: “The fear of barbarians is what risks making us barbarian. And we will commit a worse evil than that which we initially feared”⁴⁵⁶.

In the context of Greek-Turkish relations, the Greek perspective on the militarization of the islands, which lie only a few miles off the Turkish coast, did not imply an illegal action against the Treaty of Lausanne, where relevant provisions were believed to be

⁴⁵³ Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, “The Social Construction of State Sovereignty”, *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker, Cynthia Weber (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 1–2.

⁴⁵⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996): 78. [Baykal, CHP, the then FM and Deputy PM].

⁴⁵⁵ *ibid.*, 83. [Gül, RP, the then MP].

⁴⁵⁶ Todorov, *The Fear of Barbarians*, 6.

superseded with the Montreux Convention. Greece, accordingly, purported that there was, in fact, no violation and arming the islands was the fortification of the *self*, the maintenance of *self-defence*, in response to Turkey's possible attacks. This sort of sentiment aroused in Greece following the bilateral situations in Cyprus⁴⁵⁷, and in Imbros⁴⁵⁸ and Tenedos⁴⁵⁹ where Turkey became the target of the Greek accusations of invasion, discrimination and confiscation, respectively. Therefore, the Greek insights about real and ideational forms and entities of Ottomans embodied in Turkey induced the Greek perception that there were violations and threats only in one direction; that was from Turkey to Greece.

Reversely, the corresponding perception of the Turkish authorities was a likely *threat of Greek expansion*, which was rooted in the previous Greek military deployment and landing troops in Anatolia during 1919. The scenes that remained etched in the minds of Turkish elder statesmen motivated a directive speech act –*do not expand your land*– following an assertive speech act which *affirms* that *this is an invasion of the motherland*. The link between the state sovereignty and assertive speech acts⁴⁶⁰ is clearly observable in the below excerpt from MP İnan⁴⁶¹, wherein the *self* stimulates its *inner-other*, by conveying the relevant cultural background knowledge, including the national experience and history⁴⁶²:

[TR] “The event is an invasion, a rape, the rape of [...] Turkish national territory. [...] [How] can a Greek soldier go and step on [there], and plant a flag? This is an invasion of a part of the Turkish homeland and an erection of a flag. I’m also against some of Mr. Ministers’ metaphors. Sir, it’s not like the first soil-discoverer on the North Pole putting up a flag. [Narrating like a tale], a mayor had stepped on, had planted [the flag], another one had taken [it] off... This [way of understanding] puts the matter away from its seriousness, [it’s] like caricaturing, from which we deeply suffer”.

In general sense, treaties, conventions, and agreements aim to prevent armed conflicts and to resolve initial disputes, or at least to abate inconvenience, but the Geneva 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea caused quite the contrary and started a territorial dispute in the Aegean Sea, regarding Turkish-Greek relations. Even if the aforementioned legal texts do not imply

⁴⁵⁷ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 174.

⁴⁵⁸ Gökçeada in Turkish.

⁴⁵⁹ Bozcaada in Turkish.

⁴⁶⁰ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 11.

⁴⁶¹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996): 79. [Kâmrân İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

⁴⁶² Gavan Duffy and Brian Frederking, “Changing the Rules: A Speech Act Analysis of the End of the Cold War”, *International Studies Quarterly*, v. 53, no. 2 (June 2009): 330.

sovereignty over the territorial sea, their mention of ‘sovereign rights’ (a compromise between proponents of sovereignty and functional jurisdiction and control⁴⁶³) was enough to lead parties into a deadlock.

Most of the Turkish MPs were of the opinion that accurate assessment was of grave importance. In other words, putting the meaning and value of an issue in the right place was extremely critical since if this had not been achieved, problems would have likely arisen in determining the sovereignty of islands, islets, and rocks in the Aegean. Thus, perceiving the issue just as a rocky problem meant falling away from considering its main aspects⁴⁶⁴. And rocks which were of paramount importance regardless of their size were considered to reflect the sovereignty of Turkey as a whole⁴⁶⁵. MP Gül stated that the situation was not a haphazard coincidence, but *an organized act*, particularly aimed at Turkish sovereignty⁴⁶⁶:

[TR] “The event in the Aegean Sea is not a matter of who gets the 400-450 square meters wide rocks, but a matter of domination and struggle for sovereignty in the Aegean Sea. This is clear and precise. Although some have written or said the opposite, it’s a struggle for sovereignty and for domination in the Aegean Sea, and has been like this since the very beginning”.

Sovereignty, which is a condition of ‘rule’ and a matter of degree rather than full independence *per se*,⁴⁶⁷ grants the *self* to rule a legal zone demarcated by borders, where unseen lines are to cover or cease its spheres of interest and influence⁴⁶⁸ as boundaries. And the *other* is to comply with this rule and make sure that it does not take any action with the intention of spreading its interest or influence beyond the mutually recognized boundary. These two spheres, including, but not limited to territoriality, are to apply via rules, and in turn institutions. According to Onuf, “where there are rules (and thus institutions), there is rule—a condition in which some agents use rules to exercise control and obtain advantages over other agents. Rule is a stable pattern of relations, but not a symmetrical one”⁴⁶⁹. As revealed by the PM Yılmaz’s words below, in the Turkish parliament, the Greek intention was depicted as a constant

⁴⁶³ Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*, 167.

⁴⁶⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996): 75. [Baykal, CHP, the then FM and Deputy PM].

⁴⁶⁵ *ibid*, 78. [Baykal, CHP, the then FM and Deputy PM].

⁴⁶⁶ *ibid*, 82. [Gül, RP, the then MP].

⁴⁶⁷ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 7–9.

⁴⁶⁸ Friedrich Kratochwil, “Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System”, *World Politics*, v. 39, no. 1 (1986): 27–52.

⁴⁶⁹ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 7.

attack against Turkey through a *progressive political plan* based on national sovereignty⁴⁷⁰:

[TR] “Greece, asserting the sovereignty argument, armed these [islands]. The first that violated the Treaty of Lausanne was, therefore, Greece. The typical example of the violation of the Treaty of Lausanne is weaponizing the islands. [...] When Turkey’s relations with the European Union came to fore, Greece, using her full membership advantage, tried to block our relations, but it’s been overcome; other European countries didn’t allow this. [A] shipwreck occurred, [and] without having a flag of any country on, without having any marks of any country, neither a lighthouse nor a flagstaff; those rocks that haven’t been investigated to whom they belong, even weren’t known that existed, suddenly, have become the most important element of our bilateral relations. [A]nd today, unfortunately, Greece, claiming that there’s a rape, an attack to her sovereignty from Turkey, is in an effort to re-block Turkey’s relations with European Union and significantly achieve[s] to do so. The [EU-Turkey] Association Council [meeting] wasn’t held, we have very serious difficulties in the functioning of the Customs Union in terms of financial provisions, more precisely, the financial provisions of the Customs Union don’t operate”.

According to PM Yılmaz, *Greece was taking the advantage of her EU membership* to set the agenda on material (funds and provision) and non-material issues about Turkey, and all was a *political plot* to weaken Turkey’s position in the West. Greece’s interest and influence was embodied within the EU, and her conduct of foreign policy allegedly prevented any support that Turkey may get from European countries. Ironically, this depiction did not reflect the approach prevalent in Greek politics regarding relations between Turkey and Greece’s partners in the West. According to MPs Intzes and Papariga, *Greece left alone* while her Western partners either supported Turkey or took a neutral stance on the conflict between the two countries:

[GR] “I’m sorry, but whenever Greece was at such a critical moment, our partners not only showed no solidarity, but I can say [plainly] that they were against the interests of Greece and that they were advocates [of] or sly neutrals of the claiming country, [namely] Turkey”,⁴⁷¹.

[GR] “I spoke about the fact that NATO, which you consider to be the guardian angel of peace, doesn’t protect Greece in the event that she receives outrageous hostile actions. And you don’t talk about it. The only thing you can talk about is the International Court of Justice in The Hague. That’s why I spoke about your allies and nothing more”,⁴⁷².

The exposition of the MPs, which is a stereotype of ‘loneliness’ stated frequently in the Greek history textbooks that *the West is on the side of Turkey*; paradoxically corresponds to *the spoiled child of the West* in the discourses of the Turkish parliamentarians⁴⁷³ one of which quoted from MP Gül below⁴⁷⁴:

⁴⁷⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (17.04.1996): 523-24. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁴⁷¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 74. [Anastasios Intzes, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁴⁷² *ibid*, 122. [Alexandra Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

⁴⁷³ See, for instance, parliament speech of Kâmrân İnân who was then the MP of ANAP. *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey* (30.01.1996): 80-81.

⁴⁷⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996):82. [Gül, FP, the then MP].

[TR] “Actually, it's not the first time. As you know, in the issue of territorial waters, in the issue of the FIR, in the issue of fortification of the islands according to international treaties, in the issue of Cyprus, continuously, we struggle, we've problems; and Greece, with [an inferiority] complex, has been struggling with Turkey, in line with her long-lasting ideals, and is in an effort to get concessions from Turkey by creating de facto situations. While using this in her internal policy, unfortunately, [by reason of] the necessary support from the Western friends, which occasionally pampered Greece, has brought her to a situation that she would occasionally exceed the limit”.

One of the salient characteristics within the identity formation of the two countries is how to position the West in relation to the *self* that whether to be united with it or to be separated from it; in other words, it is to view the *self* as a core or peripheral member of the continent. There is always a love and hate relationship between the *self* and the West, determined by the perception of its support. Both countries' official histories hold a large number of instances which (re)locate the West beside or against the *self*. The narrative of the Turkish Independence War (1919-1922), for instance, portrays the West as an ally of Greece in the Turkish history textbooks contrary to that of Greek ones which depict the opposite. Another point is that both countries follow the inclinations of wrapping the Western states in a monolithic term –the West– while tending to be exceptional *selves* and not to be united with any other state. This exceptionalism might be a legacy of their history wherein they were endowed with amazing abilities and capabilities of being the first in numerous fields, and of being ever present for thousands of years. As both countries are armoured with tremendous predecessors and hold the attribution of being the cradle of civilizations, politicians often make use of these connotations to provide room for manoeuvring in national and/or international level.

4.2. Culture-History-Based Approaches

The symbiosis of politics and history –that the first receives an immense repository of political contentions through harnessing the memory, and the second receives an idealization through emendations– and the relationship between them sometimes blur the vision to the extent that catching the agents' point of view for reaching their intended goals becomes a tough work. As stated by Onuf, “acting to achieve goals is rational conduct, and agents faced with choices will act rationally. Viewed from outside, these choices may appear to be less than rational, but this is due to the complexities of agency and human fallibility”⁴⁷⁵. Agents surely are rational and follow

⁴⁷⁵ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 5.

rules utilizing their natural and societal capabilities for each peculiar situation, which might be deemed negligible conduct by the outsiders because decisions do not involve only the material but also ideational structures of the agency. For Clogg, this might be the reason why an outsider cannot thoroughly grasp the degree of the *Turkish fear* among the Greek society or the *obliviousness to Greece* among the Turkish policymakers. In this vein, outsiders can fail to make the point and “take account of the historical roots of present-day antagonisms and of the extreme sensitivity to perceived threats to national sovereignty”⁴⁷⁶.

4.2.1. *Other* Conceived as the Aggressor and Expansionist Actor in the Region

Carving out the position of the ideal *self* and buttressing its claims about the hostile *other* require dichotomies, such as legitimate/illegitimate, powerful/powerless, and independent/dependent; that grow out of the nation-building process, wherein the first of each of these pairs associated with the *self* and the second with the *other*. By the same token, despite whatever the factual situation is, agents envisage, and in turn believe that the *other* should be condemned as being unfair at least in their ideational international realm, for normative structures, such as beliefs and ideas, are undeniable factors in creating public opinion. In other words, a web of *othering* accompanies the *self*-building practices, including various phases extending from domesticating the *other* to strengthening the differing line between the *self* and *other*⁴⁷⁷.

In the below excerpt of the PM Simitis, the differing line by posing contrasting positions of Greece and Turkey, and the domestication process of Turkey by broadcasting the *unlawful* Turkish acts and claims through media campaigns to activate the international fora to take action against her, are noticeable⁴⁷⁸:

[GR] “The current Turkish policy isn't dangerous only for Greece, but for all the balances and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. And it start[ed] to become understandable in most countries. What are our theses? The status in the Aegean is absolutely clear. The story of thousands of years defines it. International treaties accurately define it. The national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Country are neither [to] question nor [to] negotiat[e]. [...] All means of our diplomacy and defence are directed at securing national integrity and at discouraging the Turkish reason with a strong deterrent force. The multi-faceted campaign we've undertaken over the last few months, across a wide range of forces that previously had a favourable neutral stance towards Turkey, has already [started to] create problems in Turkey. We'll continue in the same way. We'll firmly support the peace in the region, but we'll

⁴⁷⁶ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 5.

⁴⁷⁷ Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations.”

⁴⁷⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 1st Session, 4th Sitting (10.10.1996): 24, http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/10_10_96.pdf [29.10.2017]. [Konstantinos Georgios Simitis, PASOK, the then Prime Minister of Greece].

implement a policy that combines the diplomatic vigilance with the deterrent ability, [and] the prudence with the determination, [and] the right arguments with a constant presence”.

Although international treaties are considered to be concrete and material instances they can be evaluated differently in accordance with perceptions and constructions based on the *self* and the *other*. Therefore, technical issues may become intriguingly political and historical. As PM Simitis noted in the previous excerpt, what can be at first sight depicted as a strategic analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean furthers with relation to history going back to thousands of years where Turks are actually evaluated as the *other* and *disrupters* of the balance in the region. The *other* is pictured as foreign elements that have come and conquered the area from the Greeks. The historical *aggressor* is unified with the present-day *lawbreaker* in constructing the *other*, thereby it becomes a tangible entity which lies beyond the space and time.

In the Turkish Parliament, as voiced by MP Soysal, Turks, at any cost, had to defend their right of possession and keep laying their claim to the seas because “[t]here is a neighbour in the Aegean that intends to possess even a piece of rock which is 3,5 miles away, at the bottom of [Turkey’s] nose, considering that Turks do not understand the sea”⁴⁷⁹. According to this opinion, the motive behind the Greek encroachment stemmed from the perception that Turks do not make use of the sea –rather than concrete proof. This impression might have a long story, which traces back to the naval battles that inflicted a crippling defeat on the Ottoman State, respectively in 1770, 1827, and in 1853. Turks, supposedly, have not had a chance to recoup the losses and regain their ancestors' reputation for commanding the seas. In a similar vein, another reference to this unanchored relationship between Turks and water resources is traditionally made by a proverb that ‘water flows Turk stares’, which means even rivers just flow away without producing any benefit for the country, contrary to industrialized countries.

Besides, the timing of the incident was stressed in the Turkish parliament, in relation to the developments in Greece, where national issues were allegedly being replaced by international ones. In this respect, Greece intends to mitigate the impact of her domestic defects of either political or economic issues by stirring up the Turkish hatred and thrusting Turkey into the limelight. Reportedly, as the “Turkish hostility scores points in Greece”, the Greek Prime Minister thought that “he would earn reputation

⁴⁷⁹ Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (30.01.1996): 86. [Mümtaz Soysal, DSP, the then MP].

by [pursuing] such a policy”, which roots in “the antagonism towards Turkey and Turkishness” that was instilled in the education policy and domestic policy of Greece⁴⁸⁰. For MP İnan, while the political situation was becoming more volatile, regarding Turkey as *easy prey* seemed like a solution for the Foreign Minister of Greece –Theodoros Pangalos⁴⁸¹– who was an ungrateful ‘Turcophobic’ *agitator*, to deflect the attention away from the internal disputes towards an external crisis:

[TR] “The [new] government which has taken power, after Mr. Papandreou’s approximately ten years of [authority], feels very weak. Therefore, they need a foreign crisis to get acceptance among the Greek nation and to get its support. The easiest address is Turkey. Unfortunately, in the current government, the person appointed to the Foreign Ministry is Pangalos, whom I know from the European Council and we have been struggling with for years. In the period of the Greek Military Junta, he [took] refuge in Turkey; although he was shown very nice hospitality for two months [by the Turks], he is a Turcophobe, with all his cells”⁴⁸².

[TR] “Greece should best know that this type of [political] escalation, creating these types of *de facto* situations, will eventually cost much more to Greece. In that respect, taking the current government gap in Turkey as an opportunity, if Greece is in such an endeavour, she has to tidy herself up once more. By remembering the previous events, remembering Cyprus, remembering what happened to them when they landed in Anatolia, Greeks need to come to their senses”⁴⁸³.

Although the conditions in Kardak/Imia and Cyprus were significantly different; in that, the first one consisted of non-residential islets without any civilians whereas the second was inhabited by Turks and Greeks who were under direct threat to life because of the protracted armed conflicts, these two events were likened to each other as an extending part of the mainland soil.

In MP İnan’s words, “in the massacre of December 21, 1963, they slaughtered our 256 cognates. They proceeded, step by step, until July 20th of the year 1974. By creating *de facto* situation and by locking our people within 5 percent of the island, they were subjected to persecution of our people”⁴⁸⁴. In this context, both incidents were broadly considered to be the Greek attempts of establishing *de facto* situations to achieve the annexation of the island and the islets by Greece. In the excerpt from MP Gül, Greece was threatened to experience what she had encountered in Anatolia during the Turkish

⁴⁸⁰ *ibid.*, 87. [Nami̇k Kemal Zeybek, DYP, the then MP].

⁴⁸¹ Some of his recent declarations are as follows: “The only good Turk is a dead Turk. I believe it because I haven’t met a good Turk. They lack basic notions. The Turk doesn’t have a sense of justice.” See, “Πρωτοφανής δήλωση Παγκαλου: «Ο μόνος καλός Τούρκος είναι ένας νεκρός Τούρκος»,” *Kathimerini Newspaper*, February 13, 2018, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/948415/article/epikairothta/politikh/prwtofanhs-dhlwsh-pagkaloy-o-monos-kalos-toyrkos-einai-enas-nekros-toyrkos> [14.05.2018]; “Turks worked, we were lazy.” See, Sefa Kaplan, “Türkler Çalıştı Biz Tembellik Yaptık”, *Hürriyet*, 18 April 2011, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/turkler-calisti-biz-tembellik-yaptik-17573526> [23.05.2018].

⁴⁸² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996): 80. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

⁴⁸³ *ibid.*, 83. [Gül, RP, the then MP].

⁴⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 80. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

War of Independence, and in Cyprus. Greece was supposed to draw lessons from history and to relinquish her obstructive and demanding policies on islands and islets⁴⁸⁵. Greater stress was laid by MP İnan on the past, following his expression: “Greeks, God’s skirt-wearing who were slapped by Anatolia and by Turks at each of their rebellions- come, under my nose, and with 9 soldiers, they challenge me”⁴⁸⁶. In the excerpt two sorts of remarks can be accessible: The first is a derogatory one which lies in the phrase *skirt-wearing*, implying traditional Greek kilt, namely fustanella that is worn by evzones. And the second is a laudatory one which is resided in the utterance *Turks’ slap* –reminding that of Ottoman slap which used to be a trained-fight-technique used in close combat for killing the enemy– that aggrandizes Turks, for even their bare-hands are weapons.

In the Greek Parliament, contrary to the idea that Greece was heading for a replacement of serious domestic setbacks with foreign ones, PM Simitis purported that it was Turkey which made strategic formulation of its foreign policy to compensate for its internal challenges; and likened the islets to Cyprus with the aspect that Turkey had been demonstrating the same *aggressive* tendencies. Bending on the legacy of the Ottoman State, Turkey was causing instability in the regions which were formerly under the rule of Ottomans, to promote her political clout and to exert her influence to become a regional power⁴⁸⁷:

[GR] “[Greece] is concurrently facing the Turkish aggression in the Aegean and Cyprus. Turkey has changed in the biggest factor of destabilization in the Aegean Sea, [in] the Balkans, [in] Eastern Mediterranean, [in] the Caucasus and [in] the Middle East. The revival of the Ottoman Empire vision, which is ignorant of history, is the invention of the Turkish establishment to alleviate the acute internal problems and to gain an increased role in the region”.

Clinching PM Simitis’s argument, the Minister for National Defence Tsochatzopoulos and MP Papatthemelis reiterated that Greece was the guarantor of stability in the region, balancing a healthy relationship while Turkey was constantly refusing to cooperate and challenging the Greek sovereignty. Since they were the heir of an invading power, the Turks were hereditarily obsessed with expanding their borders. They did not have a sense of respect for territorial integrity of others and especially of the Greeks in that they aim at ‘shrinking Hellenism’, and in turn, the Greek nation.

⁴⁸⁵ *ibid.*, 84. [Gül, RP, the then MP].

⁴⁸⁶ *ibid.*, 81. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

⁴⁸⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (10.10.1996): 23-4. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

“The revival of the Ottoman Empire vision” or more precisely *Neo-Ottomanism*⁴⁸⁸ as mentioned in the previous excerpt by PM Simitis dates back to the 1974’s landing troops of Turkey in Cyprus and to Turgut Özal’s new perception and approach to the Turkish foreign policy throughout the 80s. Neo-Ottomanism was being voiced by several circles particularly within the period of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s ministry of foreign affairs and premiership in relation to his political vision cleared in his book called ‘Strategic Depth’⁴⁸⁹, which was scrutinized by scholars specialized in the Greek-Turkish relations⁴⁹⁰.

[GR] “Greece is not a revisionist power in the region and considers the political and legal status quo in the Aegean as the foundation of peaceful coexistence between Greece and Turkey. Greece rejects the escalation of tensions and the threat of violence used by Turkey in order to enforce [her] expansionist claims in the Aegean. And Greece calls on the international community to discourage this Turkish tactic, which inevitably leads to destabilization of peace in the region”⁴⁹¹.

[GR] “The enemy is known; it’s the eastern neighbour. It’s a strategic opponent in official terminology. It’s a simple Hellenist enemy because [...] its main goal [is] shrinking Hellenism. And this shrinkage of Hellenism seeks it as a Turkish expansionism with a constant series of acts, with escalating actions”⁴⁹².

Expansionism was exemplarized with Neo-Ottomanism in the Greek Parliament whereas with *Enosis* –political union of Cyprus and Greece– in the Turkish Parliament. When the Greek community of Cyprus called for Enosis, it aroused the reactions of Turkey, probably of evoking the enosis of Crete from where Turks had been expelled following the unification. Contrary to enosis, *taksim* (partition) became an alternative solution to the Cyprus issue espoused by the Turkish residents of the island⁴⁹³.

⁴⁸⁸ “[T]he word was coined by the Greeks after Turkey landed troops in Cyprus in 1974”. It reminds the hearer of Ottomanism, seems as if a modern version of it, in fact different it is. See, Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History* (Leiden - Boston - Köln: BRILL, 2002), 524.

⁴⁸⁹ Some lines in the book were related to Neo-Ottomanism, and sparked a heated debate in Greece. Such are as follows: “It is obvious that Turkey has to maintain a defence structure which considers the crucial factors that distinguish herself from the other countries. Historical factors of this defence structure subject Turkey to develop a defence strategy which [extends] beyond the conjectural impact of her current international borders. Having been born into the geopolitical background and history of the Ottoman State, and being [heir] of that heritage, it is impossible for Turkey to consider and plan her defence within her present day borders. This historical legacy can create de facto situations in which she has to interfere at any moment beyond her own borders”. See, Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), 41.

⁴⁹⁰ Hercules Millas, “Neo-Ottomanism, a Book and Bilateral Perceptions”, *Rethinking Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1999*, ed. Gökçe Bayındır Goularas, Hakan Sezgin Erkan (Lanham - Boulder - New York - London: Lexington Books, 2017): 1–13; Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy”, Hellenic Foundation For European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), April 2010, http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/KEIMENO-EPTΑΣΙΑΣ-8_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf. [16.05.2018].

⁴⁹¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 121. [Apostolos-Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

⁴⁹² *ibid*, 96. [Papathemelis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁴⁹³ Hasgüler posed a simple question about what would be the reasons for not protecting the rights already given to Turkish Cypriots following Geneva negotiations and instead upholding new illegal

[TR] “Our country is in a strategic position. Our nation has a glorious history. Since our nation has an identity that does not accept to be brought under the subjugation of others and that struggles with a superhuman effort for the country, honor, and faith and that for whose sake epics were written and that gained such fame, all these conditions cause to form some enemies; there are such enemies. Our country faces problems and hostility all-round from outside. We face such hostilities, from time to time, [...] especially from Greece and from many others”⁴⁹⁴.

Reportedly, Turkey was almost entirely surrounded by hostile neighbours that harbour secret feelings and sentiments, and they were in an attempt for daring ventures such as dreaming of Anatolia, or of controlling water resources and borax deposits in Turkey, or harnessing the potential of Caucasus, or longing for historical desires, etc. These were the things assumed to be an existential threat to Turkish national unity and sovereignty⁴⁹⁵. Being encircled by aggressors during the dissolution of the Ottoman State, which ended up with signing the Treaty of Sevres, although the attacks were repulsed and the Treaty of Lausanne signed by the successor nation state –Turkey– there is a common belief that bad intentions of the aggressors are still alive. This belief is remained as Sevres syndrome that cements the inherited suspiciousness and distrustfulness of *others* and results in another common belief that ‘Turks do not have friends other than Turks’.

Another important theme lies in the next excerpts, where the traditional belief embodied in a popular patriarchal statement that *the larger the population gets the stronger the country becomes*. The phrase seems like a future projection remote from reality containing wishful thinking of the rise of Turkey (that’s the rapid growth and development of the country) and an overt intention for the fall of Greece. Actually, linking the state-power with the size of the population is a tendency dating back to the Late-Ottoman period. During the regression period of the Ottoman State, it is estimated that approximately 25 million subjects were living in an area about 3 million square kilometers, which supposedly made it hard for the state to flourish successfully in economic and military conditions⁴⁹⁶. The mentioned phrases in this aspect of the two members from the Motherland Party of Turkey are as follows:

claims: “Why did not Cypriot Turks save the rights that were acquired jointly by Cypriot Rums and Turks; that were guaranteed especially by TC [Turkish Republic], Greece and England? [...] Although Cypriot Turks and Rums were mentioned alike in all the international agreements, why do Turkish executives insist on demands with no legal basis rather than these rights?” See, Mehmet Hasgüler, *Kıbrıs’ta Enosis ve Taksim Politikalarının Sonu*, 5th ed. (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2007), 316.

⁴⁹⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 26th Session, v. 2, (20.03.1996): 354, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c002/tbmm20002026.pdf> [26.02.2018]. [Mustafa Ünalı, RP, the then MP].

⁴⁹⁵ *ibid*, 348-49. [Ahmet Alkan, ANAP, the then MP].

⁴⁹⁶ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 9.

[TR] “[I]f Greece still teaches her children that the Aegean and Istanbul are within her territories, points ENOSIS as a national objective in Cyprus, if a travel agent dares to distribute maps, showing the presence of another state on our lands, to the tourists whom it will send to our country, if Greece dares to enter our territorial waters and to plant a flag on our rock; [...] there is an obligation to seriously think about [...] these problems”⁴⁹⁷.

[TR] “Greece has a national policy that has been going on since the revolt of 1821 [in] Peloponnesus against Turkey, she has megalidea, she has expansion [policy]. [Greece] was defeated in Anatolia [but] gained land in Lausanne. From her independence in 1821 till the present day, she has expanded her land four times against Turkey. She has repeatedly received the Western support and struggled with Turkey, and her nowadays big fear is the growth of Turkish nation – every six years [Turkey] adds to her population the equivalent of the whole Greece’s – by contrast with the decline in Greece’s; May God give worse, their population is falling and a sort of phobia is started because of this”⁴⁹⁸.

The *other* is an unscrupulous neighbour that pursues irredentist nationalist policies against the *self*. Greece’s *eternal irredentism* allegedly originates in her aggressive nationalism that was constructed during early years of the Greek War of Independence. As stated Greece sustains a political vision of expanding her borders to achieve Ioannis Kolettis’s⁴⁹⁹ concept of Great Idea (Megali Idea)⁵⁰⁰ which can be briefly interpreted as encompassing the lands associated with the Greek race and/or history, regardless of whether the Greek subjects constitute majority or minority of those regions. Greece, eventually, has expanded her borders against Turkey with the tacit approval of the West. From the viewpoint of Turkey, Greece is politically powerful in the international arena wherein the West is operative; and although Turkey herself is powerful in the legal realm she cannot seek her rights due to several reasons, one of which is her historical background. Although the below mentioned events are fairly old, the *others* display a resistance to assimilate them, and Turkey is constantly reminding Greece of the Fall of Constantinople and the West of the Siege of Vienna⁵⁰¹:

⁴⁹⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (20.03.1996): 348-49. [Alkan, ANAP, the then MP].

⁴⁹⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996): 81. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

⁴⁹⁹ PM Kolettis had been one of the most influential figures of the independent Greek Kingdom, for the first two decades, and was the first to coin the term Megali Idea, and introduced it as the official ideology in a public speech he gave on 14 January 1844, during his second premiership between 1844 – 1847. See, Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 211.

⁵⁰⁰ For a good review of the philological roots and discussion on the concept, See, Anastasia Stouraiti, Alexander Kazamias, “The Imaginary Topographies of the Megali Idea: National Territory as Utopia”, *Spatial Conceptions of the Nation: Modernizing Geographies in Greece and Turkey*, ed. P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, Thalia Dragonas, Çağlar Keyder (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010): 11–35.

⁵⁰¹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996): 82. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

[TR] “Greece hasn’t been able to digest the conquest of Istanbul yet. The Western world hasn’t been able to digest that we’re on the [city] gates of Vienna for two times yet. [...] Turkey must leave the drowsiness caused by the forty-five years of Cold War’s condition. That period is over. Turkey, as a regional power, as a giant has the power to stand up on her own, but Turkey fears her own shadow”.

4.2.2. Use of *Self-Images* and National Myths

Surprisingly, there is a concordant opinion about Turkey’s militarist image in both parliaments. Generally speaking, it is believed that there is a vague and unclear relationship between the state’s political and military subjects in Turkey. This argument is predicated on a disputed heritage, which asserts that the Ottoman State did not separate political and military structures and instead regarded militaries as the only guardian of the state’s maintenance and progress (i.e. the modernization attempts of the Young Turks). This very aspect is regarded as the foundational identity of Turkey; wherein national culture was furnished with military substances that espoused the maxim that *every Turk is born a soldier*. Turkey was seemingly admiring her own military prowess, and the Turkish military forces were being referred to a deterrent capacity to eliminate the threat of a possible war. However, in Greece, the ‘Turkish Armed Forces’ was the source of rising concerns about Turkey’s capacity not of threat-detering but of threat-posing. In the Greek parliament, Turkey positioned behind the Western standards that oblige militaries to remain subordinate to civilian authorities; it was particularly implied in the statement of the Foreign Minister Pangalos: “a country like Turkey, where army plays a well-known role, which is not an ordinary military role in a democratic and law-abiding state”⁵⁰².

On the Turkish side of Aegean, the country’s *self-reflection* and *self-representation* pictured a Turkey which was the opposite of what was purported by Greece. Reportedly, Turkey, for all her conjectural difficulties, remained a pioneer and a great leader since she was the only democratic and secular state in the region. And besides, she held a strong support for free-market and liberal economy which were uncommon precepts within her region⁵⁰³. There is a duality of perspective in situating the country’s place. Turkey was concomitantly described as a Western country since she was running the relevant norms and standards, also as an Asian, and Caucasian and Middle Eastern country. Her key attributes were listed as distinctive qualities and

⁵⁰² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 112. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

⁵⁰³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (10.03.1996): 119. [Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM of Turkey].

characteristics which distinguish her from all other states nestled in that unidentified geographical area⁵⁰⁴:

[TR] “Turkey, which has sustained her citizens of different ethnic origins to live in peace and brotherhood for many years, unfortunately, has been the target of also totalitarian and reactionary Islamist countries, as she is modern, progressive, and Muslim. Turkey is a country which maintains a combination of a nation concept, involving secularism and Muslimism, Kurd and Turk, Alevi and Sunni, Laz and Circassian. This beauty is a phenomenon of modernity that can be seen and sustained in very few democratic countries”.

Despite Turkey’s salient features similar to those of Western societies, her reflection on the Greek side seemed like *a potential enemy that threatened war against Greece* in retribution for its revisionist claims. Greece, therefore, became the *modern bulwark against Turkey* as was also in the past. In this sense, the country was not only guarding her own borders but also the borders of the institutions of which she was a part. Since she was a member forming the external border of the Union, and facing a dangerous traditional enemy, Greece deserved a better *protective Euro-shield against Turkey*, according to the Minister for National Defence⁵⁰⁵:

[GR] “[A] single cultural area, Thrace, Aegean, Cyprus; the implementation of the program continues. [...] Greece, the only member state of the European Union, NATO and Western European Union in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean region, wishes to play a stabilizing role in the region in general. That’s how we deal with Turkey’s destabilizing and dangerous role for security in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. [...] [I]t should be stressed that solidarity within the European Union context, in summary, requires an effort which is consistently paid by the Government on the objectives of the CFSP and on the guarantee clause about the external borders of the European Union”.

Being the gate of the EU, Greece was defending Europe’s frontier with Turkey –a condition that reminds the audient that of the myth named *Antemurale Christianitatis*. The proposition achieves three aims at once by conveying implicit messages, the first of which targets at domestic policy while the second at European Union and the third aims at Turkey. The first message was about the nation-state’s commitment to protecting territorial integrity and national sovereignty (as part of the Greeks’ historical duty and traditional responsibility) within the framework of International Law. The second one was a reiteration of the considerable cost of the fortification of the EU’s frontier with the East, which was particularly paid by Greece. And the last was a notification that Greece was not solely a neighbouring country defending her

⁵⁰⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (20.03.1996): 341. [Yılmaz Ateş, CHP, the then MP].

⁵⁰⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 121. [Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

borders, she was in fact a member of the EU defending the borders of the Union to which Turkey had been eagerly awaiting acceptance.

The Greek burden of resisting the enemy's hostile tactics necessitated solidarity, cooperation and collaboration in the region. Following the words of MP Kypourous: "Thrace, the Aegean and Cyprus, are the parts of Hellenism where people united with the army and anyone who serves there [...] becomes more Greek"⁵⁰⁶. The predominant need for the Greek nation was deemed a rapid national self-awareness motivated by the national pride, integrity and patriotism⁵⁰⁷:

[GR] "Nation [has] to regain its lost national self-confidence. Because [the nation] precisely has all the objective pre-conditions to have this faith in itself, in the possibilities of the [Greek] race, in the possibilities of every Greek, by using and exploiting the multiplication factor of the Greek soul".

National history zealously preserves the essentials of the nation-state, where frozen memories are heated and prepared for the user's purpose at considerable speed. To this end, historical memories that were out-of-date or forgotten can be reignited to stir up public sentiment. Although everything changes, history preserves the pure core of the national identity, which can be made use of by the political sphere, so that to remain purebred homogenous nations that are prerequisites for nation-states. In the excerpt above, the Greek soul is aggrandized as it represents the spirits of the Ancient Greeks. This way of holding the nation in high esteem might stem from '*progonoplexia* (ancestor obsession) and *arkhaiolatreia* (worship of antiquity)'⁵⁰⁸ which roughly means being apparently obsessed with the nation's past glories or worshipping its ancestors⁵⁰⁹. Apart from the race-based appreciation, Greece was pictured as a country, whose citizens were proud of the democratic stability, economic progress, and the tendency for conflict resolution. Furthermore, Greece was allegedly against the catastrophic effects of hegemony, racism, discrimination, and injustice in that she had a strong desire to promote peace in the world and to decrease social inequality. As stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Greece's image was: "a small country but it is valued worldwide"⁵¹⁰.

⁵⁰⁶ *ibid*, 100. [Kypourous, PASOK, the then MP].

⁵⁰⁷ *ibid*, 96. [Papatthemelis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁵⁰⁸ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 28.

⁵⁰⁹ Clogg, 2.

⁵¹⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 109-10. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

4.3. Policy-Based Approaches

During the Kardak/Imia crisis, a new world was underway and the period was witnessing rapid changes accompanying the evolvement of policies such as integration of the Balkan and Eastern European countries into the free-market economy and the EU's Economic and Monetary Union process. While the region was experiencing these transformative events, Greece, as an active member of the Union, "claim[ed] a strong position on the international stage"⁵¹¹. Stated by the PM Simitis it was a must for Greece to make a leap in her economy and self-development to join in the developed club; "if [she] does not take part in, if [she] does not take advantage of these opportunities, if [she] does not overcome the challenges, [she] will slip to a lower position in international society"⁵¹². He also asserted that despite the opposing views of traditionalists in the parliament, and the pressures of the EU; Greece had to participate in the European integration and meet the principles and fundamental criteria to be an equal member in the Union, otherwise the country would be relegated to a subordinate position⁵¹³.

4.3.1. Greek National Strategy and the 'Turkish Threat'

The growing rapprochement between Greece and the EU was, therefore, considered as the cornerstone for a stronger Greece that would have the deterrent power to eliminate the *Turkish threat*. 'The national strategy of Greece' explained by the Minister of National Defence revealed the degree and extent of the concerns about Turkey in that the document began and ended with the stress on the *Turkish threat*⁵¹⁴:

[GR] "Greece's national strategy in the external dimension includes the following basic points: Firstly, defending the integrity of the Country [against] the number one risk which is the Turkish threat that we have all realized her aim is to change the status quo in the area. Secondly, it includes the European course of the country in the context of European integration. Thirdly, it includes strengthening our country's position in the Balkans and the contribution to the gradual establishment of the Balkan pillar of the European Union. Fourthly, it includes an active Greek presence in the countries of the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean region. Fifth, it promotes the development of Greece's participation in all international organizations, [such as] NATO, European Union, WEU that are currently adjusting their strategies to the new circumstances of the international political context. Sixth, it includes the effective functioning of the Country as a metropolitan centre of Hellenism, which will take the necessary initiatives [for] national mobilization of the Greeks everywhere. Ladies and gentlemen, in order to achieve these broader goals of the national strategy and, in particular, because of the continuing Turkish

⁵¹¹ *ibid*, 119. [Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

⁵¹² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (10.10.1996): 22. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁵¹³ *ibid*, 23. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁵¹⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 119. [Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

threat, which engaged in aggressive direction in the last year by putting forward for the first time territorial claims; [our] aim is to strengthen the Country's defence doctrine towards implementing a flexible deterrent capability in order to respond effectively to every challenge, modernizing defence planning, redeploying forces and increasing the operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces”.

The strict adherence both to complying with the integration process and to fighting the traditional tenacious foe trapped the Greek policy in a sort of basic contradiction: On the one hand, the new PM declared a strong desire both for implementing a cut in the military budget and for shifting expenditures from the country's defense to the country's integration, and on the other hand, he had to announce a new military program involving more reinforcements and more armament after the Imia erupted⁵¹⁵. In his words: “The strong Armed Forces are the guardian of our national independence, territorial integrity and our sovereign rights. The central axis of our defence strategy is our high deterrent capacity against the Turkish threat”⁵¹⁶.

The *Turkish threat* was not an abstract concept belonged to a distant past because Turkey was an immediate enemy who had invaded Cyprus and had brought Greece to the brink of war several times in the last decade. As MP Papathemelis stated, Greece's “only privilege [was] an unfavourable [disadvantageous] one –privilegium odiosum– as Latins called it”⁵¹⁷. Greece was granted the privilege of being contiguous with *aggressive* Turkey, and because of this privilege, she was believed to be the *only* Western country being threatened to her territorial integrity, national sovereignty and interests.

4.3.2. Policy Implications of Changing Security Perceptions

There were also reconciliatory views of different political party holders in the Greek Parliament. In this respect, Greece was advised to reject uncontrolled arms race between countries as a solution to her security problems because it could do more harm than good for the country. Firstly, maintaining the quantitative balance of arms and ammunition between rival countries would weaken and undermine their economy. MP Skoularikis gave a concrete example of investing in arms⁵¹⁸ by stressing that with

⁵¹⁵ *ibid*, 107. [Ioannis Skoularikis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁵¹⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (10.10.1996): 24. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁵¹⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 95-96. [Papathemelis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁵¹⁸ In his book, Clogg also draws attention to the massive expenditure on military hardware, in his words: “Greek perceptions of the Turkish threat have had serious economic consequences, for enhanced spending on the armed forces has consumed as much as one-fifth of budget expenditures, even if it has had the incidental advantage of giving the officer corps a genuine sense of mission and of diverting it from political activity”. See, Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 176.

‘approximately 3 trillion Drachmas’ Greece was allocating a considerable amount of her budget to armament program, and it would be removed from “the resources that might be devoted either to the development of the country or even to the improvement of the level-of-living of the Greeks”⁵¹⁹. Secondly, countervailing such a balance would result in “the supply of weapons system which closely reflects the opponent's choices despite the special defense needs of the Greek country”⁵²⁰. And thirdly, although having a deterrent force was necessary, diplomatic efforts should not have been replaced with the militarization of international relations. Greece’s international relations would be strengthened when she became a “force for stability, cooperation, and peaceful resolution of disputes, and consolidated [her position as such] in the public opinion”⁵²¹. As MP Damanaki suggested to the government, Greece had to move steadily and clearly from the conflict-prone relationship to the rapprochement.

On the other side of the Aegean, an apparent redirection of Turkish-Greek relations from being on the verge of war to reconciliation following the Kardak/Imia crisis was also visible, especially in PM Yılmaz’s speech⁵²²:

[TR] “Distinguished members of parliament, Turkey, desires to be in good neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation with Greece. The recent crisis in the Aegean has once again revealed the dangers of leaving the years-long-conflicts unsolved between us and this country. The main way of reaching a solution is negotiation and compromise. With this understanding, we want all the problems between us and Greece to be resolved via direct contacts and negotiations. Turkey sincerely believes that turning the Aegean into a sea of peace and friendship between the two countries is in everyone's interest”.

PM Yılmaz added that although Turkey and Greece might face harsh problems in conducting their relations with each other they were able to make also good neighbourly relations from time to time. Both were the members of same alliance and able to start some initiatives to solve their problems through dialogue. In his words: “A typical example for this is the process we started in 1988, in Davos”⁵²³.

Davos was considered a governmental peace initiative by PM Yılmaz as it took place a year after the escalation of a deep dispute over the Greek attempts for oil exploration approximately 16 kilometres east of Taşoz/Thassos⁵²⁴. The then-PMs Turgut Özal of

⁵¹⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 107. [Skoularikis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁵²⁰ *ibid*, 119-120. [Tschatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

⁵²¹ *ibid*, 109. [Maria Damanaki, PASOK, the then MP. In 1991 when she became the president of SYN, she was the first female party leader in Greece].

⁵²² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 20th Session, v. 2, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c002/tbmm20002020.pdf> [26.02.2018]. [Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁵²³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (17.04.1996): 523. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁵²⁴ Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (University of Michigan Press, 1997), 373.

Turkey and Andreas Papandreou of Greece signed Davos Declaration –a no-war agreement– aiming at normalization, and remarked a renewed rapprochement in bilateral relations. Although it was regarded a political success to be celebrated by PM Yılmaz, MP Kypouros reiterated his concerns about the Davos Process as being the trigger or catalyst of the later phenomena⁵²⁵:

[GR] “Unfortunately, instead of the Black Sea, as Hellenism, we found ourselves in the white mountains of Davos, [...] both the removal of the veto and Imia didn’t suddenly fall from the sky. They were behind Davos, Davos 1 and Davos 2. [...] Davos is ultimately the original sin”.

4.3.3. Confidence Building Measures and Their Limits

Actually, in virtue of mutual communication, the year 1988 recorded further attempts for maintaining constructive and positive approaches to conflicts: Two agreements were signed to build confidence between Greece and Turkey; the first was on the 27th of May in Athens and the second was on the 8th of September in Istanbul. And PM Özal paid a state visit to Athens on the 13th of June in the same year, after a period of 36 years of no visit⁵²⁶. Since the Turkish-Greek relationship was intrinsically pregnant with peaks and troughs, any attempts might easily provoke reactions among the ones, especially those who were against reconsiderations and revisions. Such was the case with MP Spiliotopoulos⁵²⁷:

[GR] “I wanted to draw the attention of the Government to the issue of Turkish pursuits, in relation to the Confidence Building Measures that possibly lead Greece to conclude an agreement with Turkey and [...] will prospectively be made [with] the corresponding Measures of 1988, for which special attention is needed. Despite the similar declarations at the time about the non-negotiability of our rights, the then Government gave consent to the unjustified restriction of those rights, and waived the lawful pursuit of those rights”.

Accordingly, the process was a big disappointment. The incumbents refrained from making comment on, let alone reference to violations of Greek rights. No mention was made of the aeronautical exercises carried out continually by Turkey in the Aegean, within the Athens FIR. As “Greece was liable and responsible for the control of Athens FIR towards the International Community” she was the one complied with international commitments and obligations, such as “to submit flight plans, but Turkey

⁵²⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 100. [Kypouros, PASOK, the then MP].

⁵²⁶ “To the surprise of diplomats, the honor guard that greeted Ozal was made up of commandos in battle dress, not ceremonial uniforms. And there was no exchange of national anthems as is customary on such state visits.” See, Loren Jenkins, “TURKEY’S OZAL VISITS GREECE,” *Washington Post*, 14 June 1988, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/06/14/turkeys-ozal-visits-greece/e9ffb82a-548e-487e-ace0-3d10a597bb00/> [17.06.2018]. Despite a sort of backlash against PM Özal’s official visit both PMs played a decisive role in reducing the communication gap between two countries.

⁵²⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 80. [Spilios Spiliotopoulos, ND, the then MP].

did not do, [...] the abidance to the assigned exercise area, but Turkey did not respect”⁵²⁸.

Actually, the two countries had contrasting views about flight international regions: Turkey was claiming that it was a technical issue involving information and alerting services for the regions of airspace, but for Greece, it was a political issue, “a matter of sovereignty to restrict Turkish aircraft and exercises over the Aegean”⁵²⁹.

MP Spiliotopoulos furthered with his opposing position on any actions and steps, and he was not alone in his opinion⁵³⁰ that in the name of confidence-building or normalization in relations between two countries, the alterations were made routinely in favour of Turkey⁵³¹. MP Mitsotakis, for example, shared a similar view and declared a precondition for dialogue by stipulating that Turkey should have abandoned her claim of *grey-zones* that was obvious evidence of Turkey’s revisionist stance in the Aegean⁵³². Allegedly, contrary to Turkey’s revisionist posture towards the Aegean issue, which was far beyond in reaching an amicable settlement, Greece remained a *status-quo* state, which struggled to maintain the existing conditions and strongly resisted the *Turkish threat*. Therefore, Greece had to beef up her militaries, but for promoting peace in the region, and the decisive stance of Athens to secure the Greek national air and maritime space was not only a fundamental right but also “a unique way to prevent an act of war”⁵³³. As expressed by the Minister for National Defence⁵³⁴:

⁵²⁸ *ibid.* [Spiliotopoulos, ND, the then MP].

⁵²⁹ Carol Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues -- Background and Recent Developments”, CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress), 21 August 1997, <http://www.congressionalresearch.com/97-799/document.php?study=Greece+and+Turkey+Aegean+Issues+--+Background+and+Recent+Developments>. [26.04.2018].

⁵³⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 95-96. See, MP Papatthemelis of the PASOK.

⁵³¹ In fact, it was the Greek foreign policy vis-a-vis Turkey during the premiership of Andreas Papandreou that “negotiations were out of the question, as Greece was content with the existing status quo. In any negotiations between a status quo state and a revisionist state, the former is bound to lose, as the pressure is on the status quo party to make concessions so that agreement can be reached.” See, Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*, 117.

⁵³² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 133. [Konstantinos Mitsotakis, ND, the then MP].

⁵³³ *ibid.*, 121. [Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

⁵³⁴ *ibid.* [Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

[GR] “[W]e are interested in peace [...] that is why we precisely deal with acts of aggression, infringements and violations of the Turkish side, with determination and responsibility. [...] Ladies and gentlemen, a great theorist of war had stressed that ‘the basic purpose of the Armed Forces is the peace and prosperity of the people.’ That is why their high combat and deterrent capacity is needed. For this reason, Armed Forces are needed to force their respect for friends and enemies”.

Reportedly, the basic obstacle to achieving peace was *Turkish aggression*, so the military solution was valued as a reliable remedy, by arguing that peace requires a strong military presence. Various ideas were exchanged between the MPs during the discussions about strengthening the Greek Armed Forces, one of which was far more remarkable than the others. The dissenting voice of MP Papariga pointed out that Greece would fail to attain any tangible achievement of securing the country and the region as well if she counted on the NATO defence umbrella⁵³⁵:

[GR] “Do you know under what conditions can Greece play a significant role, a role recognized by her allies? [...] By establishing NATO’s multinational belligerent forces in the South-eastern Mediterranean, of course, you will get credit from both the Americans and the Germans. And these are the well-known multinational rapid action forces that you will establish together with Turkish and Italian troops and even under the command of Turkish chief-officer alternatively [...] That’s well-known. And ultimately, we establish forces for peace in the region –[where] we say, [we] see war or [we] see military, political interventions- with the leadership of a country that challenges our borders!”

Contrary to this projection, in the Turkish parliament stated by MP İnan Greece was given an extraordinary amount of freedom by NATO to pursue a sort of containment policy in order to counter Turkey⁵³⁶:

[TR] “In the recent past, Greece's military cooperation agreement made with the Russian Federation; This is the first of its kind in between NATO countries. Some time ago, she made a similar military cooperation agreement with Syria and gained the right to have aircraft in Syria. Consequently, Greece is in a sort of endeavour to pull Turkey into a multifaceted conflict. This is clearly seen”.

Greece was purportedly conducting two distinct phases of adapting to globalization. The first was on the economic level that she was consolidating her membership in the EU by doing her utmost to join the EMU, and the second was on the political level that she was making a great effort to influence her alliances to take part in the disputes where she fell short by internationalizing her national issues.

⁵³⁵ *ibid.*, 122. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

⁵³⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (30.01.1996): 80. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

4.3.4. Debates on the Effects of Globalization and the EU Dimension

According to MP Andican, the process of globalization was a matter of prestige for a country, especially like Turkey, “which is located in such geography, in a circle of fire, that covers Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East [...] to overcome her problems”⁵³⁷. Turkey would fail to settle her regional disputes by relying entirely on her own internal dynamics in that “it is not possible for a Turkey which has not got accepted to the EU, to become a leader, neither in the Islamic world nor, unfortunately, in the Turkic world”⁵³⁸. Therefore, fashioning a foreign policy appropriate to the aspired situation which could be reviewed as being a natural leader of newly founded Turkic countries entailed the EU membership. As stated by the PM Yılmaz, the EU integration process was beneficial to both gaining respect among the Turkic societies and conforming to the international institutions, rules and standards⁵³⁹. Turkey’s main objective in his words was “not to make do with the customs union” but to become “a full member of the European Union”⁵⁴⁰.

However, the PM Yılmaz also pointed out that Greece had Europeanised her own political calculations, considerations, and interests with respect to Turkey; and that in turn had vetoed the entire financial aid which was promised to be granted by the EU in order to recover Turkey’s losses due to her adaptation to the customs union⁵⁴¹. The Minister of Finance, Lütfullah Kayalar, elucidated the significance of this situation by emphasizing the amount of cost that had to be paid by Turkey on her own⁵⁴²:

[TR] “In terms of fulfilling the requirement of being included in the customs union, since the beginning of this year, Customs Duty and Mass Housing Fund cannot be collected from the imports made by the countries that are included in the union. The cost of this practice in 1996 is approximately 70 trillion TL. On the other hand, credit and other financial resources from the European Union have not yet been reached”.

Some loud dissenters in the Turkish Parliament, like MP Yazıcıoğlu, described the customs union as deplorable since its conditions and provisions were “vague, and it

⁵³⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (10.03.1996): 72. [Ahat Andican, ANAP, the then MP].

⁵³⁸ *ibid.* [Andican, ANAP, the then MP].

⁵³⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 20th Session, v. 2, (07.03.1996): 13, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c002/tbmm20002020.pdf>. [26.02.2018]. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁵⁴⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (10.03.1996): 114. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁵⁴¹ *ibid.*, 116. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁵⁴² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (17.04.1996): 440. [Lütfullah Kayalar, ANAP, the then Minister of Finance].

pose[d] dangers in terms of the concessions given”⁵⁴³. Accordingly, national customs legislation and regulation had to accord with that of the EU to where Turkey had not been admitted, thus did not have a say in its decision making bodies. His skepticism about Turkey’s prospective membership was particularly visible in his negative utterance on the Union, that supposedly “the European Union is more than satisfied with the advantages taken from Turkey via the customs union”⁵⁴⁴.

Corresponding views in the Greek Parliament were on the EU’s obliviousness to Greece’s national defence and deterrent posture towards Turkey that allegedly Greece did not reap any political benefits of this membership. Particularly it was cleared in MP Evrimidis’s complaints below⁵⁴⁵:

[GR] “Three times we had the Presidency of the European Union and we did not take advantage of our country’s gain. When we signed the GATT in September 1994, we did nothing to protect Greek agricultural products. When we have relinquished the right of veto for Turkey’s accession to the European Union, we have not achieved anything for us”.

Therefore, it was suggested by MP Intzes that in the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference, the government’s first task had to be not waiving “the right of veto on any issue that concern[ed] [Greece’s] sovereign rights and statehood”⁵⁴⁶. Greece’s veto power considered as political leverage in retaliation for bilateral disputes. In other words, Turkey had to retreat from her political stance towards Greece if she had a desire to achieve anything within the EU, as pointed out by the Foreign Minister Pangalos while explaining the general principles of the country’s foreign policy⁵⁴⁷:

[GR] “I would like to say that there is also a confusion about the customs union for lifting the veto. I don’t know, ladies and gentlemen, whether or not we were to remove the veto from the customs union then. I have the courage of my convictions, as you know, and I then criticized the lifting of the veto. However, I would like to say that this debate is not only of academic interest, because, as you know, the fact of Imia and what followed are a direct violation of the spirit and of the terms of the customs union, we returned [back to our previous position]; and [we can] sa[y] that the basis for not implementing the financial assistance to Turkey is now established due to her new behaviour and not to previous arguments we had then overlooked, namely the human rights situation and her conduct in Cyp[us]. [...] Consequently, Turkey will not receive any funding from the customs union agreement, and believe me she will [also] have great difficulty in getting funding which is the part of a more general policy regarding the Mediterranean that the Community seeks to exercise. Ladies and gentlemen, these are the general principles of our foreign policy”.

⁵⁴³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (10.03.1996): 141. [Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, BBP, the then MP].

⁵⁴⁴ *ibid.* [Yazıcıoğlu, BBP, the then MP].

⁵⁴⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 97. [Konstantinos Evrimidis, ND, the then MP].

⁵⁴⁶ *ibid.*, 74. [Intzes, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁵⁴⁷ *ibid.*, 112. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

The rule of unanimity voting provided Greece more room for engaging in political maneuvers that determined Turkey-EU relations. Foreign Minister Pangalos's statement revealed the permanence of Greek veto policy, but also the controversy raised in the Greek Parliament during the bargaining process that took place between Greece and the other EU members with regard to Cyprus's admission to the Union⁵⁴⁸, that in the end, Greece lifted her veto over Turkey-EU customs union in return for the acceptance of Cyprus's membership application.

There was general consensus in the Greek parliament that Greece had to preserve her veto policy over the improvements in respect of Turkey-EU relations. Additionally, the majority was convinced that Greece might have to exercise military power to restrain her potential threat in that veto power would be inadequate to confront *repeated violations* that were carried out relentlessly by Turkey. In this sense, the importance of *Single Defence Space* doctrine emphasized by the Minister for National Defence. It was a joint defence act of Greece *as a deterrent and stabilizing factor* in the region covering Thrace, the Aegean islands, and Cyprus. As mentioned below by MP Papathemelis military-based measures which aimed at upgrading and reinforcing the military potential of the country in tandem with Cyprus's and forming a united defense zone vis-à-vis the common *enemy* –Turkey– were unquestionably needed but they had to be buttressed with political ones by the Greek authorities, especially for achieving Cyprus's EU membership smoothly in the near term⁵⁴⁹:

[GR] "The need to overcome this enemy, aptly emphasized by the Prime Minister, means primarily shielding the Thrace-Aegean-Cyprus arc, the realization of the doctrine of a single defence space, the promotion of the pillars of strategy for the Cyprus problem, which is the accession of Cyprus to the European Union without reserves, and, of course, the doctrine of the unified defence area between Greece and Cyprus. This imposes strong, powerful Armed Forces. And, of course, it imposes a modernization of armaments, which isn't our choice Mr. President of the Coalition, it's our need. It's our imperative need when the enemy has already launched a 150 billion dollars' mammoth program, namely 37.5 trillion drachmas, without hesitation we have to proceed with the modernization of our weapons systems and [with] the re-establishment of our already afflicted aeronautical supremacy in the Aegean. An aeronautical supremacy, which has been overturned since 1988".

MP Papathemelis put greater stress on the modernization of armaments and military equipment that he believed was an *imperative need*, not an option. Accordingly, it would not be possible to protect and defend the country against possible attacks from the *enemy* while the *enemy* was persisting in arming itself by initiating expensive military ventures. And another point highlighted in the excerpt was that Greece had to

⁵⁴⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (10.10.1996): 24. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁵⁴⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 96. [Papathemelis, PASOK, the then MP].

struggle for also regaining its lost *aeronautical supremacy* over the Aegean following Davos of 1988.

In the Turkish Parliament, however, Turkey was portrayed as a peaceful country that sought *peace at home and peace in the world*. MP Ateş expressed the necessity of providing better border security and stated that Turkey was arming itself and making a costly military investment, which amounted to one-third of the country's total budget, not for *outside-others* but because of her *inside-other*, namely the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK⁵⁵⁰:

[TR] "Turkey must not entrust border security to the goodwill of her neighbours. Turkey, which conveys [the Atatürk's maxim] peace in the country, peace in the world up to a universal discourse and activity, has to demonstrate her commitment effectively also on her border protection as she resolutely does in peacekeeping. Turkey has to give the necessary fight resolutely, on every international platform, against the countries that misuse her good-neighbourly relations. Turkey, which cannot get adequate precautions and measures in her borders, is allocating a figure close to one-third of her budget each year for the weapons, bullets, bombs [of] the south-eastern, however, unfortunately, cannot stop the bloodshed".

In other words, Greece was increasing her military expenditures in response to that of Turkey's, but Turkey kept arming herself primarily to uphold her national sovereignty and territorial integrity against PKK and secondarily to beef up her borders against *outside-others* who tended to supply guns, ammunition, and explosives to the PKK.

4.3.5. Foreign Policy Goals and Link with the Cyprus Question

There were two common points circulated in both parliaments in relation to countries' foreign policy goals: peace and Cyprus. Reportedly, both countries were the genuine pacifists of the region that each was striving for peace and justice while its *other* was obstructing the initiatives. In the Greek parliament, for instance, an integrated strategy called "Package [of] Security, Friendship and Equal Cooperation" was introduced as a contribution and cooperation of Greece in the Balkan countries regarding their democratic modernization and development of the Balkan civil society. While the country was in an endeavour to become a regional power by providing peace and stability and in turn progress in the Balkans she was also in an effort to avoid being seen as an interfering country. Thus the PM underlined that Greece would "provide assistance in the way these countries look for" and support "a bilateral and multilateral

⁵⁵⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (20.03.1996): 342. [Ateş, CHP, the then MP].

dialogue to create a more coherent area of economic cooperation, which will work in close cooperation with the European Union”⁵⁵¹.

In the Turkish parliament, on the other hand, PM Yılmaz set forth the country’s foreign policy goal as achieving peace within the country, in the region, and in the world, on condition of reciprocity⁵⁵²:

[TR] “Our country, which is in a geographically sensitive position, will continue to contribute actively to efforts to resolve conflicts in the region through peaceful means. The constructive attitude we pursue in various conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East will continue. Turkey, which is an integral part of Europe and the Western world, is also a Middle Eastern and Asian country. Turkey is a factor of stability in the region between the Balkans and the Caucasus, where major problems and conflicts are nested. Turkey’s full membership to the European Union, its realization as soon as possible, will be one of the primary goals of our foreign policy. The legal, economic, social and administrative arrangements required for this will be made rapidly. Continuous efforts will be made to further develop the Customs Union Agreement [sic.] with the European Union”.

The second common point –Cyprus– was described in the Greek parliament, precisely, as an *independent state* but had to be included in the foreign and security policy of the country though. The Minister for National Defence –Tsochatzopoulos– for instance, declared that “the government is acting responsibly to create the necessary conditions that guarantee common security in the wider region and for Greece and for Cyprus”⁵⁵³. Cyprus issue, which was identified as “an international problem of invasion and occupation of an independent state by Turkey”⁵⁵⁴ by the PM Simitis, was a top priority in the Greek foreign and defence policy.

Although the issue established common ground on the Cyprus positions of all parties in the Greek parliament, the rising doubt and uncertainty about the country’s Cypriot affairs and policies were also remarkable. MP Mitsotakis voiced his dissenting opinion that Greece had to refrain from negotiating her own disputes concurrently with another independent state’s own issue. The Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue were not interrelated because Cyprus was an independent state with a separate government. Greece would maintain her support for Cyprus regardless but Cyprus had the primary responsibility for negotiations; hence putting the Cyprus issue in the center of the

⁵⁵¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (10.10.1996), 24. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁵⁵² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (07.03.1996): 23. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁵⁵³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996), 120. [Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

⁵⁵⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (10.10.1996), 24. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

Greek-Turkish relations would harm both the Greek image and foreign policy on the international level⁵⁵⁵.

MP Mitsotakis's other remarkable opinion was about the possible negative diplomatic consequences that the Greek single defence doctrine might have in the long run in that it might undermine Greek foreign policy⁵⁵⁶:

[GR] "I've long said that the Single Defence doctrine sounds good to Greek and Cypriot public opinion, but it adds nothing to Greece's long-standing position that the promotion of the Turk[ish] [presence] in Cyprus is a cause of war. And I'd recall Constantine Karamanlis's saying that there are things in politics that happen but not spoken. [...] [T]he excessive international publicity we caused by advertising the Single Defence doctrine has begun to have negative side-effects, which can also be dangerous, firstly because this position weakens our long-standing diplomatic position that the Cyprus [issue] is not a bilateral issue between Greece and Turkey and secondly because it makes it difficult for us to obtain the guarantee of the safety of the Greek borders from the European Union".

As mentioned above, Greece's open declaration of taking an active role in defending Cypriots against Turks might make a positive impression on Greek society whereas a negative one on European society. Although saving and securing the whole region including the Balkans, the Aegean, and Cyprus were defined as an additional burden on Greece in the parliament, it might be considered as if Greece was extending her territory by the EU members. And this idea might raise security concerns in that the Union would assume the responsibility for securing not only Greece but also a vague zone delineated by Greece.

In the Turkish parliament, on the other hand, PM Yılmaz maintained that Cyprus was composed of two separate societies, and supported the proposal initiated by the UN which aimed at reaching a solution based on bi-zonal bi-community federation via direct negotiations of two parties. Following his words, Turkey would sustain her support for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the rightful case of the Turkish Cypriots until "finding a permanent solution which would be accepted by both parties' own free will"⁵⁵⁷. Actually, there was a general consensus in the parliament that Turkey had to sustain her positive and constructive policies towards a peaceful settlement in Cyprus⁵⁵⁸.

⁵⁵⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996), 133–34. [Mitsotakis, ND, the then MP].

⁵⁵⁶ *ibid*, 133. [Mitsotakis, ND, the then MP].

⁵⁵⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (07.03.1996): 24. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁵⁵⁸ See, for instance the parliament speech of the MP Saffet Arıkan Bedük of the True Path Party. *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (10.03.1996): 97.

4.4. Concluding Remarks

The Kardak/Imia crisis took place in a seemingly low threat perception period, between Greece and Turkey, which had been on the brink of war just 22 years ago in Cyprus. It showed that throughout those years both countries channeled their material and moral resources towards national development and *self*-improvement. Although they might not have borne good neighborly relations –probably due to the slow emergence of democratic institutions and principles since both countries had long been under the military tutelage, and their difficult process of evolving into a modern democratic state– they did not mutually perceive a permanent threat either.

With respect to the road to their membership in the EEC, the equilibrium between Greece and Turkey disrupted after the Greek admittance to the Union. However, their goals and objectives regarding the Union remained valid and in 1996, there emerged a list of new priorities. Turkey was still far from even the threshold of the Union and seeking to become eligible for membership, and also fighting the discrimination between herself and Greece made by the Union (accordingly the Union making the prejudicial and unjust distinction between them). Greece, on the other hand, had already been a member but felt that she was still a peripheral country rested on shaky foundations. Therefore, equal integration into the Union was considered a vital interest of the country. While striving for becoming a core member state, the new PM Simitis tried to make a reduction in arming, which was then equal to one-third of the country's total budget, and thereby refrained from generating any political and military tension, especially with Turkey. In other words, despite the fact that the Union disturbed the delicate balance between them; it was a time when provoking a conflict was in neither Greek nor Turkish national interests in that they were in an effort to forge their European identity.

Redressing their national identities to adapt to the European ones was a moot point that raised discordant voices in both parliaments. In the Turkish parliament, discussions held about how to preserve and maintain religious sensitivities and national traditions, whereas in Greece they were about how to make political decisions without creating a conflict of interests. Most, particularly the opposition parties', politicians in Greece believed that the country was in a conflict of interests. Although she was a border country of the EU, her primary goal of providing the Greeks with secure lands was not ensured by the CFSP, so the main concerns stayed high. Put

differently, Greece was adopting and implementing all sorts of European policies without any exclusion but the Union –in return– was leaving Greece alone in her foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey, which was the implacable enemy of the country. Supposedly, the root cause of the nearby Turkish threat was the member states' neutrality in the bilateral conflicts or their partiality towards Turkey. Greece, therefore, was the only Western country that was being threatened to her territorial integrity, national sovereignty and interests. The widely-held Turkish threat perception in Greece was not reciprocated by Turkey, where paradoxically policymakers almost ignored and disregarded Greece.

Further, Greece's *self*-assessment that despite her EU membership, she was all alone being confronted with Turkey, did not correspond to the reflection of Greece in Turkey. Contrary to this Greek *self*-image, Turkish parliamentarians believed the opposite and maintained that throughout the history Greeks received overwhelming support from the West, and consequently became the spoiled children of the West that were complaining bitterly about the lack of help and support they got.

Turkey, surprisingly, had the anxious thought pattern about the West's exaggeration of the Greek factor in contemporary international politics both in terms of its alleged historical bonds and strategic alliances. Turkey placed limited or symbolic value on her international engagement and participation in organizations or multilateral agreements in that Western-based affiliation and association had always been likely to arouse her mistrust. From this point of view, the West attaches overriding importance to Greece than she deserves, and appreciates and supports her in comparison to Turkey. This thought pattern might probably be the motive behind shunning any third party (be they countries or organizations) intervention in their bilateral disputes. Put differently, although Turkey appears to be a modern nation-state with the Western-type democracy, which borrowed state structure and institutions and judicial system from the West, apparently, has never felt herself being actually accepted to this bloc.

Greece, on the other hand, strikingly, regarded the organizations in which she was a member as a state apparatus or an intrinsic asset of the state; that is, the country had interiorized her memberships and commitments, to such an extent that the distinction between the country and the organization had disappeared. In this respect, Greece was the tangible and visible form of the EU; it does not necessarily mean that Greece is a profit-seeking country that is keen to exploit this supranational organization neither

politically nor economically. In other words, the EU was equated with Greece, so when the country was threatened it meant the Union was threatened as a whole. Within the Greek perspective, the Turkish threat emerges as a growing direct threat to the Greek world, where the country had firmly anchored historically and geographically.

High expectations of brutal and unlawful violence in Greece affected the politicians' attitude to Turkey. Turkey defined as an aggressive state seeking to resuscitate Ottomanism (namely Neo-Ottomanism) that had destabilized the political balance and disrupted regional peace. The neighboring country was a potential military threat not only to Greece but also to the EU, to the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Aegean. Military-based discourses were discernible especially with reference to Turkey in the Greek Parliament. In this respect, Turkey emerges as the only border neighbor of Greece to be faced, despite all the inadequacies of arming against it. Most MPs appeared complaining about the deficiency of the national military forces in comparison to Turkey, which was believed to be armed to the teeth. While some parliamentarians insisted on the benefits of acceleration in the arms race between Turkey and Greece some others argued that a curb on arming would be of more benefit to the country. The noticeable argumentation was about achieving a formidable-*self*, which would be admirable for friendly countries and fearsome for enemies. Another point to be noted related to national armament was that the logical and moral reasoning behind it. Arming was linked to the concept of national fortification and *self*-defense, thus it was for defense, not offense purposes, and Turkey held fully accountable for this undesired condition.

In respect of Turkish politicians, on the other hand, neither the amount of money allocated from the country's budget to the national armament was important nor the level of military technology. Turkish armed forces were not emphasized with these aspects, their obvious references were found limited to the themes such as the Turks' military prowess in battles, a source of national pride (also espoused in the proverb Turks born as a soldier), and a serious menace to Turkey's enemies. Considering the parliamentary speeches in general, it can be pointed out that military-based statements were utilized either to frighten Greece (like reminding the Minor Asia Catastrophe or Cyprus) or to degrade the Greek troops (like ridiculing and scorning the Greek soldiers –*evzonas*– as 'skirt-wearing'). Greece depicted as a modern state immersed in reverie for her glorious past. The Greek irredentist dream that expressed the national aim at

reviving the Byzantine Empire (namely Megali Idea) referred to as the deepest desire of the country although Greece gradually gave up her claims on Turkish lands. Following the Turkish War of Independence, Greece refrained from demanding soil in Anatolia, especially on İzmir and İstanbul, which meant a shift in Greek claims that seems to be overlooked by Turkey.

Both countries denounced each other as a calculating manipulator that had been employing *othering* as a powerful lever for changing the public focus from internal concerns to external ones. The *other* was displaying aggressive tendencies to compensate its domestic challenges. By provoking an outside other (an out-group), allegedly, the *other* achieved to persist the homogeneity of its in-group and eliminate the diversity within its society. Therefore, as was asserted in both parliaments, antagonism towards the *other*, that is generating representations of a positive *self* vis-a-vis a negative other, worked in providing room for political maneuvers of governments. In this vein, daring to create de facto positions and transforming minor disputes into life-and-death struggles were defined as the innate propensity of the *other* while the *self* depicted as a guarantor of stability in the region that resolutely resisted the revisionist *other* and its encroachment on national territory.

5. TURKISH AND GREEK PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE CAPTURE OF ABDULLAH ÖCALAN

Abdullah Öcalan, who had been accused of being the perpetrator of ongoing violent actions in Turkey that were dated back to 1984 of Eruh and Şemdinli attacks, and had been driven out of several countries, became the most prominent Kurdish fugitive of 1999. Following a long period of the chase and hide, his capture by the Turkish authorities during his transfer from the residence of Greek ambassador to Kenya to the airport caused adverse effects on their bilateral relations, and discredited Greece's image internationally.

Turkey, upon the event, announced that Greece which had been covertly supporting terrorism for years was finally caught red-handed, thus became *the proven terrorist country of Europe*. Greece, on the other hand, expressed grave doubts that whether Turkey would use this event as a political lever in coercing itself into either accepting the gray zones thesis on the Aegean or lifting the Greek veto on the EU fund and benefits related to the customs union.

PM Simitis, probably of staging a limited number of responsible politicians, distancing the Greek leadership from the image of having been involved in the issue, and alleviating the public concerns and pressure on PASOK party, declared that “[t]he government [...] shar[ing] the grief and sensitivity of Greek people, have fully assumed political responsibility and [...] [t]hree ministers submitted their resignation”⁵⁵⁹: Foreign Minister Pangalos, Interior Minister Papadopoulos, Public Order Minister Petsalnikos were respectively replaced by Georgios Papandreou, Vasso Papandreou, and Michalis Chrysohoidis. Reportedly, it was the Army Major Savvas Kalenteridis, an officer of the EYP⁵⁶⁰, who brought Öcalan illegally into Greece and

⁵⁵⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 91st Sitting, (05.03.1999): 5023, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES0305.pdf>. [24.05.2018]. [Konstantinos Simitis, PASOK, the then PM of Greece].

⁵⁶⁰ Εθνική Υπηρεσία Πληροφοριών.

his misconduct during his escort was precipitated this misadventure⁵⁶¹. Eventually, in the process, he ended several careers, including his own⁵⁶².

When the event erupted, Greece was striving for stable democratic institutions, economic growth, social justice, and prosperity to become a strong European country. PM Simitis set his primary goal; to raise the position of Greece to be the factor of stability, cooperation, and peace in the region, by promoting a peaceful foreign policy and holding the Hellenic principles originated in its history and traditions. In his opinion, Greece “was respected by its friends, but also by its opponents”⁵⁶³ because it was a democratic and modern state with growing economy, social equality, and deterrent capacity. The Greek progress was portrayed as fully interrelated with the country’s European track, as pointed out by the PM: “the more they [we]re interconnected, the more Greece [wa]s assured because if Greece [wa]s threatened, the whole [wa]s threatened”⁵⁶⁴. To this end, the national strategy was developed “to strengthen Greece through its European processes, through its presence in the Balkans, in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Black Sea region”⁵⁶⁵. The European orientation, with regard to the modernization of Greece, was considered as the nucleus of internal and external policies of the country. Joining the EMU, for example, was a constructive device for meeting the goals of national economic policy and for gaining a political lever of empowerment and strengthening the country’s role in Europe⁵⁶⁶.

Modernization, especially a European-oriented one, was also at the top of Turkey’s agenda. President Demirel of Turkey, for example, believed that the full accession to the EU would have been an outcome of a two-hundred-year-old modernization process of the country. In this respect, Turkey’s national interests, future direction, and policy vision involved strengthening its ties with the EU. Turkey’s full membership of the integrated EU would have been beneficial to both Turkey and the EU itself, for

⁵⁶¹ “Yesterday a leading officer in Greece’s Intelligence Service (EYP), Colonel Savvas Kalenterides, who had been dispatched to Nairobi, said Athens had openly co-operated with the CIA to deliver Mr Ocalan to Turkey”. For an opposite version of the story, See, Helena Smith, “Athens in Crisis over CIA Links to Ocalan Capture”, *The Guardian*, 19 February 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/feb/19/kurds.helenasmith>. [16.12.2018].

⁵⁶² Miron Varouhakis, “Fiasco in Nairobi: Greek Intelligence and the Capture of PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999”, *Center for the Study of Intelligence (CIS)*, 21 April 2009, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no1/fiasco-in-nairobi.html>. [16.12.2018].

⁵⁶³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5025. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁵⁶⁴ *ibid.* [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁵⁶⁵ *ibid.*, 5033. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁵⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 5054. [Georgios Papandreou, PASOK, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs].

“history had already revealed that Europe without Turkey and Turkey without Europe were unthinkable”⁵⁶⁷. Turkey's relationship with the EU had been interrupted and stimulated by various peaks and troughs, but seemingly Turkey was holding its belief in reaching the ideal of communicating with an ‘impartial Europe’ one day. Unfortunately, the last Summit in Luxembourg, for example, was ended up with disappointment for Turkey and considered “injustice to history and discrimination against Turkey”⁵⁶⁸.

Interestingly, Greece was also supporting the enlargement process of the EU. According to the Greek FM Pangalos, “Europe c[ould] not be a closed fortress”⁵⁶⁹, but that was not necessarily mean that it would be available for every applicant. In his words, “Europe must be open to the European peoples, who for historical reasons stayed on the sidelines”⁵⁷⁰. In this sense, Greece, “with the historical and geopolitical consciousness of her other identities”⁵⁷¹ (originated in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea) was actively encouraging and promoting the enlargement process as a way of spreading the European norms and values, as well as, prosperity and democracy over those who were ‘sidelined’.

Turkey was harbouring its belief in getting acceptance to full membership, despite the Luxembourg Summit, and was in an endeavor to adjust to standards of the EU. For example, although the country was deprived of its potential benefits and relevant funds, she still considered the Customs Union as a valuable asset in that it would trigger new competitive conditions in the country to adapt her businesses to their counterparts in Europe. According to Demirel, when Turkey met the EU criteria not only in social or political issues but also in economics; such as meeting the standards of getting acceptance to the monetary union, “it would become a de facto member”, in other words, “it would be a legal registration” of Turkey’s Europeanness with its history, geography, and lifestyle⁵⁷². In this sense, Turkey was a modern country that

⁵⁶⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 1st Session, v. 62, (01.10.1998): 41, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c062/tbmm20062001.pdf>. [18.09.2018]. [Parliament speech of Süleyman Demirel, the then President of the Republic of Turkey].

⁵⁶⁸ *ibid.*, [Demirel, the then President of Turkey].

⁵⁶⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 13th Sitting, (03.11.1998): 562, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES1103.pdf>. [21.05.2018]. [Theodoros Pangalos, PASOK, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs].

⁵⁷⁰ *ibid.* [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

⁵⁷¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5025. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁵⁷² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (01.10.1998): 42. [Demirel, the then President]

strictly adhered to the western norms and values, but “it had always been experiencing an image problem while conducting its foreign policies”⁵⁷³. President Demirel suggested that this issue would totally be overcome when Turkish citizens became proud of their own country, especially in terms of its level of modernity and civilization⁵⁷⁴.

The image problem of Turkey, however, was not that of simple; limited to her lifestyle choices or economic conditions. According to the Greek FM, the image of Turkey was being damaged by the infringements and violations it caused, and unfortunately, these disrupting aspects of the country were stemming from its inherited nature. As expressed below, Turkey and Greece were not equal countries that were corresponding to each other, so if a mutual dialogue was in question, Turkey should have merited communicating with Greece which belonged to the club of the Western World:

[GR] “In order to enter into dialogue, the dialogue must be equitable. And in order to become equal, we must belong to the same legal order. We aren’t currently in the same legal order because Greece, like all the civilized and developed countries of the Western world, accepts the general jurisdiction of the Hague Tribunal [...] Greece won’t leave the civilized world to enter a place where memories of Ottoman origin, relationships of dependence and subordination are alive”⁵⁷⁵.

[GR] “We aren’t the Europeans [having] complex, because quite simply we’re the Europeans. [...] Our participation, our membership in Europe, is our right that we’ve paid and re-paid every day. No one makes us a favor. After all, switching to Cavafy, ‘since so many more barbarous than us write it, let’s write it, too’. Well, we’re Europeans”⁵⁷⁶.

In addition to the above expressions of FM Pangalos and MP Papatthemelis, in his appraisal below, PM Simitis made derogatory remarks in describing Turkey as having *violent-tended intrinsic qualities*. Accordingly, not only her ‘internationally confirmed violations’ but also her ‘phobia and obsession’ about Greece and the Greek orientation to the EU were the root causes of the backlash against Turkey in Europe⁵⁷⁷:

[GR] “It’s a neighbor who is trying to export its internal difficulties to the international stage and in particular to export them to Greece. A Turkey that tries anxiously to thwart the course of Greece towards fulfilling one of her basic goals, to become a full and equal member of the hard core of the European Union, to thwart the effort for a strong Greece. A Turkey which is accountable to the European and international public opinion for the violation of human rights. It is confirmed by everybody and has been highlighted in many texts and decisions of the European and international institutions. That’s why she is criticized for her behavior by all”.

⁵⁷³ *ibid*, 49. [Demirel, the then President].

⁵⁷⁴ *ibid*, 50. [Demirel, the then President of Turkey].

⁵⁷⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (03.11.1998): 563. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

⁵⁷⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 82nd Sitting, (17.02.1999): 4530–31, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES0217.pdf>. [23.05.2018]. [Stylianios Angelos Papatthemelis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁵⁷⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5024. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM]

In the view of ruling and opposition party members, neighboring Turkey was a serious *setback* for Greece –particularly in deepening her relations with the EU. Reportedly, knowing that Greece held high capacities to influence international situations and that would change drastically in due course of joining the EMU, “Turkey [wa]s trying to delay the course of the country, [by] putting Greece on [a state of] constant vigilance that exhaust[ed] her”⁵⁷⁸. The two countries were supposedly equal to each other in terms of their position on the international stage, a few years ago. Greece, however, proceeded with deepening her integration into the EU and eventually reached to a very different level from Turkey. In the Greek PM’s words: “We participate and define, we identify, we’re at the core of what Europe is doing [but] it isn’t. This is what Turkey wants to prevent in every way. This is the cause of her provocation and ongoing effort to hinder the development”⁵⁷⁹.

In the Turkish Parliament, there is no discourse available regarding the aforementioned issues. Concerning the capture of Öcalan, on the other hand, the Turkish parliamentarians apparently placed emphasis neither on Greece nor on the Greek involvement in the process, but on the European Union and Italy.

The *othering* of Greece in the Turkish parliament is not the equivalent of the Turkish *othering* in the Greek parliament. The Turkish parliamentary debates, therefore, cover less Greek subjects compared to that of its counterpart. In addition to that, the interchangeable usage of the European Union and Europe appears as a common aspect of both parliaments.

5.1. Rule-Based Approaches

In the Turkish parliament, Öcalan was defined so deeply associated and integrated with his ‘terrorist organization’ –PKK– that it is not easy to distinguish one from other even in the speeches where the explicit emphasis was on the terrorist organization itself. In the Greek parliament, on the other hand, Öcalan was not regarded as equal to PKK, and instead, he was regarded as a ‘political leader’ who struggled for the rights of his ‘oppressed Kurdish people’. In this respect, the international organizations such as the UN and the EU, which had regulations on granting political asylum for those

⁵⁷⁸ *ibid.*, 5042. [Nikolaos Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

⁵⁷⁹ *ibid.*, 5025. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

whose lives were in danger, were censured for their ignorance of regulations and legal obligations.

As was reported in the Turkish parliament, since Syria had long been the hosting country for Öcalan and could not be convinced to deport him to Turkey, the government was in a decision to begin legal action against her. Actually, it was approximately ten days before the Adana Consensus, which was signed between Damascus and Ankara on 20 October 1998 to put an end to Syria's support for PKK, the Turkish PM Yılmaz had voiced that Turkey would declare self-defense in terms of the UN Charter Article 21⁵⁸⁰. Syria had been the only country that was discussed to be proceeded against in the Turkish parliament. Although there were other countries on Öcalan's route; such as Russia, Italy, and Greece, none of them provoked Turkish sensitivity on the issue. This might have been due to these countries' international affiliations and engagements in the West, for Turkey was in a period full of desire and determination to succeed in forging strong bonds and close relationships with the EU. Regarding Russia, the two countries made several agreements including the utmost important –Blue Stream Pipeline Project– whereby Turkey and Russia allegedly became strategic partners, with their joint participation in energy and transport projects.

Therefore, Greece had also not been brought in the limelight until the fact that Öcalan had been hosted in the Greek ambassador's residence in Kenya was surfaced. Previous to this development, limited Turkish MPs made reference to the Greek support for PKK, one of whom was the MP Kozakçıoğlu. According to him, Syria and Greece – the first with its armed training camps in Beqaa Valley and the second with its Lavrio camp– were remained the utmost important nests for PKK's maintenance and assistance in its terrorists' return trip back to Turkey⁵⁸¹.

⁵⁸⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 3rd Session, v. 63, (07.10.1998): 284, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c063/tbmm20063003.pdf>. [18.09.2018]. [Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁵⁸¹ *ibid*, 290. [Hayri Kozakcioglu, DYP, the then MP].

5.1.1. Assessment of PKK and Its Activities

The Turkish assessment of PKK was particularly based on legal documents and official declarations. Apart from the USA and the UK, the PM Yılmaz stated that France and Germany, where the Kurdish population was high in numbers, had prohibited the activities of the PKK and its subsidiaries since the beginning of the 90s. Accordingly, through the decree of the German Federal Court of 12 January 1990 a warrant was issued, and “Öcalan was named as wanted for the crimes of murder and for managing a terrorist organization”⁵⁸².

Contrarily, the Greek MPs took a cautious attitude toward Öcalan and his organization –PKK– and avoided associating them with terrorism. Buttressing the opinion that Öcalan was the ‘political leader of a tormented ethnos’, the Greek MP Kounalakis exemplified Germany as a country which refrained from taking legal action against him, and instead, upheld his claims. Öcalan was accused of murdering a disenchanted member of PKK, who quitted the organization and was killed in Russelsheim, and running a terrorist organization that was forcibly raising money for itself from the Kurdish origin businesses in Germany⁵⁸³. In 1990, Germany authorized an arrest warrant, but “did not internationalize [it] toward other countries, [and] keep it within Germany”⁵⁸⁴. In Kounalakis’s words; “Germany, which had issued an arrest warrant against him for the murders committed by PKK on its territory, did not dare to pursue his extradition, because it just did not even want him to be tried, let alone gave him to Turks”⁵⁸⁵.

However, in the Turkish parliament, all the European countries including Germany were considered law-abiding. Supposedly, they recognized PKK as *a terrorist organization* following the irrefutable evidence that revealed PKK’s and Öcalan’s entanglement in terrorism. In addition to their terrorist activities, PM Yılmaz

⁵⁸² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 20th Session, v. 65, (18.11.1998): 464, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c065/tbmm20065020.pdf>. [18.09.2018]. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁵⁸³ Denis Staunton, “Germany Will Not Pursue PKK Leader’s Extradition”, *The Irish Times*, 21 November 1998, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/germany-will-not-pursue-pkk-leader-s-extradition-1.217211> [20.10.2019]; Saygı Öztürk, “Sadece 5 Cinayetten Aranıyor”, *Sabah*, 25 November 1998, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1998/11/25/R03.html>. [20.10.2019].

⁵⁸⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 81th Sitting, (16.02.1999): 4459, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES0216.pdf>. [23.05.2018]. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

⁵⁸⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 96th Sitting, (12.03.1999): 5287, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES0312.pdf>. [24.05.2018]. [Petros Kounalakis, SYN, the then MP].

underlined that they were also involved in organized crimes such as “narcotics trafficking, arms and human smuggling, money laundering, extortion, abduction of children”⁵⁸⁶ and an attempt to recruit militants to obtain financial resources needed to commit ‘terrorist acts’. Reportedly, Sputnik Operation, which was conducted with coordination of some European countries in September 1996, for example, clearly disclosed PKK’s link with ‘organized crimes’. Yılmaz, by categorizing drug trafficking as a ‘crime against humanity’⁵⁸⁷ and registering PKK’s relation with the ‘global illicit drug trade’, listed several other reports and declarations. Accordingly, reports of the 1995 and 1996 by the US state department and department of justice confirmed that all the attributions of PKK mentioned in the Turkish parliament were exactly true. Yılmaz stated that “in these reports, it was emphasized that the European drug trafficking cartel controlled by PKK terrorist organization”⁵⁸⁸. Simultaneously, in Europe, the Paris Institute of Criminology which was the oldest French research institute for criminal law and criminology proved PKK’s drug network in Europe. Moreover, in the final report of “Sub-Commission on Illicit Drug Trade and Related Problems in the Middle and Near East, [which] gathered in Beirut between 29 June and 3 July 1998 under the United Nations Drug Control Program”⁵⁸⁹, declared PKK as a ‘narco-terrorist organization’.

In general, PKK was related to narcotics in the Turkish parliament whereas in the Greek parliament, the Greek MPs refrained from using the abbreviation PKK and instead preferred calling the movement as the ‘Kurdish organization’ or as ‘liberation movement’. No discussions were held by the Greek MPs about the categories of PKK

⁵⁸⁶ This opinion maintains its validity; that during the conduct of this study some Kurdish mothers started to stage a sit-in demonstration in front of the HDP building in Diyarbakır, a southeastern Turkish city, demanding the release and return of their children who were claimed to be kidnapped by PKK. See, “Diyarbakır Mothers: 50 Days of Waiting,” *TRT World*, <https://www.trtworld.com/video/insight/50-days-on-mothers-in-diyarbakir-still-wait-for-their-children/5db067a56e2a1a00111d1474> [04.12.2019]; İclal Turan, “Turkey: Mothers’ Sit-in against PKK Continues,” *Anadolu Agency*, 30 October 2019, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-mothers-sit-in-against-pkk-continues/1630989> [04.12.2019]; “Kurdish Mothers: HDP Takes Revenge on Children for Not Supporting Party,” *Daily Sabah*, 24 November 2019, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2019/11/24/kurdish-mothers-hdp-takes-revenge-on-children-for-not-supporting-the-party>. [04.12.2019].

⁵⁸⁷ Bekir Aksoy of The True Path Party was another MP who had the same opinion that PKK carried out crime against humanity: “They are the brain of drug trafficking, by transferring the narcotics from the Middle East and Afghanistan to the Europe they commit crime against humanity”. See, *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 23rd Session, v. 66, (24.11.1998): 239, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c066/tbmm20066023.pdf>. [18.09.2018].

⁵⁸⁸ [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM] *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey* (T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi 18.11.1998), 463.

⁵⁸⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 463. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

acts and their conformity to international rules and conventions, but both Greek foreign ministers of the term (Theodoros Pangalos and Georgios Papandreou, respectively) distanced the PASOK government from the conduct of PKK⁵⁹⁰. According to their declarations Greece had great sympathy for the Kurdish issue in terms of fundamental human rights and minority rights, and had ever and never supported terrorism, let alone drug trafficking:

[GR] “[F]or us the treatment of the Kurdish problem has always been in line with our principles, we are against the separatist movements, the armed rebellion and the acts of terrorism and violence, but we are in favor of protecting minorities, human rights and democratic freedoms”⁵⁹¹.
[GR] “[T]he PASOK government supports the struggle of people whose fundamental rights are being violated. Our support, of course, doesn’t necessarily make us -it certainly doesn’t make us- supporters of any act of one or other Kurdish organization. [...] The main criterion of our attitude towards Kurdish [issue] was, is and will be human rights, minority rights”⁵⁹².

Both Turkish interior ministers of the term –Aktaş of 1998 and Bayar of 1999– had the same point that the West, in fact, for a long time either overtly or covertly, had ignored PKK and ‘exploited it for Turkey’s dissolution’ until they discovered its clear link with narcotics. In Bayar’s words: “Apo’s drug smuggling caused a handicap for him and in this respect PKK became unwanted in the West”⁵⁹³. Reportedly, PKK and Öcalan were unwelcome not because it was proved and realized by the West that they were the rebel forces fighting for terror purposes and not for humanitarian purposes (like human rights); but because they were ‘drug runners of Europe’. In Aktaş’s words: “PKK separatist terrorist organization has committed major crime[s] not only against the Turkish people but also against humanity; it holds the large part of the world’s drug trafficking by the networks it manages”⁵⁹⁴.

MP Aksoy stated that granting a political identity to such a person would contravene the European norms and values which Europeans were long being proud of, and the

⁵⁹⁰ In December 1993, when PASOK MPs attended to Turkey’s DEP party congress and declared their full support for the Kurdish movement, the bilateral relations strained. See, Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 609.

⁵⁹¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4467. During her parliamentary speech, MP Alexandra Papariga of the KKE used quotation from an interview of the FM Pangalos, criticizing his position. The full length excerpt is as follows: “[Y]our today’s interview shows what the government’s policy option was. You said, ‘I want to start by saying that for us the treatment of the Kurdish problem has always been in line with our principles, we are against the separatist movements, the armed rebellion and the acts of terrorism and violence, but we are in favor of protecting minorities, human rights and democratic freedoms.’ It’s a stack of things that everyone can get what they want.”

⁵⁹² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5053. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

⁵⁹³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 51st Session, v. 70, (09.02.1999): 72, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c070/tbmm20070051.pdf>. [18.09.2018]. [Cahit Bayar, the then Minister of Interior Affairs].

⁵⁹⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (24.11.1998): 259. [Kutlu Aktaş, the then Minister of Interior Affairs]

new concept of NATO, and international treaties, as well⁵⁹⁵. MP Köse, with the same fashion, referring to Article 13 of NATO's Alliance Strategic Concept adopted on 7-8 November 1991 in Rome⁵⁹⁶ and to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty,⁵⁹⁷ maintained that Turkey's request on the delivery of Öcalan was also in accord with NATO's several resolutions, and underscored the double standard Turkey faced with regard to the European concepts; supposedly, Europe was in no position to lecture Turkey on human rights anymore⁵⁹⁸.

[TR] "Distinguished members of the parliament, the greatest jurisprudence tragedy of the century has been staged in Italy, which is claiming to be the cradle of modern law. Those who host the bloody murderer of 30 thousand people, in a sea-facing villa, before the eyes of the whole world, should never mention 'law' and 'human rights'. If the rule of law, which is considered to be the greatest value of the contemporary world, is put aside persecutors will continue to be preferred to victims".

Italy's resistance to extraditing Öcalan to Turkey caused peremptory indignation in the Turkish leadership. PM Yılmaz asserted that if Italy was to insist on assessing PKK not as a terrorist but as a political organization, this wrong and criminal conduct of Italy would not be left without retribution.

5.1.2. Standpoint and Accountability of the International Organizations and Western World

It was explicitly avowed by Yılmaz that none of "the Governments of the Republic of Turkey, of the present and of the future" would never "sit at negotiating table with bloody villains"⁵⁹⁹. Proposing a negotiation policy was considered humiliation of the country. In the Turkish Parliament, the possibility of bargaining with a terrorist organization which would mean *internationalizing internal terrorism by ascribing political attributes to PKK* was met with revulsion.

In the Greek Parliament, on the other hand, not proposing a negotiation policy was considered humiliation of NATO, which was blamed for remaining indifferent to the Kurdish issue. In this regard, although NATO decided to send its troops to Kosovo claiming that "there, the liberation army [was] not terrorists"⁶⁰⁰, the same organization 'played dumb' as far as the Kurdish people were concerned. MP Tsovolas pointed out

⁵⁹⁵ *ibid*, 241. [Bekir Aksoy, DYP, the then MP].

⁵⁹⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 469–70. [Mehmet Tahir Köse, DSP, the then MP]

⁵⁹⁷ *ibid*, 470. [Mehmet Tahir Köse, DSP, the then MP].

⁵⁹⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (24.11.1998): 261. [İsmail Köse, DYP, the then MP]

⁵⁹⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 465. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁶⁰⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4469. [Dimitrios Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

that ironically “the Kurds who had been existed since ancient times as ancient Kurds”⁶⁰¹ were described as ‘terrorists’. It was discussed in general that why could not the Kurdish people have a chance to experience the same fate as the Kosovans, whose liberation army had also been condemned as a ‘terrorist organization’⁶⁰² before their case was politicized and they were transformed into *freedom fighters*. In the excerpt below, MP Konstantopoulos made the point clearly by placing Turkey and Serbia on one side, and PKK and Kosovar Army on the other⁶⁰³:

[GR] “While [...] the Serbian leadership sits at the negotiating table with the Kosovo Liberation Army, under the NATO pressure and under the threat of military intervention to change the border, the Kurdish movement, representing a forty million people, is characterized as a terrorist organization and its leader as a terrorist who is not entitled to seek asylum”.

The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999, was formed the legal basis of the Greek argument on Öcalan’s asylum process. As part of the communitarisation of asylum policy – which meant providing the minimum standards and temporary protection to displaced people from third countries who cannot return to their country of origin and who need international protection– the Greek government decided to speed up the implementation of paragraph 73A of the Treaty of Amsterdam⁶⁰⁴. According to MP Kouvelis, in addition to the EU’s there were other accords to be considered or applied such as the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which was also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention. As it was a multilateral treaty of the UN wherein Turkey was a member, Kouvelis suggested that Greece had to have recourse to the UN for Öcalan: “What was Greece refraining from, regarding the presence of Ocalan here, to apply the 1951 International Treaty in the light of the day”⁶⁰⁵. Moreover, Greece allegedly had another chance to benefit from the resolution of “the Foreign Ministers

⁶⁰¹ *ibid.* [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁶⁰² As avowed in the press conference by the Ambassador Gelbard, “we also condemn the attacks against the police and others by the group that calls itself the UCK [Kosovo Liberation Army]. As I have said before, I consider these to be terrorists actions, and it is the strong and firm policy of the United States to fully oppose all terrorists actions and all terrorists organizations”. See, Robert S. Gelbard, “Press Conference, Pristina, Serbia, and Montenegro”, U.S. Department of State Archive, 22 February 1998, https://1997-2001.state.gov/policy_remarks/1998/980222_gelbard_pristina.html. [21.11.2018].

⁶⁰³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4463. [Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

⁶⁰⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 78th Sitting, (11.02.1999): 4313, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES0211.pdf>. [23.05.2018]. [Alexandros Chrysanthakopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁰⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5278. [Fotis Kouvelis, SYN, the then MP].

of the Member States of the European Union on the political provision of 1995 or even this Schengen Convention, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 29 to 31”⁶⁰⁶.

Additionally, MP Vlahopoulos, expressing his sincere sympathy for Öcalan, emphasized the need for a Common Foreign Policy that had been absent in the Kurdish question as clearly seen. For him, “the European Union [was] neither a hell nor a paradise”⁶⁰⁷. It was not an endpoint but an ongoing process which aimed at objectives of Economic and Monetary Union with the Maastricht, and was on its way to reach a political union and impose the supranationally agreed norms and standards with the Amsterdam Treaty⁶⁰⁸:

[GR] “It is worth emphasizing that if the European Union had accelerated the implementation of paragraph 73 K2 A of the Amsterdam Treaty for communitarisation of asylum policy, then there would have been a common understanding of the European Union countries and there of Ocalan issue and also of the Kurdish question, and the European countries’ hypocrisy, which shows sensitivity to Kosovo's autonomy but turns its back to the twenty million Kurdish people exterminated in the Kurdistan mountains, would have disappeared”.

Conversely, in the view of Turkish leadership, PKK was listed and identified as a ‘terrorist organization’ by several states and organizations, including the USA, the UK, France, Germany, the OSCE, and NATO. Italy, however, refused to extradite Öcalan to Turkey, and instead welcomed him as a special guest. Supposedly, he had the chance to meet other PKK participants in Europe and “more importantly he had many advocates and proponents in the Italian Parliament some of whom were members of the ruling party”⁶⁰⁹. For the MP Kiriş, Italy’s rejection of Turkey’s warrant for the extradition of Öcalan meant denying all the agreements, legal documents, declarations, and evidence.

Moreover, Turkish parliamentarians argued about the probable outcomes of a press campaign that would be launched in Europe by Greece for granting political asylum to Öcalan. Such developments considered as re-positioning of PKK and Öcalan, which had both already been associated with terrorism by several international organizations. Kiriş pointed out that those were the Italian attempts to politicize the Kurdish issue⁶¹⁰.

⁶⁰⁶ *ibid.* [Kouvelis, SYN, the then MP].

⁶⁰⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4487. [Ilias Vlahopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁰⁸ *ibid.* [Vlahopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁰⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 474. [Altan Öymen, CHP, the then MP].

⁶¹⁰ *ibid.*, 477. [Recep Kiriş, BBP, the then MP].

In this regard, according to MP Akarcalı, the situation Turkey faced was “not a war of law but a war of public opinion, a political war or struggle”⁶¹¹.

Both parliaments believed that public opinion was a precious asset, and being backed by public opinion was the first step to achieve success in world politics. In the Greek parliament, for example, MP Kalafatis underlined the importance of raising public attention towards Öcalan’s capture and trial process. In his opinion, Greece should have brought the Kurdish efforts into the limelight, in his words: “[I]nternational public opinion must stand by the Kurdish leader and the struggle that he and his people have served, [by] forcing Turkey to respect human rights”⁶¹².

There was a strong consensus among the ruling PASOK party and the main opposition New Democracy party that engaging in the issue by giving political asylum to Öcalan would lead to ‘Greekizing’ the Kurdish problem and transform this ‘international problem’ into one of the Greek-Turkish disputes, which would then be inevitably disadvantageous both for the Kurds and the Greeks⁶¹³. The excerpts below, of the Greek PM and FM revealed the root of this political attitude:

[GR] “[A]lmost everyone in this Chamber agrees that Greece could not give asylum to Ocalan. This would serve neither the struggle of the Kurds nor Greece nor Ocalan himself. It would be an act of stupidity and would only serve [the interests of] Turkey. And Greece did not have to play the game of Turkey. [...] Such an act would turn the Kurdish question into a Greek-Turkish dispute, it would curb our foreign policy, while on the other hand it [would be a] risk to Greekize the Kurdish question”⁶¹⁴.

[GR] “[T]he real question [...] is whether or not Greece should grant political asylum to Abdullah Ocalan. We answer: No, she should not have done so. And she should not have done because it would be a loss for the struggle of the Kurdish people, it would be a detriment to peace, stability and the struggle for democracy in our region, in general. And it would have been a tragic responsibility for the nation, to turn the Kurdish issue into a Greek-Turkish dispute [probably] in the first Greek-Turkish crisis. [And] [i]t would have become the number one Greek-Turkish issue”⁶¹⁵.

The Turkish Minister of State, Seçkiner, pointed out that in addition to explicit efforts of Turkey for demonstrating the *truth* about PKK, indirect occasions also played an important role in strengthening Turkey’s argument that PKK was a terrorist organization. The USA and the UK, for example, witnessed PKK’s ‘terrorist acts and drug trafficking’ during the Operation Northern Watch, which was aiming at enforcing

⁶¹¹ *ibid*, 473. [Bülent Akarcalı, ANAP, the then MP].

⁶¹² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4479. [Alexandros Kalafatis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶¹³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4461 [Konstantinos Karamanlis, ND, the then MP]; *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4512 [Mitsotakis, ND, the then MP]; *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4523 [Papazoi, PASOK, the then Minister of Aegean].

⁶¹⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5026. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁶¹⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4460. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

no-fly zone above the 36th parallel in Iraq. As a result, the USA ‘listed PKK within the 30 terrorist organizations’ which would be issued in accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996⁶¹⁶ and “supported Turkey’s request on the delivery of Öcalan, and ran a sort of campaign on PKK that it is a terrorist organization, by sending delegates with a special mission to those European countries which had a tendency to recognize PKK as a political organization”⁶¹⁷.

The Turkish MP Hacaloğlu, additionally, speaking about the letter of Human Rights Watch which was written to the Italian Premier on 21 November 1998, expressed that “Öcalan –the head of PKK terrorist organization– was responsible for the murder of hundreds of innocent people”, and notified that “cutting a sorry figure” or “disapproving terrorism would not protect him from prosecution”, and if Italy did not try him she should have sent him to another country that would try him⁶¹⁸.

It was asked by several MPs in the Turkish Parliament that why did Italy neither surrender him to Turkey nor grant him political asylum, which meant turning both sides against itself. After leaving Syria which was his base for almost 18 years, in general, the West and Russia left him on the run from one country to another for months. It was the last straw when Italy refused to extradite Öcalan to Turkey, which sparked anti-Italian street riots across Turkey. Italy rejected him sanctuary and political asylum and instead expelled him from the country to a destination *unknown*⁶¹⁹.

While the *transparent conduct* of Italy caused diplomatic pressure of Turkey and the USA, as well as, a public outrage among Turkish origins around the world, and a boycott of Italian products by Turkish businesses; in the Greek parliament the then government of PASOK was criticized by several MPs of different political positions for concealing the facts about the situation of Öcalan and “consciously deceiv[ing] the Greek people, the Parliament, party leaders, parties, even the ruling party, even the

⁶¹⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 37th Session, v. 68, (24.12.1998): 316, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c068/tbmm20068037.pdf>. [18.09.2018]. [Yücel Seçkiner, ANAP, the then Minister of State].

⁶¹⁷ *ibid*, 316-17. [Seçkiner, ANAP, the then Minister of State].

⁶¹⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (24.11.1998): 236. [Algan Hacaloğlu, CHP, the then MP].

⁶¹⁹ It was also stated by the Greek FM Pangalos that after leaving Italy, Öcalan remained at large and no one knew exactly where he was. In his words: “I’ll also tell you that Öcalan stayed in the place we had set him for twelve days. For ten days, no one in the world knew where he was. [...] For ten days there has been the most absolute and the most widespread confusion. No one knew where he was and what was happening around him. When he began to communicate with his various associates and friends, of course, he slowly became known where he is and what he intends to do.” See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4467.

Cops”⁶²⁰ for more than fifteen days⁶²¹. The MP Konstantopoulos stated that “[t]hese actions [we]re suicidal, they [we]re acts of suicide for the country's foreign policy, they [we]re acts of criminal irresponsibility. The final result: Ocalan today [wa]s in Turkey and everybody [wa]s against Greece”⁶²². In his view, the process was initiated in terms of secret services and not in terms of political responsibility, and Greece unfortunately without triggering the European procedures and institutions consented to deal with the issue on her own⁶²³:

[GR] “Ministers, what I have to say is that your government did exactly the opposite of what the Italian government did on the same matter. The public or the Italian government has assumed the responsibility and openly handled Italy's political system of the problem. Publicly received Ocalan, the Italian courts had publicly examined the issue, publicly granted him protection, and finally publicly asked him to leave the country when Italy could not bear the burden of pressure, the pressure you acceded to. And I want to say this because you, as the Greek Government, chose the exact opposite process. Transparency, secrecy”.

Following Öcalan’s capture while he was being transferred from the Greek Embassy in Kenya to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Turkey was strongly urged –or in a sense compelled– by the EU to abolish the death penalty, to give Öcalan a fair trial, and to let international observers attend his trial. Related to the first issue, no discussion was held whether or not to impose capital punishment, after all, nobody was executed in Turkey since 1984. The second and the third points, however, aroused feelings of resentment and anger in the Turkish Parliament. The FM İsmail Cem avowed openly that the Turkish judicial system cannot be intervened in by others, and that the independence of the judiciary was under the guarantee of the constitution. For Cem, it was inexplicable since “the number two of the terrorist organization had been on trial for nearly a year [and] nobody ever thought of such a thing, no one had any objections on neither judicial proceeding nor judicial process”⁶²⁴ in Turkey. Cem, accusing the EU of acting like ‘colonial governors’, added that Turkey would not tolerate and definitely not permit any observer or lawyer from international

⁶²⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4455. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁶²¹ Approximately the same point of view was shared by the MP Orestis Kolozof of the KKE: “From the publications it appears that Ocalan visited Greece several times. It should therefore be investigated what the government’s stance each time he came here and who handled this issue. [...] It is our belief that since the arrival of Ocalan in the country, this had to be made public and all the maneuvers should have been made in full transparency.” See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5286.

⁶²² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4463. [Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

⁶²³ *ibid*, 4461. [Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

⁶²⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 54th Session, v. 71, (13.03.1999): 51, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c071/tbmm20071054.pdf>. [18.09.2018]. [İsmail Cem, DSP, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs].

organizations and foreign bars to attend the case, for both situations were not allowed by the Turkish law of procedure and the international treaties signed by Turkey⁶²⁵:

[TR] “Some think of themselves as the colonial governor who sent observers to the colonies of the 18th century, to inspect their colonies. Nobody should view Turkey from this point, we don’t let also someone do so. [...] Well, a foreign attorney will come, a foreign attorney will come to [represent and] defend [him], will interview [him]... No, there’s no such thing [...] This is the case also in the vast majority of Western Europe, only, the lawyer who is registered in [the respective state’s] bar comes and makes the defense”.

In the Turkish Parliament, in general, it was not understandable why did Europe, the European institutions, and the authorities who were defending the European democracy and human rights disregard PKK’s terrorist attacks for more than a decade, and instead vindicated and supported freedom of thought and expression before Turkey. Although “the right to life comes before freedom of thought”, as asserted by the MP Kozakçioğlu, Europe “shielded and advocated terrorism which violated the right to life” before recognizing reluctantly that those actions in Turkey were terrorist acts⁶²⁶.

5.2. Culture-History-Based Approaches

In the Greek parliament, there was a common view that the Öcalan case had hurt the contemporary spirit of Europe and downgraded it to its old times –previous to the establishment of nation-states. Without its moral norms and values, the European project would allegedly be a huge economic market with a global effect. Greece, however, due to her traditions and deep-rooted past strived alone to defend and protect fundamental human rights before an *inefficient European system*, which was reluctant to involve in political issues. On the other hand, the Turkish MPs asserted that their neighbors, which had an innate propensity for dismantling Turkey and revitalizing the Treaty of Sevres, were bearing malice towards the country. This condition was named the *European hypocrisy of diplomacy*, and it has long been in operation since internal conflicts and terrorism have been supported and favored in Turkey.

⁶²⁵ *ibid.*, 52. [Cem, DSP, the then FM].

⁶²⁶ *ibid.*, 53. [Kozakçioğlu, DYP, the then MP].

5.2.1. Criticisms of the Role of EU and Its Policies

Following a route from Syria to Russia, where he was refused to be hosted, Öcalan –a criminal sought with a red notice of Turkey– reached to Italy for a political asylum application. According to the Turkish PM Yılmaz, since PKK had already been identified as a terrorist organization and Öcalan as a terrorist by several international organizations, he would have been delivered to Turkey, and the opposite would be “a black spot on the history of civilized Italy” and “Italy would be the accomplice of all the murders committed by PKK so far”⁶²⁷.

Indeed, the Öcalan case would be ‘a black spot’ as reiterated in the Greek parliament, but not on Italy, on the EU as a whole. As declared by the MP Kontaxis “It [was] shame on Greece, it [was] shame on the allegedly civilized Europe”⁶²⁸. Since the situation was not simply about an individual asylum seeker but about the Kurdish people who were ‘fighting for their fundamental rights’, the responsibility of the Union was esteemed enormous. Unfortunately, the entire debacle would remain as ‘shame’ and “the heavy shadow of Ocalan's delivery [would] always hunt and humiliate not only Greece but also the European Union”⁶²⁹. The Greek parliamentarians thus felt disappointed immediately afterwards when they discovered the *Union's bureaucratic inertia* to internationalize or to settle the Kurdish problem, and its reluctance to ensure the minimum guarantees of human protection for Öcalan:

[GR] “The attitude of the European institutions will be a black spot for European history. It is a retreat in relation to the principles of European, legal and political civilization, the failure of the European Union to give asylum, the unwillingness to give asylum to the leader of people struggling for self-determination”⁶³⁰.

[GR] “The attitude of the European Union's bodies in this case will be a black spot in European history. Where did European culture go? And I'm not referring to its inability to resolve the Kurdish problem, but I refer to its weakness on a basic subject. On the issue of granting political asylum to a persecuted person, to a person who is fighting for the rights of his people”⁶³¹.

On the other side of Aegean, Europe was devoid of such emotions as shame and guilt, yet was depicted as a *concealed supporter of terrorism*. Contrary to its indifferent image in the Greek parliament, it was considered to be *totally involved* in the Kurdish terrorism. It, supposedly, either ignored PKK terrorist organization or facilitated its members' legal processes such as providing passports, work or residence permits, and

⁶²⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 465. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁶²⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4519. [Athanasios Kontaxis, ND, the then MP].

⁶²⁹ *ibid*, 4515. [Evangelos Apostolou, SYN, the then MP].

⁶³⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4463. [Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

⁶³¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4515. [Apostolou, SYN, the then MP].

illegal processes like armed training in the infamous Lavrio camp of Greece; in MP Kozakçıoğlu's words: "Europe, though implicitly, has welcomed terrorism in Turkey with pleasure, much like rubbing their hands⁶³² with glee"⁶³³.

In addition to its concrete help, Europe was also 'giving guidance and counselling to PKK' especially on policy making and socio-cultural issues. The perennial fear of being dismantled by the *others* was clearly visible in the excerpt below wherein the MP İncetahtacı stated that Europe traditionally had bad intentions for Turkey. Some European states had been pursuing to accomplish their ultimate goal of dividing Turkey –it was a historical zeal which remained by the time of Young Turks and survived through the newly established Kurdish association named 'Young Kurds'⁶³⁴:

[TR] "Well, today in Europe –once, like a hundred years ago [as it was] again in Europe– a movement under the name of 'Young Kurds' has been established. Europe maintains, feeds and guides this society called the 'Young Kurds'. This [situation] reveals the following fact that terrorism and consequently a number of groups and states which had goals on Turkey try to achieve their desired goals not only by supporting financial logistics but also by supporting cultural logistics".

Conversely, in the Greek parliament, "Europe, the cradle of culture, freedom, human rights, and individual rights"⁶³⁵ was regarded as politically weak and insignificant to preserve its mentioned features and proceed against 'barbaric Turkey'. Reportedly, European countries that were historically respecting human rights and protecting persecuted people around the world "proved to succumb to the cynicism of the time and refused to protect a man who is seen [obviously] being ill-treated today by a barbaric country that acts both inside and outside its borders"⁶³⁶ beyond and against international law. According to Konstantopoulos, the EU by backing off from its fundamental moral responsibilities presented a major failure in the Öcalan case. The Union might have been in economic progress, but was also in a political decline. The Yugoslavian civil war, the Persian and the Kosovar crises, and the latest Kurdish and the Öcalan issue were the great proofs that the EU had no political role in international developments. In his words: "it is an economic giant and at the same time a political

⁶³² The same idiom was used by Nikolaos Konstantopoulos of the SYN. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4463.

⁶³³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (13.03.1999): 54. [Kozakçıoğlu, DYP, the then MP].

⁶³⁴ *ibid*, 59. [Mehmet Bedri İncetahtacı, FP, the then MP].

⁶³⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4526. [Evangelos Vlassopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶³⁶ *ibid*, 4530. [Papathemelis, PASOK, the then MP].

dwarf who each time accepts the United States and NATO's initiatives and unilateral interventions”⁶³⁷.

In fact, Konstantopoulos was not the first and the last in the Greek parliament who had the opinion that the EU was ‘a political dwarf’ and ‘a stubborn diplomat’. MPs Karamanlis,⁶³⁸ Apostolidis,⁶³⁹ and Sgouridis⁶⁴⁰ were also believed that the Union was in lack of following an independent, common foreign policy even regarding the developments in its backyard such as the Balkans. Supposedly, this politically inefficient image of the EU had to be prevented and overturned because it was not reflecting the *true* Europeanness. As expressed by Sgouridis, “certainly, there [were] common values, such as democracy [and] freedom within Europe [which] generally connect[ed] [Europeans] with historical and cultural identity”⁶⁴¹. Norms and values of Europeanness were yet not included in the EU because it was still an economic union, not a political one. As MP Papathemelis put it: “It [did] not manage to become a true political union at all this time, [that’s the reason for] its inability to be present in any European problem of peace, overthrow, etc. [It] [was] an economic market”⁶⁴².

In addition to its *political inertia*, the EU was denounced for acting tacitly in protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms against violences and infringements⁶⁴³. Unfortunately, such advocates in general “openly declar[ed] their faith in human rights and, at the same time, they support[ed] by all means the bloody regime of Ankara”⁶⁴⁴. In Stathis words, Öcalan’s situation was seemingly paradoxical but unfortunately was not the first case where the European Union “announce[d] its faith in democracy and the protection of human rights but refuse[d] to do so in practice. In the [case] of Kurdish people and Ocalan [it] ha[d] refrained persistently from helping”⁶⁴⁵.

Besides, some of the PASOK MPs had a tendency to compare the EU with a religiously determining person who has been cursed by some Christian circles. The MPs Apostolidis and Lotidis, particularly, unveiled an analogy between the most important

⁶³⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4463. [Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

⁶³⁸ *ibid*, 4456. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁶³⁹ *ibid*, 4472. [Loukas Apostolidis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁴⁰ *ibid*, 4482. [Panagiotis Sgouridis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁴¹ *ibid*, 4482. [Sgouridis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁴² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4531. [Papathemelis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁴³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4484. [Antonios Fousas, ND, the then MP].

⁶⁴⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4513. [Stratis Korakas, KKE, the then MP].

⁶⁴⁵ *ibid*, 4502. [Theodoros Stathis, PASOK, the then MP].

prefect of Roman Empire and the EU. Pontius Pilate, who was identified with the adjudication and crucifixion of Jesus in Christian tradition, maintained his reputation as a historical figure that avoided personal responsibility and lobbied secretly for Jesus to be spared⁶⁴⁶. In the excerpts below the Union was defined as Pontius Pilate because of following NATO's terminology and policies, and treating Öcalan as a terrorist, instead of granting political asylum to the leader of *hard-pressed* Kurdish nation, who had been fighting for their *liberation*:

[GR] "I believe that United Europe should take its responsibilities and [start] concrete initiatives. Strengths of the Union can't function as Pontius Pilate because the European project and the European integration will lose their credibility before the European citizen"⁶⁴⁷.

[GR] "United Europe and the big countries, those in Europe, can't close their eyes to a huge problem that exists, they can't use two measures and two weights. They can't sit on their hands, like Pontius Pilate"⁶⁴⁸.

The Greek criticisms were about the widespread European disregard for and non-intervention in the Öcalan case, which supposedly spilled over into the whole Union. Contrarily, on the Eastern side of the Aegean, there was an opposite image of Europe. Öcalan's possibility of being granted political asylum, which was defined as "a great European tradition" by the then President of Italy, aroused a sort of perplexity in the Turkish parliament that MP Aksoy censured Europe for the theatrical transformation of a 'ringleader' into a political refugee⁶⁴⁹. There was a common sense in the Turkish parliament that PKK was *an outsourced terrorist organization* with roots (both economically and politically) extended beyond the borders, and "everybody kn[e]w that many countries [whether] friends [or] foes, including neighbors in the first place, had a hand and support in this issue"⁶⁵⁰. Assumingly, those which supported terrorism or counseled terrorists were in an endeavor "to weaken [Turkey] economically and to divide [the] country, [since] they want[ed] to do what they could not do with Sevres that day, with terrorism today"⁶⁵¹.

⁶⁴⁶ For further research see, Paul E. Creasy, *The Gospel of Pilate* (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016).

⁶⁴⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4471. [Apostolidis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁴⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4499. [Lazaros Lotidis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁴⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 467. [Aksoy, DYP, the then MP].

⁶⁵⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (20.03.1996): 352. [Hanifi Demirkol, RP, the then MP].

⁶⁵¹ *ibid.* [Demirkol, RP, the then MP].

5.2.2. Reference to Similes and Metaphors from National Historiography

Through the lines of argumentation used by the Turkish MPs there were no minority groups other than the ones identified in the Treaty of Lausanne, and as a result, Öcalan was barely a terrorist, a disruptor, and a violator of the common spirit of nation, which was composed of a mosaic of cultures embedded in a deep-rooted brotherhood wherein Kurds and Turks mingled with many other ethnic origins in harmony. According to MP Köse, he could not be converted into a political figure with a political identity and mission because “he was the ringleader of a terrorist organization which aim[ed] to drag Turkey into a fraternal fight”⁶⁵². Moreover, MP Hacaloğlu made special emphasis on equal treatment for all peoples in the country that Turkey as a modern state had ever and never made discrimination based between neither on ethnies nor on religions⁶⁵³:

[TR] “All of our people, who are in the position of being the citizen of this country, including Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Turks, all of our citizens who hold minority status within the framework of the Treaty of Lausanne, are first-class citizens of this country and in our pluralistic democracy all they are in equal distance to the state and have equal rights”.

Although it was emphasized by the Turkish MPs that the Turkish citizens regardless of their ethnicity were the first-class subjects of the country and endowed with the same fundamental democratic rights without any discrimination, the Greek MP Intzes claimed that “Kemalis[t] Turkey [was] a state which constitutionally enshrine[d] racism”⁶⁵⁴. In this respect, ‘apart from the Greeks and Byzantines who were exterminated by the Treaty of Lausanne’ other minorities were not constitutionally recognized in Turkey. In his words: “All of them [were] Turks, [and] the Kurds [were] Turkish mountaineers. This [was] what the Constitution call[ed] them. Not Turks, they [were] mountain Turks, the retarded”⁶⁵⁵. According to Intzes, similar to Kurds the Pontic Greeks of Trebizond were also renamed as ‘the Black Sea breed’ by the Turkish leadership in order to escape them from being defined as a minority group. Briefly explained also by the PM Simitis below, treating the issue as a minority problem would be propitious for both politicizing and internationalizing it, and in turn resolution would be fast and precise⁶⁵⁶:

⁶⁵² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 469. [Köse, DSP, the then MP].

⁶⁵³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (24.11.1998): 237. [Hacaloğlu, CHP, the then MP].

⁶⁵⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5280. [Anastasios Intzes, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁶⁵⁵ *ibid.* [Intzes, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁶⁵⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5026. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

[GR] “What's the point? The issue is the political treatment of Kurdish question at the level of International Law, international legitimacy, international society. This is being pursued by those who are interested in dealing with the problem of this minority in Turkey. This fact –dealing with it politically– at the level of International Law, has already been formally formulated as a European Union position and this is an important development. The issue is recognized and rules, which must be applied to resolve it, are recognized”.

In the Turkish parliament, this European *venture* of defining Kurds as a minority group that had to be treated as the ones written in the Treaty of Lausanne was considered as a dangerous attempt to politicize PKK terrorist organization. As mentioned by the MP Gül, since all the shreds of evidence proved PKK to be a terrorist organization that had long threatened the Turkish territorial integrity by claiming the Eastern part of the country, the radical transformation of terrorism into politics would not be an easy process so some countries were taking this sidetrack for granting PKK a political status. The MP Gül maintained that “the effort of European politics and diplomacy to put [Turkey’s] Southeast issue into a minority status stem[med] from the Sevres conception”⁶⁵⁷. Turkey, “as an indivisible whole, [and] a strong state”⁶⁵⁸ that anchored to her national unity and identity would suppress –as she did for several times in the past– this mentality of revitalizing the Sevres Treaty. In the excerpt below, underlining the country’s capacity of 1920s and 2000s, the Turkish FM Cem concluded that the Sevres or of any varieties would certainly not be possible to restore, for the country’s conditions and capabilities in the two periods were incomparable⁶⁵⁹:

[TR] “Such as to divide Turkey [or] to revive the Treaty of Sevres, nobody has the limit to do so. In the early 1920s, an understanding of Sevres that could not be imposed by all the powerful nations of the world on a Turkey of those days –which had just gotten out of a war, whose army was dispossessed of the most amount of its arms, which was under terrible economic conditions, whose people were almost in need of a slice of bread and whose population not even to reach 15 million– today, nobody should even think about to impose those type of treaties on a Turkey which is in a geography stretching from the Balkans to the Central Asia, the Middle East and the Caucasus with her most dynamic economy, with her population of over 65 million, also, with the most effective and powerful armed forces in this large geography, with so many trained people, with this much considerable saving”.

The sense of being encircled by enemies or threats dating back to the negotiations of Sevres Treaty remained as a syndrome for Turks after the Turkish war of independence, even in the new regime of the modern state⁶⁶⁰. The Treaty of Sevres,

⁶⁵⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 471. [Abdullah Gül, FP, the then MP].

⁶⁵⁸ *ibid*, 470. [Köse, DSP, the then MP].

⁶⁵⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (13.03.1999): 49-50. [Cem, DSP, the then FM].

⁶⁶⁰ In his book, Millas states that the powers prepared the Greek Revolution were ‘foreign’, that is to say, they surfaced in non-Ottoman soils like the cities Amsterdam, Vienna, and Odessa. See, Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 69. Therefore, Turkey chronically expects a threat of disintegration from outsiders and this peculiar thought of being dismantling by foreigners might have stemmed from the period of Ottomans wherein seemingly most rebellions and divisions were supervised by outsiders.

therefore, was a *historical trauma*, a threatening remark which symbolized the collapse and partition of the Turkish land. Conversely, in the Greek parliament as voiced by MP Intzes, it was a missed *historical solution* opportunity to relieve the difficulties of the Eastern people such as the Kurds whose problem lasted unsolved both during the Ottomans and the Turks, as the treaty was not issued and no other alternative was proposed⁶⁶¹:

[GR] “I have to say from the outset that the Kurdish subject is a part, it is a fragment of the great Eastern issue, which is still not solved. While the Balkans have been given a solution, that of the existence of the Balkan countries, the East of the former Ottoman Empire, the Eastern issue remained, and was much worse when the Treaty of Sevres provided for a solution which was not implemented”.

Accordingly, NATO and the EU took initiative to resolve the territorial disputes in the Balkans, but they stayed aloof from the Kurdish issue which was the visible part of a much deep problem including the Armenian issue, as well.

Both the Turkish and Greek parliamentarians utilized similes to evoke empathy and common understanding among the listeners. In this respect, PKK and Öcalan were equated with important historical subjects that made an indelible impression on European and modern Greek history. In the Turkish parliament, PKK was likened to earlier anarchist organizations like *Brigate Rosse* and *Baader Meinhoff*, and Öcalan to former political figures who were accused of committing war crimes and/or atrocities in Europe. Considering all the recent developments, MP Akarcalı warned Europe of avoiding hosting and supporting Öcalan and his terrorist organization since protecting and defending them would be a historic mistake. In his view, Öcalan was the main responsible of all the Kurdish terrorist actions, and seeking to legitimize his acts or protecting him would be meant “excusing Milosevic who [was] another villain of [the] time; and also excusing Hitler and Mussolini who were the most inexcusable people of all humanity, as well”⁶⁶².

Conversely, clinging to their national history, in the Greek parliament several MPs suggested a close affinity between Abdullah Öcalan of PKK and Rigas Feraios (Velesinlis)⁶⁶³ of the Greek Revolution. In the context of liberation movements,

⁶⁶¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5280. [Intzes, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁶⁶² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 472. [Akarcalı, ANAP, the then MP].

⁶⁶³ One of his most famous poems was ‘Thourios’ (battle-hymn) where he wrote those enthusiastic lines that ‘better an hour of free life than forty years of slavery and prison’ (Καλύτερα μίας ώρας ελεύθερη ζωή παρά σαράντα χρόνια σκλαβιά και φυλακή / Bir saatlik özgürlük kırk yıllık köleliğe yeğdir). For the Turkish translation of Thourios, See, Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 98-101. Other two important works worth mentioning are: the Greek version of La Marseillaise (the national anthem of France) and

Velestinlis, who was the pioneer of Greek Enlightenment and the most impressive hero of Greek nationalism, and Öcalan, who was the ‘prominent leader’⁶⁶⁴ of the Kurdish *freedom fighters*, were allegedly confronted with the same *hypocritical interpretation* of the events, ‘amoralism’,⁶⁶⁵ and duplicity, which ended up with the European decoupling between norms and actions:

[GR] “[T]he European Union, which refers to the democratic traditions of Europe [...] [and] the so-called political civilization of Europe, has preferred a political culture of the monarchies such as the Austro-Hungarians; the political culture expressed by Metternich⁶⁶⁶, the political civilization which led to the surrender of Rigas Feraios to his enemies, and not the political civilization which characteristically doesn’t deliver the politically persecuted ones to their enemies”⁶⁶⁷.

[GR] “Almost the same treatment, as Rigas Feraios. [...] [T]he same fate, which Ocalan has with Simitis and Pangalos, had Rigas Feraios with Metternich”⁶⁶⁸.

[GR] “It reminds me of the early 19th century, as Rigas Fereios was handed over to the Turkish authorities by the Austrians. [...] Today, Europe’s hypocrites and the government, while talking about democracy and human rights and [...] participation in Europe, follow the same policy of the beginning of the last century”⁶⁶⁹.

As asserted by some, the French Revolution (1789-99) had given the green light for the establishment of a Greek state on the Ottoman territories, whereas the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) –hosted and influenced by Metternich and his idea of saving the peace in Europe by keeping the present order– had postponed the process of Greek independence⁶⁷⁰. Reportedly, Greek Revolution was not at first served the interests of leading powers such as Russia, Austria, or Prussia, and was not supported not until “Great Britain abandoned the policy of intervention against revolutions in other countries”⁶⁷¹. As regards the allusion to Velestinlis in the above excerpts, the similarity was not only between the situations of the two leaders but between their peoples, as well. The Greeks and Kurds were allegedly experiencing the same historical pattern in that they both had been fighting the same enemy –namely, *Ottomans/Turks*– for their

the Charta (map of Great Greece published in Vienna in 1796, which included the Balkans, Constantinople, and the Anatolian lands where the Greek subjects were ostensibly in the minority).

⁶⁶⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4513. [Korakas, KKE, the then MP].

⁶⁶⁵ *ibid.*, 4526. [Vlassopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁶⁶ Klemens von Metternich –served as the Austrian Empire’s foreign minister and later the Chancellor. He was a conservatist who upheld the tradition of preserving the status quo and the power-balance in Europe, thus considered as pro-Ottoman & anti-Greek revolutionary. He was particularly infamous for the indirect involvement in the surrender of Velestinlis to Ottoman State, who was betrayed by Demetrios Oikonomos Kozanites, a Greek businessman.

⁶⁶⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4516. [Anastasios Peponis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁶⁸ *ibid.*, 4519. [Kontaxis, ND, the then MP].

⁶⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 4523. [Intzes, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁶⁷⁰ Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 64.

⁶⁷¹ “Klemens von Metternich”, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Klemens-von-Metternich>. [13.10.2019].

national liberation at the cost of their lives⁶⁷². As clearly placed by MPs Vezdrevanis and Katsimbardis:

[GR] “The Kurdish leader and the Kurdish people are known to have regarded Greece and the Greek people as the friendliest country, on the basis, of course, that the common enemy forges unbroken friendship”⁶⁷³.

[GR] “No one, as a Greek, can speak of the struggling Kurdish people -and this is what is happening today in Greece- and forget that our people have been found for four centuries under the slavery and the yoke of Ottomans –namely, Turkey”⁶⁷⁴.

As the Kurds also launched an armed struggle to gain their freedom, they were considered to be identical to the Greek revolutionists who had long before sacrificed themselves for the sake of their nation’s liberation. That was the reason why Greek MPs “always t[ook] a position in favor of this Kurdish struggle. [And] no American and no European w[ould] change that perception of the Greek citizen”⁶⁷⁵. In this respect, although, “the Americans and the Turks, who [were] the Greek’s instant enemies and [were] threaten[ing] Greeks with the disappearance of the Kurdish nation”⁶⁷⁶, it was not only about “the martyred Kurdish people and the leader of the PKK. More generally, it concern[ed] every human being who [was] inspired by the principles of humanity, solidarity, by the respect for ideals that Greek people bleed for”⁶⁷⁷. Thus, it was about the Greek collective memory and historical consciousness, and duty to defence and “support the weakest, the persecuted, [and] the rule of law”⁶⁷⁸ which respected and protected especially those in need⁶⁷⁹:

[GR] “We must make every effort to keep our relationship with this people friendly in the future, not because of the doctrine that the enemy of my enemy is my potential friend or ally -not to apply the doctrine- but because they fight for ideals that are acclaimed, even if they use methods or means with which we do not agree. [...] The notion of morality, the concept of humanity, the concept of solidarity, are elements integral to the concept of Hellenism”.

In other words, as voiced by MP Paraskeuopoulos, “had the rapprochement and sympathy with the Kurds stem[med] from the well-known [phrase] ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, if on this basis Greece had supported solidarity”⁶⁸⁰ with the Kurds then she would have undermined all the efforts made by “the [Kurdish] people who were fighting for the sovereign right in their homeland”⁶⁸¹. Additionally, the Greek

⁶⁷² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4488. [Georgios Salankoudis, ND, the then MP].

⁶⁷³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5299. [Ilias Vezdrevanis, ND, the then MP].

⁶⁷⁴ *ibid*, 5300. [Georgios Katsimbardis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁷⁵ *ibid*. [Katsimbardis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁷⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5050. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁶⁷⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4513. [Korakas, KKE, the then MP].

⁶⁷⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5027. [Simitis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁷⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4486. [Vasileos Michaloliakos, ND, the then MP].

⁶⁸⁰ *ibid*, 4485. [Paraskeuas Paraskeuopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁸¹ *ibid*, 4486. [Michaloliakos, ND, the then MP].

solidarity that rooted in the values and characteristics of Hellenism was not limited to PKK, but instead included many liberation movements around the world⁶⁸²:

[GR] “Greece, which is a country that has always supported the various liberation movements, because our history is linked to such struggles due to its particular relationship with Turkey, while of course the entire Greek people and I believe the whole political world expresses every time with sincerity their sympathy to such movements as the Kurdish movement, had many reasons to have reservations about hosting Abdullah Ocalan here”.

On the other hand, in the Turkish parliament, as was asserted by several MPs, Turkey was a ‘peaceful country’ *which sought peace at home and peace in the world*⁶⁸³ unless her territorial integrity and sovereignty were under threat. In this regard, the MP Günay underlined that “Turkey had always been in favor of friendship[s] and developing her relations in every field possible. Turkey [always] wanted to be friendly throughout her history, [and] sought friend[s]”⁶⁸⁴. In the words of MP Hatiboğlu, as criticizing Turkey’s *magnanimous* attitude towards Greece: “There is no olive branch left in our homeland as we [constantly] break and send it to Greece! Our olive branches in the gardens are finished as we break and send [continually]”⁶⁸⁵.

Paradoxically, Greece was also searching for friendship and collaboration, but the Turkish *belligerency* with its dark plans and abnormal foreign policy⁶⁸⁶ was tending to abstain from peace⁶⁸⁷:

[GR] “Turkey’s militarists, [and] the [Turkish] leadership, although repeatedly all the parties in Greece have declared over and over again that we want good relations of neighborhood and friendship with our neighboring country called Turkey, like with other countries, but especially with the Turkish people, Turkey’s militarists don’t want good relations of neighborhood and friendship, and they blatantly, provocatively, ironically [not only] violate Greece and Hellenism -as we’ve seen in the last time- but also the Kurdish people [and] international legitimacy, [and infringe] the international conventions [like] Lausanne, Paris, Montreux, and the International Law of the Sea”.

Conversely, according to PM Yılmaz, Turkey “[had] two intransigent neighbors; one is in the west, one is in the south. The unchanging axis of the foreign relations and policies of both neighbors –Greece’s and Syria’s– [was] Turkey and Turcophobia”⁶⁸⁸. Reportedly, whatever Turkey did to pursue cooperation with them ended up with

⁶⁸² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5306. [Panagiotis Kouroumbilis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁶⁸³ It is one of the famous phrases (Yurtta sulh cihanda sulh) of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which he pronounced publicly in Anatolia on 20.04.1931.

⁶⁸⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (07.10.1998): 309. [Ali Günay, DSP, the then MP].

⁶⁸⁵ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 21th Term, 28th Session, v. 18, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem21/yil2/bas/b028m.htm> (02.12.1999): 299. [Yasin Hatiboğlu, FP, the then MP].

⁶⁸⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (03.11.1998): 563. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

⁶⁸⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5046. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁶⁸⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (07.10.1998): 286. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

disappointment that none agreed to conduct good neighborly relations. PM Yılmaz identified that both had *irredentist policies* against Turkey⁶⁸⁹:

[TR] “Besides, none of our neighbours are modest; the one in the West has [M]egali [I]dea, and this one has [G]reater Syria. What’s her aim[?] All our land in the south of the Taurus Mountains, which they call ‘Fertile Crescent’, is shown within Greater Syria’s territory, including Hatay and also Cyprus”.

Supposedly, their *irredentism* formed an alliance on the basis of their mutual purpose and benefit –which was to follow a joint containment policy against Turkey. Although it was denied by PM Simitis⁶⁹⁰, PM Yılmaz introduced a military agreement signed between Greece and Syria as a proof⁶⁹¹:

[TR] “Well, against whom did Syria make a military cooperation agreement with Greece, which allows the Greek aircraft to settle in her own airports; against a force in the Middle East; no. [It’s] directly against me”.

On the other side of the Aegean, similar but different expressions took place with regard to defining the Eastern neighbor. As in the excerpts below, exhibiting her potentials Turkey was considered as an *aggressive* country which desired to extend her political influence and clout, and had an innate propensity to violate international rules and to attack Greece:

[GR] “[The people in this Chamber] know there’s an external threat, they know there’s Turkey’s expansionist policy. Do the Greek people know that every day they bleed by intercepting Turkish airplanes over the Aegean”⁶⁹².

[GR] “[T]he Ocalan case has clearly shown a reality which is decisive for the country’s foreign policy: the constant and unabated Turkish threat”⁶⁹³.

[GR] “Turkey will always be an enemy, whatever we do, whether good or bad”⁶⁹⁴.

The excerpts from different Greek MPs above professed a sort of one-way-relationship wherein the Turkish *aggression* was the main determinant. In other words, regardless of Greece’s decisions, declarations, and actions, supposedly, Turkey led their bilateral relationship to deterioration. As also visible in the excerpt from FM Pangalos below, Greece’s exceptionalism about defending and preserving international rules and laws was being confronted by a strange neighboring country that systematically caused

⁶⁸⁹ *ibid.* [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁶⁹⁰ Miltiadis Evert, the then President of New Democracy Party, during his speech in the Greek Parliament, submitted a declaration of the PM Simitis released by Ministry of Press and Media Washington on 04.09.1996. Following a question that “why do you have an agreement with Syria against Turkey?”, PM Simitis replies “We have no agreement with Syria against Turkey”. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 118.

⁶⁹¹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (07.10.1998): 288. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁶⁹² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (03.11.1998): 577. [Nikolaos Anastasopoulos, ND, the then MP].

⁶⁹³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5023. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁶⁹⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5296. [Ioannis Zafeiropoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

disputes and confusion before the Western world because of her perplexities formed during the construction of the nation-state⁶⁹⁵:

[GR] “Turkey has demands for readjustment, for a new interpretation, [and] sometimes she has unprecedented views, such as the view that any islet or rock is Turkey’s by inheritance unless explicitly indicated [otherwise] in the international treaties because she says [that] the Kemalist state is the heir of the Ottoman. You know of course that recently they celebrated the Kemalist state as a denial of the Ottoman state. While the denial and overthrow of the Ottoman [state] are political; they say that legally they’re its heirs and consequently have inherited everything, what it didn’t give explicitly to others”.

Supposedly, Greece was *exceptional* and *alone* also in protecting fundamental human rights, and the most recent confirmation of this situation was “the tragic Ocalan case when an entire Europe left Greece alone to defend the international principles of humanity”⁶⁹⁶. According to MP Kounalakis “[o]nce again, history w[ould] write that the Greeks alone ha[d] defended the human values and ideals that [were] elements of European culture”⁶⁹⁷. And in this sense Greece was *the only European country which value the Treaty of Amsterdam* at most, and obliged herself to protect Öcalan, for he was trusted in Greeks and “the guest is sacred in the Greek tradition and in the Greek sense of honor”⁶⁹⁸.

Actually it was another *unlucky Tuesday* that proved *the Greeks’ loneliness* throughout history. As quoted from the daily newspaper *Eleftherotypia* (Ελευθεροτυπία) by the MP Apostolou “[i]t will be black Tuesday in the Greek history”⁶⁹⁹. By a strange quirk of fate, the capture of Ocalan (16 February 1999), the (first) fall of Constantinople (the capture of the capital of the Byzantine Empire by the Fourth Crusade, 13 April 1204), the Fall of Constantinople (the capture of the capital of the Byzantine Empire by the Ottoman State, 29 May 1453) were all occurred on the same day –Tuesday⁷⁰⁰. The stress on Tuesday might have been an indication of the prevailing grief and sorrow across the country, and stemmed from an overwhelmingly retrospective mood which was also appreciable in the parliamentary sessions.

⁶⁹⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (03.11.1998): 562. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

⁶⁹⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4535. [Christos Pachtas, PASOK, the then Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs].

⁶⁹⁷ *ibid.* [Pachtas, PASOK, the then Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs].

⁶⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 4512. [Mitsotakis, ND, the then MP].

⁶⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 4514. [Apostolou, SYN, the then MP].

⁷⁰⁰ Actually, unlike the Western tradition, in Greece the ominous day is 13 Tuesday not Friday. And 13 comes from adding the numbers of 1453 –1+4+5+3.

5.3. Policy-Based Approaches

In the Greek parliament, criticisms, were mainly focused on international organizations, for their inefficient and hypocritical conduct in the Öcalan policy in comparison to their rapid intervention in the Balkan issue. In the Turkish parliament, conversely, the government was criticized for their faults and mismanagement of political affiliations and foreign engagements. According to the opposition parties, Turkey's arguments were in accordance with the international rules and law, but they were lacking political support because the foreign policies were not being sustained and defended as a permanent state policy.

Both parliaments shared the common ground that their country was left alone. Greece's loneliness was regarded as historical and asserted that it was caused by the Greek failure to convince the others, whereas Turkey's was considered political that originated in the traditional *othering* of and discrimination against the country by the Western others.

5.3.1. Implications of 'Loneliness' on Foreign Policy Preferences

According to the Turkish MP Gül it was the bitter truth ever that Turkey's so-called allies, and countries with whom Turkey had military, economic, or political agreements, unfortunately, "instead of supporting Turkey seemed to be supporting a terrorist organization in Turkey"⁷⁰¹. In this respect, the Turk's "true friends were only the Turkish people"⁷⁰², and Öcalan's move from Syria to Europe should therefore have been prevented, for the European countries' sympathy toward PKK and its terrorists was widely known beforehand. Reportedly, in Europe, there was a common misperception which had arisen in propagating the idea that the Kurds were *freedom fighters* who had long been discriminated and tormented on the grounds of their Kurdish ethnies. In Gül's view, the developments such as the Italian foreign minister's reference to the Sevres Treaty, the appearance of a 'so-called parliament in exile', and launching media campaigns to create deceptions, disclosed *the loneliness of Turkey* against the Western bias and double-standards in Europe.

⁷⁰¹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 471. [Gül, FP, the then MP].

⁷⁰² *ibid.* [Gül, FP, the then MP].

Conversely, in the Greek parliament, Turkey was apparently not alone and had the support of most European countries for defeating PKK. There were seemingly two integrated reasons behind this opinion. Firstly, the Greek MPs, in general, believed that the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which Greece was particularly interested in due to her threat perception, either was not in actual practice or fell short of expectations. In this respect, although Greece was acting and making her policies in accordance with the common framework of alliance she could not anticipate or predict the others' political conduct. And secondly, since the CFSP was composed of easy promises and declarations no concrete steps were taken at all⁷⁰³. Economic concerns allegedly could easily prevail over political decisions. Member states had strong economic ties with Turkey, for example, as part of their arms trade. As a result, "Ocalan [wa]s literally sold in a warfare bazaar of Italy and France, which ha[d] become the main supplier country [of] weapons systems in Turkey"⁷⁰⁴. Apart from Italy and France "Germany [wa]s [also] helping Turkey to beat the Kurds"⁷⁰⁵. MP Chrysanthakopoulos revealed his antipathy to the situation and suggested that there had to be specific clauses for solidarity that would prevent the use of those weapons against members: "It's a tragic contradiction among EU members; selling weapons to third countries, with the threat of being those weapons used against the European Union itself"⁷⁰⁶.

Moreover, it was allegedly Greece which was alone in her efforts to save the life of Öcalan. The Greek FM Papandreou argued that it was certainly and solely Greece⁷⁰⁷ that "contributed to the internationalization of the Kurdish problem" and "to the

⁷⁰³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4480. [Vasileios Sotiropoulos, ND, the then MP].

⁷⁰⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (11.02.1999): 4313. [Chrysanthakopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

⁷⁰⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 24th Sitting, (18.11.1998): 1356, https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/18_11_98.txt. [22.05.2018]. [Georgios Tsafoulas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷⁰⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (11.02.1999): 4313. [Chrysanthakopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

⁷⁰⁷ It is a very similar argument to that of his predecessor. In Pangalos's own words: "We've even today put pressure on the Presidency, which hasn't yet done anything, to take the initiative of a meeting of political directors to adopt a common text on the case. And we are the only one to do this, the only one to exercise that pressure. I just learned in the afternoon that Mr. Dini [who was the 51st prime minister of Italy from 1995 to 96 and foreign minister from 1996 to 2001] also joined our point of view. [A]s soon as we learned this incident, we did what could have ensured his life, that is, we publicized it. Firstly, we announced it before we were asked, and told all governments and all SMEs [small and medium enterprises] that Ocalan was in [a such] situation." See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament* (16.02.1999): 4460; PM Nikolaos Akritis of PASOK was also holding the same opinion that "Greece's attitude towards the Kurdish question cannot be questioned" and her contribution leaves no room for doubt. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament* (12.03.1999): 5272-5273.

acceptance by [her] partners in the European Union that the Kurdish affair, regardless of their opinion on the PKK, [wa]s an international problem”⁷⁰⁸. In a similar fashion, since PASOK was “the only government in Europe and around the world”⁷⁰⁹, which had striven for securing an escape route for the most eminent leader of the Kurdish movement by holding humanitarian reasons, the PM Simitis asserted that “[n]o one c[ould] be ignorant of what this country did, despite its dangers, despite international associations, despite the difficulties that exist[ed] on the international stage”⁷¹⁰. It was allegedly the moment when “[e]veryone wanted to get rid of Ocalan”⁷¹¹ only Greece, “sought solutions and ways to offer humanitarian support to the leader of the persecuted people”⁷¹². In this respect, “Greece [would] not apologize nor give any explanation to anyone, nor to Turkey, which [had been] infringing international law and human rights, or to any allies”⁷¹³ because the country *was compelled –though not preferably– to help Öcalan* due to the passive attitude and perverse obliviousness of the EU.

Additionally, MP Papariga claimed that the EU assured Greece of her borders’ safety with the CFSP. Although “the EU state[d] that the Greek borders [we]re the borders of Europe”⁷¹⁴ it was recently suggested that recourse to the International Court might work as a means of solving disputes with Turkey in the Aegean. Subsequently the Greek borders became much more fragile and prone to threats. Asserted by the MP Kolozof “the Greek people ha[d] the illusion that with the Common Foreign Policy there w[ould] be the borders of Europe which w[ould] protect and guarantee [them] from Turkey, [but] it didn’t at all”⁷¹⁵. According to MP Micheloyiannis, the Öcalan case was also an *unfortunate outcome* of the CFSP in that it did not boost a sense of community among its members⁷¹⁶:

⁷⁰⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5053. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

⁷⁰⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5293. [Athanasios Alevras, PASOK, the then MP].

⁷¹⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5024. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁷¹¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5287. [Kounalakis, SYN, the then MP].

⁷¹² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4535. [Pachtas, PASOK, the then Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs].

⁷¹³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5023. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁷¹⁴ *ibid*, 5038. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

⁷¹⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4455. [Orestis Kolozof, KKE, the then MP].

⁷¹⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4506. [Joseph Micheloyiannis, PASOK, the then MP].

[GR] “As no one can ignore the fact that this inhumanity of the Member States of the European Union –which have no borders with Turkey and have no security problems with Turkey, which have no disputes with Turkey– the attitude of these states led to the [current] impasse and burdened Greece with this issue”.

Moreover, MP Sotiropoulos noted that “Europe, as a single entity, [wa]s absent from the developments in Kosovo”⁷¹⁷, where another ‘failure’ of the CFSP was staged. Reportedly, the CFSP was not politically objective that it did not support territorial stability of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and once again remained as *empty pronouncements*. Thus, “Europe [wa]s extremely friendly to Muslims, [and] completely hostile to Kurds”⁷¹⁸. By designating Turkey as the joint point of reference, the analogy between a religious belief and an ethnos was furthered by MP Arapi-Karagianni: “Nowadays, in the neighboring Balkan countries, some war scenes unfold, with Turkey's Muslim bow which she wants to portray as a future threat”⁷¹⁹.

5.3.2. Geopolitical Understandings and View of the Balkans

In both parliaments, counter-arguments took place with regard to the EU's and NATO's *duplicity* in their dealings with countries, and correspondingly Greece's and Turkey's Balkan policies were discussed.

In the Turkish Parliament, the close linkage between the Balkans and Turkey was associated with religious bonds and the country's inherited heritage. Supposedly, Turkey –the heir of the Ottomans– was compelled to fill the gap originating from the dissolution and retreat of the USSR. The MP Kansu claimed that intervening in the region was a ‘historic burden’ on Turkey's shoulder⁷²⁰. The MP Açar implicitly noted that such an expectation was cherished by the Balkan peoples with Muslim roots⁷²¹:

[TR] “In today's world, of course, we aren't geographic[ally] in unity and cohesion, but the fact that [we had] five hundred years of history cannot disappear. This common history has clinched us, causing very strong bonds. Under today's conditions, about 1 million Kosovo Albanians are our demographic members and are our citizens, are our inseparable parts as nation and state”.

The Greek MPs, on the other hand, refraining from making direct connections between Greece and the Balkans, contended themselves with censuring the Union for its

⁷¹⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4480. [Sotiropoulos, ND, the then MP].

⁷¹⁸ *ibid.* [Sotiropoulos, ND, the then MP].

⁷¹⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 85th Sitting, (25.02.1999): 4766, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES0225.pdf>. [23.05.2018]. [Vasiliki Arapi-Karagianni, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷²⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 4th Session, v. 63, (08.10.1998): 371, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c063/tbmm20063004.pdf>. [18.09.2018]. [Hüseyin Kansu, FP, the then MP].

⁷²¹ *ibid.*, 367. [Mehmet Açar, DYP, the then MP].

avoidance of intervention in the political events, particularly, in the Balkans following the collapse of communism. Accordingly, the EU was not a union aiming for humanitarian purposes such as alleviating the aggression in Bosnia and Kosovo. It was considered “a global neo-liberal market”⁷²² where promoting solidarity among members and citizens was disregarded. The European “progress on economy [wa]s not commensurate with the progress in Europe's democratic institutions, foreign policy, security and defense”⁷²³. As Konstantopoulos put it, the European project had largely consisted of being a huge economic power with a global reach, and was nothing else⁷²⁴:

[GR] “However, this global economic role should also be matched by a political role in the settlement of international problems and the response to international crises. And of course it should be a political role that seeks to pursue an international policy based on the principles of peace, solidarity and cooperation. Is there anyone in this Chamber who can seriously claim that the European Union has a Common Foreign Policy based on the principles of International Law and guarantees of democratic protection?”.

In the Eastern part of the Aegean, Europe was not subject to any criticisms at the union-level but state-level. It was repeatedly iterated that Balkans were the *bleeding wound* in the country’s foreign policy, which was another ‘hearth breaking region of political ignorance’. The world was *employing double standards against the Kosovans* who were yet not recognized, though their differences in religion, language, and ethnicity vis-à-vis the Serbs. The European hypocrisy of diplomacy witnessed the ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia and Kosova by Serbia without any intervention.

The Turkish MP Kansu suggested that Turkey “had to have friendly and allied countries against Greece [both] in Balkans and on her way of connecting with Europe”⁷²⁵. Additionally, he associated Serbia’s freedom of such an appalling conduct with the exceptional support of Greece and her implicit tactics in destabilizing Albania. Supposedly, Greece had tacitly organized an armed uprising in Albania, particularly by making use of the banking crisis of 1997 which resulted in the complete destruction of the Albanian armed forces. And shortly afterwards, “in Tirana, power fell into the hands of pro-Greek militants”⁷²⁶. The Kosovans, therefore, had been left alone in both military and political aspects. Some European countries’ attribution of terrorist organization to the Kosovo Liberation Army was an evidence of overt discrimination

⁷²² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5047. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷²³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4535. [Pachtas, PASOK, the then Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs].

⁷²⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4463. [Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

⁷²⁵ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (08.10.1998): 372. [Kansu, FP, the then MP].

⁷²⁶ *ibid.* [Kansu, FP, the then MP].

against nations and encouraged the Serbs before the Kosovans⁷²⁷. In Kansu's words; "it was visible that behind the pogrom and ethnic cleansing, which occurred in Bosnia before the Balkans and now in Kosovo, was the alliance of Serbia, Greece, and Russia"⁷²⁸. In a similar vein, MP Yazıcıoğlu claimed that there was 'an orthodox alliance' between Serbia and Greece which was the main responsible for the *turmoil and massacres* in the region. Both countries were allegedly in an effort to expand their political clout and to split Albania with ethnic cleansing; since Greece was trying to capture the mining zones located in her north by claiming minority rights for the Greeks in Albania on the one hand, and Serbia was trying to dominate water resources on her south on the other⁷²⁹.

Contrarily, in the Greek parliament, the government was suggested by the MP Tsovolas to pursue a foreign policy that would "strengthen Greece's relations with the Kurdish nation, as well as, with the neighboring countries of Turkey, with whom it ha[d] a permanent rivalry" that they would function as deterrent powers, preventing "the Turks even to think of a hot spot in the Aegean and Cyprus"⁷³⁰. Supposedly, Greece was being suffered from the 'Turkish threat' for a long time and the Greek-Kurdish alliance was of special importance that "to lose a traditional ally-people, [who were] struggling for their self-empowerment and could be a deterrent to Turkish aggression and expansiveness"⁷³¹ would be disastrous in the Greek foreign policy.

It was also underscored that, throughout the years, the Turkish forces had overseen and participated in 'massacres and genocides' that were systematically overlooked by both the EU and NATO. In this regard, *hypocrisy and duplicity* were visible particularly in NATO's conduct of policy toward Turkey and Serbia. While for Kosovo, NATO –employing double standards– declared to send forces⁷³² and Europe mobilized for rapid intervention, none dealt with "the massacres and the displacement

⁷²⁷ *ibid*, 374. [Kansu, FP, the then MP].

⁷²⁸ *ibid*. [Kansu, FP, the then MP].

⁷²⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (08.10.1998): 379. [Muhsin Yazicioğlu, BBP, the then MP].

⁷³⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5291. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷³¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4468. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷³² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4527. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

of thousands of Kurdish villages and millions of migrants for fifteen years”⁷³³. As maintained in the excerpt from MP Korakas below⁷³⁴:

[GR] “Thus, while they’re preparing, for these days, intervention in Kosovo against Yugoslavia, in order to protect the Albanians by provocatively strengthening the so-called Liberation Army by all means, they’re arming Turkey to the teeth in the genocide against the Kurdish people and in the oppression against the Turkish people. We should not forget [that] right now in Turkey the Turkish people themselves suffer hardships”.

Allegedly, Turkey was continuously summing *heinous crimes* not only against her neighbours but also against her oppressed peoples who were long been subject to harsh and authoritarian treatment of the state apparatus.

5.3.3. Perceptions and Interpretations of the ‘Kurdish Movement’

There was utter perplexity in most MPs’ expressions in the Greek parliament about the motive behind the ‘Kurdish movement’. Apparently, it was unclear whether the ‘Kurdish movement’ was striving for independence or equality. According to the MP Giannopoulos, “[i]t [wa]s a deficiency in the Common Foreign Policy of Europe, which should [have been] decide[d] to establish the Kurdistan state of this very poor people”⁷³⁵, and that in turn Greece would not have the Öcalan phenomenon. However, the members of the ruling PASOK party (one of whom was the prime minister of the state) did not share a common view on identifying the Kurdish agenda and instead reached contradictory conclusions:

[GR] “PASOK and the country has always had historical, traditional friendly relations with all those liberation movements –and with the Kurdish movement– which claimed a place under the sun, a place on earth, a homeland. We’ve expressed in every way our friendship and our solidarity with the Kurdish people, and we ought to do so today”⁷³⁶.

[GR] “We have democracy. However, acts of violence aren’t permitted, as unlawful acts aren’t allowed. They didn’t have and won’t have support in this country. We don’t support violence as a means of resolving political disputes and we don’t cover armed actions against other countries. Turkey, ladies and gentlemen, is trying to create in the international community the impression that Greece allegedly fosters questioning her territorial integrity. Nothing is a greater lie. We support the territorial integrity of all states, and thus of Turkey. This is a consistent principle of our foreign policy at all times. We’ve repeatedly stated that we’re against any change of borders. That’s why we’re opposed to the independence of Kosovo sought by some Kosovars. All of this is known”⁷³⁷.

⁷³³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5299. [Chrysanthakopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

⁷³⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4513. [Korakas, KKE, the then MP].

⁷³⁵ *ibid*, 4504. [Athanasios Giannopoulos, ND, the then MP].

⁷³⁶ *ibid*, 4499. [Lotidis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁷³⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5025. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

Besides, clinching the argument of the Greek MPs Kantartzis⁷³⁸, Papariga⁷³⁹, Tsovolas⁷⁴⁰, Lotidis⁷⁴¹; the Turkish MP Aksoy declared that it was a movement with a claim on the Turkish territory, and deciphered a five-step strategy that revealed the future plans of PKK, as follows: The first was gaining power, “which meant bandits would govern at night and the state would govern in the daytime”⁷⁴². The second phase was cultural autonomy. The third was autonomy throughout their region. The fourth was federation. And the fifth was an independent state. The MPs in the Turkish parliament, therefore, agitated for respect for the country’s territorial integrity.

PKK was considered as a real threat in conducting not only violent acts but also disinformation campaigns against Turkey to inspire the European public opinion. By circulating threatening visuals and a web of false news, according to PM Yılmaz, it was aiming to display a negative image of Turkey in the world, and also to repel tourists who were planning to visit Turkey⁷⁴³.

Supposedly, in order to achieve those strategic goals, PKK was seeking to construct relevant conditions wherein its ethnic discrimination, deprivation, and exclusion theses were grounded, and as a result, the Kurdish people of the Eastern region were deprived of their democratic participation rights, and fundamental rights and freedoms. MP Akarcalı exposed a vast network of human rights abuses of PKK. Accordingly, it had been restricting the Kurdish origin people on their political and public participations, and control their electoral rights and right to vote on their political choices. PKK was impeding them to vote only for the political parties that were based on the Kurdish nationalism⁷⁴⁴. In his words, it was ‘heartbreaking’ that lately “more than 100 Kurdish people were killed [...] because of their candidacy or membership in other parties”⁷⁴⁵.

Opinions were exchanged between members while discussing what PKK really aimed at involving in such terrorist conduct. Although it had been striving for ethno-

⁷³⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5276. [Achilleas Kantartzis, KKE, the then MP].

⁷³⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4467. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

⁷⁴⁰ *ibid*, 4468. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷⁴¹ *ibid*, 4499. [Lotidis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁷⁴² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (24.11.1998): 240. [Aksoy, DYP, the then MP].

⁷⁴³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 463. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then PM].

⁷⁴⁴ In respect of the Turkish political literature, the pro-Kurdish parties are as follows: HEP (1990-1993), ÖZEP (1992-1993), ÖZDEP (1992-1993), DEP (1993-1994), HADEP (1994-2003), DEHAP (1997-2005), DTP (2005-2009), BDP (2008-2014), HDP (2012-...).

⁷⁴⁵ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 472. [Akarcalı, ANAP, the then MP].

nationalistic ideals of the Kurdish people –so was declared by itself– it had at most been *detrimental to Kurds*. Reportedly, there was a *discrepancy* between PKK’s declarations and actions; in that its terrorist attacks were taking place in the southeast part of Turkey, where the majority of habitants belonged to the very Kurdish ethnic and suffered seriously from those attacks:

[TR] “Friends, the PKK movement, isn’t a Kurdish movement. Everybody has to know this. Well, I’m saying everywhere [that] the PKK movement is a movement to destroy the Kurdish people. [I]n the future, it’ll be written by historians. What kind of a movement is this? The dead is Kurd, the [parent whose] child was deprived of school is Kurd, the [family who] was deprived of their house is Kurd, the [family whose] house was burnt is Kurd, the [one who] was deprived of his field is Kurd. What sort of PKK movement is this? Are there only Kurds on the mountain, in armed actions, today? There’re Turks, there’re Armenians, also there’re Europeans, there’re various people of the world”⁷⁴⁶.

[TR] “Besides, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the separatist organization, isn’t of Kurdish origin, as you all know he’s of Armenian origin. As far as we watch [him] on television, an informal, when you look at, he has the image of a man with mental retardation, scratching his belly while talking. [I]t’s not possible for such a person to be able to manage such an organization and to plan and conduct its activities without the support of someone from outside, especially at the state level –without the support of economic, logistical, educational or intelligence. Therefore, the event isn’t a simple Apo issue; the event is external-based [that] has come up to the present day with the support of the hostile states. Kurdish, Turkish, Circassian, Tatar; Arab, Alevi, Sunni, we [all] constitute the Anatolian mosaic under the Republic of Turkey. Especially with the Kurds, we’ve been joined at the hip for two thousand years, wives are taken and given”⁷⁴⁷.

In this regard, MP Balcılar, asserting that Öcalan was an ‘Armenian’, not a Kurd, made an assumption that *PKK was being exploited for the Armenian purposes*. To state briefly, in Turkey, there was a general opinion that the Armenians had a strong desire to dismantle Turkey, which was an incomplete task of their ancestors –who were deported to Syria due to their armed attacks against the Ottomans with the support of Russia, as claimed by the Turks in general– or –who were exterminated in the pogrom, as claimed by the Armenians in general, and by the Armenian diaspora in particular. In the excerpt below MP Balcılar drew attention to the external roots of PKK and its own agenda which might not comply with the Kurds’ who had expectations for and a belief in PKK.

According to the MP Gül, media campaigns had to be launched by Turkey to release the *truth* about PKK. There should have been a firm stance on the issue until PKK was convicted of committing terrorist activities by the international world. Supposedly, if Turkey could not have managed to draw attention of her allies, or her allies could have

⁷⁴⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (24.11.1998): 255. [Kamer Genç, DYP, the then MP].

⁷⁴⁷ *ibid*, 242. [Mustafa Balcılar, ANAP, the then MP].

turned a deaf ear to the terrorist attacks in Turkey and sustained their support for PKK. Turkey would have definitely reconsidered her foreign policy from scratch⁷⁴⁸.

Turkey considered as successful with her raising public awareness policy about the *PKK reality*, but surprisingly her neighbor –Greece– stayed aloof from the other Western states that were impressed by her campaigns and conduct of diplomacy and instead held a positive belief in PKK.

Identification of the Kurdish movement by the ruling and opposing party members of the Greek parliament remained as a complex and intricate task in that how to position it was seemingly a matter of opinion based on their respective political affiliation. For some, if the Kurds were inclined to armed conflict, they had to be excluded from the Greek support; for others, regardless of their methods chosen to win freedom, the Kurds, though with their PKK bonds, should have been supported. However, all agreed on one point: PKK was ‘a freedom struggle against human rights violations in Turkey’.

[GR] “[T]he Greek people are with them, they’re with the struggling Kurdish people, [...] the Greek people and Hellenism that are proud of their struggles for humanity, for human rights”⁷⁴⁹.

[GR] “[W]e’d say that the PKK isn’t a terrorist organization, because at the time of the Greek Revolution all the fighters [such as] Kolokotronis, Rigas Feraios, Alexander Ypsilantis, Karaiskakis were terrorists. Who ignores it? Anybody? [...] Third[ly], don’t the Kosovo Albanians do the same? Aren’t they terrorists?”⁷⁵⁰.

[GR] “[T]he struggles of every people for their freedom and for their rights termed as terrorism, with the means each time they choose. Or do we forget that in the past our people also took arms for freedom and national independence? Americans and the European Union characterize these peoples, these national liberating and social movements as terrorists”⁷⁵¹.

[GR] “You spoke today about terrorists. Indeed, in our vicinity and on the international scene, who are the terrorists, if not the Turks, who invaded Cyprus and invaded half of it? The Turks are always violating human rights in their own country, but also in the surrounding area, are the Kurds terrorists or the Albanians whom the Turks are now running to support?”⁷⁵².

[GR] “At this point, I also want to emphasize in the most categorical way that Greece condemns all forms of terrorism, wherever and by anyone else. Greece has suffered from terrorism. And it isn’t willing to tolerate and harbour terrorism. Therefore, the shameless accusations that Ankara has recently launched do not concern us, they don’t touch us. We’re fully committed to respecting human rights and condemning all forms of terrorism. We act in accordance with the rules valid in all European countries”⁷⁵³.

⁷⁴⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (07.10.1998): 299. [Gül, FP, the then MP].

⁷⁴⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4527. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷⁵⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5280. [Intzes, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷⁵¹ *ibid*, 5276. [Kantartzis, KKE, the then MP].

⁷⁵² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5063. [Giorgos Rokkos, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷⁵³ *ibid*: 5024–25. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM]; On the day of Öcalan’s capture by the Turkish authorities, the then FM Pangalos was the first member of the governing party -PASOK- who used the term terrorism, though unintentionally, while describing the situation of the Greek diplomats: “Twenty-three diplomatic authorities of Greece around the world today were occupied [καταλαμβάνομαι]. [...] At the moment, the husband and the eight-year-old son of Ambassador Angelaki are detained and prepared to spend their first night under terrible conditions of terrorism [συνθήκες τρομοκρατίας]. He is held by Ambassador Gennimatas and his wife. [And] there are five other employees.” See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4465.

The PASOK government was criticized particularly for hastening to confirm and use identification tagged by the USA and the EU. Reportedly, it was implementing the decisions of the others without discussing or raising an objection, and the Ocalan case was an end result of the meek compliance of the PASOK politicians. As stated by the MP Polidoras the Greek government “ha[d] become more royal than the king⁷⁵⁴ in Europe”⁷⁵⁵. It was condemned for advocating the policies of the USA, NATO,⁷⁵⁶ and some other countries of the EU that “sign[ed] various treaties, which on the one hand favour[ed] all those who cause[d] massacre in the Balkans, those who favour[ed] separatist movements in the Balkans”⁷⁵⁷ but did not accept the Kurdish struggle after so many years of suffering because of the methods they chose to claim their rights on the other. The MP Tsovolas pointed out that the first was the USA that considered Öcalan a terrorist, and was followed by Germany of the EU, and finally the Greek government had “to play the policy of a good child in the United Europe, and in order to integrate Greece into the euro zone,⁷⁵⁸ in terms of political criteria it g[ave] everything to achieve this supremacy”⁷⁵⁹.

5.3.4. Perspectives on NATO-EU Comparison

According to the MP Korakas, the EU, as a whole, was making biased assessment of Öcalan and his organization by linking them to terrorism. In his opinion, if this was the case then “Mandela, the African National Congress, Arafat, the Patriotic Liberation Front of Palestine, etc”⁷⁶⁰ would all be terrorists. This point of view was extended by the MP Tsafoulas, who noted that it would be a gross injustice to exclude the USA

⁷⁵⁴ Originally it reads “βασιλικότεροι του βασιλέως”, and might be translated literally into Turkish as “kraldan çok kralcı”, or functionally into British English as “more Catholic than the Pope”.

⁷⁵⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 50th Sitting, (18.12.1998): 2714, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES1218.pdf>. [22.05.2018]. [Viron Polidoras, ND, the then MP].

⁷⁵⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5276. [Kantartzis, KKE, the then MP].

⁷⁵⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4468. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

⁷⁵⁸ It is one of the main topics which was discussed repeatedly between the ruling and the opposing party members. The MP Stylianos Angelos Papatthemelis of the PASOK party made a confession during his speech that “The neo-liberal parents of Maastricht are the ones who came up with the idea of Economic and Monetary Unification. We just mythologized it here in Greece. Indeed, we created several, multiple myths of EMU, and made bloody sacrifices to reach this EMU. Imia is a sacrifice. The abandonment of the S-300 is a sacrifice. Ocalan’s delivery is a sacrifice”. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4531.

⁷⁵⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4468–69. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷⁶⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (25.02.1999): 4773. [Korakas, KKE, the then MP].

from the process of naming the liberation movements and their leaders across the world⁷⁶¹:

[GR] “After the fall of Berlin, it proceeded with Belfast on the Ireland, with [Gerry] Adams, who went there, but the leaders of the Irish illegal army weren’t considered terrorists. Then we moved to Yasser Arafat, who at first was a terrorist and then became an interlocutor. We arrived at Ocalan, who was not useful on the international stage and his arrest was ordered. We arrived at the Basque Head of the ETA, where [sic] he was arrested because he was not useful on the world stage, and then we arrived in Kosovo, where the liberation army of a terrorist was considered an interlocutor and Milosevic was considered a terrorist. This name diversification made by America, which has the responsibility for the monitoring of all those, who for the sake of politics were called [either] terrorists [or] interlocutors”.

As was iterated by several Greek MPs, the international organizations and fora which were designated to protect human rights and values did not maintain the equality principle⁷⁶² while drawing conclusions on *political processes*. In the Greek parliament, the full responsibility was apportioned between NATO and the EU whereas in the Turkish parliament NATO was portrayed as far more responsible than the others.

Turkish politicians, in general, were vexed with *the odd relationship* between Turkey and NATO, whose members were taking steps against Turkey. Italy, for example, let the ‘so-called Kurdish parliament in exile’ to hold a session under the roof of the Italian parliament; France, for example, took a parliamentary decision on the ‘so-called Armenian genocide’; and Greece made agreements with Syria and Armenia against Turkey⁷⁶³. Moreover, Greece was in an effort to impede Turkey’s progress both in financial and military issues in respect that she was chronically vetoing Turkey on the MEDA funding of the EU, which was approximately 450 million USD, and supporting PKK⁷⁶⁴. In the excerpt below, MP Yülek quoted NATO’s *apathy* toward PKK⁷⁶⁵:

[TR] “For example, when a friend of mine said ‘while the PKK is being trained in a camp of Greece, which is a NATO state, how come NATO supports this movement against its [another] state’ it was stated that ‘we don’t know anything like that’. Then Mr. Bedük said, as a former Director General of Security ‘I give you the address; it’s the Lavrio Camp, go and see there’; but the people in NATO, in the south never mentioned this”.

According to Yülek, Turkey’s role as NATO’s outpost during the Cold War period, or in his words “bear[ing] all of NATO’s burden through a 40-year guardianship”⁷⁶⁶ ended up without any political gain. Turkey was still neither an EU member nor a

⁷⁶¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5309. [Tsafoulas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷⁶² *ibid*, 5306. [Kouroumbis, PASOK, the then MP].

⁷⁶³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 20th Term, 10th Session, v. 64, (21.10.1998): 152, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c064/tbmm20064010.pdf>. [18.09.2018]. [Ertan Yülek, FP, the then MP].

⁷⁶⁴ *ibid*, 162. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

⁷⁶⁵ *ibid*. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

⁷⁶⁶ *ibid*, 152. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

WEU member and, furthermore, in case of any war against the members of these organizations in accordance with the latest agreement signed with NATO, Turkey “had to give all her materials, equipment, military ammunition, and forces to the command of Western European Union”⁷⁶⁷. He suggested that Turkey should have negotiated it thoroughly, instead of accepting it unconditionally, and made use of her bargaining power “for her European Union dream”, or in other words, “for her platonic love”⁷⁶⁸.

There was a general consensus among the Turkish MPs that NATO did not explicitly assert its opinion on the PKK issue⁷⁶⁹, and did not force its members to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of each other, let alone supporting a terrorist organization nested in a member country. As professed by the MPs Demirkol of the RP and Köse of the DYP, Turkey’s moderate foreign policy particularly had been underestimating PKK for a long time, which caused Turkey’s loss of capacity in obstructing terrorist actions on the one way and eased PKK’s acquisition of political identity in Europe on the other:

[TR] “Indeed, we see that our applied foreign policy is passive, submissive on some issues, and accepting everything. The striking example of this is the foreign policy that we implement to our neighbors. As how we accept the fact that Greece has been arming the islands for years, and has put pressure on our tribes living in Western Thrace; today, we accepted the PKK camps opened by the Greek Cypriot side, especially by Greece, and didn’t react. [...] A week ago, a private television channel [shared] the scenes and news that broadcast by a television channel located in the Greek Cypriot part, and showed the PKK’s camp here and the Greek authorities interest and support in these camps; the PKK members was being trained by the Greek officers in these camps”⁷⁷⁰.

[TR] “Greece is in NATO alliance, Italy is in NATO alliance; [but] both states, unfortunately host Apo. The foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey should be little more active, little more aggressive. So, considering that when we approach to it mildly, try to explain it with its human dimensions, [and] tell those states about our problems perhaps they will settle the issue over time [is wrong], time will be against us because until today it has been already explained. Our people in that region have no identity problems, neither language problems nor land issues”⁷⁷¹.

In the second excerpt above, NATO’s position against terrorist attacks in Turkey was deemed as a matter of indifference and obliviousness. The MP Emmioğlu argued that in order to get maximum political leverage in negotiations, Turkey should have made a bargain with NATO about whether to veto its enlargement policy, and in return, she could have received the WEU membership⁷⁷². Moreover, the MP Bedük remarked that

⁷⁶⁷ *ibid*, 151. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

⁷⁶⁸ *ibid*, 152. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

⁷⁶⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (18.11.1998): 475. [Öymen, CHP, the then MP].

⁷⁷⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (20.03.1996): 352. [Demirkol, RP, the then MP].

⁷⁷¹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (09.02.1999): 69. [İsmail Köse, DYP, the then MP].

⁷⁷² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (21.10.1998): 163. [Kahraman Emmioğlu, FP, the then MP].

there was “a decision of a secret principle between NATO and the EU [about following] an enlargement process parallel to each other”⁷⁷³. Accordingly, after getting acceptance to NATO, countries who applied also for the EU membership were admitted to the Union. The only exception was Turkey, which was included in NATO but excluded from the EU. Lately, in the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey was not even declared eligible to join the EU,⁷⁷⁴ and this was considered to be stemmed from Turkey’s lack of pursuing consistent foreign policy, for that Turkey was not used to utilizing her rights and entitlements originated from her memberships in international organizations. The readmission process of Greece in NATO’s military wing which took place during Turkey’s 1980 military coup was placed as an example for the *insufficiency* of Turkey in bargaining leverage. On the other hand, Greece was considered capable of exploiting international instruments such as her veto power on decisions in the EU. Turkey’s EU track was obstructed several times by Greece, which interpreted as “Turkey was sentenced to Greece’s [approval]”⁷⁷⁵ due to her ignorance in foreign politics. In this respect, any development through the way of the EU membership would have been supervised by the intention of Greece⁷⁷⁶.

Contrary to what was argued by the Turkish MPs, the Greek PM Simitis argued that the only required condition was “respect for legalities”⁷⁷⁷. In his view, Turkey’s European process “d[id] not concern Turkey’s relationship with Greece”, but “Turkey’s relationship with the European Union as a whole, Turkey’s relationship with the Council of Europe, with the entire international community”⁷⁷⁸. It was allegedly not a reciprocal issue between two countries, there were no loopholes or vagueness of the European plans that Turkey would have fair trial, and uphold the rule of law and human rights. In his words: “In a Turkey which follows these rules of conduct, we have no reason, like any other country, to oppose”⁷⁷⁹. In a similar vein, the FM Papandreou asserted that Greece, which had long been striving for parity and equality, for all minorities in the Balkans, and for the Greek Muslims of Thrace⁷⁸⁰, would *help*

⁷⁷³ *ibid*, 148. [Saffet Arıkan Bedük, DYP, the then MP].

⁷⁷⁴ *ibid*, 149. [Bedük, DYP, the then MP].

⁷⁷⁵ *ibid*, 150. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

⁷⁷⁶ *ibid*, 164. [Emmioğlu, FP, the then MP].

⁷⁷⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5024. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁷⁷⁸ *ibid*. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁷⁷⁹ *ibid*. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁷⁸⁰ Although the Muslim citizens in Thrace identified as minority because of their religion and named as the Muslim Minority of Thrace in general, there is a common misunderstanding of the term whether to attach those subjects of the country with Greece (meant that they are minority because of their

Turkey to make progress by exposing her to the Greek struggle for democracy and human rights, for the respect of international law and legal order⁷⁸¹. Accordingly, Greece supported Turkey's European process as a device for solving bilateral disputes⁷⁸²:

[GR] "We, Greece, want Turkey's European course, we promote cooperation in the Balkans together with Turkey, we open the prospect to the Turkish Cypriots for the European Union, which closes Turkey's occupation in Cyprus, we show particular sensitivity to human rights, to refugees in the world and to minorities, we are ready, if these conditions are actually fulfilled by Turkey -and I want to respond to what Mr Tsovolas said- to remove the veto, because it is not an end in itself. The veto is related to specific conditions".

In addition to the *impartial* feature of Greek vetoes within the EU, another emphasis was placed on Turkey's bargaining power within NATO. Turkey was deemed to be a *hard-bitten bargainer* in the international arena that somehow had achieved success for a long period of time. The Greek MP Papariga, for example, asserted that "NATO consider[ed] Turkey to be legitimate in her policy in the Aegean since October 1980, when Greece was reintegrated into the military arm of NATO", and the EU had never vindicated Greece on the issue of her borders, although those very borders were designated as the EU's Eastern external borders⁷⁸³. Papariga revealed that Greece, Italy, and "Turkey –namely the country which [was] projected as the Eastern threat– form[ed] a common military force" as a new structure of NATO "with the aim of intervening in so-called crises, in other words, this force w[ould] preserve borders and the peace" in the region⁷⁸⁴. Papariga furthered by posing a series of counterfactual questions on the Greek conception of Turkish threat, one of which was: "Are there verbal or real risks from Turkey?" Accordingly, 'if the Turkish threat is real' then why has Greece been defended by Turkey under the NATO umbrella. Another MP who was questioning the dimensions and efficiency of Turkish threat was Giorgos Rokkos

religion) or with Turkey (meant that they are minority because of their origin). The discussion between the MPs Andreas Karagounis of the New Democracy and Orestis Kolozof of the KKE might be given as an example for this situation. Two MPs could not understand each other while the one was speaking about the Muslim population in Germany the other thought that he was speaking about the Muslim population in Greece, as for both situations, the joint point of reference is Turkey. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (11.02.1999): 4314.

⁷⁸¹ Actually, it was a response from Papandreou to his Turkish counterpart. In his words: "I would like to reply to my colleague, Ismail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister. Ironically, a few days ago, he said that he believed Turkey helped Greece in 1974 in Cyprus, and today with Ocalan [...] I respond to him that Greece will reward Turkey for this help [...] together with our partners in the European Union, in every step, until the autocracy and the anachronism that keep the Turkish citizens –the oppressed Kurds and the excluded Turkish Cypriots– bounded today, are overturned". See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5054.

⁷⁸² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5054. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

⁷⁸³ *ibid*, 5037. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

⁷⁸⁴ *ibid*. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

of DIKKI. Below are the two excerpts from Rokkos and Papariga respectively, wherein they unite under the same misgivings about the implausible claim and assumption of the Greek government on Turkey:

[GR] “Turkey of the threat, of the terrorism is not as strong as you want to inspire the Greek people with your own tactics. She has her own internal problems that are too big. She has her own surroundings, with the Kurdish, with the Armenians, with the Azeris, who do not give her the pleasure of bullying. You, however, terrorize the Greek people with dilemmas: compromise or war, compromise or EMU”⁷⁸⁵.

[GR] “Is Turkey so strong, and the others -the USA, Germany- are weak? Why doesn't NATO pull Turkey's 'ear'⁷⁸⁶ once it is found violating the international treaties and international law? And we mean politically to pull its 'ear' and nothing else. They don't, because they are in favor of these Greco-Turkish frictions”⁷⁸⁷.

Papariga assumed that since NATO was the main decisive power over its member states' foreign policies the problem was neither about Greece nor Turkey. In her opinion, none of its members were able to exercise a policy without its affirmation⁷⁸⁸. On the contrary, the Turkish parliamentarians did not mention any NATO endeavour like interfering the foreign policies of others or establishing a new world order as notified by the Greek MPs.

5.3.5. State-Level Accusations over Öcalan's Capture

Following the capture of Öcalan, the Turkish FM İsmail Cem gave a speech to the Turkish parliamentary members. Accordingly, from every aspect it was a sort of debacle which exposed Greece as a terrorist supporting country 'caught red-handed' while facilitating PKK terrorist organization and hosting Öcalan. Cem quoting from his Greek counterpart –Pangalos– reiterated that all the steps taken during Öcalan's way through to Kenya were guided by the Greek PM. Greece was portrayed as an *unlawful* country which was involved in illicit acts. By referring to Pangalos and Mitsotakis –the Greek origin politicians– Cem buttressed his argument that there was a public unrest and a feeling of disturbance across Greece due to the misconduct of government⁷⁸⁹:

[TR] “Greece was caught red-handed in these events; this is very important. [...] We've been trying to explain it for years. Our Ministry has been collecting all the documents for years, collecting foreign newspapers, telling the whole world, trying to explain, however, Europe, for the first time, has now seen clearly Greece's incontrovertible connection with terrorism. While I'm dealing with this issue, I'm not saying anything, I repeat what Greece says. 'The Greek

⁷⁸⁵ *ibid*, 5063. [Rokkos, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷⁸⁶ To pull someone's ear is a common phrase both in Greek and Turkish meaning admonishing someone for doing something especially bad.

⁷⁸⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5038. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

⁷⁸⁸ *ibid*, 5036. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

⁷⁸⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (13.03.1999): 50. [Cem, DSP, the then FM].

Prime Minister is involved in the whole process regarding the terror-leader, [everything] has done within his knowledge.’ [Who] says this, the Foreign Minister Pangalos. Greece is so involved in terrorism that an opposition leader Greece, the former Prime Minister Mitsotakis, for example, says that ‘[with] this event, we have experienced the second dignity loss in the recent Greek history, since 1974’⁷⁹⁰ –that is after the Peace Operation– ‘and the reason for this is Greece’s and the Greek Government’s amateurish policies.’ It’s said by their party leader, [by] a former party leader. As a result of his relationship with terrorism the great Pangalos was toppled”.

Corresponding statements in the Greek parliament were mainly based on the inability of PASOK government to detach the country from the whole process that although Greece had repeatedly declared her neutrality on the Kurdish issue and had seemed reluctant to get involved in,⁷⁹¹ by virtue of hesitating to transform it one of a Greek-Turkish issue, she was “caught in the act [and] accused of violating the Common Foreign Policy”⁷⁹² by the EU and the USA. As was described by the MP Konstantopoulos, the “European governments [we]re rubbing their hands because the Greek disability left an end to a problem that none of them wanted to touch and take on responsibility[y]”⁷⁹³. The Öcalan case, “touched the prestige, pride and dignity of the Greek people”⁷⁹⁴. Moreover, the country was condemned by international circles due to the news which was referring to a secret agreement between two NATO countries that led Öcalan’s surrender to Turkey by Greece⁷⁹⁵.

Greece was *mocked* and *decried* even by “Turkey that [should have been] the last to be entitled to speak on matters of handling such issues and especially on human rights issues”⁷⁹⁶. Reportedly, feelings of the shame, embarrassment, and misery brought disgrace on the country vis-a-vis Turkey,⁷⁹⁷ which was defying Greece over Ocalan’s arrest by conveying an implicit message of being a strong country and underlining the Turkish inadmissibility of intervention in the Kurdish issue:

⁷⁹⁰ During his speech in the parliament Nikolaos Konstantopoulos –the MP of Synaspismos– noted as follows: “It is the most demanding test of the country since 1974. The country is experiencing a hassle with dimensions of moral and political crisis”. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5043.

⁷⁹¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4514. [Apostolou, SYN, the then MP].

⁷⁹² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5059. [Kolozof, KKE, the then MP].

⁷⁹³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4463. [Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

⁷⁹⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4519. [Varvitsiotis, ND, the then MP].

⁷⁹⁵ There are countless examples for this type of expressions of MPs; such as Korakas of the KKE, Kontaxis and Davakis of the ND, Apostolou of the Synaspismos, respectively. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4513, 4519, 4524, 4514; Also as Alogoskoufis and Karamanlis of ND, respectively. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4473, 4461.

⁷⁹⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5274. [Prokopis Pavlopoulos, ND, the then MP].

⁷⁹⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4501. [Ioannis Tzoannos, ND, the then MP].

[GR] “And today the Turkish authorities declares that it proved that no country can deal with Turkey”⁷⁹⁸. [...] “[Kurds] are a people of tens of millions who have faced for many years the barbarity of Turkey and the challenge, with the statements by Ecevit, what we have heard, by Ciller, by Yilmaz and others that no country should mess with Turkey. What else do you want, gentlemen of the Government, to realize that you have debased Greece and the Greek philosophy?”⁷⁹⁹.

The failed Greek operation of Öcalan’s hideout revealed another important point, according to the Turkish FM Cem. In the alleged Greek indictment below for the government’s misconduct of the issue, it was noted that the Greek *hatred* of Turkey caused a *heinous crime* in that it indulged in unlawful acts of *backing* a separatist terrorist organization and hiding its *ringleader*, quoted by Cem from the Greek public prosecutor⁸⁰⁰:

[TR] “An Investigation was launched yesterday in Greece; I received the prosecutor's indictment today. The prosecutor tells all the relations with the terrorist leader and says that ‘The above actions are concrete examples of Greece’s hostility and hatred towards Turkey with whom she is in peaceful and allied relations.’ [...] In another part of the indictment, the same prosecutor says that ‘Particularly the actions that Öcalan's illegal entry into Greece [and] driven into the country, providing a place to hide himself –these acts of Greece– concretely expressed hostile acts against Turkey, and such an act was declared *casus belli* (reason for war) by Turkey’.

It was believed that the Greek antagonism towards Turkey was proven by a Greek prosecutor. For the first time, Turkey was supposedly able to exhibit the distinction between the ongoing *Turkish benevolent behavior* and the *Greek malevolent behavior* vis-à-vis. According to the Turkish FM Cem, “Greece, in the view of Turkey, [wa]s a terrorist country”⁸⁰¹. Although there was a clear definition of terrorist state it did not necessarily mean that Turkey would internationally denounce or stigmatize Greece as a terror funding state. Greece, reportedly, met three criteria for being a terrorist state, which were declared then by the Spokesman of the US State Department; the first was supporting a terrorist movement or group in another country, the second was providing continuous help for them, and the last one was this support for the terrorist act in another country should have been known by the government of the country. FM Cem asserted that unfortunately Greece had these principles; since it was ‘caught red-handed’ (first criterion), not only its PASOK government but also its previous governments supported PKK (second criterion), and its FM Pangalos admitted the involvement of PM Simitis in the Öcalan issue (third criterion).

⁷⁹⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (16.02.1999): 4469. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁷⁹⁹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (17.02.1999): 4527. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁸⁰⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (13.03.1999): 50. [Cem, DSP, the then FM].

⁸⁰¹ *ibid*, 51. [Cem, DSP, the then FM].

In the Greek parliament, on the other hand, MP Intzes of the DIKKI clearly asserted that Turkey, where genocidal atrocities were nourished within both political and military structures and even so remained immune from the law, had to be the last country in the world to reprove Greece for harbouring an escaped terrorist of Turkey, let alone lecture Greece internationally about respecting the laws⁸⁰².

[GR] “I haven’t heard until now that Greece has gone publicly and internationally to denounce Turkey. Who dares to speak against Greece? Turkey? A state-run, constitutionally regulated state. This does not mean that the regime is legitimized because it violates the general principles of European culture as well as the principles of the Council of Europe and the European Union where it wants to enter. Because no militarized state can be accepted either in the Council of Europe or in the European Union. [...] Turkey, in the ending century, has officially committed three genocides: that of Armenians in 1915-1916, that of Asia Minor Hellenism and especially of Pontus Hellenism 1916-1922. Today she commits - she continues to commit for fifteen years - the genocide of the Kurds. It’s the country that currently owns a foreign country, Cyprus. And Turkey dares, from the cowardice of Greece and the dependent politics she exercises, to be a prosecutor. Who; The great guilty of both international law and our internal law. Turkey to be a prosecution against Greece!”.

Generally speaking, the Greek parliamentarians were concerned about two speculative conjectures: (a) internationalizing the issue, (b) defending territorial integrity. Regarding the first condition, one might perceive that following the Cypriot *triumph* of Greece over Turkey, Greece had begun to lay greater importance on the internationalization of bilateral issues. Accordingly, Greece was searching for friendship and collaboration, but the Turkish belligerency with ‘its dark plans and abnormal foreign policy’⁸⁰³ was tending to abstain from peace. In this respect, Greece, as a foreign policy *démarche*, maintained that Cyprus, which is under the Turkish *invasion* since 1974, is not a Greek satellite island, but an independent country where although mutual negotiations between its Greek and Turkish inhabitants were supported, as a result of facing the prospect of being drawn into a political deadlock, international help also accepted, for it was thrust upon her. This diplomatic maneuver was then regarded as a constructive suggestion –the most practical and expedient solution– for the ongoing dispute between parties (including the guarantor countries – Greece, Turkey, and the U.K. that were mentioned in the agreement signed as a part of the Treaty of Nicosia⁸⁰⁴) which definitely did much to ameliorate the situation of the island, at least concerning its admission to the EU. The common belief was that when a dispute was defined as bilateral and restricted within Greece and Turkey,

⁸⁰² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5280. [Intzes, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁸⁰³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (03.11.1998): 563. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

⁸⁰⁴ “Treaty of Guarantee”, United Nations Peacemaker, 16 August 1960), https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CY%20GR%20TR_600816_Treaty%20of%20Guarantee.pdf. [11.06.2019].

Greece would most probably be the loser, therefore, the general tendency was to internationalize the issue to achieve a settlement on the side of Greece, as was the case with the Ocalan, the Aegean, and the Cyprus issues.

The second condition was that in the Greek parliament, there seemed to be some confusion about which *self* to endorse; in some cases, the *self* which defended territorial integrity of *others* was supported, whereas in other cases, the *self* which requested a place for the tormented Kurdish people at the expense of dividing Turkey into two parts (creating an independent Kurdistan) was advocated. The latter was Turkey's redline which should not be crossed and preserved by *others* that reportedly Turkey, under safe conditions, was a peaceful country which sought *peace at home and peace in the world*⁸⁰⁵. As was clearly asserted by MP Günay: "If there wasn't any encroachment on her territorial integrity, Turkey had always been in favor of friendship[s] and developing her relations in every field possible. Turkey [always] wanted to be friendly throughout her history, [and] sought friend[s]"⁸⁰⁶.

5.4. Concluding Remarks

As was also the condition with the Kardak issue, an analysis of *self/other* nexus and their positive and negative representations show that the low-level of globalization was very effective in achieving to reach permanent othering. Put differently, the less the peoples communicate, the more the othering mechanisms work. Therefore, the declarations of the political figures play a crucial role in establishing mind maps about the *other*. The discourse that constructs the *self* with explicit positive traits, lexical, and adjectives such as respectful, tolerant, lawful, democratic, etc. also predicate stereotypes, negative traits, and implicit connotations about the *other*.

Despite what the factual (in a sense objective) situation is, the self interprets and perceives (through its own lenses) the present condition in line with its histo-cultural background, in other words, factors ideational play a greater role than material ones.

In both parliaments governments sought to construct their thesis related to the issue on a strong legal argument. It was obviously not an attempt just to attract the international public attention or activate the actors in the international arena to support themselves,

⁸⁰⁵ It is one of the famous phrases (Yurtta sulh cihanda sulh) of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which he pronounced publicly in Anatolia on 20.04.1931.

⁸⁰⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (07.10.1998): 309. [Ali Günay, DSP, the then MP].

but also it was to convince the politicians in the parliament (be they opposition or ruling parties' members) that the self *was* legally justified and well deserved their disparate worlds of thought to knit together against the threat. Thus, it has to be noted that if a valid and widely accepted legal ground cannot be established, technical issues are skillfully transformed into historical ones. Wary eyes can easily distinguish many examples in the excerpts where a reference to a clause or provision was radically transformed into a hypothetical situation with historical, traditional, and/or religious others.

In this vein, Öcalan's case highlights some of the conflicting positions adopted by the then Greek parliamentarians. Firstly, it was unclear whether Öcalan was involved in terror acts or committed any crime. Since the case would not legally achieve support due to being labeled as the leader of a separatist movement, the ethical and moral justification was sought within the framework of EU based concepts; such as depicting as political asylum which was underscored to be originated in the ancient Greek democracy. Secondly, Greek opposition criticized Simitis for getting involved in such an unsuccessful operation for the rescue of Öcalan, who was considered the political leader of a tormented ethnos, though the government attempted to distance itself from the misadventure by dismissing three members of the cabinet. In other words, the main criticism was about causing Öcalan to be captured by Turks, not about providing aid to someone who was a real nuisance to the neighbor. Apparently, Greek parliamentarians had deep sympathy for the Kurdish issue and Öcalan in terms of fundamental human rights and minority rights. Neither PKK was valued as a terrorist organization nor Öcalan considered a terrorist. Kurds regarded as the oppressed minority group that was striving for their rights and freedom. Thirdly, most parliamentarians, including the PM and FM as well, argued that they did not support terrorism or separatist movements or armed rebellion, but democratic freedoms and 'a piece of land under the Sun' for the Kurds. Paradoxically, Greek parliamentarians asserted their respect for the territorial integrity of Turkey on the one hand and asserted their claim to the Turkish lands on the other.

For the Turkish parliamentarians, the situation was clear enough not to be misinterpreted or misunderstood: Turkey was surrounded by dangerous countries that aim at dismantling the country. Accordingly, they had a secret plan for Turkey and were laying claim on the Turkish soil since the Treaty of Sevres where they could not

divide the country. It was neither about Turkey's position on fragile structure nor its weakness in *self*-defense against armed assailants, it was supposedly about the *others'* bad intentions and fiendish plot against the country. As part of this plot, Greece maintained that the Kurdish problem was chiefly minority problem, which meant placing Kurds among other minority groups like Rums or Armenians, conversely, Turkey deployed that there were no minority groups other than those declared by the Treaty of Lausanne. Accordingly, Greece was in an attempt to change the international perspective by transforming a terror issue into a humanitarian crisis that involved the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms of Kurds by Turks. Thereby, Greece tried to vindicate itself for supporting terrorism in Turkey. Although it seems that the capture of Öcalan surfaced the close relationship between the armed Kurds and the then Greek government and that provided Turkey with a powerful political lever against Greece, it was no more than stating the obvious about one of the hostile neighbors of the country, according to the Turkish politicians.

6. TURKISH AND GREEK PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE 1999 HELSINKI SUMMIT

The Helsinki was a critical summit in the history of Turkey-EU relations where Turkey was granted candidacy status to join the EU. This climax was realized following a long period, which involved such major phases as signing the Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) on the 12th September 1963, the Additional Protocol on the 23rd November 1970, and the Customs Union Decision of the Association Council on the 6th March 1995. In 1987, Turkey filed her first full application for membership in the European Community and after two years she was declared eligible for membership, but the Commission deferred the accession process until both the Community and Turkey would be ready⁸⁰⁷.

Turkey and Greece's conditions vis-à-vis the EU were asymmetrical, for the first was a member of the Union since 1981 and the latter had yet been granted candidacy. After becoming a member of the Community, Greece routinely blocked and progress in Turkey's relations with the EC including financial protocols⁸⁰⁸. However, Greece's policy regarding Turkey's European perspective changed dramatically within a short period started following the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 until the Helsinki Summit.

The Greek government of the time (PASOK) lifted its veto over giving candidacy status to Turkey. Reasons for this change of policy may be several, including a desire to contain Turkey by way of engaging her with the EC and decreasing military expenditures in the wake of inclusion into the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU. Consequently, especially after Turkey's candidacy status, Greek-Turkish relations came under the influence of positive sentiments that harbored expectations of rapprochement.

In fact, there were developments that put a strain on their bilateral relations during the second half of the 90s, including the crises like the sovereignty of Imia/Kardak, the

⁸⁰⁷ Çiğdem Nas, Yonca Özer, *Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles*, 53–54.

⁸⁰⁸ Ziya Öniş, "Greek-Turkish Relations and the European Union: A Critical Perspective", *Mediterranean Politics*, v. 6, no. 3 (11 September 2001): 37.

capture of Abdullah Öcalan, and the purchase of S-300 missile system, but the earthquakes of Kocaeli and Athens respectively provided a chance for the countries to restore their relations. Since support to the Greek Cypriots and sovereignty of Cyprus constituted one of the major parts of the Greek foreign policy,⁸⁰⁹ Greece carried this priority to the EU and Europeanized the Cyprus conflict. As was asserted, the Greek approval of the Customs Union between Turkey and the Union was made conditional upon the acceptance of Cyprus as a candidate. Thus the financial aid that was to accompany the Customs Union was vetoed by Greece and until the next Cypriot-progressive step for the Union, which was taken in the Helsinki Summit, the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey and her European course left to a series of obstructions and tensions.

In the Luxembourg European Council, 12 countries including Cyprus were declared as candidate states destined to join the EU as members. A separate section was devoted to Turkey, which proposed the drafting of a ‘European Strategy for Turkey’ without presenting the country with a candidate status. This caused a fierce reaction of the part of the Turkish government of the time. PM Mesut Yılmaz accused the Union of applying ‘double standards’ and excluding Turkey from the enlargement process due to cultural prejudice⁸¹⁰.

The proposal under a ‘European Strategy for Turkey’ such as Turkey’s invitation to the European Conference, political dialogue, and intensification of the Customs Union with the EU were rejected. Turkey also objected to Cyprus’ candidacy to the EU and declared that she would engage in close integration with the Turkish Republic of

⁸⁰⁹ The Doctrine of Unified Defense Area (Defense Doctrine of Single Area) of November 1993, which was signed by Greece’s PASOK government and Cyprus (Andreas Papandreou and Glafkos Clerides), can be a good example of the Greek political stance towards the island. Since the establishment of Greece the responsibility for Cyprus has never ended, especially after the loss of the northern part of the island during the 1974 Atilla operation of Turkey left deep emotional scars and impacted on the Greek foreign policy. For fruitful explanations and discussions about its capacity of extended deterrence, See, Yannis A. Stivachtis, “Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean Region: Security Considerations, the Cyprus Imperative and the EU Option”, *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union*, ed. Thomas Diez (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002): 46–49; Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: DER Yayınları, 2006), 609; Parliament speeches of MP Stylianos Angelos Papatthemelis of PASOK and the then Minister for National Defence Apostolos-Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos, See respectively, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.10.1996): 96, 121.

⁸¹⁰ “Çıkarken Kapıyı Kapadık”, *Milliyet*, 15 December 1997, [http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/Ee0NF8vjUjEc8jSfmEwjA_x3D_x3D_\[27.08.2919\]](http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/Ee0NF8vjUjEc8jSfmEwjA_x3D_x3D_[27.08.2919]); In his parliament speech, the then President Süleyman Demirel of Turkey declared that the Luxembourg Summit of the EU was “an injustice against history and discrimination against Turkey”. See, *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (01.10.1998): 41.

Northern Cyprus if the EU went on with the Cypriot accession process. The government also declared that it would suspend all political dialogue with the EU. This harsh reaction could be the reason of the change in the EU's approach towards Turkey, as the EU bore witness to a Turkey derailing from the European control⁸¹¹.

There were also other developments which led to the emergence of different approach to Turkey between the Luxembourg and Helsinki Summits. The earthquake diplomacy that emerged during the Kocaeli Earthquake of August 1999, the capture of Öcalan, and declaration of ceasefire by the PKK, PM Ecevit's letter to the then PM of Germany Gerhard Schroeder about Turkey's determination to carry out democratic reforms and improve the conditions in the southeast of the country⁸¹² were developments that paved the way to the Helsinki process. Another factor was associated with the Kosova Crisis of 1999, which displayed the continuing fragility in the Balkans and underlined the necessity for an inclusive approach in the EU's enlargement policy. A plethora of factors led to a changed approach towards Turkey and the result was the decision to declare Turkey as a candidate 'destined to join the EU on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states'⁸¹³.

The Helsinki Presidency Conclusions was recognized as a remarkable achievement in both countries. Greece, eventually, managed to alleviate the Turkish threat whereas Turkey, years later, reached the position she deserved. In the Greek Parliament, dissenters insinuated that for the sake of receiving admission to the European Monetary Union,⁸¹⁴ the PASOK government accepted Brussel's request and lifted her veto over Turkey's EU candidacy, thus it was the result of a *political bargain or secret diplomacy*⁸¹⁵. Still for the others, in the Turkish parliament, it was the result of clearly

⁸¹¹ Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 519.

⁸¹² "Tarihi Mektuplar," *Hürriyet*, 5 June 1999, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/tarihi-mektuplar-39083722>. [12.12.2019].

⁸¹³ "Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council", Council of the European Union, 10 December 1999, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm. [16.01.2019].

⁸¹⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 4th Session, 54th Sitting, (17.12.1999): 2550, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/SYN-171299APOG.pdf> [25.09.2018]. [Anastasios Intzes, DIKKI, the then MP]; *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 4th Session, 50th Sitting, (15.12.1999): 2375, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/SYN-151299.pdf> [24.09.2018]. [Konstantinos Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁸¹⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2369. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

Turkish efforts to redress its state structure, including amendments to its judiciary system and social rights and the free-market economy⁸¹⁶.

6.1. Rule-Based Approaches

While in the Turkish parliament most parliamentarians of different political parties were pleased with the outcomes of the Helsinki Summit; in the Greek parliament, there were two discernible positions bisected the political parties, by situating the ruling party on one side and the rest on the other. It was regarded as a *historical triumph* by the parliamentarians of the PASOK, in that, *for the first time* in history, Greece would have a *safer Turkey* with an EU perspective. On the contrary, the members of the other political parties resented the fact that *for the first time* in history, Greece *surrendered to the Turkish leadership* and gave whatever Turkey was longing for on a silver platter⁸¹⁷.

6.1.1. Turkey's Obligations Regarding the *Acquis Communautaire*

In the Greek parliament, proponents with a positive opinion on the Helsinki conclusions argued that Turkey, as a candidate, from that moment on, would be in a great effort to take a positive attitude and reach the European norms and standards, such as “democracy, respect for individual and minority rights, the rule of law, free expression of opinion, and the market economy”⁸¹⁸. The PM Simitis highlighted the importance of a real candidacy process, which would bring essential preconditions, and opposed to suggestions such as symbolic nomination, which would not bring any responsibility and accountability for Turkey⁸¹⁹:

⁸¹⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 21th Term, 46th Session, v. 22, (28.12.1999): 643–45, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d21/c022/tbmm21022046.pdf> [26.09.2018]. [Murat Başesgioğlu, ANAP, the then MP]; *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 21th Term, 33rd Session, v. 19 (14.12.1999): 216–220, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d21/c019/tbmm21019033.pdf> [26.09.2018]. [Bülent Ecevit, DSP, the then Prime Minister of Turkey].

⁸¹⁷ In Greece, there is a common attitude in questioning the level and quality of Turkey's Western orientation. “According to a widely-held view in Greece, the Turks have not been able to build a Western nation-state because they are incapable of doing so. Also according to this view, the Western institutions Atatürk imported into Turkey have not taken root, while those who undertook to take them work have never been more than an insignificant and vulnerable minority”. John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, 260–61.

⁸¹⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2362-2363. [Simitis, PASOK, the then Prime Minister of Greece].

⁸¹⁹ *ibid*, 2362. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

[GR] “We’ve said from the beginning that we don’t want Turkey’s virtual candidacy. We wanted a real, substantial nomination. An application with rights, responsibilities, obligations. Obligations arising from the principles and criteria [also] applicable to any other candidate country for membership of the European Union... [...] A nomination only in words... We haven’t made this approach. We’ve clearly and clearly defined that Turkey’s candidacy [should] ha[ve] certain preconditions”.

In a similar vein, Turkish parliamentarians both from the ruling and the opposition parties were united in harmony and concord, in that, the country’s EU course would trigger her improvement in several fields such as law, economics, and politics. Accordingly, these reforms would be constructive for the country herself, as they were “in line with the goal of becoming a democratic state of law”,⁸²⁰ and were to be done, regardless of Turkey’s acceptance as a member of the Union. The leadership of the coalition government stated that Turkey’s European journey was rather a long one which began thirty six years ago with the Agreement Creating An Association Between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community (or as known in Turkey –the Ankara Agreement)⁸²¹. Moreover, the PM Ecevit underscored how Turkey had met certain requirements regarding human rights and democracy and some sort of structural problems “in the last six and a half months” and reportedly in such a short time “Turkey made approximately 100 amendments, many of which had the characteristics of reform, to the constitution and the laws”⁸²². Therefore, the country’s shortcomings concerning human rights and democracy, which were defined as 'temporal' and loaded by “lots of unequal and unjust implementations, without any judgment or investigation”⁸²³, supposedly began to be eliminated.

Although Turkey supposedly had made significant progress towards the EU, there was a general consensus in the Turkish Parliament that the country was still at the beginning of a hefty to-do list⁸²⁴. First of all, there were the Copenhagen criteria (accession criteria) that were pending, to be met both politically and economically. Remarkably, minority rights that were referred to, as one of the accession criteria, were

⁸²⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 21th Term, 37th Session, v. 20, (19.12.1999): 369, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d21/c020/tbmm21020037.pdf>. [26.09.2018]. [Devlet Bahçeli, MHP, the coalition partner of the 57th government of Turkey, the then Deputy Prime Minister].

⁸²¹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 218. [Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz, ANAP, the coalition partner of the 57th government of Turkey, the then Deputy Prime Minister].

⁸²² *ibid*, 216. [Bülent Ecevit, DSP, the then Prime Minister of Turkey].

⁸²³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 338. [Recai Kutan, FP, the then MP].

⁸²⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 21th Term, 40th Session, v. 21, (22.12.1999): 390, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d21/c021/tbmm21021040.pdf>. [26.09.2018]. [Parliament speech of Tayyibe Gülek, DSP, the then MP].

assumed not to be an issue for Turkey,⁸²⁵ for there had been no racial discrimination in the country and minorities had already been defined and limited by the Treaty of Lausanne. Besides, the Turkish PM asserted that this criterion was an exceptional condition, for the reason that “France had denied the minority concept” and there had been also other countries that perceived the term in distinctly different ways⁸²⁶.

For MP Sağlam, the problematic fields involved democracy, human rights, the rule of law, a functioning market economy, and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces, which “d[id] not seem to be overcome in a short period of time”⁸²⁷. Similarly, the MP Ünal underlined that Turkey “was taken to the waiting room” and “according to some experts, it [wa]s a dream that c[ould] take place at least after five years; for some, after ten years, and for others, after twenty years”⁸²⁸. In addition to the need for a large space of time to propel the country into the EU, as visible below in the MP Uzunkaya’s statement, there was a need for a large spectrum of further reforms, which would ameliorate the present situation. Following his incomplete sentences⁸²⁹:

[TR] “However, we’re the grooming candidate, it’s certain that some conditions are sought to be met by us. We hope -as a country- that primarily our law [is to be adapted] to the European standards of human rights, freedoms, and especially [the obstruction] in front of the capital, the understanding that has driven in Turkey [sic], even classifying the capital according to their color with a conjunctural approach for three years... Helsinki Act and the green light we got on our way with the negotiations held in Helsinki today hopefully form a basis for development and a legal arrangement that will ease our front, our horizon in terms of the law”.

Correspondingly, for the Greek Government, since Turkey was to adhere to a code of legal discipline, her EU candidacy course meant acceptance of the International Law and treaties, and peaceful resolution of disputes through the International Court of Justice, which were long-awaited behaviors and attitudes to be likely visible on Turkey’s external relations and foreign policy. Thus, Turkey’s candidacy recognition considered as a contribution to stability and peace, and to overcome bilateral conflicts

⁸²⁵ The endeavor of the European Parliament to recognize the Kurdish issue as a minority issue during the 90s put tensions on Turkey-EC relations, and provoked a storm of protest from the Turkish bureaucracies, for example, the Joint Parliamentary Commission Meeting of the 29-30 June witnessed very tough discussions regarding the southeastern issue of the country. See, Çiğdem Nas, “Avrupa Parlamentosu ve Avrupa Birliği-Türkiye İlişkileri”, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: DER Yayınları, 2004): 477.

⁸²⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 217. [Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

⁸²⁷ *ibid*, 228. [Mehmet Sağlam, DYP, the then MP].

⁸²⁸ *ibid*, 352. [Zeki Ünal, FP, the then MP].

⁸²⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 21th Term, 32nd Session, v. 19, (10.12.1999): 154, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d21/c019/tbmm21019032.pdf>. [26.09.2018]. [Musa Uzunkaya, FP, the then MP].

and create conditions for the development of cooperation, and friendship of peoples in the region. In Simitis's words: "We pointed out that a country which wants to become a member of the European Union cannot use violence or the threat of violence"⁸³⁰.

In addition to the peacetime processes, in the time of conflict, the European logic of dealing with issues was anticipated to conduct bilateral relations whereby the threat of using hard power instruments was decisively excluded. In MP Karamanlis's statement, it was asserted that "a European and democratic Turkey" was in Greek interests⁸³¹. Following his words: "Who would not want a Turkey that embraces the European logic of solving any problems without thinking about the use or the threat of violence?"⁸³².

6.1.2. Ambivalence about the EU's Constraints and Benefits for Turkey

According to the Greek PM, another remarkable achievement of the Helsinki Summit was that the European Union had to monitor the implementation of the framework decided *with the Greek contributions* in Helsinki. Thus the EU was, in a sense, stressed to be a normative power that was composed of shared values and principles of the members. Its candidates had to comply with the *acquis communautaire* and integrate their own legal, political, and economic systems into that of the Union's since it had primacy over the participants' national law. The accession partnership that defined the framework of the accession process of Turkey, and based on the Conclusions of the previous European Councils such as Luxembourg, Cardiff, Amsterdam was of vital importance for the Greek Government, in that, it also brought the monitoring mechanism to ensure the fulfillment of mutual obligations and its EU progression⁸³³.

According to some Turkish parliamentarians, on the other hand, the Accession Partnership was not only involved legal or political procedures based on the Copenhagen criteria, but also financial and technical help to realize the economic and

⁸³⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2363. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁸³¹ Similar statements were posed by the MP Vasileios Kontogiannopoulos of the ND, who articulated his opinion that Turkey's EU journey would strengthen "the pro-European forces of the country that were against the extreme Islamists". In his words: "It's time to realize that a Turkey that will try to Europeanize and escape from the Islamic risk is a better neighbor for us". See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 4th Session, 56th Sitting, (19.12.1999): 2636, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/SYN-191299.pdf>. [25.09.2018].

⁸³² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2376. [Konstantinos Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁸³³ *ibid*, 2364. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

structural reforms in the candidate country. In the case of Turkey, reportedly, “the European Union ha[d] a liability of \$ 2.5 billion to be paid”⁸³⁴, but unfortunately this pre-accession assistance was still pending because of the Greek veto since the Customs Union. In the Turkish parliament it was generally believed that, in the Helsinki Conclusions, although Turkey was accepted to participate in the accession process without preconditions and on an equal basis with the other candidate countries, she was setting out on her European journey under unequal conditions⁸³⁵. Therefore, it was considered much appropriate for “the European Union to fulfill its former obligations”⁸³⁶ before expecting from Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria⁸³⁷ that were disappointingly ‘intangible’⁸³⁸ and ‘subjective’⁸³⁹.

Contrarily, the Greek Government did not mention any funding mechanisms of the EU,⁸⁴⁰ for them, the most important aspect of the accession process was that the adoption of the entire body of EU law contained in the *acquis* and their implementation at the national level by the candidate country. Turkey would not have a chance to mystify this legal process or mislead the EU countries about her progress in adopting the *acquis*, for the European Commission would conduct a detailed examination of Turkey's adoption of the *acquis* and prepare a report setting out the areas to which Turkey's national law had to be adapted. Besides, the whole procedure was started with Turkey's acceptance as a candidate country and with her own will to approve the Conclusions of the European Council, with the participation of her PM Bülent Ecevit in Helsinki. In this respect, Turkey, *voluntarily and consciously*, determined to *change* and become *democratic* so there would have been no further threat of violence from Turkey to Greece anymore. Eliminating the Turkish threat was seemingly one of the

⁸³⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 233. [Burhan Suat Çağlayan, DSP, the then MP].

⁸³⁵ *ibid*, 222. [Kürşat Eser, MHP, the then MP].

⁸³⁶ *ibid*, 233. [Çağlayan, DSP, the then MP].

⁸³⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (22.12.1999): 390. [Gülek, DSP, the then MP].

⁸³⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 395. [Tansu Çiller, DYP, the then MP].

⁸³⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (22.12.1999): 383. [Müjdat Kayayerli, MHP, the then MP].

⁸⁴⁰ Conversely, a Turkey through the EU was discussed by an opposition party member Evgenios Haitidis of the ND— that following ‘the Helsinki deal’ the Greek market and producers alleged to be in ‘a complete destruction’ because Greece would be flooded by the Turkish products, which would be ‘the beginning of the economic catastrophe for the millions of Greeks’. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 4th Session, 58th Sitting, (21.12.1999): 2795, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/SYN-211299.pdf>. [25.09.2018].

key motives behind the Greek decision on lifting her veto against Turkey's accession; as was also pointed out clearly by the Greek PM Simitis that any possible threat, either political or military⁸⁴¹, from that moment on, “[wa]s excluded and not possible. Whoever does it, ceases the status it has [as] a candidate country”⁸⁴².

For this reason, the political dialogue and accession partnership were of utmost importance for the Greek government since they were the means to guide a candidate country in the EU direction, or, in other words, it was a process of *domesticating the other*. In PM Simitis’s words⁸⁴³:

[GR] “The candidate country is in the box. This framework is compelling, obligatory. Through these processes, it’s controlled and guided. Of course, international relations aren’t a school room with a teacher who says this or that will be done. There’s an exchange of views in international relations, but it tends in one direction. And the direction is clear”.

Within the Greek Government’s view, the Union was a collective body of democracy, freedom, and solidarity with its principles, rules, and values; and the Helsinki Summit was deemed as an opportunity –an apparatus– and *a legal mechanism to end the Turkish threat* and as a start for the EU to compel Turkey to stay within the International Law, by its *carrot and stick strategy*.

The members of the Greek opposition parties, on the other hand, considered the Helsinki Conclusions as *a historical disaster* for the country’s national interests. It was alleged that for the first time Greece abandoned her long-standing position that considered the delimitation of the territorial sea as a political issue. In this respect, she left no leverage in hand to gain an advantage over Turkey while negotiating the issue of delineation of the Aegean continental shelf, by unconditionally accepting Turkey's admission as a candidate country. Following the Summit, Turkey had the chance to have recourse to the International Court of Justice in Hague for adjudication.

In the MP Tsovolas’s words: “Mr. Simitis, who has always made Greece belong to the Greeks, has politically recognized, in the fourth clause of [Presidency] Conclusions,

⁸⁴¹ Similarly, according to some Turkish political scientists, the increasing potential of the Turkish military power is the most important indicator of the presence of the Turkish threat in the view of Greek foreign policy analysts. In other words, the level of Turkish threat is simply equal to the capability of Turkish military power. In this vein, the economic or political conditions of the neighbor come in second place. See, for example, S. Gülten Ayman, “Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Güç ve Tehdit”, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: DER Yayınları, 2004): 499.

⁸⁴² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2380. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁸⁴³ *ibid.* [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

that Turkey, which is outside and beyond the international conventions, has vital security interests in the Aegean”⁸⁴⁴.

Supposedly, respect for the legitimate and vital interests of each country in the Aegean, which were of great importance for their security and national sovereignty implied in the Helsinki text, was connoting Turkey, for *Greece had never claimed anything* but Turkey had been continually claiming something from Greece. For this reason, the article four of the Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council⁸⁴⁵ provoked a common backlash (except the members of government) in the Greek Parliament. As noted, article four stressed the avoidance of unilateral actions on the basis of mutual respect and desire to prevent conflicts that might arise misunderstandings. This was interpreted as relinquishing the right of the country to extend her territorial sea to twelve miles based on the International Law of the Sea, and instead opening it for negotiations⁸⁴⁶. Reportedly, Turkey would never give her consent for Greece to exercise *the inalienable Greek right* since the Turkish National Assembly, years ago, declared it *casus belli*. It was defined as a strategic fault of the PASOK Government, by MP Tsovolas, that which was now in the Helsinki text opened the road for Turkey to demand Greece to retreat from its existing position that was secured by the international conventions, such as the Lausanne, the Montreux, the Paris, and the International Law of the Sea⁸⁴⁷. Supposedly, upgrading and transforming Turkey's decades-long illegal claims against Greece in the Aegean into political “outstanding

⁸⁴⁴ *ibid*, 2368. [Dimitrios Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁸⁴⁵ The disputed Article 4 is originally as follows: “4. The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union”. See, “Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council”, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm [16.01.2019].

⁸⁴⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2368. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁸⁴⁷ *ibid*. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

border disputes and other related issues” as was in Helsinki eventuated “by the support of the United States and other major European countries”⁸⁴⁸.

6.1.3. Envisaged Role of the International Court of Justice in Bilateral Conflicts

The opposition party members of the Greek Parliament, in general, argued that with the Greek PM Simitis’s signature on the Helsinki Conclusions, Turkey’s unilateral illegal claims were turned into bilateral, legal, and political claims that were to be negotiated⁸⁴⁹. Accordingly, this *Turkish plot* took a start with the crisis of rocky islets –Imia– and pursued through the ‘Madrid Agreement’, for Turkey, at first, sparked a debate on the sovereignty of *one hundred thirty Greek rocky islets* and then proposed the thesis of *gray zones* following these political events⁸⁵⁰.

On the 8-9 July 1997, Greece and Turkey held a bilateral meeting at NATO Summit in Madrid⁸⁵¹ and released a joint communique on the prospect of Greek-Turkish relations. There were 6 major points declared, extending from ‘developing good neighborly relations to refraining from unilateral acts that might raise misunderstanding’⁸⁵². The declaration envisaged contributing peaceful resolutions of the disputes between the two countries by ‘simultaneously and reciprocally’ deterring Greece from taking unilateral actions in the Aegean, such as extending her territorial

⁸⁴⁸ *ibid*, 2371. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁸⁴⁹ See, for example, the Parliament speech of Nikolaos Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP. *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2393.

⁸⁵⁰ *ibid*, 2371. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁸⁵¹ <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/home.htm> [28.09.2018].

⁸⁵² The content of the declaration, originally, as follows: (1) “A mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good neighborly relations”; (2) “Respect for each other’s sovereignty”; (3) “Respect for the Principles of International Law and International Agreements”; (4) “Respect for each other’s legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the Aegean which are of great importance for their security and national sovereignty”; (5) “Commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding”; (6) “Commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without use of force or threat of force”. See, “New Phase Opens in Greek-Turkish Relations”, Embassy of Greece, Press & Information Office, Washington, August 1997, 1–2, (West European Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University)

https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=QXCyAAAAIAAJ&pg=PP30&lpg=PP30&dq=%22commitment+to+peace,+security+and+the+continuing+development+of+good+neighborly+relations%22&source=bl&ots=I6uZTYlbnN&sig=ACfU3U1ffJ7b3cyLmD_nP_gyb9JzMVuBXw&hl=tr&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj-yM-_0KHnAhVtxaYKHT_zDzwQ6AEwA3oECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22commitment%20to%20peace%20and%20the%20continuing%20development%20of%20good%20neighborly%20relations%22&f=false. [05.01.2020].

waters to 12 miles and Turkey from using the threat of force, such as citing this extension as a *casus belli*⁸⁵³.

Leaving aside all these criticisms, PM Simitis identified the Helsinki as advantageous and declared that “a new chapter is now opened for the country. A difficult chapter was closed. [Greece] enter[s] the new century with a new perspective, with optimism, with hope”⁸⁵⁴. For the PM, the Helsinki European Council was *a vindication of the Greek foreign policy* and Greece achieved what it had planned at the beginning⁸⁵⁵.

In return to PM Simitis’s compliments on the event, the opposition party leaders such as Dimitrios Tsovolas of the DIKKI⁸⁵⁶, Konstantinos Karamanlis of the ND⁸⁵⁷, Nikolaos Konstantopoulos of the SYN⁸⁵⁸, said that *the Helsinki was disadvantageous and inclined to promote the Turkish national interests*.

MP Tsovolas, for example, claimed that the Helsinki text was an *official debacle* wherein Greece “resigned her veto and Turkey has, therefore, been subject to the status of the candidate country”, and that the PM “accepted that [Greece] ha[s] outstanding border disputes with Turkey that can [be] discuss[ed] before the International Court of Justice in Hague, along with other related issues”⁸⁵⁹. In a similar vein, MP Karamanlis asserted that supporting Turkey before the EU with a substantive candidacy, rather than a symbolic one was, apart from being controversial, barely harmful to the country’s legal rights, such as losing her veto and supplying Turkey with a list of additional profits⁸⁶⁰:

[GR] “The Council invites the candidate countries to make every effort to resolve significant border disputes and other related issues under the UN Charter. [...] What does it mean? With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, for the first time, Europe accepts Turkey's long-standing positions, with our own participation and with our co-signing! The European Council appears to recognize and legitimize the Turkish territorial claims, and to refer us to negotiate all matters without terms and conditions. We all wanted and insisted on dialogue, but under certain, clear conditions, within a framework. And this framework doesn’t exist today”.

Another dissenting voice belonged to MP Angourakis who furthered the discussion by pointing out that through the EU’s formulation Turkey could unilaterally have recourse to The Hague, even if Greece denied her application, as part of the Greek national

⁸⁵³ Ayman, “Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Güç ve Tehdit”, 493–96.

⁸⁵⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2362. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁸⁵⁵ *ibid*, 2362–66.

⁸⁵⁶ *ibid*, 2372.

⁸⁵⁷ *ibid*, 2377.

⁸⁵⁸ *ibid*, 2388–89.

⁸⁵⁹ *ibid*, 2372. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁸⁶⁰ *ibid*, 2377. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

interests, by claiming that the purported Turkish disputes were not bilateral and not accepted by the Greek authorities. Referring to its non-objective decisions on the cases of war criminals, especially in Bosnia and Yugoslavia, the MP expressed no confidence in the ICJ, and by placing his doubts about the *impartiality* of the Court he asked how would it be possible to judge the country's national issues in a court with fifteen foreign judges,⁸⁶¹ in his statement: "Do we forget that it is being manipulated by certain great powers? Do we forget about the context in which this Hague tribunal is proceeding?"⁸⁶². As a response, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – Christos Rokophyllos– voiced a *comforting opinion* that Turkey would not *dare to go* to The Hague because she was well aware that her claims would find no foundation within the International Law⁸⁶³.

Series of debates took place in the Turkish Parliament with regard to the same subject that whether or not to have recourse to the Hague for adjudication over the Aegean and the Cyprus disputes by 2004. Apparently, the Lipponen letter functioned as a sort of relief valve without which Turkey's take-up of the EU candidacy would not be realized in Helsinki. Reportedly, this *hermeneutic text* cleared the vague statements in the Helsinki Conclusions that might be misinterpreted, such as the confusion about the year 2004 as an endpoint for bilateral negotiations and the Hague was an obligation.

There were some, such as PM Ecevit⁸⁶⁴ and MP Eser of the MHP,⁸⁶⁵ who believed that by virtue of the constructive effect of the earthquakes of Turkey and Greece, the Turkish and Greek citizens and politicians were drawn into solidarity, and this situation would ease negotiations to settle the disputes without litigation.

Moreover, lodging an appeal to the International Court of Justice was not an undesirable consequence for Turkey since "considering all the Aegean disputes as a whole and not reducing them only to the FIR line [wa]s a situation that ha[d] always [been] wanted"⁸⁶⁶. In this respect, Turkey's status of the EU candidacy was an *achievement* reached without making concessions in neither Cyprus nor Aegean⁸⁶⁷. As

⁸⁶¹ Similar explanations also made by MP Karamanlis, See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2378.

⁸⁶² *ibid*, 2402. [Charalambos Angourakis, KKE, the then MP].

⁸⁶³ *ibid*, 2404. [Christos Rokophyllos, PASOK, the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs].

⁸⁶⁴ See, *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (28.12.1999): 687.

⁸⁶⁵ See, *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 222.

⁸⁶⁶ *ibid*, 232. [Çağlayan, DSP, the then MP].

⁸⁶⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (28.12.1999): 644. [Murat Başesgioğlu, ANAP, the then MP].

stated by the FM, there were no such statements left that were inconvenient for Turkey, regarding Aegean by virtue of the Lipponen letter⁸⁶⁸. Reportedly, Turkey had several bilateral disputes over Aegean; such as sovereignty controversial islands/islets, FIR, territorial waters and the Greek arming of the islands,⁸⁶⁹ and all those solutions proposed in Helsinki overlapped with those of Turkey. The self-confidence that was instilled by the Helsinki Conclusions, apparently, destroyed the deep-rooted prejudices and preconceptions against third party involvements in bilateral issues⁸⁷⁰:

[TR] “In the case of an obstruction in resolving disputes through mutual negotiations within the framework of peaceful methods and in the mutual adjustment path, as a result of these negotiations; the approach which is to take the issue to the International Court of Justice bears similarities with Turkey's approach to the Aegean disputes”.

Since countries experienced utter disappointments in their history, generally speaking, international arbitration and adjudication were regarded as biased situations, wherein the outcomes and consequences were against the *self*, in the Turkish and Greek political traditions.

Turkey, for example, as a national stance, has not opted for international judgment since 1925-26 the Mosul Vilayet decision. Following its invasion by Great Britain at the end of WWI, Mosul, which was declared also as part of the National Pact during the Turkish War of Independence, had to be left reluctantly to Britain, after the fruitless investigation by the League of Nations Council⁸⁷¹.

Greece, on the other hand, has been skeptic about the international judgment since her recourse to the ICJ on 10 August 1976; when she unilaterally applied to the Court for adjudication over the disputed Aegean Sea continental shelf arguing that the then PMs' (Karamanlis of Greece and Demirel of Turkey) statement as settling the issue through The Hague in their joint declaration was an indication of accepting to institute proceedings. Greece asked the Court to declare whether the islands were entitled to have their own continental shelf and to determine the respective parts of these island shelves. However, Turkey rejected this one-sided recourse and refused the competency

⁸⁶⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 406. [Cem, DSP, the then FM].

⁸⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 394. [Çiller, DYP, the then MP].

⁸⁷⁰ *ibid.*, 369. [Bahçeli, MHP, the then Deputy PM].

⁸⁷¹ Mehmet Hasgüler and Mehmet B. Uludağ, *Uluslararası Örgütler*, 3rd ed. (Alfa Yayınları, 2007), 133.

of the Court, which a month later “found that jurisdiction to deal with the case was not conferred upon it”⁸⁷².

6.1.4. Reciprocal and Transitive Relations Between EU and NATO

Another crucial development that of historical significance noted in Helsinki was the EU’s acquisition of its own military capabilities, by which its so-called dependency on NATO was to be diminished. Thus the Union was considered, particularly by the Greek Government, to obtain its defense identity on an autonomous basis that would be a sort of recovery in the course of Europe, following the painful experiences of the crisis in Kosovo and its weaknesses and deficits vis-à-vis⁸⁷³. PM Simitis maintained, as part of the common European policy on security and defense, and with full respect for the Charter of the UN, that it would be a great capability of having a presence within the framework for involvement or intervention, for example, “in the crisis management, peace-building, humanitarian operations without the need to appeal in these cases to NATO or other allies”⁸⁷⁴.

The opposition party members of the Greek Parliament, on the other hand, did not present a common idea on the possible European army. MP Papariga, for example, by casting her doubts on the dimensions and range of this new military organization, maintained that it would not have any effects on Greece’s national defense, as was the case for the Greek membership in NATO. Thus naming it as ‘European Army’ would not supposedly save Greece from being “the third among the countries that import weapons from the USA”⁸⁷⁵.

Conversely, another opposing party member, MP Konstantopoulos of the Synaspismos, supported the idea of shaping a common security policy based on an independent military structure of the Union. In his opinion, it would be a political opportunity both for the EU and the world in that it would provide the EU with full independence and prevent the world from being strategically dependent on one superpower. If member states were to refrain from forming their own defense

⁸⁷² “Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey)”, International Court of Justice, <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/62>. [09.04.2019].

⁸⁷³ [See, for example, the Parliament speech of Apostolos-Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence] *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2395.

⁸⁷⁴ *ibid*, 2366. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁸⁷⁵ *ibid*, 2386. [Alexandra Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

structure, then the EU would have always been condemned to stay under the *US umbrella* and would remain as a *satellite of the NATO* and stuck to its priorities⁸⁷⁶.

On the other side of the Aegean, the declaration of Turkey's candidacy for the EU appeared to overshadow this development and the decision about initiating a rapid reaction force, in accord with the European military aspect. Broadly speaking, it was assessed as a coercive development that most probably would give rise to a serious conflict between the EU and NATO. MP Eser, for example, asserted that this new situation might spark a new debate on the necessity of NATO; that is to say, the Euro-corps was most probably to *negate the NATO forces*. Moreover, there was allegedly a correlation between the European Security and Defense Identity and Turkey's EU candidacy, in that, Turkey was expected to run a position in this new military organization similar to her existing one in NATO⁸⁷⁷.

Another related point was made by MP Sağlam; that the EU refused Turkey's participation in the decision making procedure of its defense identity whereas Turkey had not imposed a veto (though she had the right to do so) on NATO's decision to share its capabilities and facilities with the EU⁸⁷⁸. According to MP Tayan, Turkey might suppose to get the achievement that was hampered in NATO⁸⁷⁹ within the EU. In his words, "Turkey [wa]s not a sick man"⁸⁸⁰ and instead, she was equipped with modern arms and technology for the defense, though with peaceful purposes⁸⁸¹:

[TR] "We don't have the intension to change the geography we live in; We also don't have the opportunity to choose our neighbors. We'll live in peace, in this environment. We want to be strong, for the defense and peace. From time to time, we witness the disturbing behavior of some of our neighbors due to historical reasons. These should be left behind. The peaceful and constructive behavior of Atatürk and Venizelos during the warmth of the war, should be an example for today".

⁸⁷⁶ *ibid*, 2392. [Nikolaos Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

⁸⁷⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 223. [Kürşat Eser, MHP, the then MP].

⁸⁷⁸ *ibid*, 228. [Sağlam, DYP, the then MP].

⁸⁷⁹ Similarly, not only about NATO but in general, it was believed that Turkey's western friends used to be unfair against her, particularly by deferring her EU candidacy process. For a simple example statement, see the parliamentary speech of MP Ali Coşkun of the FP: "Turkey, for many years, has taken place in Western alliances, completed burdensome obligations in her most difficult days, but when it comes to getting her vested rights –especially as we see in her European Union relations, even her vested rights were dismissed by her western friends". See, *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 21th Term, 29th Session, v. 18, (07.12.1999): 418, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d21/c018/tbmm21018029.pdf>. [26.09.2018].

⁸⁸⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, 21th Term, 41st Session, v. 21, (23.12.1999): 493, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d21/c021/tbmm21021041.pdf>. [26.09.2018]. [Turhan Tayan, ANAP, the then MP].

⁸⁸¹ *ibid*. [Tayan, ANAP, the then MP].

Although their organizational types were completely different, the EU and NATO were regarded simply as international organizations, wherein should Turkey have a position worthy of herself. Therefore, the proposed military structure of the EU was widely welcomed by the Turkish parliamentarians, with the thought of being promoted to higher rank that the country held in NATO for years.

6.1.5. Loss of Legal Ground in the Cyprus Question

In the Turkish parliament, regardless of their political party affiliations, almost all parliamentarians were deeply concerned about the clause on Cyprus. As understood from the debates, Turkish politics (as a whole, regardless of political differences of the parties) *reluctantly acquiesced in the EU's decision on Cyprus*⁸⁸², for the reason that EU-accession without a precondition of a political settlement would mean acceptance as a whole island including the Turkish northern part and brushing aside the rights of Turkey stemming from the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960⁸⁸³. According to MP Ayhan, Turkey, by 'saying yes in Helsinki' was losing her most important mechanism in hand, following his words: "It means that 'you will relinquish your rights arising from the London and Zurich Agreements', for [they] obstruct the accession to a community in which Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece not to participate together"⁸⁸⁴. Additionally, MP Çiller pointed out that the coalition government made a *costly mistake* by 'passing South Cyprus's candidacy, membership, in front of Turkey's', for it would eventuate in a brand new prohibition on Turkey's Euro-path –namely, the Cyprus veto⁸⁸⁵.

Although it was elucidated by the Turkish PM Ecevit that Cyprus's accession to the EU without a solution was unacceptable and intolerable, it seems that he was convinced to attend to the Helsinki Summit to take up the candidacy, following multifarious initiatives made by Bill Clinton, Jacques Chirac, Paavo Lipponen, and others to resolve the anxieties about Cyprus and to inculcate Ecevit to endorse the Conclusions⁸⁸⁶.

Reportedly, all of them, including the heads of state or government, and foreign ministers of the EU member countries, and several emissaries from Brussels, made a

⁸⁸² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 219. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then Deputy PM].

⁸⁸³ *ibid*, 226. [Oğuzhan Asiltürk, FP, the then MP].

⁸⁸⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (10.12.1999): 189. [Cevat Ayhan, FP, the then MP].

⁸⁸⁵ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 394. [Çiller, DYP, the then MP].

⁸⁸⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 215. [Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

great effort to persuade Ecevit to agree to approve the offer of EU candidacy. Yet Ecevit seemingly had not been relieved until the letter of the then President of the EU, to which he paid particular attention, in his words: “Thus, the official letter of Mr. Lipponen had been included in the European Union law as an additional text to the Helsinki Conclusions”⁸⁸⁷.

In the Turkish parliament, this letter was considered a legal document since it was written by the President-in-office, who was deemed a *primus inter pares* among the other members of the EU:

[TR] “As the Nationalist Movement Party, although we oppose to the accession of Greek-Cypriot side to the European Union without the permission [...] of Turkey, we were convinced by negotiations made about the letter of the term-president Lipponen, and as a result, our government did its part and has made a historical decision and attended Helsinki”⁸⁸⁸.

[TR] “We can’t say that we’re satisfied [...] especially with the European Union’s approach to Cyprus. [...] The letter that the Prime Minister of Finland –Lipponen– as the President of the European Union sent to [our] Prime Minister has largely abolished our concerns about this issue. By the reply of Mr. Prime Minister, who notes the official and binding character of the incoming letter and also notes Turkey’s views about it, equality was achieved and the problem, which was called the ‘last-minute crisis’ in the press, was solved, satisfying both parties”⁸⁸⁹.

The Lipponen letter, however, did not only placate the Turkish side it also caused a widespread sensation on the Greek side. According to the Greek government, it was neither an additional protocol nor a supplementary legal document but just a simple letter with no binding value⁸⁹⁰:

[GR] “[Regarding] Lipponen’s letter; [...] Mr. Ecevit, Mr. Chirac, Mr. Schroder and other heads of state -on various other occasions telephones are made and letters are exchanged- all of them are not part of the agreement. Part of the agreement is only the decision by the Council Summit and the conclusions by the Council Summit that are adopted unanimously. All the others do not bind. [...] Mr. Ecevit, to gild the pill in Turkey, said: ‘We take into account what the one and the other said to us.’ [And] Mr. Karamanlis supports the same position, leaving the firm position of not only Greece but also of all the European states that only the decision of the Council Summit is binding and implemented as they are written in the texts. It cannot be otherwise, because no one knows what is written, what is said on the phones, what is promised to each other”.

Simitis’s further clarifications of the Western *political maneuvers* were unfortunately not efficacious in appeasing the opposition parties. Apart from MP Papariga⁸⁹¹ others remained immovable on their opinion⁸⁹² that the letter was *abusive and deceptive* in that it was an unprecedented approach to a substantial candidate to “negotiate behind the back of the Greek delegation, with Ankara”⁸⁹³. Reportedly, in his letter Lipponen

⁸⁸⁷ *ibid.* [Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

⁸⁸⁸ *ibid.*, 223. [Eser, MHP, the then MP].

⁸⁸⁹ *ibid.*, 219-20. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then Deputy PM].

⁸⁹⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2380. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁸⁹¹ *ibid.*, 2383. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

⁸⁹² *ibid.*, 2401. [Dimitrios Sioufas, ND, the then MP].

⁸⁹³ *ibid.*, 2377. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

pointed out that the period up to 2004 was not a deadline, but a simple timing of a new debate in the European Council. Therefore, a settlement might have been extended to an indefinite time, and sanctions for Turkey would have been postponed⁸⁹⁴. As a last minute offer, the Lipponen letter with its utmost gravity aroused the sense of being deceived in the Greek Parliament whereas in the Turkish Parliament the sense of reassurance on the Cyprus and Aegean issues, particularly clarifying the fourth paragraph that the Turkish-Greek disputes were to be solved politically and that the 2004 was not a deadline for a solution⁸⁹⁵.

Ironically, both prime ministers –Simitis and Ecevit– were criticized by their opponents to make concessions of Cyprus rather than of their own country. PM Ecevit insisted on claiming two separate states on the island while giving assurance to the Turkish Cypriots that Turkey was closer than ever to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Following his words: “The European Union candidacy status was conferred on us, knowing our resoluteness. In this respect, our Cypriot brothers should worry the least”⁸⁹⁶. According to his view, the existence of TRNC was not essential for only Turkish Cypriots, but also Turkey in terms of her security.

In both parliaments, the skeptics and doubters concerning Cyprus preserved their stance, as being loyal to the Cyprus case, and criticized their governments for allegedly the biggest political sell-out of the history. On the Turkish side, it was argued that the EU had been in such an endeavor to give the island to Greece for 25 years and that finally succeeded in its purpose, by implying 2004 as an endpoint, to impose its own decision without recourse to The Hague. The situation below was placed as obvious proof of the argument:

[TR] “Simultaneously, the European Union is satisfied, the United States, which organizes this work remotely [and] inculcates in the European Union, is also pleased, Southern Cyprus is also pleased, but the Federated State of Northern Cyprus and its representative -Mr. Denktas- is displeased. Logic has standards. In such a case, while for a quarter of a century this struggle continues, I wonder if there might really be a settlement regarding the Cyprus issue with which everybody all together is satisfied; no way. If Turkey says that she is also satisfied, then it means she sacrifices Cyprus. Look, I'm reading Simitis's own statement, word by word: ‘All the European Union leaders gave a guarantee, an assurance concerning the divided island of Cyprus and the Aegean islands that are problematic with Turkey to Athens. We took whatever we

⁸⁹⁴ *ibid*, 2378. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁸⁹⁵ For important points in the letter, See, Natalie Martin, *Security and the Turkey-EU Accession Process: Norms, Reforms and the Cyprus Issue* (Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 52–53.

⁸⁹⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 216. [Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

wanted; in this respect, I am very happy.’ Dear brothers, I think we’ve been tricked on this issue”⁸⁹⁷.

[TR] “Dear friends, there are pros and cons of our candidacy to the European Union, and the facts must be clearly revealed. The happiness of Greece, the sadness of Denktas, should make us think. Of course, making concessions from our strategically important places, lands and fields is a political mistake”⁸⁹⁸.

The Greek rejoicing and festivities about the Helsinki Summit, and especially declarations of the Greek PM, presenting it as a victory, caused negative reactions in the Turkish Parliament, except the DSP party. Since a victory cannot be a joint achievement by the *self* and the *other*, if Greece was to win then it meant Turkey to lose. By the same token, the press release of the Greek authorities declaring that *Greece succeeded in taking whatever she wanted*, interpreted as she marked a victory against Turkey, not the EU, by the Turkish authorities.

MP Sağlam is a good example of the Turkish parliamentarians who questioned the *Helsinki paradox*, which was being celebrated both in Turkey and Greece. In his opinion, although the Turkish PM’s declarations on Cyprus were important, according to the Conclusions, it had to be admitted that, either as a whole or as a part, the EU member states agreed to confer full membership on Cyprus⁸⁹⁹. Reportedly, the process of the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus accession to the Union was dissociated from the success of UN negotiations on the Cyprus settlement. The expressions, found especially in article 9 (b),⁹⁰⁰ fueled a debate among the members of both ruling and opposition parties that *Cyprus was a lost island* surrendered to the Greeks:

[TR] “I’d like to state that we’ve found some drawbacks in paragraph 9/B; of course, there’re some drawbacks. As the Democratic Left Party Group, we believe that the words used in this part, which is understood to be related to the Greek Cypriot Administration, won’t have any meaning beyond encouraging the Greek Administration. It’s obvious what, when, and how much we can do. The Greek Cypriot Administration has no chance to conduct accession negotiations on behalf of the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, both in terms of law and in practical terms. It’s impossible for the members of the European Union to approve the Greek Cypriot Administration to enter the European Union, by ignoring the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”⁹⁰¹.

[TR] “[O]n the Cyprus issue, it’s clearly stated that even if the parties fail to reach a consensus, even if the parties don’t come to a conclusion, it’ll be taken into the Union. Now, here, of course, as a nation, we consider Mr. Prime Minister’s commitment to the Cyprus issue important,

⁸⁹⁷ *ibid*, 226. [Asiltürk, FP, the then MP].

⁸⁹⁸ *ibid*, 352. [Ünal, FP, the then MP].

⁸⁹⁹ *ibid*, 228. [Sağlam, DYP, the then MP].

⁹⁰⁰ In English original: “9. (b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors”. See, “Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council”, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm [16.01.2019].

⁹⁰¹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 232. [Çağlayan, DSP, the then MP].

however, it's a duty to express here that the condition in this text on Cyprus, which reads regardless of the outcome of the negotiations it'll be accepted to the Union, is there."⁹⁰²

[TR] "Actually, there's one saying, 'the bitter taste of onion is known by the one who chops it not the one who eats it'. Opinions of Mr. Rauf Denktaş, who devoted a lifetime to the Cyprus case, and of Mr. Mümtaz Soysal, who has been attending these negotiations as a consultant for years, and of many intellectuals are also in this direction. Actually, there is a folk idiom, 'they get the killer to carry the corpse'. Cyprus was hanged by Mr. Ecevit. And he did it successfully. No other prime minister would have made this concession"⁹⁰³.

[TR] "Well, doesn't it seem strange to you; here, Simitis is celebrating [it], Greece is celebrating [it], Denktaş is weeping bitterly, Turkey is celebrating [it]. Now, doesn't this picture seem strange to you?"⁹⁰⁴.

For the ruling party members, this clause would affect neither Turkey's EU course nor the reconciliation negotiations between the island's Turkish and Greek administrations. Besides, they apparently bore full confidence and trust in the EU, which was believed to adhere strictly to its norms and moral values. If the Greek Cypriot Administration was to get acceptance to start accession negotiations, on their own by excluding the Turkish Cypriot Administration, it would be a *gross infringement* of the Turkish Cypriots' rights. However, for the opposition parties' members, without restraint or any preconditions, ongoing Cyprus's EU accession process, which was conducted by the Greek Cypriots as if their administration forms the only legitimate government for the whole island, would be finalized and unfortunately authorized by the European Union.

6.2. Culture-History-Based Approaches

As was stated by several,⁹⁰⁵ it might have been the earthquakes of İstanbul and Athens,⁹⁰⁶ respectively, which caused the Greek bureaucracies to hold the bonds with her traditional *other*, no doubts having the support of Greek media and public or it might have been the Turkish progress in redressing herself, especially in terms of

⁹⁰² *ibid.*, 228. [Sağlam, DYP, the then MP].

⁹⁰³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 338. [Kutan, FP, the then MP].

⁹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, 394. [Çiller, DYP, the then MP].

⁹⁰⁵ Regarding the situation, Georgios Papandreou's (the then FM) and Christos Rocofyllos's (the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) parliamentary speeches can provide a good example. See, respectively, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2398, 2404; For another declaration of the FM, See also *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (21.12.1999): 2797.

⁹⁰⁶ [Yet there were also some others who believed that the post-earthquake rapprochement between Greece and Turkey was cosmetic and might only serve some pre-election purposes in Greece, but would not create necessary permanent conditions for positive solutions and wider understanding in the long run. See, for example, the Parliament speeches of Dimitrios Tsovolas of the DIKKI and Nikolaos Konstantopoulos of the Synaspismos, respectively.] *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2368, 2389.

socio-political reforms to meet the standards of EU; that caused a rapid reconciliation between the two rivals.

Regardless of the background reason, the Helsinki Conclusions was interpreted as a *dream* by both the governments: Turkish government was satisfied with the outcomes perceived as self-realization of the country whereas Greek government experienced a period of great content achieving a safer position than ever after facing brutal forces of her neighbor, which would be under domestication of the EU in the future.

6.2.1. Realization of the *Self* and Domestication of the *Other*

With regard to tangible possibilities, the Greek Government considered the Helsinki Conclusions *a propitious start* with a positive fresh outlook on the traditional Greek-Turkish relations that would contribute friendship of peoples in the region, where accountability was shared between Turkey, the EU, and Greece. As was declared by Simitis, expecting a miraculous change in less than no time would be misleading and naïve, but Greece was ready and striving to build peaceful relations with Turkey. In his words: “After so many years of friction that will not disappear within an evening, it will be a difficult course, a long-lasting one. However, the conditions for the success of this course have now been shaped. There is a possibility of success”⁹⁰⁷.

Other members of the Greek Government, such as Apostolos-Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos⁹⁰⁸ (Minister of National Defense) and Georgios Papandreou⁹⁰⁹ (Minister of Foreign Affairs) repeating the PM, reiterated that the Helsinki Conclusions opened *a new page in the history of Greek-Turkish relations* which had to be exploited and not to be missed by degrading this opportunity or by failing to properly inform the Greek citizens and entrepreneurs, who were also invited to contribute directly, through NGOs and businesses.

The Helsinki Summit was an *opportunity*, which Greece did not have for many years, as it brought the protracted Greek schemes and interests together. *Ill-fated Greece* would, eventually, had a chance to relieve her safety concerns and distress, stemming from her neighbor, that the Conclusions had the power to change the context wherein Greece was living for so long; such as during the Balkan Wars and the Cold War’s

⁹⁰⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2364. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁹⁰⁸ See, *ibid*, 2394, 2395.

⁹⁰⁹ See, *ibid*, 2395, 2396.

bipolarity, as well as during the conflicts she faced in the region, ranging from Cyprus to Yugoslavia⁹¹⁰. Consequently, it was believed that Greece would be safer than ever when Euro-lands expanded. In FM Papandreou's words⁹¹¹:

[GR] "A vision that was also offered by Rigas Feraios while he was speaking of one Constitution [for] all peoples in the region, with Muslims, Orthodox, Jews, Turks, Albanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, as he said. This vision will become a reality if we base our relations on basic principles, the principles of democratic rights, human rights, non-change of borders, peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for International Law and Treaties and European perspective".

Reportedly, the progressive and forward-looking aspect of the European perspective would not be effective only in Greece's relations with her neighbors; so should not have been limited to a fixed Euro-land, and instead should have covered wide geography of the Balkan peninsula, where the Balkan peoples would raise a common voice to set forth their own fate. In other words, the enlargement of the EU with new candidates was in a sense *a Greek dream* that was complied with Velesinlis's utopian proposal revealed in his famous Charta (the map), which pointed out *a cultural sacred geography*⁹¹² for all Balkan peoples of different religions.

Deciphering similar remarks made in the Turkish Parliament, on the other hand, it is clear that getting involved in the EU integration or becoming the eastern frontier of Europe was also *a Turkish dream* dating back to the Tanzimat Reform Era of the Ottoman State. PM Ecevit, following his reference to a similar period of history, as did Papandreou, pointed out that being a member of the western developed world was complied with also Atatürk's principles and reforms, in other words, the European principles and criteria were in perfect harmony with the long-running national goals of the country. Following excerpts from different MPs, including the PM's, show the Euro-enthusiasm of the country:

[TR] "While some of the conservative and racist circles of Europe haven't yet been able to digest [Turkey's candidacy], the Turks have been European for some 600 years; but not only European, also Asian, Caucasian, Middle Eastern. Turkey is a very effective country in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Balkan countries. Now Turkey set out to become an energy hub where the oil and gas wealth of the Caspian Basin and the Caucasus transported to the world markets. Turkey is a live link not only between Europe and Asia, but also between Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Among the countries whose majority of the population is Muslim, Turkey is the pioneer of democracy, modernity, and secularism. The more Turkey develops and strengthens these qualities, the more its efficiency in the European Union increases; that is, the more Turkey approaches Atatürk, the more it eases its integration into Europe"⁹¹³.

⁹¹⁰ *ibid*, 2396. [Georgios Papandreou, PASOK, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs].

⁹¹¹ *ibid*. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

⁹¹² See, Irini Stathi, Eleftherios Foteinos, Nikos Soulakellis, "Geography as Utopia: From the Rigas Pheraios Map to the Division and Establishment of Borders in the Balkans", <http://www.geo.aegean.gr/earth-conference2008/papers/papers/C021D121.pdf>. [29.01.2019].

⁹¹³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 217. [Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

[TR] “Turkey's interest in the integration movement into Europe can't be considered a shallow target, like only taking place in the family picture of developed countries; because the principles that were shaped by the Amsterdam and Copenhagen Criteria, and are behind the integration into Europe are the universal principles that we aim for, by modernization and Westernization of [our country], which has turned her face to the West with the Tanzimat and gained a new identity with the Great Atatürk's Republic”⁹¹⁴.

[TR] “Turkey, as Lamartine signified, ‘is a front guard of the European liberty’”⁹¹⁵.

[TR] “Now, the way for full membership of the European Union is opened for Turkey, and Turkey left behind another milestone of her ideal [and] participate in the era defined by the Great Leader Atatürk”⁹¹⁶.

Generally speaking, it was also believed that Turkey was not an ordinary candidate since her heavy national baggage was loaded with cultural distinctiveness and historical peculiarities. According to the FM, none of the candidates opened a window of civilizations for the EU, but Turkey did. If there was a clash of civilizations the sole country that would provide a consensus of civilizations against it, was again Turkey. Following the FM Cem's words⁹¹⁷:

[TR] “Which candidate country with its seven hundred years of, one thousand five hundred years of history; which candidate with its hundreds of years of cultural background enters the European Union; which candidate adds the wisdom, culture, and experience of a new world, of a new civilization, of Islam and East to the European Union?”.

Yet Turkey's thousand-years old Anatolian civilization and her success in geographically and culturally synthesizing East and West apparently were not enough to make a favorable impression on the EU members;⁹¹⁸ that up until the Helsinki Summit, reportedly, Turkey was unfairly treated and excluded from accession to the EU as a candidate,⁹¹⁹ especially in the Luxembourg Summit, wherein the European doors were closed firmly for Turkey⁹²⁰.

Paradoxically whatever expressed as the *richness* and the *glorious heritage* that had to be internationally promoted in the Turkish Parliament, evaluated as a source of *intimidation* in the Greek Parliament, since Turks were proud of being the descendants of the ones who had spread over three continents or having been dominating Anatolia for five thousand years whereas these instances provoked the undesirable part of the Greek national history that was accompanied by an intense sentiment of hate and horror.

⁹¹⁴ *ibid*, 227. [Sağlam, DYP, the then MP].

⁹¹⁵ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (22.12.1999): 384. [Kayayerli, MHP, the then MP].

⁹¹⁶ *ibid*, 390. [Gülek, DSP, the then MP].

⁹¹⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 407. [Cem, DSP, the then FM].

⁹¹⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (22.12.1999): 396. [M. Necati Çetinkaya, MHP, the then MP].

⁹¹⁹ *ibid*, 383. [Kayayerli, MHP, the then MP].

⁹²⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 214. [Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

6.2.2. Effect of International Engagements and Commitments on National Traditions

EU's *very late decision* on Turkey's candidacy⁹²¹ regarded as an outcome of the strict Turkish foreign policy that was determined following the Luxembourg Summit⁹²². Accordingly, *becoming an EU member was not an obsession for Turkey* but giving it up completely was also out of the question. As explained by PM Ecevit, the government sustained policy of no-negotiation on political issues defined as red lines of the country, on one hand, they improved bilateral relations with the member states, on the other. Moreover, the EU, supposedly, should have understood that Turkey's candidacy was of benefit for itself⁹²³. Apart from its biased nature that was clinched by the traditional prejudice against Turks, the Luxembourg Summit allegedly *coerced Turkey into changing her stance* and approaches to the debated policy areas in return for becoming eligible for candidacy⁹²⁴. There was a common sense that with Agenda 2000, Turkey was exposed to discrimination in the Luxembourg Conclusions, which was admitted fault by the EU⁹²⁵.

In Greece, generally speaking, with regard to military components, political circles believe that neither human nor equipment based assets of the country might be enough to overcome a possible Turkish military intervention. Probably of this reason, most parliamentarians have always shown sensitivity and care to the country's international engagements. Although this situation can *compel the country to adopt and implement policies* that are not stemming from its own national interests (as was argued by the opponents), Greece holds that she might relieve the Turkish threat and consolidate the country's position in the international arena.

The idea that Greece's military capacity would not confront the Eastern-oriented problems, was raised particularly following the Turkish landings in Cyprus. According to the common belief, Cyprus got accepted to the European club in virtue of internationalization of the issue by Greece. In the FM Papandreou's statement: "In our effort, always for the internationalization of the Cyprus problem, we have called for

⁹²¹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (10.12.1999): 155. [Saffet Arıkan Bedük, DYP, the then MP].

⁹²² *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (28.12.1999): 644. [Başesgioğlu, ANAP, the then MP].

⁹²³ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey* (14.12.1999): 216. [Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

⁹²⁴ *ibid*, 219. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then Deputy PM].

⁹²⁵ [The then MPs Eser of the MHP and Sağlam of the DYP, see respectively]. *ibid*, 222, 228.

all European countries, and the USA, and Russia, and the others to help”⁹²⁶. Apart from Papandreou, PM Simitis also pointed out that Cyprus, which was of strategic importance for Greece, publicly and politically was kept on the world’s agenda as a means of converting a Greek-Turkish dispute into a Euro-Turkish dispute⁹²⁷:

[GR] “In order to ensure a smooth and rapid development of the Cyprus accession dialogue with the European Union, we’ve promoted this dialogue because it’s a means to promote and solve the political problem of Cyprus, to overcome the difficulties. It’s one of our high cards and we have to use it. Of course, we’re now expecting and calling for UN resolutions to be put into practice. We expect the international community’s practical awareness of Cyprus and international legitimacy. [...] The truth is, however, that in this way we’re moving the Cyprus issue [forward], in this way we keep it in the news, in this way we present our positions in the international community and commit it to a framework. If we abandon this way, then there’s only a conflict of power with Turkey.”

When the Greek efforts of *internationalizing bilateral disputes* brought about success in Cyprus⁹²⁸ that the island was elevated to the status of candidacy for the EU and was saved from a further Turkish attack, Greece assumed that any settlement would be secured by *leaving her nation-state identity* and putting on her EU identity. Turkish barrier to the unification between Cyprus and Greece was, therefore, in a sense, torn down by the EU, in the view of the Greek leadership. In other words, the *Greek dream* dating back to the awakening years of the nation was ultimately a step away from the fulfillment; that people who were separated from each other due to some sort of either historical or political reasons would have the chance to reunite.

This new type of *enosis* (the political union of Cyprus and Greece under the EU umbrella) was seemingly foreseen by the Turkish PM Ecevit that he reformulated his repeated argument, whose conventional form involved positioning the Greek-populated Southern part of Cyprus and Greece on one side, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey on the other. In its new version, however, the Greek subjects of the island were juxtaposed with the EU. Following the PM’s words: “the fact that there are two separate states in Cyprus cannot be denied in any way [...] the more the Greek Cypriot administration nears the European Union, the more the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus nears Turkey”⁹²⁹. Although the addressee was apparently changed from Greece to EU in the new Cyprus rhetoric of the PM, the MP Çağlayan of the same political party implicitly suggested that Turkey would always be ready for the worst and in case of a new Greek attack to the Turkish subjects of the

⁹²⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5054. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

⁹²⁷ *ibid*, 5026. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁹²⁸ Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler (1945-1960: Batı Bloku Ekseninde Türkiye-1)”, 597.

⁹²⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 216. [Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

island Turkey would intervene regardless of the Greek-Cypriots' membership to the EU⁹³⁰:

[TR] "The message is clear here: It's said by today's Prime Minister; it's said by the then Prime Minister of 25 years ago who could not digest what had been done to the Turkish Cypriots and brought freedom, peace and democracy to both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Today, Mr. Prime Minister is the assurance of the Turkish Cypriots as was in 1974".

In fact, for some of the Turkish political figures, there has been the opinion still alive that Greeks are pursuing their irredentist ideal (Megali Idea) on the Turkish territories. In this regard, the situation with the Aegean islets and especially with Cyprus are considered as the concrete sign of this revisionist foreign policy on the process since the 1950s. Greek Cypriots' appeals to the UN for the right of self-determination and the Greek General Georgios Grivas's 'terrorist organization' named EOKA were taken as pieces of evidence of the ultimate Greek goal on the island. Reaching its peak with the 'Bloody Christmas' of 1963, according to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, "the Greek Cypriot militia attacked Turkish Cypriots across the island", based on the Acritas Plan, which was "an ethnic cleansing initiative prepared by the Greek authorities"⁹³¹, aimed at "reduc[ing] the Turkish Cypriot people to the status of a mere minority, wholly subject to the control of the Greek Cypriots, pending their ultimate destruction or expulsion from the island"⁹³².

Conversely, in the view of Greece, following the Helsinki Summit, any future initiative for Cyprus should have been calculated thoroughly by Turkey in that the EU was also party to the process. It was believed that this development would reduce the Cyprus burden on Greece's shoulders. Thus relieved Greece, by virtue of discharging her *Cyprus task*, was ready for a new page as being the descendent country of the Ancient Greeks who had 'invented' the term dialogue⁹³³. Greece was inclined to communicate with Turkey, completely free of prejudices and stereotypes, and support negotiations unless its sovereign rights were at stake⁹³⁴. It was also a part of the country's traditional positive and constructive strategy toward her neighbors⁹³⁵:

⁹³⁰ *ibid*, 233. [Çağlayan, DSP, the then MP].

⁹³¹ "Kıbrıs Meselesinin Tarihçesi, BM Müzakerelerinin Başlangıcı", Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris-meselesinin-tarihcesi_-bm-muzakerelerinin-baslangici.tr.mfa. [01.09.2019].

⁹³² "Cyprus (Historical Overview)", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-_historical-overview_.en.mfa. [01.09.2019].

⁹³³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2395–96. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

⁹³⁴ *ibid*, 2397. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

⁹³⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2398. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

[GR] “Of course, our positive approach to Turkey's candidacy contributed substantially to our negotiating capacity because our partners saw that Greece had no prejudice, that the Greeks were not turk-eater [sic.],⁹³⁶ but that the Greek people were only asking for peace, cooperation, security, international law, human rights, democracy”.

Tourkophagos/Turk-eater (figuratively Turk slayer), stated by the FM above, was a nickname given to a Greek protagonist; namely, Nikitas Stamatelopoulos⁹³⁷ whose fame comes from ‘killing 3,000 Turks’⁹³⁸ at once in the Greek War of Independence. The *kleftic* (literally thief) leader Nikitaras’s qualification as a *Turk-eater*⁹³⁹ was later generalized and used as a stereotype for people with the attribution of fighting Ottomans/Turks or Muslims⁹⁴⁰ in the Balkans. According to Clogg, although these *klefts* aimed at robbing also Greeks instead of Ottoman elite, they gained a reputation in the eyes of public opinion and were elevated to become the symbols of the Greek national movement against the Ottomans. Following his words: “Their physical prowess was legendary (one was credited with the ability to leap over seven horses in a row, while Nikitas himself was reputed to be able to outrun a horse) and many of the *kleftic* ballads recorded their heroic defiance of Turkish torture”⁹⁴¹.

By making reference to one of a historically popular stereotype, the FM positioned the *new Greek standpoint far from its conventional one*. Allegedly, Greece’s this proven positive stance would be major bargaining leverage, for it revealed that the country

⁹³⁶ Originally “τουρκοφάγος”.

⁹³⁷ He was also a nephew of Theodoros Kolokotronis who was the most important Greek leader of the Greek Revolution and the subject of the 1823 Greek Civil War. Following the Greek War of Independence, Nikitaras and Kolokotronis were jailed by the newly established Modern Greece’s Bavarian King Otto. See, “War of Greek Independence”, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/event/War-of-Greek-Independence>. [18.03.2019].

⁹³⁸ “Greek Revolution 1821-1829”, *Glad Tidings* (March 2005), 14. [18.03.2019].

⁹³⁹ He took part in the Battle of Valtetsi and in the Siege of Tripolitsa, which both became a symbol of the mass killings of Ottomans (and the Jews in the second), decimated the Ottoman population as a whole including the civilians. In the Greek national historiography, just to give a simple example, in the Greek History Textbook of the sixth grade (the last grade of primary education) the scene of Valtetsi was portrayed as follows: “the Greeks came [...] the Turks ran away and left their dead. [...] There you see the Turkish women scratching their cheeks bleeding with their nails, and pulling their hair, and the children shouting and searching [for] their fathers. [...] But who can also paint the joy of the Greeks? This glorious battle of Valtetsi is the salvation of the homeland”. See, Aktypis et al., *Sta Neotera Chronia: Istoria St’ Dimotikou (In Modern Times: Grade 6 History)*, 107 See, also 108.

⁹⁴⁰ For example, during the conduct of this study, a terrorist named Brenton Harrison Tarrant attacked two mosques in Christchurch -New Zealand, on 15 March 2019, leaving 50 dead and more than other 50 wounded behind. As revealed out by the police, the terrorist had apparently scrawled the same Greek word (Turk-eater) on his weapon. See, “New Zealand PM: ‘This Is a Terrorist Attack,’” *BBC*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-47579433/new-zealand-pm-jacinda-ardern-this-can-only-be-described-as-a-terrorist-attack> [26.03.2019]; “New Zealand Killer’s Weapon Had ‘Turkofagos’ and ‘Hagia Sophia Will Be Liberated’ Written On It – The National Herald”, <https://www.thenationalherald.com/235490/new-zealand-killers-weapon-had-tourkofagos-and-hagia-sophia-will-be-liberated-written-on-it/>. [26.03.2019].

⁹⁴¹ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 41.

held no place for the traditional perceptions of hatred or enmity, which by the international public opinion were once assumed to be the main substances that shaped the policy of Greece in blocking Turkey's European course⁹⁴². In other words, by lifting her veto, Greece was assumed to leave her baggage, filled with narratives of national history, behind and refresh her image as unbiased in the EU.

Besides, this new unbiased image of Greece was useful and functional when any Greek foreign minister was heading for a debate with an EU member. As explained by the FM Papandreou, whatever he said to members was understood as the way it was because *they had full confidence in him*. As reported by him, it was certainly believed that the Greek FM was *frank* and really meant it, and “that he was not telling them to put any obstacles to Turkey because he had some hatred against [her]”⁹⁴³. The EU members were completely sure that *Greece would not reject something for frivolous reasons*, and that if something was refused it should have been due to its probable damage to peace and security in the region. In this regard, as stated by Papandreou, the *Greek voice* was considered *trustworthy* “just because [in Helsinki] it came out and said; Yes, in principle, I support the Turkish candidacy”⁹⁴⁴.

Interestingly, the coalition government member in Turkey –Mesut Yılmaz– by making different sentences but similar in meaning, declared that Turkey passed the EU threshold, struggling with historical stereotypes⁹⁴⁵:

[TR] “We’ve arrived at this point, by carrying on our shoulder some sort of external problems, none of which we desired, by struggling with prejudices that come from history and that continued to haunt us in every step, by experiencing the sadness of seeing our national and cultural identity is placed as an obstacle in front of us, and we must confess that sometimes [we] were immobilized, [we] made no progress [because of] clinging ourselves to unfounded illusions, but despite all these adversities, without ever leaving our goal, without sacrificing our interests”.

The members of the Greek opposition, on the other hand, maintained that the Helsinki European Council was a *big disappointment* to Greece, which was wrapped as a gift – *an achievement*– by the Government⁹⁴⁶. According to the MP Karamanlis, similar

⁹⁴² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 12th Sitting, (02.11.1998): 524, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES1102.pdf>. [21.05.2018]. [Vasilios Magginas, ND, the then MP].

⁹⁴³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2398. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

⁹⁴⁴ *ibid.* [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

⁹⁴⁵ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 218–19. [Yılmaz, ANAP, the then Deputy PM].

⁹⁴⁶ This view rooted in the Greek image of Turkey that has highly been embedded in the country’s national ideology, which positioned Turks as ‘shaky’, not reliable for their Western orientation, and ‘backward’ and undeveloped. According to Koliopoulos and Veremis, it was very difficult, if not

scenes of another *false victory* were said to be taken place during the Madrid Agreement,⁹⁴⁷ where the Greek PM Simitis allegedly for the first time “recognized Turkey's vital interests, security vital interests in the Aegean, and after a few days, the theory of gray zones emerged”⁹⁴⁸. The MP Tsovolas described the incident and the related media coverages as *festivities* that were witnessed also in the past, when the PM Simitis and the FM Pangalos again distanced themselves from the country's national interests⁹⁴⁹:

[GR] “Ladies and gentlemen, hadn't the Government celebrated, right after signing the Madrid Agreement? Hadn't the Government relied on, the same as it said today, the Madrid Agreement signed between Greece and Turkey, [that] it [would] allegedly undertake Turkey to respect the International Law and international conventions and promote peace in the region?”

It was underscored that following the Imia crisis, particularly after the Madrid Agreement, the *Turkish contentiousness* and *expansiveness*, the provocative declarations of politicians and state officials both in Turkey and Cyprus were multiplied. Reportedly, her unilateral disputes of gray zones and claiming 130 Greek islets took place following the consent and retreat of the Greek leadership. Turkey, supposedly, was not on her own in these ventures. The USA –as the protector of Turkey– was assumed to put pressure on Greece to withdraw from the Imia, and to hand Öcalan to Turkey⁹⁵⁰.

Another US-backed development for Greece was to resign unconditionally from the installation of S-300 missiles in Cyprus. According to Tsovolas, it was not a matter of a simple abolition, but instead it literally meant that “Greece, which is the victim, acknowledges the right of veto to her perpetrator -Turkey- in determining the defense of both Greece and the independent state of Cyprus”⁹⁵¹. The unpredictability and

impossible, to repair this image of Turkey, so long as the Greek national school system and the press do not stop propagating it, and Turkey does not change her perception of Greece. “The Turk has not simply been one of the ‘others’; while the Slavs, Albanians, and Latins have all been ‘others’, the Turks were indissolubly associated with all the dark aspects of the past which the Greeks have shared with them and from which they want to believe they have at least freed themselves. Divesting Turkey of all its perceived negative features would require a redefinition of modern Greek identity on a scale much greater than that accomplished by the post-Second World War Germans over their own identity and their relations to the French”. See, John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, 261.

⁹⁴⁷ The Greek-Turkish Madrid Agreement was signed on 09 July 1997, as a part of the NATO Summit in Madrid, between the Turkish President Süleyman Demirel and the Greek PM Konstantinos Simitis, with the aim of reducing tensions in their bilateral relations.

⁹⁴⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2375. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁹⁴⁹ *ibid*, 2368. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁵⁰ *ibid*, 2369-2374. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP]; *ibid*, 2375. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁹⁵¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 53rd Sitting, (21.12.1998),” § Plenary Session (1998), 3028, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES1221.pdf>. [23.05.2018]. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

violations of Turkey, therefore, were implied to have a link with the US policies in the region.

Although nothing had changed, neither in the international arena and nor in the Turkish attitude to Greece, it was not understandable by the opponents why did Greece change her strategy against Turkey. As was demonstrated by the previous experiences (Madrid, etc.) expecting an improvement in bilateral relations with the Helsinki Conclusions was a naïve opinion. In addition, it was clearly in favour of Turkey, which seemed to have a greater strategic position compared to Greece in the view of both the leaders of the EU and of the USA⁹⁵². In MP Tsovolos's utterance⁹⁵³:

[GR] "I ask you, Prime Minister, in particular: Firstly, did Turkey cease to be the biggest factor in destabilization of the Aegean, the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the Middle East, which you said in October 1996? Secondly, the unseen visions of the revival of the Ottoman Empire that you mentioned at the time, isn't it the invention of the Turkish establishment for Turkey to have an increased role in the region and to relieve her acute internal problems? Or did the Turkish establishment change and we didn't notice it and only you know it?"

PASOK Government was criticized on changing their vision of Turkey; that they previously described it as the reason for instability in the region. Since she was formerly under the rule of Ottomans, Turkey was in pursuit of her heritage by promoting her political clout and exerting her influence to become a regional power⁹⁵⁴. And PASOK was assumed to leave its previous argument on Turks only in return for a grant of getting acceptance to Eurozone.

In general, it was believed that Simitis was conducting a secret diplomacy, engaging in euphemism and equivocating too often to conceal the truth. In the past, for example, during the Imia crisis, following his usage of the word *differences* (διαφορές)⁹⁵⁵ in the plural form, which was ignited a fury in the parliament, he explained that he used plural form just for practical reasons that to refer to two things at once (the Imia rocks and the territorial sea) without any other connotations⁹⁵⁶. He was also said to

⁹⁵² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2383. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

⁹⁵³ *ibid*, 2370. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁵⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (10.10.1996): 23–24. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁹⁵⁵ In the Greek political circles, the word 'difference/dispute' (διαφορά) have been used in singular form in that Greece has only one difference with Turkey which is extending her territorial sea to 12 miles, on the other hand, Turkey has allegedly been uttering many differences of several fields which could be listed as grey-zones, sovereignty of 130 Greek islets, sovereignty of territorial borders, Greek armament in the Aegean islands, Cyprus, etc. Therefore, the common belief among the Greek parliamentarians is to refrain from using the word in plural form in order not to destroy the international public opinion molded in support of Greece.

⁹⁵⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2369. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

manipulate the media outlets and to initiate spreading false news and analyses to support his damaging government policy at the Helsinki Summit, such was 74% of the Greek citizens supported and accepted Helsinki⁹⁵⁷.

6.2.3. Challenging the Greek Socio-Historical Attitude to Cyprus

With regard to the accession of Cyprus to the EU without a precondition of submitting a settlement to the Cyprus problem was another issue debated among the Greek opposition parliamentarians. The main reason for the backlash on Cyprus was that the European Council supposedly would no longer regard the Cyprus problem as “an international problem of illegal invasion and occupation”⁹⁵⁸. MP Tsovolas, by interpreting the article 9 (b) of the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions, asserted that within this new vision the issue was degenerated as a political problem to be resolved by negotiations. It was argued that a political solution to the problem would make it easier for the European Council to accept Cyprus in the European Union. Thus an international issue was, in a sense, downgraded to a national problem that had to be resolved politically between the two communities of the island. As was deciphered by the MP Tsovolas⁹⁵⁹:

[GR] “Therefore, indirectly but clearly the United Europe and Greece with the agreement of the President of the Republic of Cyprus, as the Prime Minister has stated tonight, legitimize Attila in Cyprus and the persistent breaches of the international legal order and human rights of Hellenism in Cyprus”.

Renouncing the country’s right to impose veto, which was esteemed to be a substantial and effective measure of Greece, at the very beginning of the Cyprus’s accession course echoed sort of patriotic sentiments in the parliament. In general sense, the situation was considered degrading and demeaning to the Cypriots especially to the “heroes and dead people of Cyprus” such as “Afxentiou”⁹⁶⁰, Karaoli-Dimitriou⁹⁶¹,

⁹⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 2371. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 2373. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁵⁹ *ibid.* [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁶⁰ Grigoris Pieris Afxentiou (In Greek: Γρηγόρης Πιερής Αφεντίου) (22.02.1928 – 03.03.1957) was a guerilla fighter of Cyprus who fought against the British rule on the island. He was considered a pre-eminent national hero, and in the hierarchy of EOKA, he was supposedly second in command to General Georgios Grivas. EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston) was a Greek Cypriot nationalist guerrilla organisation that fought a campaign for the end of British rule in Cyprus, for the island's self-determination and for eventual union with Greece.

⁹⁶¹ They are also national heroes who fought in "the sacred struggle of EOKA" on Thursday after Easter, May 10, 1956 “the two young people watered the tree of Cypriot freedom with their blood”. See, “10 Μαΐου 1956 Λευκωσία. ΑΠΑΓΧΟΝΙΖΟΝΤΑΙ ΟΙ ΗΡΩΕΣ ΚΑΡΑΟΛΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ. ΤΙΜΗ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΞΑ.”, *ΕΜΠΛΟΚΗ* (blog), 10 May 2016, <https://greekmilitaryvoice.wordpress.com/2016/05/10/10-%ce%bc%ce%ac%ce%b9%ce%bf%cf%85-1956-%ce%bb%ce%b5%cf%85%ce%ba%cf%89%cf%83%ce%af%ce%b1->

Solomou and Isaac”⁹⁶². The first two historic figures of the 1950s were the heroes of the Cypriot movement through EOKA which was striving for *Enosis* –the unification of Cyprus with Greece. The last two were the Cypriot cousins, renowned also in Greece due to unfortunate loss of their lives within a couple of days, one behind the other. Tassos Isaac⁹⁶³ was the first killed on 11 August 1996, in the UN protected buffer zone, during a demonstration against the presence of the Turkish military forces on the island. Solomos Solomou was the second killed when he climbed to the flagpole of the Turkish flag in order to remove it, on 14 August 1996 during the protests held after the funeral of his cousin Isaac.

Reportedly, by signing the Helsinki, the PM Simitis sacrificed the Cypriot Hellenism “in the name of stock exchanges and multinational companies and bankers”⁹⁶⁴. Accordingly, capital did not have homeland or borders, and investments were to flee from any form of strains or disputes in the region. Consequently, although the EU should have been transnational cooperation it was unexpectedly acting like a transnational corporation, leaving no room for the survival of its values and norms⁹⁶⁵. The PASOK government was following this new version of the EU with fully liberal policies, in PM Tsouvolos’s dramatic statement: “Isn’t there any blood in [your] veins? The values of Greek culture that come out of many struggles, the universal values, and especially the patriotism, aren’t they no more appealing to anyone?”⁹⁶⁶.

In general, in the Greek Parliament, the common opinion was that Turkey had long been violating the International Law by implementing an aggressive foreign policy in the region. Since Greece was adjacent to this undemocratic country with an overwhelming influence of a military regime, which meant it was not a standard western type of country that Greece was used to. Thus MP Rokos maintained that the PASOK government should have been careful in taking steps as it was so easily “convinced whereas the German people were not as they know what an Islamic

%ce%b1%cf%80%ce%b1%ce%b3%cf%87%ce%bf%ce%bd%ce%b9%ce%b6%ce%bf%ce%bd%cf%84%ce%b1%ce%b9-%ce%bf%ce%b9-%ce%b7%cf%81/. [16.01.2019].

⁹⁶² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2373. [Tsouvolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁶³ His death unearthed a bitter truth that he would be a father in a few months. The then Greek Government, therefore, as a token of their gratitude, decided to be the Godparent of the baby girl whom was baptized Anastasia by the then Greek FM Theodoros Pangalos.

⁹⁶⁴ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2373. [Tsouvolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁶⁵ *ibid*, 2373, 2384 [Respectively page numbers for the then MPs Dimitrios Tsouvolas of the DIKKI & Alexandra Pappas of the KKE].

⁹⁶⁶ *ibid*, 2373. [Tsouvolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

country⁹⁶⁷ –and indeed Turkey– means in the European Union today. [They] know the status of Turkey, which does not change”⁹⁶⁸. Reminding the historical experiences of Greek-Turkish confrontations and evoking the common opinion that Turkey had long been the disrupter in the region⁹⁶⁹ MP Karamanlis also emphasized the Turkish endeavour to expand territorial borders and widen political clout as an unchangeable policy. In his words⁹⁷⁰:

[GR] “Greece is the only country in the European family that is threatened. This truth must always be remembered [...] Turkey, ladies and gentlemen, isn’t any European country. Unfortunately, she’s basically a peculiar regime with an excessive influence of the military establishment, aspiring to play the role of a regional superpower, which holds almost half of Cyprus by the force of arms, which has explicitly expressed and constantly reiterated [her] aspirations against Greece, which has claimed her neighbors, including Greece, to adapt to her own arbitrary demand, which has also found [...] enough support internationally”.

In a similar vein, another member of the same political party – Prokopis Pavlopoulos– had declared some months ago that by pure mischance Turkey happened to be the member of the Council of Europe, in his words: “Turkey is a bad luck in the Council of Europe, and with her tactics she should have been expelled long ago because in terms of human rights violations she is the champion of and accountable to all the international fora”⁹⁷¹.

Allegedly, from 1973 onwards, Turkey was systematically making unilateral claims, but projecting them as bilateral disputes. This unpredictable revisionist neighbor had always been intimidating Greece such was the case with the *casus belli* of the Turkish National Assembly on implementing the Greek right of twelve-miles stemming from the Law of the Sea in the Aegean. Turkey was portrayed as a strange country which was responding just in an opposite manner to whatever presented to her. The approval of the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey was placed as an example by the MP Karamanlis that following this Greek retreat, Turkey replied with the Imia crisis

⁹⁶⁷ For a thorough review of this discussion, See Risse, *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*, 213–24.

⁹⁶⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2399. [Giorgos Rokkos, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁶⁹ As clearly expressed by Koliopoulos and Veremis, the common prevailing view among Greeks about the Turks is not a positive one. Following their words: “the Turks were not only the latest of all arrivals in the region they occupied, but also total strangers to its history and civilization. Moreover, they had not been able, in the centuries when they held sway over their subject peoples, to produce real wealth; they had adopted aspects of the civilization of their subjects and were living as parasites on the wealth produced by them. They were temporarily camping in their lands until the inhabitants were in a position to evict them. Thus the Greeks have always thought of the Turks as usurpers of their sovereignty and temporary squatters, and have never accepted that these latest arrivals from Asia were co-habitants or had even acquired rights to the lands they had conquered by force”. See, John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, 260.

⁹⁷⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2375–76. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁹⁷¹ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (12.03.1999): 5274. [Prokopis Pavlopoulos, ND, the then MP].

as a return. Thus an expectation of a revenge ensued from the Helsinki, probably in relation to Cyprus, was considered to be the inevitable end in the Greek-Turkish relations. Karamanlis pointed out that “in the name of a supposedly modernizing mentality, [Greece] may think that [her] neighbourhood has already become Scandinavia, perhaps unintentionally, [which] can be seriously damaging”⁹⁷².

Supposedly, Greece was in favor of normalization in the Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, and of progression in the Euro-Turkish relations, but unfortunately this Greek desire was far from the harsh reality that “Turkey ha[d] been steadily increasing her pressure and escalating her aggression, multiplying her claims, breaching the International Law and treaties”,⁹⁷³ and had been explicitly posing threat of violence to impede Greece to activate her rights founded on the Law of the Sea, which is the cornerstone of stability and peace in the Aegean.

Reportedly, Greece had done her bit for Turkey’s European course several times in the past. Although Turkey consistently had *failed the class* Greece kept upgrading her circumstances⁹⁷⁴. By harboring hope for better days and with the approval of the Greek leadership, for example, the EU implemented the Customs Union with Turkey. As stated by Karamanlis, “in 1995, [Greece] had made her first major retreat [from her earlier position] in favor of Turkey in the European Union”⁹⁷⁵, and unfortunately, only a few months later the Imia was erupted, which was followed by several other mischances shortly afterwards. Turkey remained to be the disrupter in the region until the European Council’s *genuinely historic decision* in the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. Therefore, the Helsinki Conclusions was regarded as another backward step, which caused Greece to lose her previous position that was consolidated in Luxembourg.

⁹⁷² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2376. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁹⁷³ *ibid.* [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁹⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 2399. [Rokkos, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 2376. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

6.3. Policy-Based Approaches

The European Council's decision, especially on Cyprus and Turkey, was esteemed to be "historic for peace, security, and development of the region"⁹⁷⁶ by the Greek Government. Reportedly, its significance derived from several dynamics such as henceforth there would be a framework whereby clear and set conditions and terms that would initiate Turkey's cooperation and peaceful cohabitation would be implemented and her aggressive tactics vis-à-vis Greece would be eliminated. The European perspective of Turkey was anticipated to lead to cooperation and to be a means to *domesticate* her and in turn, *alleviate the Turkish threat*. In PM Simitis's words: "All Greeks c[ould] feel more confident and safer. Risks [we]re limited"⁹⁷⁷. In addition to a safer neighbor, Greece was assumed to have achieved all the goals it set⁹⁷⁸ about the Aegean and Cyprus that Turkey could no more defer resort to the ICJ for a final adjudication, by accepting the decisions of Helsinki. Contrary to what was voiced by the opposition, according to the PM, Helsinki Conclusions did not assume that when a candidate country made a unilateral claim, it would be shifted into a bilateral dispute that had to be recognized by the relative member country⁹⁷⁹. In the vision of the Greek opposition, however, the Helsinki clarifications of PASOK were *artistic embellishments* that aimed to turn a worse story into a better one.

In the Turkish parliament, on the other hand, before the Summit, it was suggested that confining the vision of the country to one track of foreign policy would drive Turkey into a state of desperation, where EU might manipulate the country in an unfavorable direction, like granting "conditional acceptance", following MP Yılmazyıldız's words: "If there are no other possibilities in your hand, given that you are only condemned to one, such impositions are always probable to encounter"⁹⁸⁰. After the Summit, however, MPs of different political parties expressed their full appreciation and gratitude for the country's membership process, but with their concerns. The MPs Uzunkaya of the FP and Bedük of the DYP, for example, while underlining their approval of the country's European course declared that *unprecedented steps of the*

⁹⁷⁶ *ibid*, 2364. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁹⁷⁷ *ibid*. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁹⁷⁸ *ibid*, 2362. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁹⁷⁹ *ibid*, 2365. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁹⁸⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (07.12.1999): 421. [İlyas Yılmazyıldız, DYP, the then MP]

European route were expected to be taken. In Bedük's expression; "Since we have not yet got any information about the conditions [and] events desired to be dictated to the Republic of Turkey, I, particularly, want to express my hesitation"⁹⁸¹.

Generally speaking, the policy-based debates with regard to Helsinki Conclusions revolved around three common points in the parliaments. The first heated argument was about the political repercussions of the Summit that whether or not it would create a fresh start on Turkish-Greek bilateral relations. The second one was about the concepts of human rights and minority rights, and demystifying their differences. The last was about the countries' changing policy on the Cyprus issue.

6.3.1. Mutual Skepticism Towards Turkey's Euro-Path

Both sides of the Aegean were seemingly concerned about the prospects for the EU-Turkey relations. The Turkish side had doubts about whether the European framework was a correct fit for herself, whereas the Greek doubts were about whether Turkey would make enough efforts in adapting itself into the *acquis communautaire*.

According to most Greek parliamentarians, regardless of their political affiliations, the European route of Turkey should have been supported since it sheltered improvements both in mutual dialogue and in the Europeanization of Turkey. The Greek support for Turkey involved all shades of opinion on its methods, policies, and procedures, though. In a similar vein, in the Turkish parliament, although the majority was in favor of the membership, there was no visible common opinion on how to conduct the process.

For the PM of Greece, having strict and clear rules throughout the accession partnership –chart of obligations and rights– was a very important achievement⁹⁸². Besides, the process was to be accompanied by the European way of political dialogue, which meant continuous political negotiations at regular intervals to establish a common political line and policy that was accepted by all parties⁹⁸³. Reportedly, one of the central points of the Summit was to create a framework to develop and facilitate

⁹⁸¹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (10.12.1999): 155. [Bedük, DYP, the then MP].

⁹⁸² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2363. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁹⁸³ *ibid*, 2364. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

peaceful relations with Turkey that in turn would trigger friendship and cooperation and thereby regulate stability and security in the region⁹⁸⁴.

This framework, however, did not exist, according to MP Karamanlis⁹⁸⁵. Turkey's Western steps of the Cold War period also reformulated as European steps; and as a result, the Helsinki Presidential Conclusions upgraded the Turkish-EU relations as well as her prestige and international position. The main point behind the critics over upgrading Turkey's position in the international arena stemmed from both the confusion over the government's conflicting accounts of acts and statements⁹⁸⁶ and the concerns about losing the country's veto power;⁹⁸⁷ in other words, Turkey, allegedly, won promotion without being imposed any sanctions as a deterrent force against her brutality and bare infringements.

Greek parliamentarians, in general, were of the opinion that Greece 'should have preserved her veto against Turkey's EU candidacy'⁹⁸⁸ because for many years it had been the 'only effective weapon against Turkey'⁹⁸⁹ and unfortunately the Turkish casus belli was still valid. Purportedly, without the approval of the House, the country's foreign policy on the national issues was shifted significantly, as was the PM himself, who was accused of making contradictions, in time. By the Helsinki Decisions, 'the temple of democracy'⁹⁹⁰ allegedly witnessed "a blow to the parliamentary system of the country, but also to the democratic institutions. And especially the biggest blow to the country's Parliament"⁹⁹¹.

⁹⁸⁴ *ibid*, 2380. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

⁹⁸⁵ *ibid*, 2377. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁹⁸⁶ In his speech Karamanlis stated that "during the elections of 1996 Simitis declared that his goal was the isolation of Turkey" whereas after the elections he devoted pretty much time to support Turkey. Similarly, Nikolaos Konstantopoulos of the SYN argued that the PASOK government shifted from traditionally oriented foreign policy stance with regard to the Greek-Turkish relations because of external pressures on Greece. In his opinion, it was not a strategic orientation of the government as declared by the PM, but instead the Helsinki Conclusions were a clear result of a strong political pressure. Respectively see, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2375 and 2388–89.

⁹⁸⁷ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2377 [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP]; Similar concerns were observable also in the Turkish parliament, but with regard to the usage of vetoes as a political leverage. Following MP Necati Çetinkaya of the DYP party: "If Southern Cyprus enters [to EU] alone an alliance vote will be needed when the door is opened also for our full membership negotiations; Because if there is no alliance in the European Union, you cannot enter the European Union. Yesterday there was a Greek veto, only one vote. Now there are two votes against us and you face two vetoes". See, *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (22.12.1999): 397.

⁹⁸⁸ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2377. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁹⁸⁹ *ibid*, 2371. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁹⁰ *ibid*, 2369. [Dimitrios Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁹¹ *ibid*, 2370. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

The main opposition party leader –Konstantinos Karamanlis– voiced his reservations about the prospective acts of Turkey over her alleged disputes. In this regard, if Turkey was to present her list of claims in the future and invite Greece for a dialogue to resolve them; Greece would have been stuck between accepting and rejecting this call for dialogue. If Greece was to accept the dialogue, then the unilateral illegal Turkish disputes would have been turned into bilateral legal ones, and in turn would be opened to negotiations, which was a situation that Greece had long been refraining from as a national policy. On the other hand, if Greece rejected the dialogue, then it would be internationally exposed as a *non-respondent*, which would drive Greece into a corner⁹⁹².

Purportedly, members of the opposition –particularly of the DIKKI– had encouraged the government to start talks with Turkey and to reach a settlement over continental shelf through The Hague, but it was before the Helsinki Summit, where all illegal Turkish claims were legalized as bilateral disputes⁹⁹³. Apart from their objection to lifting the country's veto, the Greek politicians endorsed Turkey's Europeanization⁹⁹⁴. Following MP Karamanlis's statement⁹⁹⁵:

[GR] “We have repeatedly stressed that we're ready to support the European orientation of Turkey, because for sure a European Turkey or if you allow me the term –a Europeanized Turkey– can't behave like an international troublemaker, because for sure all Greeks we seek cooperation and friendship with all our neighbors. Since all Greeks want our country to be a factor of peace and stability in this troubled corner of the world”.

In the Turkish parliament, the positive atmosphere provided by the Summit revealed high expectations for achieving a permanent peace in bilateral relations through the EU development. The PM⁹⁹⁶ and the members of the coalition (the Democratic Left Party, the Motherland Party, and the Nationalist Movement Party) expressed their optimism and confidence in rapprochement. The contentment emanated from the Greek backing for Turkey's Euro-route was underlined;⁹⁹⁷ stressing the remarkable coincidence (of interest and support for accomplishing the Copenhagen and Maastricht

⁹⁹² *ibid*, 2378. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁹⁹³ *ibid*, 2369. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

⁹⁹⁴ [See, parliament speech of Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM] *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (05.03.1999): 5054; [See, also the Parliament speech of Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP] *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2393.

⁹⁹⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2375. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

⁹⁹⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (22.12.1999): 390. [Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

⁹⁹⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (28.12.1999): 658. [Oktay Vural, MHP, the then MP].

criteria) between the inner dynamics and outer circles of the country⁹⁹⁸. Moreover, there would also be an accession strategy related to the reforms for membership process and Turkey –as a candidate like the others– would receive incentives and benefit from community programmes, and could attend sessions that were conducted between the EU and the other candidates⁹⁹⁹. Although they were few there were also sceptic dissident voices in the parliament. MP Kutan of the FP, for example, bearing the belief that the democratic foundations of the country were not strong enough to comply with those criteria, highlighted the political mood that had long been governing the citizens. In his opinion, the Muslim population (that was the majority) had been downgraded and repressed by the Western-oriented groups in the country, and Turkey finally would practice democratic developments due to its engagements for the European candidacy. Paradoxically, while he was criticizing the Christian mentality which allegedly ruled the country, he expected democracy from the EU, whose member states also held Christianity¹⁰⁰⁰. In his striking style¹⁰⁰¹:

[TR] “We're breathing an orthodox political air, wherein the representatives of totalitarian culture consider that democracy is too much for the public. Politics, trade, economy, education, almost everything is being shaped by this orthodox mentality and mindset”.

As was noted by the MP, his ‘orthodox mentality’, which also ‘sacrificed science for attire’, would emerge from the darkness and become clearly visible by 2004 when the truth about the Helsinki Summit would reveal itself. Contrary to what was broadcast by the media, the reality was that Greece was encouraged by the EU's high level of support for both the Aegean and the Cyprus disputes¹⁰⁰².

6.3.2. Misconceptions About Human Rights and Minority Rights

The second common argument of both parties was about the basic rights and freedoms in Turkey. From the Greek point of view, the issue was purely linked with human rights in the country, whereas for the Turkish parliamentarians it was limited to the minority rights. According to the European perspective, either because of the Turkish authorities’ ignorance or of the country’s national unreadiness, Turkey missed most of the reforms on civil and political fundamental rights, such as the right to life or freedom

⁹⁹⁸ *ibid*, 645. [Başesgioğlu, ANAP, the then MP].

⁹⁹⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 368–69. [Bahçeli, MHP, the then Deputy PM].

¹⁰⁰⁰ *ibid*, 337. [Kutan, FP, the then MP].

¹⁰⁰¹ *ibid*, 338. [Kutan, FP, the then MP].

¹⁰⁰² *ibid*. [Kutan, FP, the then MP].

of expression. The European perspective, which also supposedly left Turkey languishing ineligible for the EU candidacy, was closely embraced by Greece; not only because she was a member of the Union but also because she believed that the PKK/Apo case was a recent example for an outcome of misconduct against the Kurds in Turkey.

And quite the contrary, Turkey believed that her minority groups and their rights were clearly defined in and confined to the Treaty of Lausanne, thus since her establishment there had been no deliberate abuse of right in the country. There were, however, the ambivalent climate of opinions between the FP members and the rest of the parliamentarians regarding human rights violations in Turkey. According to Asiltürk¹⁰⁰³ and Kutan¹⁰⁰⁴ of the FP, for example, the religious people of Turkey did not have the right to freedom of religion and worship. Additionally, there was also perceived pressure over these subjects that they tended to abstain from any state-based potentials and opportunities which were actually available to *soft-religious* people (supposedly the ones who did not follow Islam strictly) of the country.

There was only one political party –the Virtue Party– at the time in the Turkish Parliament which had the same thoughts as the Greek parliamentarians on Turkey’s regular infringements of liberties and human rights, but with an important distinction. The FP MPs maintained that flagrant violations were against the citizens with religious sensitivities, whereas the Greek MPs asserted that violations of human rights were against the citizens with the Kurdish ethnies. MP Recai Kutan’s below excerpt unfolds his striking remarks about the gap between the Turkish establishment and the religious Turks, throughout the country’s Westernization process¹⁰⁰⁵:

[TR] “Dear deputies, Turkey has entered into a new period with the Helsinki Summit, December 10th. Our Westernization adventure, which started with the 1839 Tanzimat Edict [the Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif], reached a new point after 160 years. We paid a lot for this cause, and we are still paying. There were times that we denied our history; broke our ties with our past; excluded our own values, immaculate culture and civilization; rejected [our] heritage for the sake of this love. [T]here were times that we swore at [our] history for the successor’s gratification. [T]here were

¹⁰⁰³ MP Oğuzhan Asiltürk of the Virtue Party was the first who debated human rights in the country. Following his words: “What do we expect from entering the EU? ... Turkey will obtain human rights. Turkey will have freedoms like West, there will be a democracy”. See, *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 224–25.

¹⁰⁰⁴ See, MP Recai Kutan’s expressions such as: “Now, everyone, the West-oriented ones, and Westerners are through a character test, that whether or not they want a contemporary civilization. What do they understand from democracy, what do they understand from human rights, what do they understand from freedoms; we will live through and see it”. *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 337.

¹⁰⁰⁵ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 337. [Kutan, FP, the then MP].

times that the great religion, which is the life source, of this nation [sic.], we have uttered the greatest slander of history about the believers of this religion by saying that ‘they are the obstacles to Westernization, they are the reasons for our backwardness’. [O]ne hundred sixty years we punched the darkness, there were times that we made revolutions, executions, and impositions for Westernization”.

As regards the European perception of human rights issues in Turkey, MP Müjdat Kayayerli of the coalition government made the point that there was no single similarity between so-called infringements and fight against terrorism. In this vein, Kayayerli laid stress on the contradicting conduct of the Union towards Greece and Turkey that the first was not even decried as a terrorist country, let alone accused of supporting PKK and hiding its ringleader Öcalan, and the second, conversely, being continually accused of violating human rights while performing operations against the PKK terrorist organization¹⁰⁰⁶. Being left alone, Turkey was constrained to “make agreements with terrorist countries”¹⁰⁰⁷ in terms of getting acceptance for its EU candidacy.

From the very beginning, reportedly, the EU did not portray a reliable and fair attitude towards Turkey, that in turn, the Turkish-EU relations were reduced to human rights dimensions. Although stipulating unequal demanding conditions on Turkey’s candidacy, the Union was truly not a union with each of its members experiencing different socio-political and economic difficulties. If the Union was fair in its relations with Turkey, then it would have perceived that “Turkey was the far most experienced country among its members in living with foreign nations”¹⁰⁰⁸. Moreover, there were anti-Turkey groups campaigning for blocking the EU funds allocated to Turkey, and suspending Turkey’s EU candidacy process and that in turn could annihilate her membership perspective. As was stated by PM Ecevit, “those who say that Turkey’s European Union candidacy [wa]s an illusion” believed that “Turkey w[ould] not fulfill the conditions for full membership and w[ould] not ease her economy in the near future, as well”¹⁰⁰⁹.

In a similar fashion, in the Greek parliament, MP Karamanlis claimed that apart from some European countries, surprisingly some decision-making centers in Turkey were also not looking for full membership in the EU. Since “many European countries

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (22.12.1999): 383–84. [Kayayerli, MHP, the then MP].

¹⁰⁰⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (14.12.1999): 222. [Eser, MHP, the then MP].

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (22.12.1999): 384. [Kayayerli, MHP, the then MP].

¹⁰⁰⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (28.12.1999): 687. [Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

dislike[d] the idea of a migratory wave from Turkey of the sixty million” at the time and probably ‘a hundred’ in the future, ‘the full membership of Turkey’ was allegedly not accommodated by the EU members at all¹⁰¹⁰. In addition to conspicuous foresight of the Greek center-right-wingers about Turkey’s EU journey, the idea that Turkey was not really supported for the membership but her limited integration in the EU institutions was claimed also by the far-leftists such as the MPs of the KKE. Accordingly, with the proclamation of Turkey as a candidate country in the Helsinki Summit, it was intended to remove the barriers between some European countries like Germany, Italy, France, Britain, and their interests, in this sense, Turkey was not only “a relatively virgin territory for the European funds”,¹⁰¹¹ but also for the European entrepreneurs and investors, who supposedly planned to be accompanied by the Greek businesses, as well¹⁰¹². Furthermore, a strategic point was not to be missed that Turkey’s candidacy would facilitate the intervention of the EU to the Caucasus and its fossil energy sources on the one hand and of the USA to Europe on the other. Therefore, these circles were not interested in human rights, “neither the Turkish people [in Turkey] nor the peace and security in Europe”¹⁰¹³.

6.3.3. Loss of Political Ground in the Cyprus Question

The proponents of the Helsinki Summit, who thought that it was a fruitful outcome for both the bilateral Turkish-Greek and the trilateral Greek-Cypriot-Turkish relationships, mainly argued that being released from the obligation to reach mutual solution in Cyprus would accelerate the accession negotiations and the Europeanization of Turkey and Cyprus. Since the statuses of Greece and Turkey were not equal to each other, given that the first had been a member of the EU since 1981 whereas the latter had just found eligible for candidacy, their opinions on the Conclusions were differentiated basically on what they achieved in Cyprus.

¹⁰¹⁰ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2376. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

¹⁰¹¹ *ibid*, 2385. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

¹⁰¹² In a similar fashion, it was argued also in Turkey, that the collapse of the bipolar system downgraded Turkey’s position (as being the militarily/strategically important asset of the Cold War period) in the view of Europe. However, following the 1980s Turkey started to become an open market that by “the 1990s, the share of EU countries in Turkey’s foreign trade was around 50 %”. See, Sönmezoglu, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 514.

¹⁰¹³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2385. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

For the Greek government, although they still had to be cautious because the issue was pending, Cyprus's gain for 'unimpeded accession'¹⁰¹⁴ to the EU, without 'having any preconditions, like a settlement'¹⁰¹⁵, in other words, being 'irrespective of a political solution'¹⁰¹⁶, was a *great* achievement. The only obstruction in receiving their full membership was fulfilling the accession negotiations.

The Turkish government, on the other hand, asserted that following the Summit, the EU left its ongoing policy of imposing a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus dispute, which was used to be a necessary precondition for Turkey's EU-candidacy¹⁰¹⁷. However, this development should not have been interpreted as tolerating the then-present situation in the island or practices of the 'Greek-Cypriot Administration', following the below excerpts of the MPs from the coalition government, respectively, Tayyibe Gülek of the DSP, Murat Başesgioğlu of the ANAP, and Oktay Vural of the MHP:

[TR] "We see that the statements, regarding the candidacy of the South Cyprus Greek Administration, in the Helsinki Decision, created sensitivity. At this point, I want to state that our political and legal objection to the application of the South Cyprus Greek Administration to the EU has continued, just as before, and will continue"¹⁰¹⁸.

[TR] "In Helsinki, our country's candidacy status was registered. This is, at the same time, the registration of [the fact that] Europe without Turkey is not possible and that Turkey is a leading country in her region. Turkey, which did not accept any preconditions for the candidacy status, did not also make any concessions of her principles, regarding the Cyprus and Aegean issues"¹⁰¹⁹.

[TR] "Cyprus is our national issue; the cause of the Cypriot-Turks is a matter of dignity also for us"¹⁰²⁰.

The socio-political and military bonds between Turkey and 'TRNC', as were assumed, would not be affected by this new situation on the island, on account of security reasons. Parallel to this argument, in the Greek parliament, especially the opposition party members asserted that Turkey was being supported by the USA and Clinton's last state visit to Turkey¹⁰²¹ was obviously the recent evidence that revealed an

¹⁰¹⁴ *ibid*, 2395. [Apostolos-Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

¹⁰¹⁵ *ibid*, 2363. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

¹⁰¹⁶ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (21.12.1999): 2766. [Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

¹⁰¹⁷ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 369. [Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP, the coalition partner of the 57th government of Turkey, the then Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister].

¹⁰¹⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (22.12.1999): 390. [Tayyibe Gülek, DSP, the then MP].

¹⁰¹⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (28.12.1999): 644. [Murat Başesgioğlu, ANAP, the then MP].

¹⁰²⁰ *ibid*, 658. [Oktay Vural, MHP, the then MP].

¹⁰²¹ President Clinton's endorsement of Turkey's EU perspective and his visits to Turkey and Greece, the efficacy of this US initiative on the abolishment of the Greek veto over Turkey's candidacy were

unforeseen step of re-starting negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. According to the MP Orestis Kolozof, it was another US ‘pursuit of imperialism that impose Turkey's entry into the European Union’, without respecting the progress on the Cyprus issue,¹⁰²² and to Dimitrios Tsovolas, although no talks between Rauf Denктаş and Glafcos Clerides were on the agenda at that time, ‘under the pressure of the US’ the government decided both to go back to the negotiation table and ‘to lift the Greek veto against Turkey to join the European Union’¹⁰²³. In a similar vein, another statement from the Turkish Parliament was voiced by the MP Aydın Tümen of the DSP. In his words, President Clinton had taken ‘very positive and constructive steps’ towards Turkey, by ‘for the first time’, ‘clearly’, expressing that “it is not possible to turn back to the situation before 1974 in Cyprus” and declared that ‘the USA is close to the Turkish thesis’¹⁰²⁴.

Leaving the criticisms of the opponents aside, the Greek FM Papandreou described his glowing prospects for Cyprus EU accession and the background reason. The point was about the persuasion of four member countries –France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands– that previously had made ‘a joint declaration’ wherein they stipulated the settlement of the political issues before the EU accession, as a prerequisite. Reportedly, Greece explained that if this condition was to be applied to Cyprus, then she ‘would be penalized, for the second time, for the Turkish occupation on her northern part’. Thus Greece allegedly ‘strived to abolish the implementation of this statement’ in order to save Cyprus from not becoming a member because ‘someone else [wa]s in possession of [her] territory’¹⁰²⁵. In other words, Greece secured Cyprus both in means of militarily and, by the Helsinki Conclusions, politically against Turkey and the EU.

In general sense, the Greek government had the belief that the Greek-Turkish relations would no more be affected by the Cyprus issue, but seemingly, it was not the case for the Turkish government. The MPs of the coalition partners (DSP, MHP, and ANAP)

discussed also by Turkish scholars. See, for example, Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 519; For Clinton’s sentiments and opinions about these state visits, See, Clinton, *My Life*, 809–10.

¹⁰²² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 4th Session, 29th Sitting, (17.11.1999): 1427, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/SYN-171199.pdf>. [23.09.2018]. [Orestis Kolozof, KKE, the then MP].

¹⁰²³ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2368. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

¹⁰²⁴ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (28.12.1999): 665. [Aydın Tümen, DSP, the then MP].

¹⁰²⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2396. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

in Turkey, avowed their full support for TRNC whether or not she became an EU member. It was not a matter that had been resolved, on the contrary, TRNC was just at the beginning of her political life in the international arena. Reportedly, TRNC would finally acquire “the political identity and personality that she ha[d] longed for and deserved for many years, within the international community of nations”, which meant that “the military achievement in 1974 was crowned by a political triumph under again the Ecevit rule”¹⁰²⁶. In similar fashion, FM Cem maintained that by the framework of the UN’s final decision it had been clearly accepted that “without permission from TRNC the United Nations Peacekeeping Force could not settle in the north of the island”¹⁰²⁷. In fact, it was believed that there was no problem that would not be solved in Cyprus,¹⁰²⁸ but if settlement of the Cyprus dispute was not to be succeeded and even so Southern Cyprus became a member of the EU, then there would be two options probable; either ‘TRNC would also become a member’¹⁰²⁹, or ‘unite with Turkey’¹⁰³⁰. As was asserted by PM Ecevit, reaching “a solution in Cyprus had a very simple truth, not to ignore the reality that there [we]re two separate independent states in Cyprus”¹⁰³¹.

In the Greek Parliament in parallel to this statement of the Turkish PM, the MP Konstantinos Karamanlis of the ND briefly portrayed the rising concerns of the Greek politicians about the irrepressible Turkish threat, despite the Helsinki Conclusions¹⁰³²:

¹⁰²⁶ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (19.12.1999): 378. [Ertuğrul Kumcuoğlu, DSP, the then MP].

¹⁰²⁷ *ibid*, 407 [İsmail Cem, DSP, the then FM]; This argument was raised by the MP Charalambos Angourakis of the KKE in the Greek Parliament. Following his words: “In conclusion, I’d like to emphasize with regard to the Helsinki, of course, it’s a great ‘success’. I just submit the well-known statement of the Cypriot Government, for the Minutes, which denounces the fact that the UN Security Council has now also placed Turkey so that she [will] ha[ve] a say for the UN troops in Cyprus and thereby promotes the partition of Cyprus. Thank you”. See, *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 4th Session, 57th Sitting (20.12.1999), <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES991220.txt> [25.09.2018]. There is no page information available.

¹⁰²⁸ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (23.12.1999): 493. [Turhan Tayan, ANAP, the then MP].

¹⁰²⁹ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (22.12.1999): 383. [Müjdat Kayayerli, MHP, the then MP].

¹⁰³⁰ *Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, (28.12.1999): 665. [Aydın Tümen, DSP, the then MP].

¹⁰³¹ *ibid*, 686. [Bülent Ecevit, DSP, the then PM].

¹⁰³² *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, (15.12.1999): 2378. [Konstantinos Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

[GR] “Ladies and gentlemen, even before the ink dried in Helsinki, Turkey began to reiterate her extreme theses; she even hardened them more. We’ve all heard the Turkish Prime Minister’s answer, which states that ‘there is no doubt that there are two states in Cyprus’. We’ve heard it and we should not underestimate the assurance it sent to the occupied [territories]: ‘The special relationship and the ties between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will continue to develop in tandem with the policy pursued by the European Union on Cyprus’”.

The given situation was interpreted as “the Cyprus issue [wa]s now downgraded and led to a confederation”¹⁰³³ by the opponents. According to the MP Alexandra Papariga of the KKE and Dimitrios Sioufas of the ND, Cyprus was downgraded by the UN in two aspects. Firstly, “the Cyprus question was led to the final burial at the Helsinki Summit. The UN decisions, on a just and viable solution to the Cyprus question, have been thrown in the waste basket”¹⁰³⁴. Thus the Cyprus question, although once it was considered an international issue of invasion and occupation, downgraded to a local problem, which had to be settled between the two parties, in the view of the EU. Secondly, the decision taken yesterday would have serious impact on the Cyprus because ‘a trap of annexation’ was set by the UN decisions ‘that recognize[d] Attila’ and ‘the rule of Denktash’¹⁰³⁵. Allegedly, it was a paradoxical and weird situation, wherein ‘a de facto partition or a confederation seemed an inescapable conclusion’ since “two candidate countries as new members, one with accession status, the other with candidate status, are on the road to their participation in Europe, but one with an occupying army of the other on its territory”¹⁰³⁶.

6.4. Concluding Remarks

One can easily distinguish the difference between Turkey’s and Greece’s approaches to their international alliances in the previous cases of this study. Turkey was a member of NATO while Greece was both a member of NATO and the EU. Although they had unequal and strained relations with the EU due to Turkey’s circuitous EU route, their membership in NATO seemed to be stable and functional.

In the Greek parliament, however, NATO was referred to be a worthless organization that provided support for Turkey in all circumstances. Regarding the Kurdish issue,

¹⁰³³ *ibid*, 2373. [Dimitrios Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

¹⁰³⁴ *ibid*, 2385. [Alexandra Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

¹⁰³⁵ *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament*, 9th Term, 4th Session, 55th Sitting (18.12.1999): 2594, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/SYN-181299.pdf>. [25.09.2018]. [Dimitrios Sioufas, ND, the then MP].

¹⁰³⁶ [Nikolaos Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP] *Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament* (15.12.1999), 2393.

for example, NATO's decisions allegedly served to demean the organization in the eyes of the international public that it evaded getting involved in the Kurdish issue but supported and sustained their Balkanic equivalents, Bosnians in Serbia; while the first case was named as a terrorist organization, the second named as the liberation army. Thus heavy criticism was directed to NATO for conducting controversial policies and irresponsible attitude and keeping low-profile in the Imia/Kardak crisis and the capture of Öcalan.

On the other hand, in the Turkish parliament, the EU was placed at the target of criticism arrows for its hypocrisy and duplicity that was surfaced lastly at the Luxembourg European Council. The union was not regarded as a geographical entity, but instead it was a socio-political entity that was home for scientific and economic progression. Turkey clung to the belief that the country would become a full member of the EU, despite the Luxembourg Summit. Since Turkey was deprived of the financial aid and relevant funds that should have accompanied the Customs Union due to the Greek veto, their bilateral relations and the country's European course left to a series of obstructions and tensions. Despite the earthquakes of Kocaeli and Athens, which provided an opportunity for the countries to restore their relations, it was not easy to restore a friendly relationship after such hostile developments. Therefore, when the Helsinki Summit appeared to be regarded as a political triumph by the Greek government, especially by those who held the opinion that Turkey's membership process would lead to a Europeanized Turkey, the Turkish side began to question how would the conclusions of Helsinki benefit the country.

Both sides' opposition parties believed that there could not be a mutual achievement for the reason that the large basket of their past was full of serious confrontation or win-lose situation.

Thus the Helsinki Summit, surprisingly, did not raise the positive attention and response for most parliamentarians. When all issues were considered, it can be concluded that the probable future condition of Cyprus was the one that drew the most attention. Some believed that the Helsinki Summit Conclusions would be devastating for their Cyprus ideal while others thought that it was output from their own government's one-sided reconciliatory steps which meant making concessions in Cyprus.

7. CONCLUSION

This dissertation primarily argued that otherness in the identity formation of Turkey and Greece exerted an important impact on the bilateral relations of the two countries and that although identities are quite resistant to change, groundbreaking developments and events can have a determining influence on identities by changing notions of otherness. The thesis focused on the time period between the 1996 Kardak/Imia crisis and Helsinki Summit of 1999. The basic question that initiated this research was how could two countries that came to the brink of war over an islet on the Aegean transform their relationship towards cooperation within the framework of a couple of years? How did Greece's approach towards Turkey change?

While Greece lifted its veto over Turkey's candidacy, Turkey was declared as a candidate to join the EU in the Helsinki Summit. In the conclusions of the Helsinki Summit it was stated that candidate countries should resolve bilateral disputes among each other and with the EU Member States before their membership to the EU. 2004 was given as a milestone year and the parties were encouraged to submit their disputes to the International Court of Justice if they could not resolve them by that time. The conclusions also included reference to the Cyprus dispute and stated that the EU Member States supported a UN-based solution to the division of the island. However, reunification of the island would not be a precondition for its membership to the EU. The Turkish government of the time had some afterthoughts about these two provisions in the Helsinki Council conclusions. However they accepted the offer of candidacy anyway which could be understood as an inclination to engage in dialogue with Greece over bilateral disputes and also work for the reunification of Cyprus. Hence the allure of candidacy to the EU also had an impact on bilateral relations with Greece.

The thesis aimed to explore the identity perceptions and notions of otherness at the political level in Greece and Turkey by studying the speeches made by parliamentarians in both legislative organs of the two countries. The aim was to see how these events were perceived and narrated by the MPs and whether any changes in

notions of otherness were discernible. A qualitative discourse analysis was applied. Parliamentary debates in the Greek Parliament were translated by the author from its original Greek version to English and parliamentary debates in the Turkish Grand National Assembly were also translated by the author from Turkish to English in order to lay the basis for a comparative approach.

The thesis approached the issue of identity and otherness from a social constructivist perspective on the premise that identity conceptions are the significant factors that make an impact on states' approaches to policies and international issues. Identities are not exogenously given but socially constructed and are prior to interests as no *self* can make decisions without knowing itself at first. Accordingly, identities determine and form interests, and in turn attitudes, behaviors, and policies, in other words, each *self* encounters an *other* without having a pre-existing set of preferences or ideas. These perceptions and ideas are constructed as a result of interactive processes and are deeply embedded in notions of national identity. The constructivist view underscores the discursive power of ideas, knowledge, language, and culture in comprehending and interpreting foreign relations.

For the purpose of keeping the focus on identifying the continuities and changes of the Turkish and Greek identities the thesis attempted to find answers for the following research questions: 'How is the *self-other* nexus defined in Turkish and Greek identity?', 'What are the discourses employed by the parties during the Kardak/Imia crisis, the capture of Öcalan and the Helsinki Summit?', 'Is it possible to discern a change or continuity in identity perceptions in both parties?', 'What are the causes of change and continuity in identity perception if any?'.

Particularly three important milestones were selected to be studied: Kardak/Imia crisis, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, and the 1999 Helsinki Summit. Parliamentary debates have been analyzed concerning the discourses employed on the *self-other* nexus. Studying these selected cases reflects a cross-section of Turkish-Greek relations loaded with distinguishable identity shifts where parties within a very short period of time portray their potentials of being on the edge of war, conflict, and peace, respectively. By focusing exclusively on the political discourse held in the parliamentary debates and speeches, this dissertation sought to make an original contribution to the Turkish-Greek studies literature on understanding their perception of the *self-other* nexus and construction of national identities.

The thesis analyzed parliamentary debates with respect to three distinct events, i.e. Kardak/Imia crisis, capture of Öcalan and Helsinki Summit. All three events had important repercussions on Turkish-Greek relations and corresponded to milestones in the approach of the two countries towards each other. They were also related with both countries' ideas about the West and their vocation vis-à-vis Europe. These three cases were particularly relevant for the study of the interlinkages between *self-other* notions and identity-interest connections. The parliamentary debates were subjected to a discourse analysis in order to discern how the approach to the other country was narrated and which concepts were used such as 'aggressor', 'neighbour', 'rival', 'friend', 'ill-intentioned,' etc. in order to evaluate each other's actions and motives.

As a result of the analyses in this thesis, the following conclusions were arrived at by the author: firstly, it was found that policies employed by both Greece and Turkey during the three cases were closely related with identity perceptions. Members of Parliament referred to perceptions of *self* and *other* in arguing their cases regarding particular policy preferences. The way MPs in both Parliaments referred to the other country displayed a mirroring effect. For example, both countries viewed themselves as 'alone' in the system of international relations without any support from the West or Europe, while they evaluated the other country as being supported or tolerated by the West and/or Europe. A victimization could be discerned in notions of *self* while each of the countries referred to their proud, misunderstood and painful *self* conceptions.

Secondly, the thesis arrived at the conclusion that notions of *self* and *other* were deeply embedded in the political discourses of political actors in Greece and Turkey and formed a backdrop of policies towards each other. As argued by social constructivist approach, the notions of *self* were very much influenced and intersubjectively constructed with notions of *other*. In this context, while Greek national identity was based on a concept of other which was symbolized in Turkishness, 'suffering under the Ottoman yoke' during the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire laid the basis for a search for independence. The dichotomy between Christianity and Islam became a clear marker of identity against the Ottomans and strengthened the role of the Church in the formation of the national state. The Greek attempt to occupy western Anatolia was rebuffed by the Turks during the War of Independence, which was described as the 'Asia Minor Catastrophy' by the Greeks. Hence a chapter of national pride and

heroism which was the basis of the Turkish national state was evaluated by the Greeks as a sad event that always reminded them of the loss of Asia minor.

Following the Second World War, both countries benefited from the Marshall aid and became members of NATO while maintaining close relations with the USA and the transatlantic community of states. During the Cold War the bilateral disputes between the parties could not be resolved though the two countries were in the same bloc. The Cyprus conflict was an instance when they were at opposing sides, one supporting the Turkish cypriots while the other was supporting Greek Cypriots and the idea of Enosis. Being in the same Alliance did not amount to a close relationship between the two countries. However it helped to contain the bilateral disputes from turning into an all-out war between the countries. With the ending of the Cold War, the disciplinal effect of the bipolar world order was gone and the 1996 Kardak/Imia crisis could be a manifestation of this change. Both countries felt the need to reclaim their sovereignty and defy each other's claims about territory over a seemingly insignificant piece of land on the Aegean. Hence material factors such as alliances did not fundamentally change the nature of identity perceptions and *self-other* notions in the relations between Greece and Turkey.

Thirdly, the thesis explored the identity perceptions as reflected in parliamentary debates in Greece and Turkey and asked the question whether there was a significant change from the Kardak/Imia crisis to the Helsinki Summit when Greece lifted its veto over Turkey's candidacy to the EU. From a social constructivist viewpoint, it was the assumption of the thesis that any significant reversal in policy orientation should be accompanied by a shift in identity and in the case of Turkish-Greek relations by a shift in the notion of *otherness* vis-à-vis each other. Identity shifts do not take place overnight. However, an ongoing process of contestations of identity in the public sphere and by opinion leaders, intellectuals, civil society and politicians may erode certain aspects of identity and lead to the emergence of alternative approaches. However it would take a significant event that would make this shift apparent and emerge out into the open in the public sphere. For example, the *otherness* inherent in German-French identity conceptions which were apparent after the Second World War were challenged with the idea of a Coal and Steel Community that would be based on supranational integration between the countries. Although the formation of this Community did not change identity conceptions overnight it created an environment

which would provide alternative notions of identity and challenge established notions of *otherness*.

In the case of Turkey-EU relations the capture of Öcalan proved to be a turning point that changed the conditions for the traditional identity narrative and provided an opportunity for the Greek political class to voice and question alternative notions of otherness vis-à-vis Turkey. The events surrounding the capture of Öcalan when he was discovered carrying a Greek Cypriot passport in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya created a crisis for the Greek government of the time leading to the resignation of the hawkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodoros Pangalos. Underneath this watershed moment of shame for the Greek government was an identity notion based on contestation and conflict where the other was defined in relation to Turkey. The failure of this plot by the Greek government provided an opportunity for the emergence and acceptance of alternative identity conceptions. Hence the reversal of the policy towards Turkey in the Helsinki Summit can be understood as a consequence of this shift in identity construction. The parliamentary debates studied in this thesis provided an insight into the narrative of this identity construction and the rationalisation by way of a reversal of identity of a changed approach towards Turkey.

In the case of Turkey, the identity perception towards Greece may contain many *others*, not only Greece. Especially in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis which has gained the upper hand in the political structure, the West in general, Armenians, Jews, Kurds can also be constructed as the *others* of an 'ideal' Turkish identity. The significance of Greece as the other may be more apparent and significant than the other *others* owing to the Byzantine past of Asia minor which is not adopted as source of identity but mostly as a counter-narrative, and the problems in the foreign policy sphere associated with delimitation of territorial waters in the Aegean, Cyprus question, minorities, etc. Regarding the progression of affairs from Kardak/Imia crisis to the proclamation of EU candidacy at the Helsinki Summit, the rapprochement with Greece was quite important. Turkey's acceptance of candidacy status came with strings attached. Other than the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria, one of them concerned the resolution of bilateral disputes with neighboring countries in this case with Greece and the other being resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Accepting these two 'extra' conditions can be evaluated as a new understanding and shift in identity perception vis-à-vis Greece. Rather than a foe, Greece would now be a partner for Turkey. The

start of exploratory talks with a view to resolving the disputes over the Aegean, also required a willingness to compromise and negotiate based on mutual trust and acceptance. Taking into account the close relations between Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey İsmail Cem and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Andreas Papandreu and the civil society rapprochement following the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake, it could be concluded that alternative conceptions of identity vis-à-vis Greece were already becoming discernible. However, the clear promise of EU membership by way of candidacy proved to be a watershed which justified and rationalized a change in the approach to Turkey and a rethinking of identity notions vis-à-vis the other.

The thesis aimed to approach a particular phase in Turkish-Greek relations from 1996 to 1999. Many events took place in Turkish-Greek relations since then. The major contribution of the thesis is to introduce into the literature a comparative study of Turkish and Greek notions of *otherness* by way of deciphering parliamentary debates in both Parliaments. Especially the study of parliamentary speeches in the Greek Parliament in the original language and direct reference to texts in Greek can be seen as a strength of the thesis, due to the lack of direct references to Greek texts in the literature in Turkey. Regarding recommendations for further study, parliamentary debates after the Helsinki Summit can be studied. While the change in identity perceptions were closely linked with the EU candidacy for Turkey, the failure of the accession process and Turkey's current estrangement from the EU can also be evaluated in terms of impact on identity perceptions and Turkish-Greek relations. Finally, in addition to parliamentary debates, separate studies can be conducted surveying the media coverage of events in Turkey and Greece. While a study of parliamentary debates provided us with an account of identity construction and narratives of *otherness*, a study of conventional as well as social media could provide us with an insight into process of public opinion formation and mass perceptions of identity and otherness.

At the time of defending the thesis, a severe escalation of tensions between Greece and Turkey became apparent once more. The issue revolved around the delimitation of territorial waters on the Aegean and hydrocarbon explorations in Eastern Mediterranean. While Greek government accused Turkey of violating international law and infringing on the sovereign rights of Greece and Cyprus, Turkey accused the other party of disrespecting its own legitimate rights in its territorial waters. The

tension escalated to a dangerous point when warships collided and Turkish and Greek naval vessels shadowed each other in the contested waters. The dangerous situation which is being experienced at the moment attests to the fact that the normalisation that was experienced prior to and during the Helsinki European Council could not be sustained and failure of Turkey's EU membership process also triggered a deterioration in bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. The language used by leaders on both sides and the re-emergence of the *othering* discourse shows us that without a meaningful shift in identity perceptions any attempt to forge friendly relations between the parties cannot be sustainable. More research on identity perceptions and causes of *othering* mechanisms are needed. Academic research in this area can also have a positive impact on the actual state-of-play in Turkey-Greece relations and make a positive impact on the search for dialogue and cooperation between the two countries.

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ÖZGEÇMİŞ

1. Adı Soyadı: Betül Ayanoglu

2. Öğrenim Durumu:

Derece	Alan	Üniversite	Yıl
Lisans	Çağdaş Yunan Dili ve Edebiyatı	İstanbul Üniversitesi	2007
Lisans	İngilizce Mütercim Tercümanlık	İstanbul Üniversitesi	2007
Y. Lisans	Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler	Yıldız Teknik Üni.	2011

3. Akademik Unvanlar:

Ünvan	Bölüm	Üniversite	Yıl/Dönem
Öğretim Gör.	Modern Diller	Yıldız Teknik Üni.	2012 - devam

4. Yayınlar

4.1. Uluslararası bilimsel toplantılarda sunulan ve bildiri kitabında (Proceedings) basılan bildiriler

Ç. NAS And B. AYANOĞLU, "Yunan Parlamentosunda 1999 Helsinki Zirvesi: Türkiye'nin AB Adaylığı Söylemi Üzerine Bir Analiz," 4. Uluslararası Bilimsel Araştırmalar Kongresi , Yalova, Turkey, 2019

B. AYANOĞLU, "Yunanistan Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Öteki İmajı," 1. Karadeniz ve Balkan Ekonomik ve Politik Araştırmalar Sempozyumu , Zonguldak, Turkey, pp.425-438, 2014

4.2. Ulusal bilimsel toplantılarda sunulan ve bildiri kitabında basılan bildiriler

B. AYANOĞLU, "Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkilerinde İnşaatçı Bir Bakış: Kardağ Krizi," Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi I. Yıldız Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Lisansüstü Öğrenci Sempozyumu , Turkey, 2014

B. AYANOĞLU, "Yunanistan Tarih Ders Kitaplarında I. Dünya Savaşı," YTÜ BALKAR Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Birinci Dünya Savaşı , İstanbul, Turkey, 2011

4.3. Diğer yayınlar

Γιώργος Βαλασιάδης (Yorgos Valasiadis), *To Χαμάμ (Hamam)*, Αρμίδα 2008, Yunancadan çev. Betül Ayanoglu, 310s., Pan Yayıncılık, Şubat 2011.

5. Ulusal & Uluslararası Projeler

TÜBİTAK “Balkan ve Karadeniz Ülkeleri Güncel Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Osmanlı/Türk İmajı” adlı 110K571 no’lu, **Bulgaristan, Yunanistan, Kıbrıs Rum Kesimi, Makedonya Cumhuriyeti, Sırbistan, Karadağ, Kosova, Bosna-Hersek, Hırvatistan, Arnavutluk ve Rusya** ülkelerini içeren proje kapsamında, Yunanistan’da, 2010-2011 eğitim öğretim yılında kullanılmış olan ilköğretim ve ortaöğretim zorunlu tarih ders kitaplarında Osmanlı/Türk İmajı çalışılmıştır.

6. İdari Görevler

Bölüm Başkan Yardımcısı (Modern Diller Bölümü)

2015 - 2018

7. Bilimsel ve Mesleki Kuruluşlara Üyelikler

Afette Rehber Çevirmen (ARÇ-AFAD)

8. Ödüller

İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Birincisi (2006-2007 mezuniyet yılı)

9. Diğer Deneyimler:

2000 – 2006 Free Lance Yapımcı / Yönetmen Yardımcısı
Görev Alınan Bazı TV Projeleri: 12 Eylül Partileri Belgeseli, Demirdağın Atlıları Belgeseli, 1 Mayıs Belgeseli, Beko ile Dünya Yemekleri, Lezzet Pınarım Yemek Programı, Yoksa Siz Hala Yemek Programı, Çocuk Oyunu, Özkan’la Kaç Para, Ballı Pazar, Aziz Üstel Show, Müjdat Gezen’le Pazar Şöleni...

1998 – 2000 Akademi Prodüksiyon / Yönetmen Yardımcısı
Görev Alınan Bazı Projeler: Ariel Matik Reklam Filmleri, Ultra Prima Reklam Filmleri DYO Garantili Boya Lansman, Unica-Sana Margarin Reklam Filmi, Star Gazetesi Lansman, Asabi Gazetesi Lansman, Türk Seramik Sanayii Belgeseli, Ferrari World Tour F355, Hava Harp Okulu Tanıtım Filmi, Gölge Oyunu Siyasi Belgesel, Katılsana Yarışsana Yemek Programı, Pişir Pişirebilirsen Yemek Programı, Reyting Hamdi, İnce İnce Yasemince, Riziko Bilgi Yarışması...

1996 – 1997 Time Bilgi İşlem Ürünleri
Robot Operatör Sistemleri / Halkla İlişkiler

1995 – 1996 American Airlines
Ticketing Department